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NOTES ON THE TEXT
The text refers to the third person singular self in a gendered form, partly 
because it is harder to dismiss a self or a subject when she (or he) has a gender, partly 
as a way to redress an obvious imbalance and partly as a means to a less inelegant 
style.
Most references to French and German works are, wherever possible, to 
standard English translations. This has sometimes meant that various different 
translations have been consulted, occasionally that the original untranslated work has 
been cited and less often still that another translation has been offered. In the latter 
case, any such translations of my own have been acknowledged in the footnote text, 
and where these differ from the standard translation this is indicated in the reference 
with the term ‘(translation slightly altered)’.
ABSTRACT
This thesis is primarily about how we can critically understand ideology and 
the purpose of its critique. The thesis proposes a renewal of ideology critique on the 
basis of a radical reconstruction of what ideology means, particularly as this applies to 
subjectivity. The thesis argues that the presence of ideology is indicative of attempts 
to construct meaning within the context of one of the most formative conditions of 
existence - unfreedom. In present times, this unfreedom is, however, of a rather 
peculiar sort - it is both an undemocratic, involuntary unfreedom but also a 
democratic, as it were, ‘voluntary servitude’. It is in this seemingly paradoxical 
relation of freedom to unfreedom that we can detect the presence of ideology -  
indeed, ideology is itself an articulation of contradiction. The argument of this thesis, 
that contradiction is inherent within ideology itself, is a radical departure from other 
ways of conceptualizing ideology. Ideology critique has been dominated by what we 
view as types of ‘objectivism’ - with arguments that in some way or other assume 
ideology is predominantly a matter of an external, effectively unmediated imposition 
of ideas and forms of control, and that this imposition is what gives rise to a 
necessarily distorted view of reality. In the thesis we develop the argument that 
ideology certainly involves some kind of obscuring of the consciousness to its actions 
but that this is no simple error or distortion; nor is it merely a more complex 
manifestation of the functional outcome of reified or ideological realities. Rather, it is 
the presence of a contradictory reconciliation between the subject with that which 
exists as a playing out of unfulfilled need. In an engagement with critical debates on 
ideology in the works of Karl Marx, Georg Lukäcs and Louis Althusser, we focus 
upon particular aspects of the fractured and frequently antagonistic relationship that 
this contradictory reconciliation takes in terms of what might generally be considered 
as ‘malaises of unfreedom’ -  in alienation, estrangement, disenchantment, 
unconscious fear and control, cynicism and sentimentality, and so on. Here we 
theorize the role of subjectivity or the self as constitutive within an involvement in 
ideology, rather than supposing, as much ideology critique has done, that the struggle 
for meaning can be resolved solely within a seeking out of some objectively 
determined phenomena by which the subject is controlled. We open up the critique of 
ideology to this sense of a surplus that transcends ideology by outlining the usefulness 
of an ‘ethos of the imagination’ -  a theorization of the creativity and openness in 
which the self can engage ethically within humanity.
In t r o d u c t io n
THE QUESTION OF IDEOLOGY
In a moment of soulful recognition of the more difficult and yet seemingly 
more authentic path unwinding before him without the comfort of illusion and a 
deliberate forgetfulness, Goethe’s Weither muses upon the act of people who instead 
paint their prison walls “with colourful figures and bright views” . 1 As a metaphor for 
life this tells us much; but what exactly is it that the imprisoned are doing? What is 
occurring here with our need to ‘glorify the lie’? Goethe captures in an evocative way 
something of the melancholy effects of a paralyzing self-deception, but this situation 
can also suggest the sense of a conscious grasping for an anticipated freedom and the 
rejection of what appears stifling within one’s current circumstances.
This metaphor provides us with one of the central ways in which we will 
interpret ideology in this thesis. Ideology, I will argue, frequently suggests the 
distance that appears between our imagining selves and the world upon which we act; 
it is both the “darkness of the lived moment”, to use an expression of Ernst Bloch’s, 
and the existence of an anticipatory consciousness through which people relate to this 
aspect of their lives. 2 Why this seeming self-delusion or displacement of reality, 
which constitutes the ideological, should give rise to a need to understand ourselves, 
and do so frequently within the existence of a sense of our possibility, is no mere 
accident awaiting the self: It surely emerges within the context of our existence, not as 
subjects, but as selves in some ethical relation to other selves, a relation through 
which we take on the meaning of being. What this responsibility means for our sense 
of freedom is a fundamental part of our ability to bring into some relation 
consciousness and being. And it is then displacements within this relation that 
constitutes us within the ideological. But the ideological, like any other aspect of our 
attempts to find meaning within existence, is a restless, contested amalgam of needs, 
creativity and contradictory determinations and intentions. It is this sense of openness
t T r i l l  O  H o t T I t N l  I n  
TV \ S  TV AAA M t  V VV/ capture ’n iP*ie
1 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, The Sorrows o f Young Werther, trans. Michael Hulse 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1989), pp. 30-31.
2 Ernst Bloch, The Spirit o f Utopia, trans. Anthony A. Nassar (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2000), p. 192.
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Theorizations of ideology that place as central to their understanding of ideas a 
recognition of the self as a subject can bring to our attention many limitations to the 
expression of an ethical self, and yet often this has meant a tendency to solidify what 
we then take the ideological to mean. What this thesis will particularly investigate is 
how much ideology critique has severed a sense of what one can be, in other words, a 
self in the process of becoming, from the substance of a critique of ideology, thereby 
cutting adrift subjectivity from any significant appreciation of an anticipatory 
consciousness or presentiment that ideology might itself express.
The existence of presentiment (Ahnung) within the ideological will be a 
fundamentally important issue for us to consider - not as the presence of mere illusion 
preventing us from seeing the dark desperation of many lived moments, but as a basic 
form of questioning of the self both within herself and her world. And yet the very 
tendency to concretize the ideological as the constitution of a caged or entrapped 
subjectivity makes us return to the question -  young Weither’s question - that if 
certain beliefs cannot be realized as anything other than the real illusions they are, 
why do we make of them a seeming necessity? Are we looking out of a prison of 
externally imposed compulsion, or from a prison of our own internal confinement? 
These too, we will see, are pertinent issues for the study we are undertaking, and will 
thus take us into territory that the philosophy of ideology critique (Ideologiekritik) is 
so fundamentally grounded in and yet seems to ultimately have been unable to 
resolve. This thesis will be concerned with the critique of ideology as a way for us to 
consider the contradictions within the struggle for meaning that ideology entails: It 
will also be a way for us to more sensitively, and with greater discernment, appreciate 
the limitations of such critique. How we are to understand the nature of these 
contradictions is undoubtedly a complex and difficult task, but in the struggle for 
meaning at least, we will seek to make clear processes of the fermenting and 
formation of the very openness, and particularly future-oriented openness, I attribute 
to the ideological.
This is, of course, a controversial claim to make, one which the following 
chapters of this thesis will attempt to defend. Seeing the search for understanding, 
through and against the ideological, as, in Bloch’s term, a potential form of 
‘anticipatory consciousness’, requires a participating rather than a merely 
contemplative reason. Indeed, it requires something somewhat different from reason 
-  it needs a ‘venturing beyond’ in which the problem of meaning as incompletedness 
addresses both objective tendency and subjective intention. 3 What the meaningful
3 Ernst Bloch, The Principle o f Hope, vol. I, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Knight 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), p. 4.
Introduction 3
suggests to us today is a fraught, although by no means hollow, construction upon 
thought. It is an engagement with the inventions and fables humanity appears to agree 
upon, as well as with their refusal, rather than any type of last refuge or set teleology 
of known purpose. An engagement in particular ideas no doubt structures aspects of 
our experience of responsibility, of any ethical commitment to life, but we cannot 
merely assume that ideology is here premised on some certain outcome. Theodor 
Adorno’s pertinent concern that the attempt to ascribe positive meaning to life was 
always “an affirmative lie” is typical of a type of ideology critique that blurs the 
distinction between truth and inauthenticity and assumes that the ideological has only 
one direction in which it might proceed -  to a falsity and untruth in which it will 
always successfully entrap the subject. 4 And yet, at the same time, this can indicate 
for us where a critical absence of meaning leaves its traces.
This unavoidable sense of the discontinuous, arrived at out of the very 
solidifying of meaning which much radical ideology critique has insisted upon, 
suggests to us that rather than abandoning this critique it is precisely here that we 
must start. Meaning is, as ideology critique has largely pointed out, produced 
aesthetically, in the surplus of meaning over and beyond what, in our case, thought 
means by itself. Thus the question of meaning for us is inevitably also a question 
about our existence and carries with it all the complexities and elusiveness that such a 
question must.
What we will argue throughout the thesis is that the ideological can reveal to 
us aspects of this struggle for meaning, for existence, as a need to find in ourselves an 
ethical connection with other selves and thus with life. The epistemological 
guarantees so associated with the issue of ideology as distorted thought and 
consciousness belong to another, earlier preoccupation within the theorization of ideas 
-  that of viewing ideology as a form of false consciousness. In this thesis we will 
instead be concerned with the problem of the interrelationship between a subjective 
knowing and various dimensions of process and tendency within social conditions that 
revolve around the ethical meaning of freedom. If we have a need for a sense of what 
is real or true within this possibility, then, following Friedrich Nietzsche’s aphorism 
against the tyranny of the true, we might be well warned against allowing such truth 
to become omnipotent -  it should be enough for us that it possesses great power. In 
doing so “it must be able to struggle and have opponents”. One must find relief from 
truth from time to time in untruth “otherwise it will become boring, powerless and
4 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. C. Lenhardt, eds. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 219.
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tasteless to us, and make us the same” . 5 Truth within such possibility is, in this 
Nietzschean and Schopenhauerian sense, a mode of existence, a place in which one 
resides: And, despite suppositions otherwise, this necessity of contemplation through 
which meaning and freedom might be discovered in its struggled-for ‘truth’, is very 
much the concern of ideology as well.
This dynamic between truth and untruth, between external and internal 
constraints, and between self-delusion and hope, is the basis of ideology. For, as we 
will argue throughout this thesis, at its most fundamental ideology involves some type 
of disjuncture whose outcome is never certain between consciousness and its actions. 
The thesis will put forward an extended argument for understanding ideology in a way 
that situates this disjuncture as part of a need to gain access to the world via a sense of 
who we might be. Undoubtedly a sense of what we might become takes us into the 
realm of where it is we might locate ourselves -  do we realize that we are captive, or 
do we imagine we are quite free inside the cage of our existence?; have we abandoned 
any hope in finding a way out, or do we recognize that a door to the cage always 
exists? Such identifications with the world, or ‘sense of the world’, obviously matter.6 
Jean-Luc Nancy, for example, contends that the subject needs to expose herself to 
‘worldness’, a sense of an opening of the world, not only by means of truth, but by 
way of analysis beyond itself, the ‘cold eye’ of analysis that leads to a transformation, 
a praxis, that “effects the agent, not the work” . 7 It is also a sense of transformation in 
which we ourselves are personally changed that we will be interested in for this thesis 
but so too, we will argue, must this transformation of the self ultimately be a 
transformation of our existence.
An emphasis upon the necessity of an agent, which we might see as itself 
heralding a shift to increasingly fertile ground within the critique of contemporary 
thought and including within some post-structuralist thought previously marked by a 
hostility to such ideas, allows us to develop more productively our own critique of the 
idea of subjectivity in relation to ideology. This critique is neither post-modernist nor 
deconstructionist but is able to engage with such approaches where the idea of a
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, trans. R. J. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), par. 507.
6 Nietzsche’s rally to humanity to claim the world and its values, a world of being and becoming which 
we have created, is not merely a critique of the tendency to ignore a sense of our responsibility for this 
world, but is an attempt to re-position what he sees as the vitality of the force of ‘true being’, the 
subject, within life and interpretations of the world. Much of Book III of The Will to Power deals with 
this issue. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann, trans. Walter Kaufmann and
R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968).
7 Jean-Luc Nancy uses this Nietzschean idea. Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense o f the World, trans. Jeffrey
S. Librett (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 47, 48, 9.
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radical transformation of the self is taken seriously. Most importantly, the critique we 
will put forward will highlight the active participation of the self within 
manifestations of the ideological. In addition, we will explore the idea of a basic 
contradiction at the centre of ideology itself: this, as we have mentioned, claims that if 
ideology suggests a sense of the imposition of barriers and control, so too does it 
reveal an anticipated or unrealized freedom against which a fettered subjection or 
compulsion exists to restrict many of its possibilities.8 Terry Eagleton tells us that 
ideology “plays a part in persuading people to tolerate unjust situations; but [...] it 
almost never does so without a struggle” . 9 It is a sense of this struggle involved in 
ideology that we want to capture; and not just in the sense of a type of counter to the 
ideological, but as a fundamental part of the ideological itself. Ideology, and its 
critique, represent a wrestle for understanding, creativity or ‘truth’, truth here best 
understood in the sense of a kind of knowledge, life experience and self-awareness 
requiring a “greatness of soul” . 10 And we, the participants in ideology, are, as 
Alasdair MacIntyre argues of us more generally, people who are seeking, who are on 
a quest. * 11
This is obviously not the way in which ideology has been commonly 
understood; for, if any certain meaning is attributed to the term ideology, it is much 
more that of its implacable mere presumption of either an innocent or wily, 
uncontested ‘truth’ against which those in opposition to it might claim its very falsity 
in terms inevitably suggesting an equally uncontested reality. This sort of ‘truth’, as 
opposed to the one just mentioned, does not imply any sense of experiential self- 
awareness or self-transformation, but instead relies upon some external notional 
judgement or standard from which a false construction of ideas might be distinguished 
from (true) reality. What we will see in this thesis is that the issue of a demarcation 
between ideology and reality is a deceptively difficult one. At one level, it would 
seem perfectly obvious, and indeed ludicrous to suggest otherwise, that no simple 
dividing line can be drawn between ideology and the real -  reality itself presents its 
own fictions, its symbolic constructs, its necessary illusions. 12 There is in this sense
8 For a view of the problem for social theory of the issue of containment or interruption of conflict, see 
Roberto Unger, Social Theory: Its Situation and Its Task (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987).
9 Terry Eagleton, “Ideology (1994)”, in The Eagleton Reader, ed. Stephen Regan (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1998), p. 245.
10 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), 
par. 50.
11 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 203-204.
12 This seeming circularity of the ideological is sometimes referred to as ‘Mannheim’s paradox’ 
because it is argued that, in Ideology and Utopia, Karl Mannheim attempts to escape this circularity by 
claiming the possibility of an evaluative standpoint which takes into account the correlations within the
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no extra-reality, no extemalization of the ideological capable of revealing to us a 
whole and complete reality or truth. At the same time, the idea of a seamlessness 
between ideology and any other reality is wholly unsatisfactory and runs counter to 
much of our everyday experience of life. Slavoj Zizek is surely right to see in the 
claim that we are never actually dealing with reality, only symbolic constructs -  “such 
a quick, slick ‘postmodern ’ solution, however, is ideology par excellence” . 13 Zizek’s 
path out of this conundrum -  to argue for the existence of ‘an empty place’ not 
occupied by ideology or any positively determined reality -  is one that ultimately we 
cannot share, but his argument that a tension must exist between ideology and reality 
for a critique of ideology to take place, is precisely our starting point.
The tension we will pursue here is that of the existence of ideology within the 
reality, including the ideological reality, of a wrestle for meaning, an ‘invocation of 
meaning’, as Charles Taylor writes. 14 It is this search for understanding that requires 
of us an ability to confront our experience of reality as that of “a consciously 
illuminated, knowingly elucidated content”, as Bloch states in his reference to the 
concrete-utopian horizon of human culture. 15 Ideology is not some completely 
separate realm from this but is very much involved in the way in which a ‘knowingly 
elucidated content’ is or is not arrived at. Ideology is also entwined, then, with a 
sense of how the self projects herself upon the world, in other words, with the issue of 
subjectivity.
The subject or self that our inquiry will follow is a conceptual construct, at 
times individual, at times collective; but, more importantly, it is a vital selfhood in 
which we invest not only the effects of both structure and agency but the sense that 
we are not yet or not enough. This selfhood is not, in the Cartesian sense, an absolute 
or a relative ego cogito\ it is not a simple T , in this way, but a fundamental part of a 
‘We’. In this identity we can see the relation we will take to be a part of selfhood -  
that of the connection between a self and those who are, in this sense, other than the 
self. As we will consider in the final chapter of the thesis, this idea of selfhood is not 
without both its difficulties and its more positive elements. We will contend, 
however, that it is a necessary way in which to reconsider the relation between
historical process, but which, nonetheless, reproduces the problem of external assessment of the 
relationism detected. For a critique of Mannheim see Paul Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, 
ed. George H. Taylor (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), especially lectures 10 and 16.
13 Slavoj Zizek, “The Spectre of Ideology”, in Mapping Ideology, ed. Slavoj Zizek (London: Verso 
1994), p. 17.
14 Charles Taylor, Sources o f the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), p. 18.
15 Bloch, The Principle o f Hope, vol. I, p. 146.
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subjectivity and ideology. This selfhood or subject is a seeking subject who, as Judith 
Butler writes of her Blanche Dubois-inspired subject, “follows a narrative of desire, 
illusion, and defeat, relying on occasional moments of recognition as a source of 
temporary redemptions” . 16 In our subject we allow for this but also something more -  
we track our necessarily speculative subject in the traces of her confrontation with 
consciousness, a certain kind of purpose, and hope. 17
At an immediate level, this confrontation with reality would seem to run 
counter to the very notion of ideology, let alone its supposed cunning ability to distort 
and hamper reason and self-knowledge. And yet ideology need not be viewed solely 
as the impossibility of any consciously illuminated content. This content, I will argue, 
does not exist in some external contradistinction to ideology but is present in the form 
of the ideological itself. Whilst self-knowledge might not necessarily become 
manifest within ideology, it is not its fundamental opposite. In this sense, we cannot 
situate ideology and utopia as forms of noncongruence within reality, as Karl 
Mannheim attempted, nor even as points of discrepancy and demarcation which offer 
an alternative to the problems of a ‘science’/ideology divide, as Paul Ricoeur has 
more recently suggested. 18 Ideology is as liable to express a ‘concrete-utopian 
horizon’ as is any other form of ideas and practices. For this is primarily what the 
ideological is; a form of ideas, values and practices in which cultural contradictions 
and problems are played out. And yet there is something about the process that 
ideology entails -  an obscuring of the consciousness to its own actions -  that makes of 
it a very particular collection of contradictory cultural practices. We might not here 
choose to theorize this process as any clear distance between some settled, rational 
core of the critic of ideology and that supposedly great player of the game of 
deception, ideology itself (as has been, and continues to be, attributed to many 
ideology critiques) 19 but what we will contend is the necessity of some type of self- 
awareness in order to engage with the contradictions to which ideology gives 
expression.
16 Judith P. Butler, Subjects o f Desire: Hegelian Refections in Twentieth-Century France (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1987), p. ix.
17 We will refer to the subject as a self or being, to suggest that the self is a conscious, responsible 
‘who’ rather than a subjected, abstract, Cartesian ego cogito or ‘what’. In suggesting that this self is a 
creative, vital being we are then inferring neither a simple ego nor a fixed subjectum.
18 Mannheim’s various essays were written in the late 1920s and early 1930s and collected in his work 
Ideology and Utopia. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of 
Knowledge, trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972); Ricoeur, 
Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, passim.
19 Stanley Fish, for example, attributes such a view of ideology to, amongst others, Terry Eagleton. 
Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally. Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice o f Theory in Literary 
and Legal Studies (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), p. 518.
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As we have just mentioned, ideas of self-knowledge, creativity and a wrestle 
for understanding are rarely associated with the concept of ideology. Instead, the 
concept has been captured by a discourse involving, either a variety of notions 
concerning falsity and the absence or obscuration of truth, or reality in the service of 
particular interests, or that of the materiality of reality as an expression of power and 
domination. According to this logic, ideology imposes a type of falsity or materiality 
that its victims take to be true or real. It is ideology’s purpose to manipulate, ensnare 
and beguile, and its existence is the pure manifestation of this manacled, deceived, 
impounded state. For example, in his The Grammar o f Modern Ideology, Bernard 
Susser states that ideology “claims certainty because it is its social function to do so” 
-  it must “orchestrate and authoritatively justify the allocation of possessions, power 
and prestige” .20 This might well be so, but it only really tells part of ideology’s story, 
as this thesis will set out to explain. Even if one aspect of the ideological is to justify 
and legitimate, this does not mean that it is unable to equivocate on this, or that a 
cynical disbelief or at best an ironic, self-parodying certainty, is not an equally 
effective modus operandi f  This is because ideology exists in an unfixed, sometimes 
quite random state, where the very cynicism or, for that matter, sincere belief with 
which ideology is regarded, is a part of its manifestation.
Viewing ideology as a wrestle for meaning thus allows us to see this unclosed, 
unsettled state of ideology. It contains within it all that which it seeks to contain or 
make deceptive. This means that sheltering within ideology is the reality with which 
it is in tension. This tension can, at times, result in a surplus of unrealized, unfulfilled 
anticipations given shape to, often by way of the more illusory content of ideology. A 
purpose of ideology is certainly to convince and this sometimes means a pretension to 
truth, which is, however, unrealized - but in the act of attempting to convince, or 
assume a particular truth or justification (which may of course involve justifying what 
is known to be an untruth), ideology is involved in a state of undecided gambit, 
negotiation and contingency. What will emerge within this wrestle for meaning 
contains a certain although often unclear openness through which traces of anticipated 
possibility are repeatedly interwoven.
20 Bernard Susser, The Grammar o f Modern Ideology (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 3. Susser argues 
perfectly convincingly that no society “can escape the need to legitmate its distribution of resources, 
the advantages and deprivations it mandates, the sacrifices it demands, the violence, even the killing, it 
sanctions” . Ibid., p. 11. In other words, societies need ideology. On this basis, however, Susser then 
considers that an “ideology of skepticism is a contradiction in terms” . This might apply, superficially 
at least, more to the context of modernism to which his work is directed: it would seem to be a less 
certain claim when viewed in the light of the culture of contemporary cynicism.
21 It is quite possible to “lie in the guise of truth”, as Slavoj Zizek, referring to cynicism, argues. 
Zizek, “The Spectre of Ideology”, p. 8.
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The thesis will present an argument for a renewed theorization of ideology on 
the basis of acknowledging the particular cultural inheritance in which a wrestle for 
meaning takes place. First and foremost, this means understanding that ideology 
exists within inner and outer worlds of contradiction and antagonism: And if we are 
here arguing for a type of self-awareness in the service of an understanding of the 
contradictory reality of ideology then we do indeed need some distinction between 
inner and exterior. Paul de Man might well have found in this distinction a 
metaphysical banality, 22 but we would maintain that eliding all distinction between 
self-aware and self-deluded content, as much post-modernist criticism has since done, 
does not lead us to any greater understanding of the problem of a fracturing between 
thought and deed. We can view ideology, at its most general, as the construction of 
thoughts, ideas and practices by which meaning is derived. Why we might describe 
such thought as ideological, rather than simply as the derivation of meaning, is 
because this construction of meaning through ideology takes place within a particular 
type of world of contested interpretation. Ideology is fundamentally conditional and 
exists within the contestation of meaning. It resides also within the thresholds and 
limitations of individuals themselves, individuals who so often “allow more to be true 
than appears to us true” . 23 These internal and more external realms of antagonism are 
at work within the ideological. Antagonism is basic to a social reality of unfreedom. 
More particularly, it is the outcome of the dialectic between freedom and unfreedom.24
What the cultural inheritance of an antagonistic world entails is reflected well 
in a critical sensitivity to the dilemmas of modem existence, and, specifically, a 
modem “uneasy consciousness”, as Adorno writes.25 In this thesis we will concentrate 
most particularly upon the sense of an alienated nausea, generated out of internalized 
fear and unfulfilled desire, detected in various aspects of consciousness and
22 Paul de Man, Allegories o f Reading (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 107.
23 Nietzsche, Daybreak, par. 479.
24 We will not pursue this in any greater depth here but it is interesting to briefly consider this issue of 
antagonism in relation to the outcome of the dialectic between freedom and unfreedom. Antagonism is 
not merely the outcome of objective social cleavages and discontinuities; it indicates something more 
fundamental within the way in which we structure social reality and the social imaginary. It is also the 
case that antagonism is not merely the outcome of unfreedom; neither freedom nor unfreedom are 
complete in this sense in antagonistic relations. Zizek correctly points to a common tendency to 
‘ontologize’ freedom by conceiving it as “the terrestrial apparition of a ‘higher’ stratum of reality”, a 
“supra-sensible universe that persists in its Beyond” . Zizek, “The Spectre of Ideology” , p. 27. This 
indicates something important about the way in which freedom is often conceptualized as a realm 
entirely removed from unfreedom and thus a realm in which antagonism and the ideological play no 
part. This I believe is a mistaken view of what is rather a necessarily dialectical relation between 
different experiences of reality.
25 Theodor W. Adorno, The Jargon o f Authenticity, trans. Knut Tamowski and Frederic Will (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), p. 35.
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experience -  what we might broadly view as modernist concerns. 26 These concerns 
will be referred to as ‘malaises of unfreedom’. The approach to ideology I have 
outlined lends itself well to an understanding of these issues. The difficulty of 
contemporary existence is felt in the transience and indeterminacy of much meaning 
and value. It is also fundamentally related to a culture riven by the manifestations of a 
lack of freedom. It is an existence in which the strange phenomenon of a ‘voluntary 
servitude’ is repeatedly expressed. 27 It is in just such a climate that the ideological as 
a struggle for meaning flourishes. For in ideology we can detect the playing out of the 
antagonisms of a created and creating social world. Indeed, as we will later see, 
ideology is primarily of significance as it exists burrowed within the social delusion 
that the individual is a mere contemplative spectator upon her own life, rather than 
“the poet who keeps creating this life” . 28 And it is this state of the ‘contemplative 
spectator’ that most captures the sensibility of our present political dilemmas. It is 
this process of creating that makes of ideology an ever evolving, unstable and 
impermanent feature of everyday life. And yet, at the same time, struggles for 
meaning through ideology are not simply the outcome of the very constancy and 
predictableness of change marking all social existence in one way or another, but are
26 By modernity we mean a particular sensibility rather than any discrete period. We can associate the 
modem with ideas of transience, disruption, discontinuity and fragmentation, particularly as this 
applies to the realm of the subjective. As Baudelaire, the literary totem of modernism claims, 
modernity is “the transitory, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art, of which the other half is the 
eternal and the immutable”- a continual adjustment between the transient and the eternal. Charles 
Baudelaire, quoted in Stjepan G. Mestrovic, The Coming Fin de Siede (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 
22. Similarly for Wyndham Lewis the modem is ‘the Vortex’ -  “a shaped, controlled and heady 
circling, centripetal and three-dimensional, around a funnel of calm” . Wyndham Lewis, quoted in 
Peter Faulkner, Modernism (London: Methuen, 1977), p. ix. For a short, accessible essay suggesting a 
questioning of a post-modernist demarcation of modernist and post-modernist concerns, see Frank 
Kermode, “Modernism, Postmodernism, and Explanation”, in Prehistories o f the Future: The 
Primitivist Project and the Culture o f Modernism, eds. Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 357-372. For a variety of works considering the broader debate 
re the modem, see Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda o f Modernity (New York: Free 
Press, 1990); Matei Calinescu, Five Faces o f Modernity (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987); 
Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience o f Modernity (London: Verso, 
1990); David Frisby, Fragments o f Modernity: Theories o f Modernity in the Work o f Simmel, Kracauer 
and Benjamin (Cambridge: Polity, 1985); Stephen Spender, The Struggle o f the Modern (London: 
Hamilton, 1963); Renato Poggioli, The Theory o f the Avant-Garde, trans. Gerald Fitzgerald 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); Jürgen Habermas, “Modernity versus 
Postmodemity”, New German Critique, no. 22 (Winter 1981); David Kolb, The Critique o f Pure 
Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger, and After (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Derek Sayer, 
Capitalism and Modernity: An Excursus on Marx and Weber (London: Routledge, 1991).
27 This idea of a ‘voluntary servitude’ appears in Etienne de la Boetie’s work De la Senntude 
Volontaire, written in the early 16Ih century. It is variously translated as Anti-Dictator: the Discours 
sur la servitude volontaire, trans. H. Kurz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942); The Politics 
o f Obedience (New York: Free Life Editions, 1975); and most recently as Slaves by Choice, trans. 
Malcolm Smith (Eghan: Runnymede, 1988).
28 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 
par. 301.
Introduction 11
more suggestive of underlying processes of struggle against unfreedom. Walter 
Benjamin’s understanding of social revolution as the grasp by humanity travelling in 
an out of control train for the emergency brake, captures this sense of a dialectical 
relation between freedom and unfreedom.29 Ideology is indicative of just such a 
wrestle for ‘truth’. In it we can detect the contradictory, unstable relation that exists 
between freedom and unfreedom. Ideology always reflects something of a dynamic 
process, even when this process is not completely or readily apparent.
It is also the case - and this is part of its interesting difficulty - that in ideology 
ideas seem to be plunged into darkness. In ideology we are, as Nietzsche argues, 
confined and locked within “a proud, deceptive consciousness”, and the key has been 
thrown away: “And woe to that fatal curiosity which might one day have the power to 
peer out and down through a crack in the chamber of consciousness and then suspect 
that man is sustained in the indifference of his ignorance by that which is pitiless, 
greedy, insatiable, and murderous -  as if hanging in dreams on the back of a tiger” . 30 
Ideology suggests something about this state which we fail to recognize -  the nature 
of the tiger, the content of our dreams and the skewed, listing relation between them. 
Again, this should not suggest that in critique we possess the light of reality to 
illuminate ideology’s darkness -  it is our state of being in ideology which is shrouded 
in a shadowy existence. It is a wrestle with this being -  a peering into the chamber of 
consciousness -  that the ideological can provoke. Ideology is, then, concerned with 
the matter of consciousness -  an internal question of the ability of the self to deal with 
the conditions in which she finds herself, and the capacity to appraise this situation 
from the vantage point of self-awareness. The critique of ideology I will develop here 
will reconsider this central problem of subjectivity.
The issue of subjectivity in relation to ideology and its critique is able to tell us 
much about the problems of cultural inheritance. To do this we will generate three 
major themes that together unravel for us something of the problem of ideology. 
These I term the fracturing of subject and object and the eclipse of self-knowledge 
within a ‘spectacle of commodification’, the eliciting of a state of a ‘deliberate 
unconscious’ within ‘imagined inner experience and a psychology of control’, and 
ideology as a form of ‘inventive need’ played out by a ‘calculating slave’ within a 
dialectic of freedom and unfreedom. In Part Two of the thesis we will present these
29 Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften I: 3, p. 1232, quoted in Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of 
Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute (Sussex: 
Harvester, 1977), p. 60.
30 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” , in Philosophy and Truth: Selections 
from Nietzsche’s Notebooks o f the Early 1870s, trans. David Breazeale (Atlantic Highlands, New 
Jersey: Humanities, 1979), p. 80.
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themes by way of reinterpretations of the works of Georg Lukäcs, Louis Althusser 
and Karl Marx. Taken in this order we will also see something of a thematic 
progression from a critique of ideology via a more traditional understanding of 
method and its relation to a self-reflective subject, to that of a sense of the loss of this 
subject and an otherness within a critique that, at the same time, now places some 
emphasis upon the problem of experience rather than only upon the social category of 
contradiction, to, finally, that of a dialectical mediation between subjective experience 
and social context. This sort of progression should not, however, be over­
emphasized, as what we will find within each of the central three chapters of the 
thesis is the interesting, if also at times difficult, unevenness of a critical examination 
of the ideological that is basic to Ideologiekritik.
The themes we will pursue in the thesis deal with what we have already 
indicated as ‘modernist’ concerns - most particularly issues dealing with the nature of 
the human subject within conditions of alienation and exploitation. These are themes 
that have their sources in a much broader, early nineteenth century romanticist protest 
against a sense of humanity’s homelessness within the world. Numerous Western 
thinkers have contributed to this deeply felt need to re-enchant a spiritless world; 
Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Spengler, Freud, Reich and Heidegger all in quite different 
ways perceived aspects of humanity’s precarious condition and put forward original 
analyses of the problem of modernity as they viewed it. And on the basis of an 
understanding of many of these ideas a range of critiques dealing more specifically 
with twentieth century developments of this same tendency towards humanity’s 
strange sense of loss or disempowerment appeared by Bloch, Lukäcs, Gramsci, 
Benjamin, Horkheimer, Bataille, Marcuse, Lefebvre, Adorno, Sartre, Althusser, 
Foucault, Derrida and Negri, to mention merely the better known. Many of these 
twentieth century philosophical contributions to the debate on subjectivity and 
consciousness have much to say about the specific issues we intend pursuing in this 
thesis. Gramsci, Horkheimer, Adorno, Althusser and Foucault all consider aspects of 
power - particularly institutional power - and control; Benjamin, Bataille, Marcuse, 
Lefebvre and Adorno consider the cultural implications of a reified existence - 
frequently in terms spanning both a critique of the commodifying tendency and a 
concern for the psychological impact of this; Sartre and Derrida both examine aspects 
of thinking and discourse in relation to constraints upon human freedom; and Bloch, 
in his own masterly way, considers most of this and more. It is, however, Karl Marx, 
Georg Lukäcs and Louis Althusser whom we have chosen as representatives of the 
particular themes we consider in relation to the issue of ideology and its critique. 
Their related and yet very different approaches to the problems of commodified need, 
reified thought and unconscious control allow us to deal with the continuing struggle
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for radical theory to come to terms with the existence of thought which emerges in 
difficult relation to the world and our sense of the world. It is through an engaged 
critique of the ways in which these themes are approached that we are able to 
reformulate a sense of the ideological as it appears today.
The examination we will undertake here will present original re-readings of 
the works of Lukäcs, Althusser and Marx. It will consider the continuities between 
the concerns of Lukäcs’s early writings and his important work in Marxist philosophy 
and the problem of commodification, History and Class Consciousness; it will pursue 
the provocatively interesting theorization of a psychology of fear within a range of 
Althusser’s works, including his more recently translated early writings; and, lastly, 
will treat seriously the development of core themes of freedom and unfreedom within 
Marx’s wide-ranging and challenging corpus. Whilst the issues considered in these 
chapters are chosen deliberately as thematic constructs, the analysis of them will 
proceed by way of an unashamedly textually based exegesis. The approach 
throughout the thesis, and most evidently in Part Two, is very much within the 
continental philosophical tradition of lecture de textes -  a critical reading of texts and 
an interpretation of the philosophical problems they present.
The critique of ideology constantly reminds us that the problem involved in 
the construction of meaning is one of imagining, as well as of thinking and 
experiencing. And, as we have already hinted, superficially at least, in ideology we 
are presented with something elusive within the character of ideas, experiences and 
the imagination. In ideology, ideas are, as Sarah Kofman argues, in ‘an enclosed 
chamber’ .31 This quality makes it part of our task to adjust our eyes to the darkness so 
as to see the relationships that constitute ideology via the imagination, experience and 
thought. We will consider these relationships in the connections between a 
spectacularized commodification, a psychology of fear and control and the dialectical 
relation between freedom and unfreedom, which we have just mentioned. It is aspects 
of our experience within a contradictory, antagonistic and perverted world that many 
of the radical theorists of ideology, particularly throughout the twentieth century, have 
attempted to present; but, as we will see, in such a way that a focus is given merely to 
one aspect of these related parts of the ideological, often to such a degree that the 
outcome is an objectivist analysis of ideology.32 No concept such as that of ideology,
31 Sarah Kofman, Camera Obscura o f Ideology, trans. Will Straw (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1998), p. 13.
32 For a contemporary account of the relation more specifically between contradiction and subjectivity, 
Anthony Cascardi’s work, The Subject o f Modernity, is pertinent in this context. Cascardi points out 
how deeply and fundamentally contradictory the subject’s position and self-awareness is within a social 
world, itself riven by contradiction. Cascardi argues, for example, that “the subject tends on the one
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or its critique, will ever do adequate justice to the problem of the experience of 
consciousness and unconsciousness -  something, and perhaps a very great deal, of 
these realities will always elude us; and yet a dialectical understanding is certainly one 
prescient attempt to capture both a critical stance towards a society in which 
unfreedom reigns, and a sense of the potential capacities within people to struggle to 
alter their realities.33 It is such an approach to ideology that I will present in this 
thesis.
What has been well understood in the modernist approach to ideology critique 
is the pervasiveness of an alienated nausea and despair characterizing contemporary 
society, whether or not such conditions are recognized as such. We might -  and 
ideology has much to do with this -  still be ‘hanging in dreams on the back of a tiger’, 
still encased in an indifference to our condition, or we might be in the process of 
being drawn irrevocably into the chamber of self-knowing, but both indicate the 
existence of a problematic cultural inheritance. Some theorists have well detected the 
dialectical ‘shock’ and dissonance of such a situation, where the cause of much 
human suffering is also a source for a radical re-appropriation of a distorted existence. 
What we will want to elaborate in the analysis of ideology to which this thesis will 
lead, is a sense of what it is that this dialectical shock represents -  a desire for 
transcendence through the potentiality of one’s encounter with, and in, ideology. The 
“Petrified Forest of human culture”, as Andre Breton writes, where nothing is left 
standing, is also one in which roam lights that call for the deliverance of all things. 34 
We will assess the relevance of such re-appropriation to the reproduction of the 
ideological within contemporary conditions of unfreedom in the final chapter of the 
thesis. This sense of an anticipatory consciousness and transcendence through the 
embellishment and signifying distortion that ideology represents can tell us much 
about an unrealized surplus contained within struggles for meaning and the dialectical
hand to accept the principles of science as reflecting the indisputable truths of reason, while on the 
other hand the subject assents to the proposition that disputes about value and desires cannot be 
resolved according to standards of rational truth” . Anthony J. Cascardi, The Subject o f Modernity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 11.
33 This problem more generally of the limits of theory has been considered by a variety of theorists. 
See, for example, Stanley Rosen, The Limits o f Analysis (New York: Basic Books, 1980); Terry 
Eagleton, The Significance of Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) and, more specifically in relation 
to deconstruction, Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy o f the Limit (New York: Routledge, 1992).
34 Andre Breton, Ode ä Charles Fourier, intro. Jean Gaulmier (Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1961), 
p. 73.
Je te salue de la Foret Petrifie de la culture humaine
OÜ plus rien n’est debout
Mais oil rodent de grandes lueurs toumoyantes
Qui appellent la delivrance du feuillage et de l’oiseau
De tes doigts part la seve des arbres en fleurs.
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processes of an antagonistic reality. Constraints upon freedom, whether internally or 
externally imposed, always imply the presence, repressed or obvious, of the struggle 
for, and awareness of, freedom. It is this sense of the ideological that this thesis will 
explore.
We will attempt to encapsulate the contemporary problem of ideology through 
a theorization of a state of ‘democratic unfreedom’, as Herbert Marcuse refers to it, or 
a ‘freedom still enmeshed in servitude’, as Hegel calls it, or, as we have already 
referred to in Etienne de la Boetie’s term, a state of ‘voluntary servitude’, the general 
state Marx focuses upon as that of the ‘calculating slave’. We will view the spectacle 
of commodification and the internalization of fear as aspects of this unfreedom, and as 
central factors of the contemporary, agitated movement of the ideological. In the 
frenzied, rococo-like ideological embellishment contained within, and basic to, a 
spectacle of commodified existence, there is the seeming deformation of any value 
beyond that of mere venal exchange. 35 Reality ‘rises up in the spectacle’, as Guy 
Debord argues, and what is spectacularized becomes real. 36 A commodified world 
becomes a series of spectacles because people seem to experience life as if at a 
remove. Instead of a direct involvement in the creation or understanding of the world 
of things about them, people are distanced and alienated from both the commodities 
themselves and from emotions and feelings associated with them. Whilst, to a certain 
degree, it might be that the idea of a spectacle of the world emerged as something of 
an occidental idea, as Nancy for example argues, it is not really the case that it is only 
those granted the leisure to be spectators who constitute for us the reality of the 
spectacle. 37 The spectacle involves a whole range of human creativities and desires 
implicated in the world of production, consumption and exchange that becomes itself 
commodified, and in this process people experience a spectacularized form of 
emotions and creativities rather than more fully direct, uncommodified experience. 
Unfortunately these processes know few boundaries, and so the spatial and temporal
35 We recognize that the issue of value is itself a difficult and vexed problem for philosophy and 
worthy of considerably more attention than we are able to give it here. For an introduction to some of 
these problems as they have been discussed within contemporary social theory, see Steven Connor, 
Theory and Cultural Value (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) and see especially the first chapter on “The 
Necessity of Value”, in which the author draws our attention to both the paradoxical structure of value 
as immanent transcendence, and to its role in confronting us with the possibilities of our humanity by 
way of risk and uncertainty. See also Barbara Hermstein Smith, Contingencies o f Value: Alternative 
Perspectives for Critical Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), a work that 
considers the difficult issue of distinctions drawn between absolute and relative values.
36 Guy Debord, quoted in Len Bracken, Guy Debord: Revolutionary (Venice, CA: Feral House, 1997),
p. 8.
37 Nancy, The Sense o f the World, p. 164.
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reach of the spectacle has been great. 38 Just as the existence of the spectacle need not 
imply its saturation throughout all current existence, it is also the case that its 
spectators need not approach it with a stupefied alienation in order for it to still be 
effective. As we will later consider in the thesis, a self-consciously knowing cynicism 
or a seemingly engaged sentimentality can serve its purposes equally well. We indeed 
often bring a contradictory and unfixed sense to many of our practices that we will 
later consider in terms of the concept of presentiment.
It is nonetheless the case, however, that within much imagined inner 
experience, and particularly the insidious recitation of the psychological expression of 
fear and desire, we are confronted with the overwhelming contamination of thought 
by a psychology of control. In both these aspects of contemporary life there often 
appears to be little more than the experience of a reified relation of the subject to the 
object (in the sense of particular phenomena of socio-historical experience) and of the 
damaged relation of the individual to her very sense of life. And yet in this ideology 
of ‘democratic unfreedom’ there are, within the given experiences of a perverted 
world, unrealized dimensions that a painful deformation of freedom can neither fully 
anticipate nor control. Wresting these aspects of the dialectic of the ideological from 
its seemingly most obvious untruth is the task of a contemporary critique of ideology. 
This cannot mean abstracting any easy, glib falsity from any equally merely presumed 
accessible truth, as we have already stated. There are, as Benjamin reminds us, 
“blood-stains in fairy-tales” . 39 Nor can it be resolved by any immediate negation of 
the given through which a critical intellect might survive to realize an identity via the 
experience of negation.
The critique of ideology I hope to bring to the fore is that of the open 
potentiality within the reality of ideology itself, within the antagonisms that unfree 
society engenders in the spirit of freedom that is the cultural heritage of our humanity. 
What I will endeavour to reveal is the relation between a spectacularized existence 
and its recognition via a complex interrelationship of need as imposed constraint, and 
need as a more creative hunger in which the place of the imagination is vital. This is
38 This does not mean that alternative ways of existence are in any sense insignificant. Opposition to 
unfreedom has always, and continues to be, critical.
39 Walter Benjamin, quoted in Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical 
Theories o f Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 27. Walter Benjamin, 
“Goethe’s Elective Affinities”, in Selected Writings: Volume One 1913 -  1926, eds. Marcus Bullock 
and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1996), pp. 297 - 360. As Benjamin argues: 
“The wisest thing - so the fairy tale taught mankind in olden times, and teaches children to this day - is 
to meet the forces of the mythical world with cunning and with high spirits.” Walter Benjamin, “The 
Story-Teller: Reflections on the Works of Nikolai Leskov” , in Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. 
Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 102.
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how we will approach ideology -  as embodying both of these facets of the human 
creative impulse. The critique of ideology I will develop in the thesis, of the 
turbulent, jangling manoeuvres, potentially explosive in their restlessness, of a 
dialectic of freedom and unfreedom, will situate an engagement with life within the 
realms of consciousness, experience and the imagination. We will focus upon the 
particular vitality of an imaginative, ethical commitment to life.
The approach I will develop, a dialectical critique of ideology, can be 
contrasted with the dominant tendencies within the critique of ideology. We will see 
that ideology has traditionally been understood as the problem of a mystification of 
reality, capable of justifying, masking or in some way naturalizing a given state of 
affairs. It has also been seen as perhaps a more insidious, because more direct, form 
of inescapable manipulation.40 These tendencies which span much of the scope of an 
Ideologiekritik or modernist approach we will summarize, for the purpose of our 
critique, as epistemological critique and immanent critique. In both these tendencies, 
the subject, who is the victim of ideology, is conceptualized as passive and merely 
reflective of her cultural inheritance. We will attempt to show the manifest problems 
with such a conceptualization. A critical perspective within the epistemological 
theorization of ideology often carries with it the implication of a justification of the 
given capitalist order of economic and social exploitation, political corruption and 
general injustice.41 This conception frequently draws a distinction between the
40 We have made no mention of a chronology here precisely because no such predictable unfolding has 
existed. We can currently find examples of a more traditional predominantly ‘false consciousness’ 
view of ideology in a form not entirely unlike that put forward in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, just as we can acknowledge the existence of various forms of a more immanent critique of 
ideology from early in the twentieth century, persisting to the present. We can add here that there are 
also interesting examples that claim the title of false consciousness but which nonetheless argue a more 
straightforward sense of immanent critique. David Hawkes’ recent work on ideology is centred upon 
the argument that ideology can be most convincingly understood as a form of false consciousness in 
which a belief in the autonomy and determining power of representation prevails. In general Marxist 
terms, Hawkes draws a relation between this kind of ideology and market capitalism, but, at the same 
time, sees this consumption based society as decidedly post-modern. For Hawkes, it is in just such a 
society that the falseness of ideology asserts itself. In a consumption and credit based global world, 
symbols of representation, such as money, become increasingly abstract, ceasing to be in any way 
grounded in reality and increasingly autonomous in their subjective power. In broadly Baudrillardian 
terms, he argues that this autonomy of representation is the post-modern economy. David Hawkes, 
Ideology (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 2-3. This era of the image and its autonomous representation 
are the result of a particular type of false consciousness. In much literature, as Hawkes notes, false 
consciousness has been understood as a type of misapprehension of reality, a state of being misled by 
an illusion. The type of false consciousness that pervades the post-modern world is not an illusion 
running counter to some material reality, it is the reality itself but a reality in which “we systematically 
behave as if an illusion were true”. Ibid., p. 178. This illusion is the autonomy of representation as 
expressed in the market economy. There is then an ontological falseness in what presents itself as 
objectively true.
41 A critical theorization of ideology on this basis will often attempt to discern the fundamental nature 
of the interests which such a state serves. Habermas’s critique of ideology as systematically distorted
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various parts of the system or the aspects of its instantiation, separating out that in 
which the ideological supposedly resides -  the ‘superstructure’, the consciousness, the 
mind and the subjective. Whilst there is nothing particularly ill-conceived about 
understanding the ability of ideology to justify the given -  and, indeed, this remains 
an important task of critique - this way of viewing ideology has long been surpassed 
with what can be broadly termed ‘immanent critique’ . 42 Here, the former view of 
ideology as a justification of indirect forms of domination gave way to a recognition 
that ideology works by way of direct domination of conscious and unconscious 
experience. What we arrive at in immanent critique is an understanding of 
contradictions within thought and practice via an analysis of contradictions within the 
context of social life. I refer to this as ‘immanent critique’ because there is something 
of an immersion in the object under scrutiny -  in this case the domination of all 
thought by ideology -  often to the extent that ideology is presented as having its own 
independent logic which somehow escapes the contradictions and antagonisms to 
which it would otherwise bear some relation.43 Where formerly there may have 
existed some sense of the possibility of a confrontation with ideology, within the 
immanent critique of ideology we see any optimism about ideology’s undoing lost to 
theoretical expositions of the power of contradiction to eliminate all opposition to the 
domination of thought by the necessity of the system itself. Here too, however 
complex its description, we find some kind of imperative to immediately apprehend 
the distinction between the supposed falsity of ideology and the truth of its critique on 
the basis of the materialization of the ideological. Moreover, once a sense of a ‘post- 
historical’ flatness seeped into an understanding of cultural heritage, then any belief in 
the possibility of actually altering that by which the ideological was supposedly
communication could be viewed as one current example of such an approach. See Jürgen Habermas, 
The Theory o f Communicative Action, vols. I and II, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1984).
42 Terry Eagleton identifies what he takes to be the two principal mainstream traditions within the 
theory of ideology as that of a preoccupation with ideas of false and true cognition, and that concerned 
with the function of ideas within social life, and contends that “both of them have something interesting 
to tell us” . Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991), p. 3. My description of 
these tendencies differs from this only slightly by highlighting the more specific tradition of immanent 
critique within the analysis of ideology. In addition to this, I argue for the need to theorize a dialectical 
critique of ideology.
43 We are aware here that most of the theorists we will encounter in this thesis, whose writings we 
might want to describe in terms of ‘immanent critique’, are largely aware of the problem of immanent 
critique itself: and yet it is still the case, as we will find, that these theorists fail to contend with the 
problem they find their works entail by merely addressing the critical issues of a dominating ideology 
without suggesting any other sort of theoretical critique. Although a type of transcendental critique 
might emerge on occasion, this itself is often presented in an unproblematic manner. Ultimately, 
however, it is the absence of a fully developed dialectical critique which maintains the central axis of 
an immanent critique within such works. What is presented is often a seemingly independent logic to 
the nature of ideology as it is depicted; contradiction and antagonism within the ideological are 
marginalized and a dialectical understanding of ideology suppressed.
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materialized, was decidedly lain to rest.44 If the so-called economic ‘base’ was rigidly 
fixed, frozen by an age of broken, despairing unrealized challenges and the mocking 
triumphalism of an ascendant neo-liberalism, then its supposed superstructure was just 
as surely stranded upon the plateau of history. But in this scepticism too much went 
unconsidered - processes of the materialization of ideas, separate and discrete from 
some presumably suspiciously interior realm of mistaken appearances and false 
beliefs, as well as notions of ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’ in themselves. The 
perpetuation of these strangely resuscitated assumptions regarding ideology (which 
were known to have been long superseded within much critical theory itself) lent this, 
the post-modernist dismissal of ideology critique, a falsely pioneering character, 
when, in reality, it merely abandoned in large part any sustained exploratory 
engagement with the ideological.
This thesis will develop an outline for an alternative critique of ideology, one 
which views ideology neither as only a type of falseness, nor one in which thought is 
reduced to the process of domination. Rather, it will put forward a dialectical critique 
of ideology. In doing this it will critically engage with many of the useful insights 
that radical critiques of ideology have generated, particularly those which highlight 
the social contradictions implicated in ideology, and which offer a degree of 
determinate possibility in relation to emancipatory change. In emphasizing the latter, 
it will also couch the discussion of an alternative theorization of ideology in terms less 
familiar, although certainly present, within some Marxist and radical critiques of the 
ideological. These terms have much to do with understanding the anticipatory 
consciousness, the ‘dream of the thing’, as Marx refers to it, 45 contained within many 
aspects of human existence, including that which functions ideologically. Our 
purpose in this thesis will be to make apparent the character of presentiment and 
cultural surplus within ideology, and the anticipatory, imaginative and illuminating 
aspects of critique that suggest a transcending of what exists through the very 
signifying embellishment or condensing avoidance that ideology represents. There is 
objectively real possibility within thought and practices, rather than a determined 
necessity. That such possibility needs to be looked for in the seemingly unassuming 
and least obvious aspects of the ideological, and, indeed, in the complex process by 
which the ideological is engaged in both appearance and sublimation, is part of what 
should strike us as the enduringly interesting theoretical problem of ideology and its
44 Arnold Gehlen’s influential work Man in the Age o f Technology is useful to consider in this context. 
Arnold Gehlen, Man in the Age o f Technology, trans. Patricia Lipscomb (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1980).
45 Marx to Ruge, September 1843, in Karl Marx, Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone and 
Gregor Benton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), p. 209 (translation slightly altered).
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critique. To argue this places us very much within the theoretical terrain of a dialectic 
of hope. 46 This anticipatory consciousness we will theorize as an ability to regard the 
self as another, in terms of a fundamental connectedness through which the 
emancipatory impulse might be realized.
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first, ‘Perspectives on Ideology’, 
contains the initial introductory chapter, ‘The Unfinished Problem of Ideology’, in 
which we consider in what ways ideology and its critique are vital problems for 
contemporary philosophy. Here, we will introduce a theorization of what we take to 
be a central aspect of a cultural inheritance -  the existence of states of unfreedom, 
objectively and subjectively mediated through the commodification of life and the 
internalization of control.
Part Two of the thesis, ‘Aporias of Realization: Subjective Possibility and 
Objective Necessity’, is comprised of three chapters, Chapter Two, ‘The Fracturing of 
Subject and Object: Ideology as the Spectacle of Commodification’, Chapter Three, 
‘The Deliberate Unconscious: Ideology as Imagined Inner Experience and a 
Psychology of Control’ and Chapter Four, ‘The Critique of Social Life: Ideology as 
the Inventive Need of the Calculating Slave’. The critical focus of the investigation in 
this part of the thesis is the question of the development of ideology critique and its 
fundamental philosophical assumptions within three central thematic approaches to 
critical theory - that of the widespread commodification of social life and its 
consequences; that of a psychology of control; and that of a dialectic of freedom in 
which need is played out. We will devote a chapter to each of these concerns and will 
consider the significance of them via a critical engagement with some of their leading 
philosophical exponents. As mentioned, this will entail an evaluation of some of the 
central ideas found in the work of Lukäcs, Althusser and Marx. Within these 
important themes we will trace the basic philosophical assumptions that are involved 
to see what sort of ideology critique emerges. We will consider critically the 
strengths and weaknesses of these approaches, and, on this basis, gamer insights into 
the theorization of ideology from the point of view of an understanding of the 
significance of the problems of self-knowledge, fear, and the difficulty of the play of 
constraints and limited possibilities in which the subject operates.
We will then suggest that these areas of theoretical investigation enable us to 
reconsider a critique of ideology. This will bring us to the third and final part of the 
thesis, ‘An Ethos of the Imagination’, which contains the final chapter of the thesis,
46 This thesis is indebted in its inspiration to the work of Ernst Bloch, whose three volume magnum 
opus The Principle of Hope presents us with an array of examples of anticipatory consciousness.
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‘The Dialectic of Ideology and Presentiment: Ideology as the Waking Dream’, in 
which we will bring together a critique of the ideological with a theorization of the 
concept of presentiment -  a sense of a future-oriented otherness emerging as a result 
of and beyond the ideological. What we will here suggest is the need for a 
theorization of the imaginative creativity of the self in her ethical engagement within 
humanity. We will attempt to show that a critique of ideology capable of exposing 
the basis of separation and inequality must also explicitly embrace a sense of an 
ethical commitment to life.
PART ONE
PERSPECTIVES ON IDEOLOGY
CHAPTER ONE
THE UNFINISHED PROBLEM OF IDEOLOGY
Introduction
In this first chapter of the thesis we want to understand what it is that is meant 
by ideology in order initially to suggest the inappropriateness of a marginalization of 
ideology critique in contemporary philosophy, and then to explain more fully the 
usefulness of a critique of ideology in theorizing contemporary unfreedom. For this 
purpose we will introduce two major perspectives on ideology. The first is one in 
which ideology is viewed in terms of some kind of justification of the given order of 
things, derived ultimately from the nature of the object world. This perspective has 
dominated theoretical approaches to the critique of ideology {Ideologiekritik) and is 
generated in both epistemological and immanent types of critique. The second 
perspective is the approach to ideology that I develop in this thesis, a dialectical 
critique of ideology or better perhaps one that is able to detect both subjective and 
objective synchronous and non-synchronous contradictions based on a play of 
energies and forms in which humanity and nature are engaged. We will explain what 
we mean by this sort of critique and whether we need to draw any distinction between 
this and the dialectical as such later in the thesis. We can point out here, however, 
that this understanding of ideology will be derived from considering the problem of 
unfreedom as a decisive aspect of a contemporary cultural inheritance. We will see 
that what enters into such an inheritance is a mediation between subject and object in 
which a range of images, values and practices - some supine, slavish or compensatory, 
others more imaginatively wishful - can become manifest in ideological form. Thus 
we will argue that understanding the contemporary place of the ideological means 
examining it within the play of contradictions of which it is a part. In doing this it 
will hopefully be apparent that what we are arguing is that the ideological can best be 
understood as ideas and practices offering unfulfilled solutions to social 
contradictions.
The chapter will be divided into three sections. The first of these will situate 
the contemporary impasse in ideology critique within its philosophical context and
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will explain why I believe a certain impasse has indeed emerged. The second section 
will examine the concept of ideology in more detail, distinguishing those ideas that 
have been relevant to a radical theorization of the ideological from those which bear 
little, if any, relation to it at all. The third and final section of the chapter will prepare 
the ground for an examination of the ideological in the three central chapters of the 
thesis. Throughout this present chapter, we will examine the significance of 
theorizing a state of what we are referring to as a ‘democratic unfreedom’, or a 
‘voluntary servitude’. It is this sort of ambiguous, undecided state that ideology 
critique best addresses. It is also through this state that the ideological problem of the 
spectacle of commodification, a psychology of control, and inventive need, will be 
most apparent. We will make it clear why these issues are of importance to a 
contemporary understanding of ideology. With this chapter, then, we will hope to 
make obvious the continued relevance of a critique of ideology and to have presented, 
in general terms, the basis for a critical understanding of the scope of the ideological.
Section One: The Impasse in Contemporary Ideology
Critique
The Fluctuating Fortunes of Ideology as a Philosophical Concept
When, in the late 1970s, Jean Baudrillard declared that with “the coming of 
this new phase of the image, ideology critique has lost its relevance”,1 a decisive shift 
in the theorization of ideology was apparent. The investigation of the concept of 
ideology, a topic of hitherto extensive debate within cultural theory and philosophy, 
appeared to be brought to an end.2 It is well known that what was at issue here was a 
broad questioning of some of the fundamental philosophical issues of Western 
thought - a questioning of an understanding of reality, materiality, ideality,
1 Jean Baudrillard, Simulations (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983), p. 48.
2 It is important to remember that such endings theorized for the concept of ideology have been a 
repeated feature of the concept’s existence. Some commentators draw out similarities between these 
repeated episodes in the life of ideology. Peter Dews, for example, argues that there are “some striking 
parallels” between descriptions of a condition of post-modernity and an end to “metaphysical 
guarantees of shared meaning”, as is argued by Jean-Fran?ois Lyotard, and the ‘end of ideology’ debate 
begun by Daniel Bell in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Peter Dews, “Editor’s Introduction” to Jürgen 
Habermas, Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews, ed. Peter Dews (London: Verso, 1986), pp. 6, 7.
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representation, reason, knowledge, subjectivity and self-realization.3 Implicated in 
such misgivings about these basic philosophical tenets was a clear shift away from 
critique and, specifically, from the critique of ideology. Ideology critique was taken 
to be fatally associated with untenable conceptions of the subject, of privileged 
spaces, perception and knowledge, with an assumption of a realm of disembodied 
ideas, with the notion of transparency and with supposedly unquestioning teleological 
tendencies.4
Since this time, the critique and analysis of ideology has been renewed in 
various forms with the appearance of a recent spate of works on the topic, such as 
Peter Sloterdijk’s work on what he terms ‘enlightened false consciousness’, Critique 
o f Cynical Reason, Slavoj Zizek’s The Sublime Object o f Ideology, For They Know 
Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor and the collection Mapping 
Ideology; Paul de Man’s Aesthetic Ideology; Terry Eagleton’s Ideology: An 
Introduction; David Hawkes’ Ideology, David McLellan’s Ideology, Steve Barnett’s 
Ideology and Everyday Life', Mike Cormack’s Ideology; Michael Freeden’s Ideologies 
and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, the translation into English in 1998 of 
Sarah Koftnan’s 1973 work Camera Obscura o f Ideology, Rastko Mocnik’s 
“Ideology and Fantasy”; Ernesto Laclau’s “The Death and Resurrection of the Theory 
of Ideology” and the collection edited by Simons and Billig After Postmodernism:
Reconstructing Ideology Critique', to name some of the many, all attesting to a
/
continued interest in the topic.5 The very theoretical diversity of these recent studies
3 For a work that questions the critique of ‘grand narratives’ by post-modernist thinkers and argues 
instead for the importance of a ‘reflective authenticity’, see Alessandro Ferrara, Reflective Authenticity: 
Rethinking the Project o f Modernity (London: Routledge, 1998).
4 In his work, Ideology: An Introduction, Terry Eagleton, for example, accounts for a flight from the 
critique of ideology in terms of both the philosophical and the political positions adopted by its 
theorists. An anti-realist, anti-empirical (as well as anti-empiricist) and anti-epistemological 
philosophical position, coupled with an opposition to radical or revolutionary politics, inevitably leads 
to the denial of any internal relation between “particular socio-economic conditions, and specific kinds 
of political or ideological positions”. Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction, pp. 203-219, 205, 210, 206. 
Within this sort of theoretical approach no conceptual space need be given to the question of the 
derivation of interests, since interests are merely what we construct rather than anything arising from 
present reality. Eagleton concludes that the end result of this approach is the tendency to “overlook the 
legitimating functions of ideology”. Ibid., p. 209.
5 Peter Sloterdijk, Critique o f Cynical Reason, trans. Michael Eldred (London: Verso, 1988); Slavoj 
Zizek, The Sublime Object o f Ideology (London: Verso, 1989); For They Know Not What They Do: 
Enjoyment as a Political Factor (London: Verso, 1991); Zizek, ed., Mapping Ideology, Paul de Man, 
Aesthetic Ideology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Eagleton, Ideology: An 
Introduction; Hawkes, Ideology, David McLellan, Ideology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1995); Steve Barnett and Martin G. Silverman, Ideology and Everyday Life: Anthropology, 
Neomarxist Thought, and the Problem o f Ideology and the Social Whole (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1979); Mike Cormack, Ideology (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992); 
Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996); 
Kofman, Camera Obscura o f Ideology, Rastko Mocnik, “Ideology and Fantasy”, in The Althusserian 
Legacy, eds. E. Ann Kaplan and Michael Sprinker (London: Verso, 1993); Ernesto Laclau, “The Death
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of ideology suggests, not any sort of death or a more recent resurrection of the term, 
but rather a predictable mutation in the meaning and significance of the concept over 
time.
The shift away from ideology critique of the 1970s has come to be understood, 
perhaps overly summarily, under the rubric of post-modernism.6 Although now itself 
an issue of a rather rapidly receding past, this change in theoretical perspective has 
continued to provide a point of reference for much contemporary theorizing on 
ideology.7 For example, in his 1996 text Ideology, David Hawkes sets out to 
demonstrate the relevance of a type of ‘post-modern’ understanding of false 
consciousness by addressing the issue of doubt cast by post-modernism upon the use 
and value of the concept of ideology. Ernesto Laclau has recently referred to a 
ghostly revivification of the term ideology that has marked its post-structuralist and 
post-modern death.8 Thomas Keenan also refers to the “ghosts of ideology” and the 
“strange afterlives of the concept of ideology itself’ that suggest “its singular success” 
in outliving announcements of its demise, and claims, in Zizekian terms, that there is 
nothing more ideological than the contention to have put an end to ideology.9 Rather 
too similarly, Tom Cohen’s 1998 work Ideology and Inscription argues for a 
conception of ideology “in its afterlife” that appears at the very point at which it 
abandons itself and contemporary theory tracks its evisceration.10 Simons and Billig’s
and Resurrection of the Theory of Ideology”, MLN, no. 112 (Spring, 1997): pp. 297-321; Herbert W. 
Simons and M. Billig, eds. After Postmodernism: Reconstructing Ideology Critique (London: Sage, 
1994).
6 There is, of course, no simple chronology implied here in what is sometimes viewed as the 
emergence of post-modernism in the wake of a failed structuralism. As Margaret Rose argues, the term 
post-modernism may be found at least by 1934, well before the rise of structuralism or the more 
popular recent rise of post-modernism. Margaret A. Rose, The post-modern and the post-industrial: A 
critical analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. xi. Indeed, for the benefit of the 
more pedantically semantic-minded, Rose notes that according to Wolfgang Welsch’s work, Unsere 
postmoderne Moderne, the word post-modern was used as early as the 1870s by the British artist John 
Watkins Chapman and in 1917 by Rudolf Pannwitz. Ibid, p. 180, n. 1.
7 It is appropriate to acknowledge here a range of works engaged with a post-modernist framework that 
continues to explore the possibilities of what could largely be described as ‘modernist’ concerns -  
particularly that of subjectivity. See, for example, Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, 
Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992); James 
Schmidt, ed., What Is Enlightenment?: Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Warren Montag, “The Emptiness of a Distance 
Taken: Freud, Althusser, Lacan”, Rethinking MARXISM, vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1991) and “Marxism and 
Psychoanalysis: The Impossible Encounter, The Minnesota Review, no. 23 (Fall 1984): pp. 70-85.
8 Ernesto Laclau, “The Death and Resurrection of the Theory of Ideology”, MLN, no. 112 (Spring, 
1997): p. 298.
9 Thomas Keenan, Fables o f Responsibility: Aberrations and Predicaments in Ethics and Politics 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 177.
10 Tom Cohen, Ideology and Inscription: “Cultural Studies” after Benjamin, de Man, and Bakhtin 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 18.
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collection is specifically directed towards what is seen as an unwarranted attack upon 
ideology critique by post-modernism. John B. Thompson’s Ideology and Modern 
Culture, which argues for the continued relevance of a concept of ideology, refers 
more obliquely, but nonetheless deliberately, to “the literature of social and political 
theory of the last two decades or so” that has responded to the difficult heritage of the 
concept of ideology by dispensing with the concept in its entirety." Much 
contemporary debate on the ideological then has centred upon some assessment of the 
post-modernist dismissal of the critique of ideology and has attempted to address 
some of its concerns. What we will later see, however, is that the issue of greatest 
relevance to an approach to ideology -  that of a metaphysics of the self or a critique of 
subjectivity -  is the least well theorized. It is just such a relation between the concept 
of ideology and a critique of subjectivity that this thesis will investigate.
As well as a post-modernist scepticism regarding the critique of ideology, 
various other recent theories have challenged the importance of ideology critique. 
This has been particularly the case in the development of theories of various forms of 
resistance, such as Michel de Certeau’s The Practice o f Everyday Life'2, and Paul 
Willis’ work on ‘symbolic creativity’ Common Culturef both of which indirectly 
question the notion of a dominant or hegemonic ideology. A work such as Jacques 
Camatte’s This World We Must Leave14 is indicative of renewed attempts to deal with 
rather than ignore ideology by outlining a case for a creative refusal that challenges a 
particular notion of ideology critique - that which views human beings as ideological 
precipitates - rather than dismissing the concept in toto. Felix Guattari and Toni Negri 
argue in Communists Like Us15 for new spaces of freedom and new lines of alliance 
that include a more dynamic sense of the processes of ideology. This is done most 
effectively in the authors’ rejection of what they see as a regimentation of thought that 
terminates the idea of the individual. Similarly, Negri’s jointly authored work with 
Michael Hardt, Empire, presents us with the prospect of a nascent sense of 
community, where a new nomad horde might successfully challenge a variety of 
forms of ideological control and reconstitute the power of its own movement. 16 More
11 John B. Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass 
Communication (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), p. 5.
12 Michel de Certeau, The Practice o f Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
13 Paul Willis, Common Culture: Symbolic Work at Play in the Everyday Cultures o f the Young 
(Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1990).
14 Jacques Camatte, This World We Must Leave and Other Essays, ed. Alex Trotter (New York: 
Autonomedia, 1995).
15 Felix Guattari and Toni Negri, Communists Like Us: New Spaces o f Liberty, New Lines o f Alliance, 
trans. Michael Ryan (New York: Semiotext(e), 1990).
16 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000).
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broadly amongst the recent Italian left Giorgio Agamben, Gianni Vattimo and Paulo 
Vimo have all theorized transmutations in the ideologies of a world of an intensified 
domination and oppression. In France, theorists such as Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe have considered the problems for a sense of the contemporary 
subject within an ideological existence of constraint and compulsion.17 Cornelius 
Castoriadis’ work of the 1990s that considers, in particular, the place of the radical 
imagination within the context of institutions that impose types of socialization, takes 
seriously individual and collective struggles for autonomy against the ideological.18 
O. K. Werkmeister, the theorist of aesthetics, questions more directly a departure from 
an ‘argumentative culture’ in which the critique of ideology is central. Werkmeister 
considers the dispersion of critique into a crisis consciousness of indecision that has 
replaced the critique of ideology with a reactive permanent self-doubt reflective of a 
culture of insecurity, industrialized ego-centrism and individual alienation. This 
‘citadel culture’ is the repository of sufferings turned into “crass aesthetic displays” 
devoid of positive social fictions.19 As we will argue in the final chapter of the thesis, 
it is just such a citadel culture that is reflective of a contradictory reconciliation 
between subject and object, a culture to which the abandonment of the critique of 
ideology concedes far too much. The challenge to ideology critique comes, as we will 
see, not in any definitive terminus of its critical possibility but in an engagement with 
the conceptual means by which this possibility might be realized. Various theorists 
have devised different terms for describing phenomena that in one way or another 
encompass much of the meaning, or one or more of the meanings, of the term 
ideology. Terms such as ‘discourse’ of one sort or another, ‘habitas’, ‘doxa’, ‘entre- 
nous' , ‘scenario’, ‘spectacle’, ‘simulcra’ or ‘cynical reason’, all suggest the existence 
of a realm of meaning in relation to the world. Thus, rather than necessarily 
altogether disappearing, the concept of ideology has more recently, I would argue, 
presented itself in different guises.20
17 Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, The Subject o f Philosophy, ed. Thomas Trezise, 
trans. Thomas Trezise et. al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
18 See, for example, Cornelius Castoriadis, “Radical Imagination and the Social Instituting Imaginary 
(1994), in The Castoriadis Reader, ed. David Ames Curtis (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 319-337.
19 O. K. Werckmeister, Citadel Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
20 The term discourse is frequently used by post-structuralist theorists such as Jacques Derrida and 
Laclau and Mouffe to denote the identity of objects in terms of their discursive conditions of 
emergence. Doxa is a term used by Pierre Bourdieu in his work, Language and Symbolic Power 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1991) and is claimed by its author to be a more useful term than ideology because 
it grasps the unconscious mechanisms of power in society. The other term used by Bourdieu is that of 
habitas - a “strategy-generating principle enabling agents to cope with unforeseen and ever-changing 
situations”. It is a “system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, 
functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions and makes possible the 
achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to the analogical transfer of schemes permitting the
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The Postmodernist Dismissal o f  Ideology Critique
What we have here are varied critiques of what can be taken to be the 
ideological that are, at the same time, critical of traditional understandings of 
ideology. These critiques have been generated from a broad reach of radical 
philosophy. The sources, then, of a critique of ideology critique are more general and 
more internally contested than is suggested by attributing the critique of ideology 
critique to a single body of thought, such as post-modernism, which is, in any case, 
itself wide-ranging and fragmented.21 However, in having successfully cast doubt 
upon the project of ideology critique, post-modernism has exhibited a surprising 
cohesiveness. Even though it may be questioned whether, for example, a theorist 
such as Baudrillard is himself really a part of a broader post-modern shift22 to which a 
scepticism about the critique of ideology is integral, the sentiment his comment 
implies, mentioned at the outset of this section, is a feature of this outlook.
What is significant about the post-modernist rejection of the possibility of a 
critical theorization of ideology is that it emerged out of a repudiation of radical, 
emancipatory theories of social life, and Western Marxism more specifically. As we 
will consider in general terms in this thesis, by the 1970s, there were considerable 
grounds for misgivings about the ways in which ideology had been theorized within 
some of the more dominant Marxist critiques. In this sense what was to follow the 
contraction of Western Marxism was a logical outcome of theoretical difficulties
solution of similarly shaped problems”. Pierre Bourdieu, Outline o f a Theory o f Practice, trans. 
Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 72-95. The term entre-nous - a 
state of the endless image of reciprocity into which we are incorporated via the hallucinogenic quality 
of nearness and familiarity - is used by Claude Lefort. See Claude Lefort, The Political Forms of 
Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism (Cambridge: Polity, 1986), p. 229. The 
idea of the spectacle is used by Guy Debord in his Society o f the Spectacle (Detroit, Michigan: Red & 
Black, 1970). The spectacle is a social relation of images that show the unrealism of real society. 
Debord argues that in present day bureaucratic capitalism the social surface presents shimmering and 
yet banal diversions that mask class divisions. These diversions are spectacles, a lamentable world of 
repressive pseudo enjoyment. The idea of the simulcra appears in the works of Jean Baudrillard. See, 
for example, Jean Baudrillard, The Mirror o f Production, trans. Mark Poster (St. Louis: Telos, 1975).
21 Lyotard, for example, makes a useful distinction between what he sees as a ‘slackened’ post­
modernism and a more radical post-modernism that maintains the experimental heritage of modernity. 
Jean-Frangois Lyotard, “Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?”, trans. Regis Durand in 
Jean-Frangois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington 
and Brian Massumi (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1984), pp. 71-82. See also Jean- 
Frangois Lyotard, Postmodern Fables, trans. Georges van den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997). Numerous other distinctions could also be made. For a useful overview of 
such material see Andreas Huyssen, After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture and 
Postmodernism (London: Macmillan, 1993) and Heinz Paetzold, The Discourse o f the Postmodern and 
the Discourse o f the Avant-Garde (Maastricht: Jan Van Eyck Academie, 1994).
22 In 1986 Baudrillard himself rejected both post-modernism and the fact of being included within its 
perspective. He viewed post-modernism as artificial and lacking any meaning, preferring to describe
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within critique more generally, of which many of its adherents were only all too well 
aware. Granted that many post-modem theorists were looking to a new “cultural 
dominant” , 23 thrilling to the dizzying view from each new Bonaventura Hotel-type 
experience, and finding, on a number of occasions, a genuinely distinct, if not quite 
novel, sentiment to write home about:24 but the point we have made regarding the 
theoretical problems facing critique in general is often underplayed by contemporary 
‘end of ideology’ theorists who tend, rather, to emphasize far too cursorily, although 
not always completely unreasonably, the problematic claims of Western Marxism’s 
treatment of reality, subjectivity, materialism and seienticity, and, most particularly, 
revolutionary change. What is apparent, although not stated by these critics 
themselves, and this I contend as a significant argument of this chapter, is that the sort 
of critique of ideology cast into suspicion by post-modernism is predominantly that of 
an epistemological kind. It is also of a highly particular epistemological kind: It 
involves the assumption that ideology critique claims the ideological to be a form of 
false consciousness against which we can be assured that its own critique proffers 
some kind of real or scientific knowledge. Post-modernism thus assumes, or proceeds 
as if upon the assumption, that the concept of ideology is entirely that of false 
consciousness and that the idea of critique is solely concerned with establishing 
‘scientific’ guarantees of knowledge.
What then must be pointed out is that subjecting the claims of epistemological 
critique to scrutiny was hardly theoretically innovative. The problems of an easy, 
accessible relation between truth and falsity, thought and reality, and so on, all on the 
basis of a largely unstated external mechanism or methodology of visibility or
his enterprise as an analysis of the void. See Chris Horrocks and Zoran Jevtic, Baudrillard for 
Beginners (Cambridge: Icon Books, 1996), p. 171.
23 This is Fredric Jameson’s term for the new kind of depthlessness he associates with the phase of 
post-modernism. Fredric Jameson, “Postmodernism, of The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism”, New 
Left Review, no. 146 (July/August, 1984): p. 56.
24 It is again Jameson who tells us not only of the “undecidable” architecture of the Crocker Bank 
Center that allows us to experience “physically and literally” the depthlessness of the post-modern, but 
who then expounds at length on another example of late 1970s architecture, one built in downtown Los 
Angeles, The Bonaventura Hotel. Distinguishing itself from examples of high modernism, this 
building seeks “to speak that very language” of the “tawdry and commercial sign-system of the 
surrounding city”, Jameson argues. Its escalators are “allegorical devices” and “dialectical 
compensation”, its empty spaces “an element within which you yourself are immersed”, he enthuses. It 
is, he concludes, a “postmodern hyperspace” that has “succeeded in transcending the capacities of the 
individual human body to locate itself’. Jameson, “Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism”, pp. 81-83. Elsewhere, Jameson has commented on the ability of post-modern buildings to 
celebrate “their insertion into the heterogeneous fabric of the commercial strip and the motel and fast- 
food landscape of the post-superhighway American city”. Fredric Jameson, “The Politics of Theory: 
Ideological Positions in the Postmodernism Debate”, New German Critique, no. 33 (Fall 1984): p. 64. 
According to Dan Latimer, for Jameson, The Bonaventura Hotel, as well as other examples of 1970s 
and 1980s architecture, “shredded the psychic map of the American intelligentsia”. Dan Latimer, 
“Jameson and Post-Modernism”, New Left Review, no. 148 (Nov/Dec, 1984): p. 121.
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knowledge, had been apparent for much of the twentieth century, if not for a 
considerable part of the previous century as well. The development of 
epistemological concerns within radical critique was representative of, amongst other 
things, a broad debate as to the possibility of a theory of knowledge in conditions of 
uncertainty. Its critique did not have to await the arrival of post-modernism. Much 
immanent critique, including that of a variety of Western Marxist theories themselves, 
had occupied this mantle long before, and to much greater effect. 25 What post­
modernism rejected in Marxist theories of ideology were often ideas that were too 
general to be of any great significance to Marxism in particular, or were ideas for 
which Marxists had themselves provided extensive critique, or sometimes, indeed, 
were in fact ideas which Marxists had sound reasons for retaining.26 Nonetheless, 
when added to many extensive self-critiques within Marxism itself, this post­
modernist criticism was to be of considerable significance in displacing and then 
marginalizing attempts to develop critiques of ideology. It is here, as this thesis will 
show, that the most important problematic element of the dominant critiques of 
ideology was left uncriticized -  the assumption that ideology primarily entailed the 
capacity of the system to ensure its own justification. 27 This ultimately objectivist 
assumption is what will be placed under scrutiny within this thesis.
Ideology Critique and a Theorization o f Unfreedom
It will hopefully become more apparent throughout the thesis that I consider 
there to be much value in re-establishing a critique of ideology within a broader 
radical, emancipatory project. Such a critique, as we will develop in the course of this
25 For an examination of a manifestation of something of this problem in the relation between Critical 
Theory and some of the basic concepts used within post-structuralism, see Peter Dews, Logics of 
Disintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims o f Critical Theory (London: Verso, 1987).
26 Enmeshed within this theoretical questioning is the equally vexed question of attachments to 
political ideas and movements of the early to mid-twentieth century period, specifically Leninism, 
Stalinism and forms of Eurocommunism. This issue, which has been interestingly approached in works 
such as those by Dick Howard, The Marxian Legacy (London: Macmillan, 1988), Perry Anderson, 
Considerations on Western Maivcism (London: Verso, 1987), Michael Löwy, “Lukäcs and Stalinism”, 
in Western Marxism: A Critical Reader, ed. New Left Review (London: New Left Books, 1977), and 
his theoretical biography of Lukäcs, Georg Lukäcs: From Romanticism to Bolshevism, trans. Patrick 
Camiller (London: NLB, 1979) and Gregory Elliott, Althusser: The Detour o f Theory (London: Verso, 
1987), and of which much more could be postulated, will not be pursued in any depth here. To treat 
this issue of political context with any degree of seriousness would of course also require an analysis of 
the economic pragmatism and militaristic opportunism of the capitalist State and, most particularly, the 
progressivist, determinist and evolutionist tradition of social democracy - all of this would require a 
work other than the one in which we are presently engaged.
27 We would need another work to theorize upon the reasons as to why this issue of objectivism within 
the critique of ideology has been so ignored by post-modernism. We can, however, mention 
speculatively that it is probably not unrelated to the continuing problem of objectivism within many 
post-modernist accounts of power themselves.
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work, will question objectivist assumptions within epistemological and immanent 
critiques of ideology and will instead present a type of dialectical understanding of the 
ideological that starts out from the basis of attempting to come to terms with the 
mediated relationship between objective and subjective instances of the unfreedom of 
contemporary existence. As Nancy argues, the world is “heavy with suffering, 
disarray, and revolt” and it is this ‘sense of the world’ in relation to the ideological 
that we need to understand.28 In order to situate the ideological within this world we 
are less in need of first outlining some ultimate reason upon whose basis we can then 
assert unequivocal truths. As we mentioned in the introduction to the thesis, the sort 
of possibility we view as a component of an engagement with ideas requires an 
impulse towards understanding as a dynamic mode of existence, rather than a 
tyrannical, one-dimensional position of completion. Whether this necessitates 
thinking beyond categories of truth and error, reason and unreason is certainly worth 
assessing. Before we consider the problems involved in clearly defining the terrain of 
the ideological, let us nonetheless anticipate some of this by setting out where we feel 
the continued relevance and vitality of a critique of ideology might reside. We can 
perhaps do this most effectively by situating this evaluation in relation to the sort of 
dismissal of ideology critique we mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. We will 
arrive at this evaluation by way of a brief examination of our own approach to 
ideology critique.
The principal reason why the critique of ideology is a crucial, timely and 
valuable exercise is that the ideological remains a current feature of our everyday 
existence. Relations in which humanity is engaged are given conscious and 
sometimes unconscious expression that bear more or less either active or passive 
relation, and more or less objectifying relation, to the life of the self. We see this in 
quite obvious struggles over the meaning of freedom or who or what belongs to the 
‘free world’, the ‘free market’, the ‘global compact’, and so on; we see it too in claims 
against the embeddedness of democracy and what, if anything, this then means for a 
range of other values. These values are not fixed or final entities. Overt and 
substantial struggle in relation to a sense of equality, for example, is currently 
marginal, if not indeed lost, to a knowingly unequal world, but this does not mean that 
a turn towards a seeming acceptance of vast inequalities is not itself a deeply 
ideological matter. And what this suggests to us is the continuation of the ideological 
in forms that might seem temporally or theoretically distant and hidden. The 
ideological is not of course necessarily involved in every instance of a struggle for 
self-realization and freedom (and thus a struggle too around constraint), and yet such
28 Nancy, The Sense o f the World, p. 9.
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irreconciliation underpins the existence of ideology, whether it is of an embellishing, 
repressive or a potentially illuminating character. In ideology, therefore, there is 
expressed some relation between ideas or values and social conditions or reality: And 
where this reality entails constraints upon the realization of what it is to know oneself 
-  “the poor bird that felt free and now strikes the walls of this cage!”, as Nietzsche 
writes29 -  there is the formation of ideas in and against unfreedom.
We have argued that it is the social condition of unfreedom that determines 
much of our present experience of reality and thus ideology, particularly where the 
latter is expressed in a struggle to find meaning within contested and frequently 
manipulated values. There is as well something about us as seekers of meaning, ‘we 
aeronauts of the spirit’ who steer ourselves into a difficult and hopeful distance, and 
who seem to need this “mighty longing’.30 As pervasive as this longing might be we 
will want to consider whether there is still some relation to purpose, purpose which is 
also in contradiction, which exists, to use Bloch’s term, as a “self-disturbing 
cohesion”.31 We will pursue a greater understanding of these subjective and objective 
states and their mediation later in the thesis. For the present let us note that many 
theorists attribute to the existence of ideology something more arbitrary, or a level of 
social effect considerably more functional for social conditions or formations. Fredric 
Jameson, whom we alluded to in relation to comments he had made at the height of 
post-modernism, earlier developed a sense of ideology as symbolic act, as a form 
beyond the strategies of containment that he felt Marx and Lukacs had viewed it as.32 
For the Jameson of this late 1970s early 1980s period, ideology is almost the result of 
the individual colliding with experience, as Russell Berman expresses it.33 More 
recently, Slavoj Zizek argues that, in the very fact of a changing order by which life is 
lived and changing perceptions or misperceptions of this order, we are “compelled to 
accept the unrelenting pertinence of the notion of ideology”.34 For him, this 
fluctuating horizon of the historical imagination is ideological because it exists in a 
fractured relation to the order of the world itself: When the order of the world was one 
of unremitting exploitation of nature and its resources, “everybody was busy 
imagining different forms of the social organization of production” -  fascism or
29 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, par. 124.
30 Nietzsche, Daybreak, par. 575.
31 Ernst Bloch, “Causality and Finality as Active, Objectifying Categories (Categories of 
Transmission)”, Telos, no. 21 (Fall 1974): p. 103.
32 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (London: 
Methuen, 1981).
33 Russell A. Berman, “Review of Fredric Jameson’s Fables o f Aggression: Wyndham Lewis, the 
Modernist as Fascist”, Telos, no. 45 (Fall 1980): p. 196.
34 Zizek, “The Spectre of Ideology”, in Mapping Ideology, p. 1.
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communism as alternatives to liberal capitalism. Today, he argues, when “nobody 
seriously considers possible alternatives to capitalism” the popular imagination is 
“persecuted by the visions of the forthcoming ‘breakdown of nature’”. It seems 
easier, Zizek wryly concludes, to imagine the end of the world than a far more modest 
change in the mode of production, “as if liberal capitalism is the ‘real’ that will 
somehow survive even under conditions of global ecological catastrophe” .35 Whether 
we want to accept Zizek’s emphasis upon a relation between the historical 
imagination and the inscription of ideas in events and epochs, his highlighting of the 
existence of some sort of generative matrix allows us to consider something of the 
purpose of the critique of ideology. Ideas concerning our relation to the world are 
made immanently meaningful, heterodox or conformist within a wide range of 
conditions, narratives and experiences. In the case of the ideological -  which, as we 
will continue to present in this thesis, for us concerns contradiction within ideas and 
practices -  there are certain articulations and experiences that are of particular 
significance. The condition we have highlighted for consideration in this work is that 
of our subjective relation to unfreedom.
The construction of meaning within our lives takes place within the context of 
an unfreedom that is both formative and pivotal to our existence. This is partly 
because it is a complex form of unfreedom that we experience as a part of everyday 
life. It exists as both a provocation and as something seemingly unavoidable; as a 
direct imposition and as a seamless, almost evanescent aspect of a state of being. It is, 
as we have argued, both an undemocratic and also, at times, a voluntary unfreedom. 
It is obvious, then, that in this we are assuming that the self-encounter involves some 
sense of freedom as against unfreedom. The sense of freedom that confronts 
constraint is a broad, open, historical, but also, at times, suprahistorical web of 
processes that ultimately turns, as Nietzsche argues, upon the answer to one’s own 
question as to how or to what end life is lived. 36 The self should coincide with 
destiny, Bloch tells us.37 It is when one fails to bring, or is prevented from bringing, 
one’s character in accordance with the destiny one creates, or vice versa, that 
unfreedom dictates the course of life. We will need to explore what it is we take to 
mean by this freedom throughout the course of this work. Let us, at this stage, merely
35 Ibid. There are, of course, some, and undoubtedly an increasingly significant number, who take 
possible alternatives to capitalism very seriously indeed, but perhaps before the tide of protests against 
globalization beginning with events in Seattle and in, very differently, the life-destroying intent behind 
the crumbling of the World Trade Centre Towers, an ever-present wide array of alternative voices 
could have been more easily overlooked.
36 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”, Untimely Meditations, ed. 
Daniel Breazeale, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 65
37 Bloch, The Spirit o f Utopia, p. 220.
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indicate that existence, as Emmanuel Levinas argues, “is not in reality condemned to 
freedom, but is invested as freedom” .38 Just as we can disclose what it is that liberates 
freedom from the arbitrary, so too can we detect that which constrains and inhibits 
freedom. And, like Levinas too, we will argue that this knowledge as critique 
involves a fundamental questioning of one’s own freedom. Ideology is part of the 
contentious struggle for meaning assembled from a range of symbolic, 
representational and sensuous forms which compose and recompose in some relation 
to the problem of a life that is unfree.
Ideology and Meaning
Most theorists have chosen to see ideology as in some general way a matter of 
the difficulty of meaning, but many have tended to do so on the basis of seeing 
ideology from the perspective only of an objective need for justification and 
naturalization. The propensity for this perspective to become a highly schematic way 
of approaching ideology has led to an unnecessarily restrictive sense of meaning 
within ideas. What emanates from such a way of conceptualizing ideology is not 
necessarily without merit, particularly in terms of detecting certain tendencies towards 
legitimation; it is more that such an approach is frequently unable to see 
contradictions or a fluidity of determinations within these tendencies. For the sake, 
then, of a critique of some given ‘falseness’ a causal, goal-oriented mechanism is 
elevated to the theoretical level of verifiable explanation and all open mediation, all 
‘self-disturbing’ confluence of contradictions, is marginalized if not completely 
ignored. As mentioned, this has resulted in a predominantly objectivist approach to 
ideology in which very little discontinuity of the subjective mediations with, or its 
relation to, the object is theorized. There is a strange singularity of purpose and 
reason, and an unlikely motionlessness, in the existence of ideology so formed. Thus 
a statement such as that by Paul de Man, namely that “what we call ideology is 
precisely the confusion of linguistic with natural reality”39, suggests a completedness 
in relation to what might or might not constitute ideology. A typical approach 
involves specifying the ideological problem within ideology in such a way that a 
social function of ideology is taken as its directing or causal element. John B. 
Thompson, for example, defines ideology as “meaning in the service o f power”40, and 
whilst this conveys much of the sense of ideology as located within a social context
38 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), p. 84.
39 Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 11.
40 Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture, p. 7.
38 Ideology Critique and A Philosophy of Freedom
that we consider important, it also delimits the ideological, and does so specifically in 
its most negative sense.
In this thesis, we will give reasonable consideration to the variety of social 
instances that give meaning or significance to particular ideas, but will not define 
ideology exclusively in relation to one aspect of any given social function as itself a 
necessary and, as it were, foreclosed ordering of reality. Thus whilst we view the 
problem of unfreedom as a key part of understanding the existence of ideology, we do 
not take ideology to be only that in which the denial of freedom operates. We will 
thus be more concerned with the relation of ideology to conditions that militate 
against freedom, rather than to those that result, more exclusively, in the imposition of 
power. If this appears as a somewhat arbitrary distinction then it is perhaps because at 
times it is; it is not, however, for reasons of some supposed greater fidelity to reality 
that the importance of unfreedom as the objectivity of power is temporarily suspended 
here -  rather, it is because historically, within the theorization of ideology, it has left 
too little room for an investigation of any movement between subject and object. 
Undoubtedly, we would want to be able to argue that the role subjectivity plays in 
conditions that militate against freedom is significant, and indeed perhaps the most 
important part of a life lived within a world of objects that deceive -  but this would 
constitute another project. Here, we simply want to open up the areas of a mediation 
between subject and object and of a reciprocity of contradictions to discussion.
What we hope to begin to see in the course of the thesis is that the idea of 
constraints upon freedom, including that of self-constraint, is better able to indicate 
something of the subject’s own role in the perpetuation of ideology. It is this role that 
the idea of power as objectivity marginalizes or skews in an overly one-dimensional 
manner. The critique of the processes of objectivization, referred to at times in the 
German as Vergegenständlichung, is a part of a tendency in which the problem of 
objectivism is articulated. Numerous theorists have engaged in critiques of this kind, 
emphasizing the destruction of the realm of experience and disappearance of human 
life and the world we encounter within objectivizing thought. In this thesis we want 
to bring some of this critique to an analysis of the critique of ideology. The existence 
of ideology we will view as the problem of cultural inheritance; in particular, in its 
manifestation in the peculiar kind of unfreedom we experience -  that of a seemingly 
democratic unfreedom, a voluntary unfreedom.
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This sort of unfreedom is partly conveyed within Rousseau’s dictum that 
‘people are bom free and yet are everywhere in chains’ , 41 and yet in its modem variant 
it is often unclear who it is who has imposed the chains, how real the chains are and 
why it is that even with the ability to unchain ourselves we remain unfree. It is 
precisely in such a seemingly paradoxical relation of freedom to unfreedom that we 
can detect the presence of ideology. It is these interrelated movements between the 
imposition of power and its translation into a contradictory content that we want to 
understand. Ideology is, in this sense, a complex of processes, including those 
processes involving the strange combination of something recognized and yet 
something capable of being transfigured, rather than an abstract entity or thing. It is 
not the reduction to concepts or methodological device we find in much theorizing. 
Thus its critique is not the presumption of a complete dissolution of some given 
mystery or enigma by way of the reduction of the origin to the status of an effect, as is 
implied within a false consciousness thesis and then generalized as the model of all 
Ideologiekritik.42 Ideology is aporetic and unstable. It is a part of the creation and 
interpretation of symbolic and sensuous meaning within the context of social 
interaction between people and the social situations they participate in and create. In 
its ability to metamorphose it often expresses a sensuous non-sensuousness, a 
‘sensuous supersensibility’, as Marx says of the commodity. 43 This ‘sensibility’ is, as 
Nicholas Lobkowicz argues, the basis of knowledge; it is not mere sense-perception 
but is rather a form of receptivity in relation to the world in which we exist. 44 
Ideology often expresses what both Hegel and Marx refer to as ‘reflex categories’ -  
certain relations in which value or meaning is attributed only insofar as that particular 
value persists within the relation so constructed.45 We will return to a sense of the
41 This idea of human alienation and unfreedom appears in both of Rousseau’s main works -  
Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Mankind (1755) and The Social Contract 
or Principles o f Political Right (1762) where the more specific articulation of it as “man is bom free; 
and everywhere he is in chains” appears at the opening of Book I. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social 
Contract and Discourses, trans. and intro. G.D.H Cole (Dent: London, 1966), p. 3.
42 Ricoeur, for example, argues this. Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, p. 47.
43 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique o f Political Economy, vol. I, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward 
Aveling, ed. Frederick Engels (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1983), p.76. As Jacques Derrida points 
out, the English translations of this concept conjure away the difficulty and complexity of Marx’s 
intention. Jacques Derrida, Specters o f Marx: the state o f the debt, the work o f mourning, and the New 
International, trans. Peggy Kamuf, intro. Bernd Magnus and Stephen Cullenberg (New York: 
Routledge, 1994), p. 192, n. 19. Thus the Moore and Aveling translation construes the metamorphosis 
of an ordinary, sensuous thing into a sensuous non-sensuous, sensuously supersensible thing 
(verwandelt er sich in ein sinnlich übersinnliches Ding) as “it is changed into something transcendent”. 
Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 76.
44 Nicholas Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice: Histoiy o f a Concept from Aristotle to Marx (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), p. 354.
45 Marx’s most obvious example of this is the relative form of value of a commodity but he explains 
the idea of reflex-category very well with his comment: “For instance, one man is king only because
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ramifications of this way of viewing the ideological in both the chapter concerning 
Marx’s critique of social life and in the final chapter. At its most fundamental, 
ideology is a part of a cultural heritage in which tensions around the problem of a 
continued unfreedom are played out. By viewing ideology in this manner, we are able 
to focus upon the ideological from the perspective of specific problems of cultural 
inheritance, such as the problems we have mentioned of a democratic unfreedom and 
a voluntary servitude.
The Dismissal o f False Consciousness Leaves the Ideological Unchallenged
Let us then briefly consider why, given a seemingly unquestionable relevance 
of a critique of ideology to conditions such as those of commodified existence, 
internalized control and the problem of freedom - problems most radical theorists 
would readily agree permeate our current existence - we confront the conundrum of a 
theoretical scepticism regarding both the existence of ideology and the formulation of 
its critique. We mentioned at the outset Baudrillard’s dismissal of ideology critique 
that has come to signify much of the contemporary objection to a theorization of the 
ideological. We will not enter into any significant debate with Baudrillard’s particular 
theorization of the field of ideology, but rather will focus more generally upon two 
principal aspects of this critique. Firstly, it is argued that an autonomy of 
representation, the “super-ideology of the sign” 46 now characterizes the form of 
ideology which exists. This has come about as a result of the development of an 
overtly consumerist society. Indeed, for Baudrillard, there has been the ascendance of 
a type of ‘consummativity’ that has replaced ‘productivity’ as the organizing principle 
of consumer capitalism. Secondly, it is claimed that, as the objectification of the 
ideological structure of capitalism has always existed, it then makes little sense to 
refer to commodification in terms of its illusory, fetishistic power. On this basis it is 
argued that any notion of ‘authentic’ being is mistaken. Such a notion is presumed to 
characterize any view of the fetishization of commodities, and any view of 
fetishization is presumed to be a view of ideology as false consciousness. Baudrillard 
conflates and indeed muddles too many issues here whilst also recognizing something 
of the problem with this: But let us isolate two major difficulties. That capitalism has 
tended towards ever greater symbolic production (and that this production achieves a 
certain autonomy) is undoubtedly the case, but this general tendency has always been 
present in the form of consumption and its associated production. It has certainly
other men stand in the relation of subjects to him. They, on the contrary, imagine that they are subjects 
because he is king”. Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 63, n. 1.
46 Baudrillard, The Mirror of Production, p. 122.
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been vastly more apparent from the period in which Baudrillard was writing -  the 
early 1970s. The mere fact, however, that representation appears more autonomous 
and non-referential does not then mean that its status as ideology has in any sense 
disappeared. It seems that when representation is equated with false consciousness 
then this might be the troubling conclusion one would reach, thereby cancelling out 
the very concept of ideology (as false consciousness) itself. Only if ideology is 
formally reduced to a conceptualization of thought as opposed to reality could this 
problem of representation emerge. Secondly, only if the ideological is equated with 
an objectivist necessity (such as power, domination, consummativity, and so on) 
could some separation be supposed between this state and that of a subjectivity 
capable of piercing the veil of this imposed illusion.
The assumption that ideology suggests a necessary dichotomy between 
materiality and ideality is the central misunderstanding responsible for this scepticism 
we have outlined. Ideology is taken as a form of illusion against which the 
acknowledgement of a changing reality (such as change within capitalism, for 
example) is assumed to create problems. Even where it is not openly described in 
such terms, such a view tends to reproduce a false consciousness thesis. This type of 
false consciousness is basic to an epistemological approach to ideology critique, the 
focus of which is overwhelmingly upon the falseness of the justifications and 
sublimations involved in the ideological. It is not, however, restricted to such an 
approach. We will look in the next section at where immanent critique at times in fact 
reverts to aspects of an epistemological approach.47
In this thesis I argue that the notion of false consciousness has always been 
marginal to a critical understanding of the ideological. The epistemological critique 
of ideology is a limited critique.48 This is not to suggest that both falseness and a 
falseness in relation to consciousness do not exist -  they can and do: But ideology 
need not suggest any artificial opposition between ideas and matter, subject and 
object, if contradiction is seen as inherent within the ideological itself Here, we 
might instead consider what Derrida refers to in relation to Marx as “the furtive and
47 It should be noted of course that this is not what has been argued within the post-modernist critique 
of ideology critique. Here, we tend to find a generalized treatment of false consciousness made the 
target of criticism in relation to the idea of ideology, and little, if any, distinction made between 
epistemological or immanent type critiques.
48 As a model of consciousness it has been described, not altogether facetiously, as having been 
“founded on the rather surprising model of St Paul on the Damascus road”. Stuart Hall, “The Problem 
of Ideology”, in Ma?vc: A Hundred Years On, ed. Betty Matthews (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 
1983), p. 67.
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ungraspable visibility of the invisible”, or, more particularly, the interrelation of 
subject and object within conditions that are often blurred and contradictory.49
Related to post-modernist assumptions regarding false-consciousness is the 
idea that ideology suggests the notion of an ‘authentic’ subject -  a human essence 
alienated in the fetishized labour process. What is meant here by ‘authenticity’ is 
largely left unsaid, but we may conclude that some notion of a prior human 
wholeness, since lost to the ravages of consumer society, is being criticized. Is this 
post-modernist criticism in any sense warranted? At one level, it surely seems not so 
unreasonable to suggest that a more worthy, less alienated, as it were more authentic 
humanity, is that subjectivity which might exist outside the clutches of consumption. 
This need not infer any necessary, absolutist essentialism as to what humanity might 
be. Nor need it have blithely assumed that the constant stream of images the spectacle 
produces do not in fact rely upon the very real cravings of individuals, who at some 
level derive pleasure from their participation within such a way of life. In this way at 
least, the post-modernist dismissal of ideology critique seems overly suspicious, if not 
indeed cynically empty. So too, at another level, a more important point seems to be 
that the critique of ideology does not necessitate any essentialist account of 
subjectivity, if a sense of the contradictory dynamic within ideology itself is 
understood. The purpose of the dialectic here is to cast into a relation of 
indeterminacy and vitality the interrelation between subjective and objective content 
rather than to in any way, as it were, humanize the ideological. A dichotomy between 
subjectivity and an externally imposed objectivity in the shape of ideology is simply a 
mistaken and ultimately objectivist view of the dynamic through which ideology 
exists. The post-modernist dismissal of ideology critique often deals merely with the 
quite obvious problems of an epistemological approach, and, in this sense, a part of its 
focus is very misplaced. As we mentioned in the introduction to the thesis, most 
critical accounts of ideology set out on the basis of an immanent critique of the social 
whole rather than an epistemological evaluation of truth and falsity, even if some of 
this latter approach on occasion creeps back in to an assessment of the social whole. 
It frequently appears that the post-modernist distancing from ideology critique is a 
failure to deal critically with the problems of immanent critique. As we will later see, 
these problems are not the result of an emphasis upon the relation of subject to object
49 Derrida, Specters of Man:, p. 7. Derrida, as we will consider later in the thesis, sees the spectral 
within ideology as suggesting the incorporation of autonomized spirit, as “objectivizing expulsion of 
interior idea or thought”. Ibid., p. 126. The emphasis in this thesis is more upon the interrelationship 
of subject and object.
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in itself, which various theories have claimed, but are with the way in which this 
relation is construed.50
We will here summarize briefly the two matters that types of post-modernist 
criticism emphasize in relation to theories of ideology in order to show how the 
substance of the issues involved demonstrates the continued rather than diminished 
relevance of the ideological. Changes occurring within the spectacle of 
commodification give greater rather than lesser significance to the problem of 
ideology. We see this most particularly with those changes that seem to further 
entrench a symbolic level of the ramifications of consumption in such things as a 
disconcertingly rapid creation of consumptive need, ever changing technological 
means to exploit this need and an erratic vortex in which the exchange of information 
both incorporates and alienates. A seeming autonomy is precisely a realm in which 
ideology is of greatest impact. Currently we see this repeatedly in a political 
abnegation of responsibility from economic decision making, a decision making that 
remains powerfully in the control of political elites, notwithstanding the very real 
influence and power of wholly undemocratic economic institutions with whom 
political bodies are rarely in anything less than complete agreement; and yet this 
reality of collusive and effective power is one that is conveniently side-stepped at the 
political level.51 The ideological value of promoting the idea that a globalized 
capitalism is beyond anyone’s control is great indeed. The strange mixture we are 
dealing with here of a spectacularized and a seemingly more raw reality might be 
difficult for us to untangle but the problem is not whether ideology plays a part in this 
or not. If ideology is present in what is often taken to be conditions of autonomy, so 
too can we detect it in processes that are deemed to reflect the end of the subject. 
Rather than being marginalized from the exigencies of global capitalism, of 
restructuring, the decentralization of production and the mobility of labour, of 
technologized work, the apparently impersonal implementation of bureaucratic
50 In recent times we have perhaps most notably those theories put forward by Habermas contra 
Adorno suggesting instead that the subject is constituted by forms of exchange such as language or 
communicative action rather than what is seen as a consciousness theory of the relation between 
subject and object.
51 Balibar makes an interesting point in his analysis of what he terms the present “reign of statism 
without a true state”. The current “invasion of power” gives the impression of a proliferation of the 
State but is really a ‘statism’ which combines administrative and repressive practices with contingent 
arbitration of particular interests. Balibar likens this situation to Third World states. But it is the sort 
of combination of powers that the State includes within its ambit that is crucial for understanding 
oppositional politics: “All the conditions are therefore present for a collective sense of identity panic to 
be produced and maintained. For individuals fear the state - particularly the most deprived and the 
most remote from power - but they fear still more its disappearance and decomposition”. Etienne 
Balibar, “Es Gibt Keinen Staat in Europa: Racism and Politics in Europe Today”, New Left Review, no. 
186 (March/April 1991): p. 17.
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directives, and so on, the self is brought into being, in an ideological sense, in relation 
to these changes in a powerful and productive manner. We see this in a range of ideas 
in and around these changes with which subjectivity has been engaged: And although 
it is more usual to focus upon ideologies of incorporation, such as the acceptance of 
ideas of ‘flexibility’, the stripping of public assets, high levels of racist hostility 
towards anyone whose need is construed as a potential threat to another’s life 
situation, and so on, it is important to acknowledge in this living reality of the creation 
of a contemporary subjectivity the existence also of instances of refusal, the creative 
assertion of affirmative values in relation to self-organization, the positive 
appropriation of time outside work and the self-management of social needs. 52
We exist in very real relation to these changes and it is here that new elements 
of subjectivity emerge. In saying this we are contesting the implied assumption that 
the operation of ideology cannot mean an actively self-determining or even partially 
self-creating subjectivity. Ideology is, I would argue, mistakenly taken to be a part of 
an objective determinism of domination, power, ruling ideas, and the like. Ideology 
is, rather, a part of the intricate interplay between subjective and objective relations 
occurring within the context of unfreedom -  of which domination and power are 
certainly a part, but not as one-dimensional determinants of any concrete structure of 
ideas. What we might want to theorize of the historical presuppositions of a given 
content of ideology can, indeed, only be understood in relation to their particular 
manifestations at a subjective level. There is, then, a tension between subjective and 
objective relations rather than any form of fundamental categories.
Beyond the Impasse
Within this thesis, what we will come to theorize in ideology is the subject- 
object relation as an event or occurrence in the German sense of Geschehen, which 
includes a sense of shock or accident in terms of what happens. The reciprocity that 
this concept implies means that we cannot pre-determine the importance o f ‘objective’
52 The work of the Italian Autonomist theorist Mario Tronti and his formulation of the ‘inversion of 
struggles’ is taken as a seminal analysis of this type of refusal. See, for example, Mario Tronti, “Social 
Capital”, Telos, no. 17 (1973): pp. 98-121 and Mario Tronti, “The Strategy of Refusal”, Semiotext(e), 
3.3., 1980, pp. 28-35. In general Tronti argues that it is workers’ struggles that provide the basic 
dynamic within capitalism. Capital does not unfold according to its own logic, which it controls, but is 
instead constantly subject to the antagonism of the system. Capitalist development is always propelled 
by capital’s need to harness the power of labour. Toni Negri also looks at the cooperative potentialities 
of social labour under new forms of capitalist domination. See Antonio Negri, The Politics o f 
Subversion: A Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century, trans. James Newell (London: Polity, 1989). 
For a review of this terrain as it applies more specifically to the realm of technology see Nick 
Witheford, “Autonomist Marxism and the Information Society”, Capital and Class, no. 52 (Spring 
1994): pp. 85-125.
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relations, for example, over relations that are ‘subjective’. These relations do not 
possess definite dimensions. They are, indeed, merely categories indicating the 
existence of forms and general relations. There is more an incessant capturing of 
moments within a dialectical present of which past and future, subject and object, are 
a part. As mentioned, we will return to a fuller analysis of this later in the thesis. 
Likewise, the way in which we assess the eccentricity or difference associated with 
aspects of contemporary culture needs always to bear in mind the context of what has 
occurred before: Every epoch, Benjamin tells us, appears to itself inescapably 
modem; every age needs to feel itself to be a new age.53 What this inevitably means is 
that insufficiently understood occurrences and patterns announce themselves as novel 
before we are able to assess their situatedness, changes are accorded an exaggerated 
status and continuities are frequently dismissed or ignored. When these very changes 
involve something akin to a “fragmentation of time into a series of perpetual 
presents” , 54 or to an historical amnesia -  as is argued in relation to the post-modem - 
then this is even more likely to be the result. Ironically, what this often means is that 
genuine changes, or the more substantial aspects of their emergence, are missed. 
Thus the post-modernist dogma of the ‘exhaustion’ of the modernist moment that 
theorists such as Andreas Huyssen and John Barth put forward, or even the more 
critical and subtle summation of a “waning of effect” with the arrival of a fully 
consumerist society that itself heralded the apotheosis of capitalism, which Jameson 
suggested, diverted attention from the very significance of the sorts of changes 
perceived.55 With hindsight, of course, the rapid expiration of the post-modem 
moment would itself be an obvious indicator of a much more general underlying 
problem of cultural exhaustion interspersed with the ‘new’ as objectively real 
possibility -  the sort of process that has been with us in human history for a 
suggestively long time and yet one that remains so curiously little theorized.
53 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap, 1999), pp. 545-546.
54 Fredric Jameson, “Postmodernism and Consumer Society”, in Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster 
(London: Pluto, 1985), p. 125.
55 Andreas Huyssen, “Mapping the Postmodern”, New German Critique, no. 33 (Fall 1984): pp. 5-52. 
John Barth, “The Literature of Replenishment: Postmodernist Fiction”, Atlantic Monthly, 245:1 
(January 1980) pp. 65-71. Jameson, “Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism”, p. 61. 
Interestingly, it is in some of Jameson’s earlier work that he seems to perceive the nature of these 
changes in a more insightful fashion. In 1976 he suggested that “we continue to walk the older world 
of everyday life of classical capitalism while our heads move about in the apparently quite different 
hallucinogenic atmosphere of the media and the supermarket/suburb”. Here, Jameson also refers to 
those realities of capitalism that have not changed substantially -  “wage slavery, money, exploitation, 
the profit motive”. Fredric Jameson, “The Ideology of the Text”, Salmagundi, nos. 31-32 (Fall-Winter, 
1976): p. 243.
46 Ideology Critique and A Philosophy of Freedom
What is apparent is that the displacement of ideology critique occurred within 
the context of what we should now sense as a certain impasse reached with the 
theorization of ideology - specifically that which had been developed within overly 
objectivist accounts of the ideological. Although much has been written on some 
attendant philosophical assumptions that were viewed as necessitating such a shift, 
there has not been a clear understanding of why an impasse within the critique of 
ideology emerged. This thesis addresses important aspects of this issue. The central 
question that is being considered is whether the impasse in ideology critique can be 
attributed to the particular conception of ideology which has dominated many of its 
theories. We must therefore ask whether an objectivist account of power and 
domination as the substance of the ideological, and thus a view of ideology from the 
perspective of an objectivist justification, is at fault here. We are bound also to 
question whether this dominant view of ideology is the only interpretation that need 
be given to a radical engagement with ideology critique.56
First, let us consider something of the definitional problem of ideology by 
initially considering the concept of ideology critique, then by situating the concept of 
ideology within its recent history, and turning, finally, to an analysis of the different 
concepts of ideology. The conceptual typology that will follow will consider three 
broad approaches to the critique of ideology. The first is what we can refer to very 
broadly as the traditional or epistemological approach. This way of viewing ideology 
is primarily concerned with seeking to find some definitive difference between 
ideology and reality, a false and a true consciousness or the error of understanding 
that is deemed to be ideology. Although this way of understanding ideology is 
widespread, and elements of it can indeed be found in some seemingly unlikely 
places, it has already been considered extensively, and therefore for both this reason 
and the fact that it has generally been surpassed by Ideologiekritik, or what I will here 
term ‘immanent critique’, it will be only briefly analysed. The second approach to 
ideology we will consider is, as just mentioned, that of immanent critique. Some of 
the crucial ideas involved in this way of understanding ideology will be explained and 
evaluated, and a sense of the significance of this theoretical approach as a negative 
critique will be considered. What we will argue is that both an epistemological and an 
immanent critique approach tend towards viewing ideology from the same perspective 
-  that, as I have mentioned, of the issue of necessary, sufficient justification. Lastly, 
we will set out, in abridged form, some of the ideas we will expand upon later in the
56 There have been other attempts to theorize the ideological in terms that shift an analysis away from 
this ground. We have already mentioned the work of Castoriadis and we can also mention Ricoeur’s 
essays, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia. In these essays Ricoeur explores what he sees as the polarity 
between ideology and utopia via the concept of the cultural imagination.
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thesis concerning a dialectical critique of ideology, a critique in which the problem of 
unfreedom is at the basis of our understanding of the ideological.
Section Two: A Conceptual Typology of Ideology
The concept o f ideology critique
In any discussion of ideology critique, what must be instantly acknowledged is 
the sheer difficulty involved in defining the terrain of what is, inevitably, a realm of 
seemingly established possibility. There is a constant openness in relation to the use 
to which the concept of ideology is put, and yet this openness vies for significance 
against more congealed histories of the concept as well as certain assumptions as to 
the solidity of the concept itself. David McLellan, for example, refers to ideology as 
“the most elusive concept in the whole of social science” .57 As with many theorists at 
various other junctures, Graeme Turner has recently claimed that ideology “is the 
most important conceptual category in cultural studies” , 58 and this is surely partly 
because of the highly contested scope of the concept itself. Ideology critique has 
evolved to be an increasingly fragmented concept within the social theory lexicon, a 
portmanteau term devised to deal both with the problem of ideology and of its 
critique. Because ideology, as the subject of critique, changes form over time, the 
concept of ideology critique often seems troublingly open-ended. The sheer volume 
of meanings given to the concept is one source of its difficulty, but also, we will 
argue, of its usefulness. It is possible to be quite selective as to a particular meaning 
intended by any use of the term and thus to lend to the term renewed force and 
significance. Given this seeming difficulty in the use of the concept, let us look a 
little more closely at some of the background to the definition of the term.
We have already mentioned that many conceptualizations make quite apparent 
a definitional terrain, even if very broadly conceived, from which they put into use the 
concept of ideology. As we have seen, ideology is detected in justifications of 
corrupted reality or in the individual’s unexamined experience of domination. The 
sense of ideology that emerges in most radical critique is that of a suggestion of the 
presence of some kind of compulsion, often concealed or unknown by the one 
compelled. Ideology therefore acts as a justification or naturalization of this state of
57 McLellan, Ideology, p. 1.
58 Graeme Turner, British Cultural Studies: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 182.
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compulsion. Most theories of ideology, even those which attempt to give an overview 
of the multitudinous ways in which the concept has been cast, distil from both the 
insights and problems of the theory a more defined terrain of analysis. For example, 
Ferruccio Rossi-Landi’s wide-ranging work on the concept of ideology, which brings 
together a discussion of Marxist theory with semiotics and linguistics, presents a 
terminological overview of eleven categories into which the idea of ideology can be 
sorted, and applies to these categories four areas of classification - ideology as false 
thinking, as world-view, as philosophy and as false consciousness. The categories of 
ideology range from mythology, illusion, common sense, lies, fraud and false 
thinking, to philosophy, world-view, intuitive view, behaviour pattern and sentiment. 59 
Terry Eagleton’s work on ideology also reviews the gamut of meanings given to the 
term ‘ideology’, isolating at least sixteen broad meanings attributed to the term which 
are currently in circulation. 60 Again, these range from false, distorted or legitimating 
ideas, to ideas that are characteristic of a particular group or those motivated by 
particular interests, or the processes of the production of meaning. These might 
constitute the way in which people make sense of their world or their construction of 
illusions; they might be the result of identity thinking, or the confusion of linguistic 
and phenomenal reality, or, indeed, the conjuncture of discourse and power. 61 Having 
provided a sweep of possible meanings for the term ideology, both Rossi-Landi and 
Eagleton tend towards using the concept in highly particular ways: Eagleton argues 
for an understanding of ideology in relation to the material structure of society, which 
in the case of particular societies, such as capitalist formations, requires processes of 
legitimation and naturalization. Rossi-Landi also considers the importance of 
discourses of legitimation that emerge out of a social reality whose basis is controlling 
and oppressive. In this sense, he argues that most theories of ideology are attempting 
to account for some phenomenon of social life - power, oppression, a lack of freedom, 
processes of control and alienation, the commodification of life, the mediation of 
symbolic forms of social existence, through technical and institutional means, the 
impact of mass communication, and so on. Likewise, Zizek, having reduced the 
variety of ideas associated with the term ideology to three main categories -  ideology
59 Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, Marxism and Ideology, trans. Roger Griffen (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990). 
pp. 18-19. According to Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, Georges Gurvitch’s detailed analysis of Marx’s work 
finds thirteen different connotations of the term ideology in Marx’s work alone. Whilst different 
meanings of the term are certainly present across Marx’s entire corpus of work and these differences 
are of importance to Marx’s more general theoretical concerns, the highly particular semantics of the 
term seem less important than the theoretical uses of the term ideology in relation to other ideas. The 
work by Georges Gurvitch to which Rossi-Landi refers is Le Concept des classes sociales de Marx a 
nos jours (Paris: Centre de documentation universitaire, 1954).
60 Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction, p. 1.
61 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
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as a complex of ideas “destined to convince us of its ‘truth’, yet actually serving some 
unavowed particular power interest”, ideology as materiality, and ideology as the 
‘spontaneous’ ideology at work at the basis of social reality itself -  argues in each of 
these cases that ideology entails the presence of some mechanism or network through 
which power interests are directly or ultimately served.62
These sorts of particular approaches to the wide-ranging if not unwieldy 
possibilities of the concept would seem to be entirely justified. However, it is 
noteworthy that most, if not all, of the sort of phenomena often raised more generally 
in relation to a working definition of the term, outline an objective basis to ideology, 
suggesting sometimes more or less overtly a certain ‘negative critique’ in the sense of 
how ideology is understood to operate. This tendency, I will want to argue, reflects 
something of a limitation of much theorization on ideology. Of course, it is the case 
that a critique of ideology will undoubtedly emerge on the basis of some account of 
social life, and all of the phenomena mentioned above - power, oppression, a lack of 
freedom, processes of control and alienation, commodification and so on - are cause 
for theorization. What we find, however, is that these phenomena often tend to be 
theorized in an undialectical, almost tautological manner: Ideology exists because 
oppression is oppression, or commodification is commodification. Zizek indeed 
prefaces his understanding of ideology by initially defining it as reality that is 
ideological: “ideology is not simply a ‘false consciousness, an illusory representation 
of reality, it is rather this reality itself which is already to be conceived as 
‘ideological’ ” . 63 Zizek continues by telling us much more about this difficult social 
reality that is the ideological, but nonetheless what we are presented with are realities 
that exist for us as if they are complete within themselves. By contrast a sense of 
‘self-disturbing’ contradiction within unfreedom, commodification or control opens 
these categories to a sense of conflict and otherness in which all realities move. We 
will consider this problem a little further on in the discussion. Let it be pointed out 
here that I do not mean with this that ideology critique is a negative critique merely 
because it often attributes the ideological to “the thought of the other”, with the 
implicit criticism which this implies, as we see Thompson, for example, explaining it 
as such:64 Ideology critique theorized thus is also a negative critique in the sense that it 
deals with an exposition of the experienced moment as a given and not with the 
processes of a transformation of the given. Those theorists who recognize the 
importance of antagonism shift this critique further in the direction of questioning
62 Zizek, “The Spectre of Ideology”, pp. 9-12.
63 Zizek, The Sublime Object o f Ideology, p. 21.
64 Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture, p. 5.
50 Ideology Critique and A Philosophy of Freedom
ideology as some mere extemalization of domination, repression and so forth, and yet 
more often we find a critique of the ‘system’s’ antagonistic character on the basis of 
assumptions as to the system’s own interests than any dialectical analysis of the 
subjective and objective interrelationship of antagonism itself.65
The possibilities of an imaginative, creative self, in and against the 
‘objectiveness’ of reality, need to be seen as a part of, and indeed prior to, a failure of 
the realization of possibility itself, which, as the ideological, can itself function in 
open and unpredictable ways. It is certainly the case that this will involve the ability 
to account for those ideas, beliefs, narratives, and materially instantiated aspects of 
ideology that indicate, or signal the repression of, fundamental antagonisms: In this 
sense, Zizek usefully points out that ideology is “nothing but the form of appearance, 
the formal distortion/displacement, of non-ideology” .66 But what this then means is 
that any subjective construction or engagement with these narratives cannot be 
ignored. It is this difference that we want to capture in theorizing an alternative 
critique of the ideological. The issue that we want to re-introduce into a radical 
critique of ideology is that of the mediation of the subjective within the problem of 
cultural inheritance. In this we want to bring out the unclosed nature of the 
ideological, including elements of a cultural surplus to which the presence of ideology 
gives rise. To this end, we will consider the role of the imagination and an 
anticipatory consciousness within the objective possibility that ideology confers. In 
doing so, we will reflect on something of the recent history of the use of the concept 
of ideology in order to situate our own use of the concept.
The recent history of the theory of ideology
Despite its relatively short history within the lexicon of political theory terms, 
the concept of ideology could well be described as one of the more deep-rooted and 
contentious. The controversy surrounding the concept is often assumed to be in some 
way related to its use within contemporary political debates and yet an array of 
meanings associated with the term seems to have always marked its long-contested 
passage into common use. The concept of ideology unquestionably has a long and 
vexed history. We will look later in the thesis at some different meanings of the
65 Zizek is certainly one of these theorists who places the concept of antagonism at the centre of his 
critique of ideology and considers, what he refers to as, both the ‘spectre’ and the ‘real’ of antagonism. 
However, even here we do not have much of a sense of the subject in relation to these aspects of 
antagonism other than as an objectified part of the ‘paradoxical topology’ of the real.
66 Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London: Verso, 1999), 
p. 185.
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concept that will help us to generate the sort of alternative critique we have mentioned 
to which this thesis is directed. It will become clear in this alternative critique that I 
contend it is only where the concept of ideology is restricted to a sense of 
epistemological concerns over guarantees of truth, reason and falsity that its history is 
limited to the period from the early nineteenth century. This reduction of the concept 
to this recent period is a common assumption regarding the history of the concept.67 
If, however, a very different understanding of what ideology might be is attributed to 
the concept then far more precursors of a broader sense of ideology as a wrestle for 
meaning might be seen. Indeed, we would contend that some notion of ideology has 
accompanied humanity ever since the problem of unfreedom and the inability to see 
things, not so much as they really are but as one actually is, or in the separation 
between these states, emerged. Here we can merely state that dispute concerning the 
concept of ideology indeed seems to suggest that, well before 1796 when the term 
‘ideologic’ was apparently coined by the French sociologist, Antoine Destutt de 
Tracy, the idea of ideology was firmly in currency. This might be because some 
notion of ideas as social constructs, subject to all the vagaries and potential problems 
of socially constructed thought, has been a part of the entire history of human 
consciousness. What this in turn suggests is a closeness of certain meanings of the 
term ideology with other philosophical concepts. Those that seem most readily a part 
of ideology - illusion, alienation, deception, falseness and cynicism - are still separate 
and distinct ideas. And yet a sense of what ideology is without recourse to these other 
ideas would be futile. It will be apparent, then, that any discussion concerning the 
meaning of ideology seems necessarily to involve a complex intertwining of terms 
and ideas. But however interconnected and overlapping these various terms might 
appear, the meaning of ideology needs to grasped, for it is dispute over particular 
meanings of the term that has created so many difficulties for the use of the idea and 
has indeed perhaps contributed, not only to its more recent marginalization, but 
actively prevented the development of an alternative theorization within radical 
philosophy.
Throughout its usage, ideology has most commonly been seen as an 
expression of a particular world view or Weltanschauung, which can range, as if
67 Numerous commentators claim that the history of the concept of ideology is short, rather than 
making a distinction between its appearance within a lexicon of political theory terms and its existence 
and use more generally, the latter a topic which far pre-dates the former. For example, Andrew 
Vincent argues that the “history of the concept of ideology is comparatively short -  approximately two 
hundred years old -  but complex”. Andrew Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1992), p. 1.
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within a continuum, from the relatively neutral to the completely pejorative.68 
Although it is de Tracy who is perhaps the most well-known theorist associated with 
this sense of a ‘world view’, this was not his own view of ideology: de Tracy and his 
school of ideologues (so called, supposedly, by Napoleon) 69 believed that they had 
founded, rather, a ‘science of ideas’ whose unifying character would replace the 
ambiguities inherent in other previously disparate fields of practice and 
understanding. 70 In this way politics and economics could be made coherent and 
rational, allowing a just order to be reliably and indubitably attained with this new 
‘science of ideas’. Religious, moral and metaphysical questions could be relegated to 
their proper place: For the empirically inclined de Tracy, they were part of the 
unattainably ethereal ‘arts of the imagination’ and not the stuff of scientific 
measurement. Michael Freeden points out that this meaning of ideology is today of 
little significance, and yet, even if this is so, it is not the case in relation to the debate 
surrounding this meaning.71
68 Jürgen Habermas argues that the emergence of such world views occurred in the context of both a 
critique of what was taken to be the dogmatism of traditional interpretations of the world and as a way 
of claiming the supposedly scientific character of one’s own position. Habermas thus relates 
Weltanschauung to the legitimation of power relations. See Jürgen Habermas, Toward a Rational 
Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (London: Heinemann, 1971), 
p. 99.
69 Imprisoned in France during ‘the Terror’, de Tracy found that his ideas, which had originally found 
favour with Napoleon, were rapidly attacked as subversive. For Napoleon, the ideologues' attempt to 
theorize society as a whole was a dangerous denial of the sentiments and illusions that could help unify 
assumptions as to the necessity of his own rule, whose legitimation could not be fulfilled by a more 
scientific approach. For a discussion See Charles H. van Duzer, The Contribution o f the Ideologues to 
French Revolutionary Thought (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935). Whereas, for de Tracy, as 
Eagleton comments, “ideology belonged to a rational politics, in contrast to the irrationalist barbarism 
of the Terror”. Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction, p. 66. For Napoleon, a new political order would 
require a sense of religious belief in which the idea of the divine sanction of social inequalities - 
particularly the inequality of property - would be accepted. The calculations of exchange that might 
emerge from a science of ideas could not ensure such a compliance with inequality. In an ironic 
countermove that itself speaks of its ideological purpose, Napoleon could condemn de Tracy’s 
ideologic as “that sinister metaphysics”. Cited by Hippolyte Taine, Les Origines de la France 
contemporaine, Le Regime moderne (Paris: 1898), 2: 219 -  220, quoted in Hans Barth, Truth and 
Ideology, trans. Frederic Lilge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 13.
70 Antoine Louis Claude Destutt, Comte de Tracy, Elements d ’Ideologie (Brussels: 1801), 1: 3. 
Following an interpretation of Condillac’s scientistic sensualism, Locke’s empiricist naturalism and 
Cabanis’ research in the sciences, de Tracy believed his science of ideas would form a “component and 
supplement of physiology”. M. Destutt, Comte de Tracy, Principes logiques ou Recueil de faits relatifs 
ä l ’intelligence humaine (Paris: Mme Vive Courcier, 1817), p. 97. De Tracy refers to Cabanis’ 
Rapports du physique et du morale, as a work “in which the true foundations were really laid for all our 
philosophical and medical knowledge”. See de Tracy, ibid. The other works which particularly 
influenced de Tracy were Etienne Bonnot de Condillac’s Traite des Animaux and Essai sur I’Origine 
des Connaissances Humaines, in his Oeuvres completes (Paris: 1798); also John Locke’s Essay on 
Human Understanding, ed. and intro. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
71 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, p. 14.
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What is noteworthy in the debate that has emerged out of de Tracy’s 
conception of ideology is an interpretation of ideas, or ideas as ideology, that is 
grounded in a belief in scientific progress, and the idea of the perfection of a rational 
social order. It is this that it was thought an unravelling of ideas as ideology or 
otherwise could show. Thus in her Origins o f Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt is able 
to theorize a connection between all ideological thinking and ‘totalitarian elements’, 
on the basis that ideological thinking entails the logic of an idea -  a logical ordering 
of facts starting from some axiomatically accepted premise that then deduces 
everything else from it. This ideology, in Arendt’s terms, is notable for her in its 
consistency -  a consistency which “exists nowhere in the realm of reality”72. And yet 
we might also note that Edward Shils argues that a consistent scientific progress and 
its rules of judgement and observation are antipathetic to ideology. 73 By the mid­
twentieth century period, what had emerged in the thinking on ideology was an 
uneasy sense of the need to distinguish knowledge or certain ideas from ideology.74
Elements of this perceived need had been clearly evident in de Tracey’s work. 
Believing that society consisted of nothing more considerable than mutual business 
transactions, de Tracy contended that his ‘ideologic’ could provide a knowledge of 
this state of humanity with precise and scientific certainty. Falseness would be 
revealed against the dependable measurement that ideologic could provide. It is not 
difficult to see, then, how this concept might have given rise to ideas of false 
consciousness and mistaken perceptions, both of which we will consider shortly. It is 
significant that it is this type of speculation concerning an interpretation of ideology 
that is often claimed as the substance of the debate concerning the concept, when it is, 
rather, a no doubt influential and yet in its own way extremely limited, and often 
scientistic view of ideology. It is in some senses interesting too that Napoleon’s 
attack upon de Tracy’s ‘ideologic’, as a sinister attempt to deny potentially politically 
useful illusions, finds many echoes in the contemporary pejorative use of the term. 
Ideology is often understood as a set of false ideas to which someone (rarely oneself) 
has unfortunately succumbed. 75 Daniel Bell’s work, The End o f Ideology, is perhaps
72 Hannah Arendt, The Origins o f Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1973), pp. 469, 471.
73 Edward Shils, “The Concept and Function of Ideology”, International Encyclopaedia o f the Social 
Sciences, vol. VII, 1968, p. 74.
74 This sort of view characterizes a work such as that, for example, by Barth, Truth and Ideology.
75 Eagleton expresses this wittily with his claim that “ideology like halitosis, is in this sense what the 
other person has”. Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction, p. 2. There are many and varied inflections of 
this approach to the definition of ideology. Kenneth Minogue, for example, chooses to see ideology as 
“any doctrine which presents the hidden and saving truth about the evils of the world in the form of 
social analysis”. Kenneth Minogue, Alien Powers: The Pure Theory o f Ideology (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1985), p. 2. Such doctrines, according to Minogue, reveal a “pure theory of ideology” of 
which the particular ideology, Marxism, constitutes “the paradigm of ideology itself’. In keeping with
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one of the better known expressions of this view, with its declaration that “ideology, 
which was once a road to action, has become a dead end”:76 But even Adorno’s claim 
that “living people have become bits of ideology”, harbours some of this sentiment.77 
Whilst this pejorative meaning has become widespread, and indeed was in currency in 
Germany, for example, by the 1830s,78 much radical social theory is distinctive in its 
being ostensibly wary of this unavoidably relativistic view of ideology.79 The general 
sense in which de Tracy employed the term, as that of a rationalistic, scientific 
explanation of ideas, has much in common with various general contemporary uses of 
the term such as that involved in the espousal of a particular perspective upon the 
world: But the idea that one’s world view could in some way be related to historical 
and social conditions was also a commonplace of many French theorists of the 
Enlightenment, such as Cabanis, Condillac and more particularly, Holbach and 
Helvetius.80 Many theorists are credited with having devised terms or concepts that 
have encompassed the idea of ideology - most notably Machiavelli, Bacon, Vico and 
Rousseau. Spinoza’s theory of superstition has been understood as a forerunner to 
Althusser’s treatment of ideological State apparatuses.81 Bacon’s theory of idola - the 
prejudices, preconceptions or sources of error which impede one’s cognitive capacity 
- is seen to a certain extent, for example, by Karl Mannheim “as a forerunner of the 
modem conception of ideology”.82 This issue is not, however, one of socially 
situating consciousness: It is more with drawing a connection between a world view
this logic it is not altogether surprising that Minogue considers the term ‘capitalism’, for example, to be 
ideological. Whilst he is forced to admit that the term now has a universal currency he reminds us that 
“in strict usage” capitalism is no less than “an inherited condition of things in which humanity has been 
shattered into millions of disconnected fragments whose ant-like scurryings around society have 
created the structure of oppression from which we suffer”. Ibid., pp. 1,4, 5. Despite presenting an odd 
definition of ideology, albeit one which he admits is deliberately narrow, Minogue is undoubtedly right 
about ideology when he writes that “Like sand at a picnic, it gets in everything.” Ibid., p. 1.
76 Daniel Bell, The End o f Ideology (Glencoe, New York: Freepress, 1960), p. 370.
77 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1990), pp. 267-268.
78 The pejorative sense of the term ideology had appeared in dictionaries in Germany by 1838. See 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, ed. O. Brunner, W. Konze and R. Koselleck (Stuttgart: Klett, 1972-92), 
vol. Ill, pp. 131-169, quoted in Michael Rosen, On Voluntary Servitude: False Consciousness and the 
Theory o f Ideology (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), p. 172.
79 It should be noted that one of Marx’s own references to de Tracy finds Marx at his most spleenful - 
for Marx, de Tracy is nothing more than a “fish-blooded bourgeois doctrinaire”. See Marx, Capital, 
vol. I, p. 606.
80 Baron d’Holbach, The System o f Nature, trans. H. D. Robinson (New York: Burt Franklin, 1970) 
refers to the delusions and “massive chains of prejudice” that mislead us as resulting from an ignorance 
of nature. d’Holbach, The System o f Nature, p. viii.
81 Warren Montag, “Spinoza: Politics in a World without Transcendence”, Rethinking MARXISM, vol. 
2, no. 3 (Fall 1989): p. 96.
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and an externalized verification of meaning. For if the issue in question for 
philosophy is one of an awareness that an array of obstacles exists in the path towards 
a knowledge of oneself and the world, then, since its inception, most philosophy could 
be said to have dealt with aspects of this issue.
We have mentioned that a sense of ideology suggesting some sort of 
compulsion, a compulsion that is often elusive and difficult to recognize as such, has 
dominated much theory. For Adorno for example, whether in a state of resignation or 
in delusion, in ideology people are enthralled by an idol. Incapacitated, they become 
“a screen for society’s objective functional context”: functionally determined, they are 
“bewitched, on pain of losing their existence” . 83 Zizek continues something of this 
way of understanding ideology with his argument, in The Sublime Object o f Ideology, 
that people know ideological realities to be ideological and yet act in such a way as to 
perpetuate what is ideological about their reality. 84 Is the problem here that ideology 
has meant too many things to too many different theorists, or is it that the definitional 
problem itself is one which ought to be questioned? What we will attempt to show is 
that a particular way of theorizing ideology -  as a part of a generally objectivist 
understanding of society -  has led to a narrowing of the meaning we might give to 
ideology and, more specifically, to an attenuating of an emancipatory or creative 
impulse within this theorization. We will now consider some of the more significant 
ways in which ideology has been theorized in order to demonstrate this tendency and 
to suggest, in outline, the ground this leaves for an alternative theorization of 
ideology.
Epistemological, Immanent and Dialectical Critique: A Brief Typology of the
Concept of Ideology
In this sub-section we will set out a brief typology of the concept of ideology. 
This is in no sense a comprehensive account of the various ways in which ideology 
has been conceptualized, but is rather an argument concerning what is paradigmatic in 
some of the dominant approaches to ideology. We will consider two broad categories
83 Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 55. Bacon’s idols - the Idols of the Tribe, the Idols of the Cave, 
the Idols of the Marketplace, and the Idols of the Theatre - are described in his Novum Organon, eds. 
Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
83 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 53, 66, 312.
84 Zizek argues, for example, that when individuals use money they “know very well that there are 
relations between people behind the relations between things”. The problem as Zizek sees it is that “in 
their social activity itself, in what they are doing, they are acting as if money, in its material reality, is 
the embodiment of wealth as such”. Zizek thus argues that people are “fetishists in practice, not in 
theory”. Zizek, The Sublime Object, p. 31.
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-  types of epistemological and immanent critique - and then briefly consider 
something of the critique I formulate to theorize the unclosed aspect of the ideological
-  a dialectical or liberatory critique of ideology. We begin then with the problem of 
epistemological critique and consider here the issue of false consciousness. What we 
will focus on in particular is an emphasis upon a kind of counterposition between 
reality and ideology that makes of ideology an untruth, a falsity, often in the service of 
particular interests. We will then turn our attention to the immanent critique of 
ideology and consider three examples of such a critique. With much of the particular 
material presented here we will encounter a sense of overlap between an 
epistemological understanding and the more sociological critique we will find within 
immanent critique. Within the development of the immanent critique of ideology we 
find a definite sense of ideology in relation to the contradictions of social form 
(capitalist relations of exploitation, power or domination more generally) but also 
quite often descriptions of ideology in terms of illusion, misperception or falseness. 
As we have said, there is distinct value in maintaining some sense of illusion as a 
facet of the ideological, particularly where this encompasses a view of it as a slightly 
altered aspect of reality. Gerard Granel’s term mirement plays this function well, 
conveying the ability for thought to be, as it were, refracted in reality with the effect 
that the object appears somewhat differently (in the strict sense of the term, higher) 
than it really is. 85 We will shortly see whether such a conception of illusion has 
tended to be developed. The first example we will look at is that of mistaken 
perception, which usually straddles a sense of falsity and that of the contradictions of 
social form. Secondly, we will consider the concept of material reality in relation to 
ideology. Thirdly, we will look at an example of ideology as structured interest and 
justification or legitimation, in order to show how, once a sense of a material basis of 
the ideological is viewed, this can all too easily tend towards suggesting some 
independent logic to the form of ideology itself. What we will see here is that a 
reflection upon a general interest structure such as class or a reified totality (an 
‘outside’ point of view normally associated more with a transcendent critique) slides 
into a focus upon the internal form or structure of an aspect of the totality as an 
abstraction. Lastly, we will introduce, as an alternative, the idea of dialectical critique 
and explain its distance from what can generally be termed the negative critique of 
epistemological and immanent critique approaches.
85 Gerard Granel, “Pourquoi avons-nous publie cela?”, in De l ’Universite (Paris: TER, 1982), p. 105.
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Epistemological critique as the veil o f convention — problems in the theorization o f 
false consciousness
We have already mentioned that many radical and particularly Marxist 
theories of ideology have been commonly associated with the concept of false 
consciousness. 86 It should of course be noted that Marx himself did not in fact ever 
use the term ‘false consciousness’, nor did he refer to the sense in which the term 
takes on a specific meaning for those who did most use it - this being, rather, the sense 
referred to by Engels and used by some Marxists and many commentators on 
Marxism thereafter. For these Marxists, false consciousness tended to mean a type of 
self-consciousness on the part of a social agent, which is, however, false because it is 
a mistaken perception of the agent’s own actions. The well-known passage by Engels 
expressing this sentiment occurs in a letter he wrote to Franz Mehring a decade after 
Marx’s death: “Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker 
consciously, indeed, but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him 
remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all. 
Hence he imagines false or apparent motives” . 87 This construction of ideology as a
86 The issue of attributing the idea of false consciousness to Marxism is often blurred by a conflation of 
the theoretical approach attributed to Marx and that presented by various Marxists. In a recent work, 
Christopher Pines, for example, refers to the notion of false consciousness as defining “the classical 
Marxist conception of ideology”. Whilst admitting some difficulty in ascribing this view to Marx 
himself, in relation to interpretations of Marx, Pines sides with those who argue in favour of the false 
consciousness thesis. Christopher Pines, Ideology and False Consciousness: Marx and his Historical 
Progenitors (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), p. 2. The end result of having such a 
false consciousness is the inability of the working class to realize itself as a revolutionary proletariat. 
Although this is the substance of Pines’ work on Marx and ideology, the evidence he provides for this 
argument is, at best, limited. A more interesting example within a Marxist approach of viewing 
ideology as a form of false consciousness can be found in the work of Bertell Oilman. The 
contemporary rejection of the formulation of ideology as a false consciousness is also put forward on 
the basis of interpretations of Marx. In his work, Marxism and Philosophy, Alex Callinicos argues that 
there are “distinct and conflicting elements” involved in Marx’s account of ideology. Alex Callinicos, 
Maivcism and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) p. 128. Even within a single text 
such as The German Ideology, for example, Marx and Engels use ideology in a number of senses. At 
one level it is used in the sense of false consciousness, the false ideas which function so as to 
completely mystify with their illusions, and at another level, it is used as a more objective rather than 
merely imaginary construct, in the sense that it is expressed in material terms and functions with 
material consequences for those subject to its systems of ideas. W. J. T. Mitchell makes this point in 
relation to The German Ideology, where he observes that the camera obscura model is at odds with the 
depiction of consciousness as a social product found elsewhere in the work. See W. J. T. Mitchell, 
Iconology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 173.
87 Engels to Mehring, 14 July 1893. In the letter to Franz Mehring, Engels refers to the “false or 
apparent motives” imagined by the thinker, the “real motive forces impelling him” remaining an 
unknown and thus ideological process. Engels’ definition of ideology on this basis is then “a process 
accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness.” Engels’ 
letter to Mehring is also significant in its criticism of his own and Marx’s failure to give a sufficient 
account of the means by which “political, juridical and other notions” come about. This Engels saw as 
directly related to an inevitable emphasis in their analysis upon the derivation of ideology from “basic 
economic facts”. Engels to Mehring, 14 July 1893, in Selected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers),
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process occurring consciously, but without an understanding of its real motivations, is 
the basis for much speculative analysis as to what the ‘real motives’ impelling people 
are and why they fail under ordinary circumstances to become known to the agent. 
For many Marxists, an assumption is made that ‘real motives’ correspond in some 
way to the interests of a class, which under particular circumstances will reveal 
themselves, thereby allowing ‘the real’ to become known. Lukäcs’s examination of 
the process of reification, despite a central focus upon the fragmentation of agency 
under conditions of a rationalized and technological capitalism, and even despite his 
emphasis upon dialectics, is, I will argue, a partial extension of a false consciousness 
idea. In less obvious ways, Althusser too uses a variant of this idea to argue that the 
imaginary - the universal unconscious - structures what the human subject can never 
be - free from ideology as a form of unconscious control. As we will see this sort of 
critique veers more towards an immanent critique of the pervasive and deeply 
entrenched nature of the ideological.
The concept of false consciousness is itself an interesting one because it both 
conveys a general sense of what can be meant by ideology (ideas and actions which 
are deceptive or untrue) and because it has resulted in much confusion. It is 
nonetheless odd that the term is so attributed to Marxism, firstly because as we 
mentioned above, as a term, it was never used by Marx and, secondly, because, at 
least at a superficial level, it has been extensively criticized by many Marxists. 88 We
p. 690. As to whether is it adequate to deduce Marx’s treatment of ideology from words contained 
within a letter written by Engels a decade after Marx’s death, or whether one should attempt the more 
involved task of critically analysing Marx’s various works themselves, it should be clear that I regard it 
as fundamentally unscholarly to base one’s claims concerning Marx on a narrow appreciation of his or 
anyone else’s work. Marx and Engels made very different contributions to an analysis of capitalist 
social relations. Even at the height of their collaborative efforts, Marx was moved to write how 
“exceedingly odd” it was that a contemporary commentator “speaks of us in the singular - ‘Marx and 
Engels says', etc”. Letter from Marx to Engels, 1 August 1856, Collected Works vol. XXXX, pp. 61- 
64. Marx would no doubt have been horrified to know that many a commentator would come to elide 
all distinction between himself and Engels, making Marx not only responsible for Engels’ utterances 
during Marx’s own lifetime but also well after his death.
88 The claim that Marx used such a term is very widespread. In his general conceptual overview, 
Ideology, John Plamenatz claims that, for example, “Marx often called ideology ‘false consciousness’” 
and yet, perhaps ultimately because there is no evidence, does not offer a single reference to any of 
Marx’s work. John Plamenatz, Ideology (London: Macmillan, 1971). But Plamenatz is far from alone 
in this respect; many Marxist theorists have made the same claim. For example, Alex Callinicos’ 
general argument is that Marx’s conception of ideology equating ideology with false consciousness 
puts forward the idea that there are false ideas that can be simply inverted in order to change the reality 
of existing conditions. There are obvious problems with this sort of analysis for a materialist account 
of ideology, he argues; to begin with, changing capitalist reality is not as simple as merely substituting 
false ideas for those which are true. Such a view, according to Callinicos, attempts to invert the 
Hegelian inversion of subject and predicate and places “the site of this inversion in social reality” but, 
in so doing, merely asserts that “capitalism possesses the properties of the Absolute Idea”. This mere 
inversion of Hegel’s teleological dialectic, he continues, has the effect of supposing that Being “as the 
immediate unity of subject and object [...] [is] conscious of itself as divided into essence and 
appearance”. This “intro-reflection” of Being “has the effect of endowing capitalist relations of
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mention it here for two reasons -  firstly because, as we will see, it provides only a 
narrow and rather limited sense of what ideology might mean, and secondly because, 
somewhat oddly, it is this way of understanding ideology which has been generalized 
in a number of ostensibly more sociological theorizations of ideology. It will no 
doubt be obvious that I consider an alternative theorization of the ideological requires 
a critical distance from this particular conceptualization of ideology.
As we have considered, this particular concept of ideology began its life as a 
rationalist attempt to provide a sytematized view of ideas and consciousness; it is in 
this sense a child of the Enlightenment. In many ways this systematization was seen 
as necessary in order to counter what were viewed as pre-scientific superstitions and 
fetishistic beliefs. Charles de Brasses’ influential view of the fetish gods of Africa 
was, for example, interpreted by Marx not only to suggest much about the 
superstitions of a ‘pre-scientific’ world but also the fetishistic character of modem 
industrialized society.89 However, according to a more strictly rationalist approach, 
ideology was present where incomplete, unscientific, merely metaphysical knowledge 
existed.90 False consciousness in this sense would be indicative of a lack of such 
control over those unruly aspects of a susceptible or incomplete mind. It is this same 
language of control that inevitably infects all theories of false consciousness, even 
those which attempt to ground the idea in seemingly more objectivist terms. The idea 
of exposure is also a part of this, presented as if the very act of exposure will ensure 
some desired outcome. In the work of David Hawkes, for example, a rigorous 
opposing of the real to theory will lead to such exposure.9'
Of course, whilst any claim to truth or falsity sounds unfashionably Cartesian, 
somewhat inconveniently, it also seems to accord with much basic experience of 
ideology’s function. False, unfounded ideas do exist. It would be unwise, however, 
to upon this basis construct a theory of the absolute truth of thought that unmasks the
production with the ability to reflect upon themselves, in the form of fetishism”. As Callinicos’ related 
view is that fetishism tends towards the idea of the spontaneous generation of false consciousness he 
argues for the necessity of dispensing with any Hegelian category that fails to account for the material 
determination of ideologies. Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy, pp. 132-133. In addition to this, 
Callinicos argues, the whole idea of truth versus falsity is somewhat beside the point if the idea of the 
determination of ideologies by class struggle is taken seriously. Referring to Marx’s comments on 
ideology in the 1859 Preface to A Contribution to the Critique o f Political Economy, Callinicos 
suggests that what “matters is that they are the ‘forms in which men become conscious of [...] conflict 
and fight it out’.” Ibid.,p. 135.
89 See Karl Marx, “Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood”, Collected Works, vol. I, pp. 224-263.
90 Thus, for the ideologues, ideology was most appropriately considered a part of the ‘natural science’ 
of zoology. If the consciousness could be plotted and mapped out as a matter of sense perception, in 
much the same way that the parts of the body or the planets had been systematized, then one’s control 
and regulation over this knowledge would, according to this logic, be all the greater.
91 Hawkes, Ideology, p. 181.
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falsity of ideology as if a notional, independent abstract category of judgement is 
readily accessible: Not only unwise, but perhaps even unnecessary. It is important to 
remember, as Eagleton argues, that “we do not need intuitive access to the Platonic 
Forms to be aware that apartheid is a social system which leaves something to be 
desired” .92 What is real or ‘true’ for emancipatory theory is always at issue, it is not 
guaranteed in advance by reference to some pre-given, fixed truth criteria. If what is 
false about false consciousness is not its failure to conjure the image of a perfect truth, 
then it is worthwhile to ask what, predominantly, has the idea of a false consciousness 
been about? For many Marxists, the ‘falsity’ of ideas (even if not expressed in this 
way) concerns the gap between a capitalistic or bourgeois view of the world and an 
assessment of the world from the perspective of Marxism.93 It is more the one­
sidedness of certain ideas that reveals them to be characteristically ideological, rather 
than their total lack of truth or reality. But just as the notion of myth becomes the 
basis for reason, so too the notion of ideology suggests a different reality, a side 
suppressed by the dominance of another. Having distanced itself from the idea of 
having some privileged access to perfect truth, contemporary social theory is left with 
the choice between renouncing history, reason, reality and praxis - and thereby 
claiming the end of ideology - or approaching ideology from a different direction, in 
which the dialectical relations between people and the world they experience - types 
of ‘reason’ and ‘history’, not hypostasized but grounded in practices - still demand 
that ideas be interrogated on the basis of the categories and claims they put forward: 
In other words, the critique of ideology.
The problem associated with the ‘false consciousness’ thesis is related also to 
confusion surrounding the status of any given consciousness. An objectively false 
consciousness might well describe distortions and delusions that emerge from a 
fractured and contradictory system, whereas a subjectively false consciousness seems 
merely to imply some individual dysfunction, and nothing more. As Bloch expresses 
it, an objectively false consciousness might be as simple as “saying ‘Bible’ and 
meaning ‘calico’”, for example, as in the case of the wilful deception of people for 
whom such falsity is not apparent, or it might be as problematic, and in many ways as 
unsatisfactory, as the fact that the “true secret history of Rome is that of private
92 Terry Eagleton, introduction to Ideology, ed. Terry Eagleton (London: Longman, 1994), p. 17.
93 Fredric Jameson, for example, claims of Marx that he saw ideology as a matter less “of ‘false 
consciousness’ or of class origins [...] [than of] the structural limits or ideological closure imposed on 
thought by its class positioning within the social totality”. Fredric Jameson, Fables o f Aggression: 
Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. 17. 
Although we will have reason to question this sense of the ideological in Marx’s work later in the thesis 
it is certainly the case that this tendency highlighted by Jameson applies to many Marxists.
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property” . 94 Presenting realities as something other than that which they are certainly 
can involve falseness. It often seems indeed, as Nietzsche argues, that we are 
“unremittingly ridden and drilled by false feeling'\ a sentiment that prevents us from 
admitting the reality, and often the bleak reality, of our existence to ourselves. But 
what if this false feeling is more of the nature of errance -  the involvement of truth in 
error and error in truth? In the final chapter of the thesis we will look at some 
contemporary examples in which we are “transformed and reduced to the helpless 
slaves of false feeling” . 95 As previously mentioned, it is not the presence of false 
ideas, of “the object riddled with error” 96 that is doubted - false, misleading, inaccurate 
ideas exist: The degree of falseness and inaccuracy is not known in relation to some 
final abstract judgement of ultimate truth, but is perceived in terms of its implication 
in masking other views and realities. And it is, as Jameson argues, unlikely that such 
a thing as pure error is possible. 97 Distortion tells us something about ideology at one 
level. It is only by setting up a realm of final, abstract judgement that the distorted 
and undistorted appear suspiciously reachable, which is precisely the aim of a theory 
of ideology as false consciousness. However, what is left out of an account of this 
sense of the ideological as false consciousness is the possibility that what might also 
be occurring within such scenarios is the ‘wrestle for truth’, which includes the type 
of wrestle with one’s very self we mentioned at the outset of the chapter. Perhaps 
expressing this as a type of ‘truth’ in the midst of criticizing accounts of falsity 
confuses the issue at this stage -  the ‘wrestle for truth’ is a wrestle with reality, indeed 
with the competing, contradictory realities, including those of the self, which 
underscore ideology.
It is certainly the case that radical theories of ideology, and more specifically 
Marxist theories of ideology, have long been wary of any claims to ultimate, eternal 
truth; and even those Marxists who have toyed with ideas of ‘science’ or ‘totality’ 
against which ideology could be contrasted, have done so with various degrees of
94 Bloch’s mention of such a deliberate deception, perhaps with reference to Marx, continues “and not 
only in the colonies”. Ernst Bloch, The Utopian Function o f Art and Literature: Selected Essays, trans. 
Jack Zipes and Frank Mecklenburg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), p. 255. Marx too uses a 
similar example with his examination of the transformation of commodities into money and money into 
commodities -  here Marx selects iinen-money-Bible’ as an instance of this transformation. Marx, 
Capital, vol. I, p. 111.
95 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth”, in Untimely Meditations, ed. Daniel Breazeale, 
trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 219.
96 Walter Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era o f High Capitalism, trans. Harry 
Zohn (London: Verso, 1983), p. 103.
97 Fredric Jameson, “Reflections in Conclusion”, in Aesthetics and Politics, ed. and trans. Ronald 
Taylor (London:Verso, 1986), p. 201.
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difficulty. 98 What is obvious, however, as we will attempt to account for later in the 
thesis, is the absence of any other sense of what philosophy might be. If a search for 
truth is only ever problematically pursued as entwined with reason, how else might 
philosophy engage with the significance of the imagination and the deepest yearnings 
of the soul or psyche? As we will see, ignoring such issues has meant an avoidance of 
a fundamental enquiry into the place of the self within her world. What has emerged 
instead is an ultimately fractured recognition of the problem of types of guarantees for 
a certainty of being. Assuming some fixed, external point of reference from which a 
critique of ideology might take place, is fraught with problems. If this sort of notion 
of ideology requires the presence of some ‘extra-ideological’ reality does this not also 
imply an a priori distinction between realms of pure reality and falsity? If we are to 
know these realms, we would also presumably need to rely upon some medium 
beyond both truth and falsity, a medium which indeed collapses the distinction 
between truth and falsity. 99 For most theorists who have chosen this sort of 
explanation the path taken has been treacherous. But what if the idea of falsity is used 
to mean not that which fails to satisfy some golden certitude of dogmatic ‘absolute 
truth’ but, rather, much more generally, that which is inaccurate, misleading, 
inadequate or partial? Surely on such a basis an overriding concern with the problems 
of a theory of false consciousness is not entirely misplaced? Are there not 
inaccuracies, misleading pieces of information, and partial, loaded or inadequate 
explanations?
We have seen that a false consciousness thesis must assume that ideology 
exists to convince us of its deceptive truth: It can be characterized in these terms as a 
notion of “ideology ‘in-itself”, as Zizek argues. 100 But what if the problem is more 
that we make of reality a lie for a whole variety of externally promoted and internally 
more or less resolved reasons? Where would such a view leave our concept of 
ideology? Viewing ideology as a type of reality is certainly a worthwhile advance 
upon those accounts that maintain ideology could only ever be an illusion, a complete 
phantom -  but, as we will see, there is nothing particularly distinctive about this
98 What we will later consider is, somewhat surprisingly, that Marx’s work suggests a suspicion of all 
thought that forces an uncritical veneration from its creators, all thought which smacks of the 
sacrosanct certainties of a ‘Holy Family’, turning ideas and realities into lifeless dogmas. This includes 
what Marx saw as the compromised ‘Young Hegelian’ “revolt against this rule o f concepts”. Here a 
chiding instruction imagines that it alone will cause realities to collapse: “Let us teach” the holders of  
ideas “how to take up a critical attitude to them”, “how to get them out of their heads”. Critique, 
including the critique of ideology, cannot proceed in this way. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The 
German Ideology (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 29.
99 Zizek expresses such a realm as a “For-itself o f ideology at work in the very In-itself o f extra- 
ideological actuality”. See Zizek, “The Spectre of Ideology”, pp. 14 - 15.
100 Zizek, “The Spectre of Ideology”, p. 10.
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position. It is what Marx argued and what various Marxists - most prominently, 
Althusser - have argued. It is less the inaccuracies and partial explanations that are at 
issue here; the real, in its totality, lies. What is important to note, however, is that 
Marx did not refer to this as false consciousness. 101 It seems that in so doing -  in 
referring to this lived reality as false consciousness -  theorists such as Hawkes, as we 
have already mentioned, are inexorably led into the types of philosophical 
dichotomies - truth versus falsity, reality versus illusion, and so on, posed in entirely 
abstract terms - which Marx was at pains to avoid. 102 But even if we allow for a 
certain straying into conceptualizations of ideology that posit more of the ideological 
in its extemalization, via practices, institutions, structures, and so forth -  a view of 
“ideology ‘for-itself ” as Zizek would argue - where does this leave the relation of 
reality to ideology? 103 Is reality completely subsumed within the ideological, or 
allowed, on occasions, to appear as the truth against attempts to naturalize a symbolic 
order of power and control? What we find in a number of contemporary theorists is 
the tendency to attribute a state to the ideological that allows for very little that we do 
not already know to be false. 104 Such theories rarely attempt to explain why people 
choose to believe in something they know to be untrue. Indeed, we are sometimes 
unclear of what status, if any, is given to the role of the consciousness and the 
unconscious in this. The whole difficult issue of individual understanding and 
volition is sidetracked, often in a pre-emptory and quite unsatisfactory manner, by an 
insistence upon the commodity economy’s total destruction of the subject. We will 
see that the issue is much more one of the difficulty the individual has in fully 
possessing herself, in knowing how to become what one is, than it is one of tracing
101 Complicating this issue of whether such an interpretation of ideology should be referred to as false 
consciousness is the fact that various theories which ostensibly deplore the use of the term tend to 
reproduce the same problems which Hawkes encounters. It is nonetheless puzzling that, considering 
the sheer volume of work within Marxism expressing varying degrees of hostility to the idea of false 
consciousness, it is this issue which is the focus of much post-modernist criticism. Any 
characterization of Marxist theories of ideology exclusively in relation to false consciousness would 
seem to appear, at least at a superficial level, somewhat misplaced. But what is stranger still is a 
largely unquestioned acceptance that those theorists who claim to distance themselves from a false 
consciousness thesis do in fact achieve their intended aim. As a part of our investigation of the place of 
ideology within a dialectic of freedom and unfreedom we will also consider parenthetically how well 
Marxist theories of ideology, which have been seemingly pitched against theories of false 
consciousness, have indeed fared. It should be emphasised that this issue of the critique of false 
consciousness is not central to the critique we are developing: It is more that we need to explicitly 
counter any assumptions as to its centrality to ideology critique more generally in order to move the 
critique of ideology forward.
102 On such issues Marx, as we will later consider, repeatedly challenges the notion of counterpositions 
that do not account for the ways in which the consequences of such values are resolved.
103 Zizek, “The Spectre of Ideology”, p. 12.
104 This is much of Zizek’s approach in his Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique 
o f Ideology (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993).
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some supposedly necessary unfathomable dispersal of the subject into the ideological 
mechanisms of social reproduction. 105 The problem with understanding ideology as 
signifying unfounded, intoxicatingly illusory thought, or misplaced beliefs, is that it 
unavoidably suggests a certain sense of the relation of social reality to what are taken 
to be true or false ideas, which, at most, obliquely suggests but does not come to terms 
with the problem of experience and imagination.
Let us re-state that much dissatisfaction exists with a conceptualization of 
ideology as a set of false or distorted ideas -  we will see this quite clearly in our 
examination of the works of Lukäcs, Althusser and Marx. Ideology is able to function 
‘materially’ in the sense that it can have real effects within a social context, effects 
which are perceived and understood as real. For this reason, ideology cannot be 
dismissed as simply false or distorted in relation to a true and non-distorted reality. 
What we will see instead is that the idea that ideology might involve mistaken 
perceptions of the way reality presents itself, or that reality is lost to a faulty memory 
of what reality is really like, or that some merely flatter themselves by having returned 
to them a mistaken view of the object, or are simply prevented from seeing the object 
as it really is because the position from which they direct their gaze obscures its 
reality - all of these ideas, which fall under the rubric of misperception, have had 
greater currency. 106 Such views also present problems for us in a theorization of the 
ideological. Let us now consider what some of these might be.
105 Bloch refers to the individual thus: “I am. But without possessing myself. So we first come to be”. 
Ernst Bloch, A Philosophy o f the Future, trans. John Cumming (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 
p. 1: And Nietzsche subtitles his Ecce Homo with the phrase “How One Becomes What One Is”. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is, trans. R. J. Hollingdale 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), p. 31. Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil is subtitled “Prelude to a 
Philosophy of the Future”. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy o f the 
Future, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974).
106 It is probably partly for this reason that some degree of overlap seems apparent with viewing 
ideology as false ideas and viewing it as mistaken perception. This could explain the persistent 
association made between Marxist theories of ideas and the theory of false consciousness. But this is 
perhaps being too generous to those who make such claims. It is more likely that Marxism is 
associated with the theory of false consciousness in order to discredit Marxism as a theory. The idea of 
false consciousness will never be able to rid itself of its self-limiting positivist view of absolute truth or 
falsity, and so too Marxism can be condemned by consanguinity as a misguided and irrelevant 
positivism. It is of little surprise that in its criticism of Marxism post-modernism takes the short step 
from questioning the concept of truth to elliding all distinction between the real and the fictional, and 
often prefers instead to wallow in an acceptance of a universal condition of hegemonic control. Much 
value exists in the former but little is to be gained from artificially contriving a structure of hegemony 
from which any knowledge of reality disappears.
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Immanent critique: Ideology as the contradiction o f social form and ideology as 
illusion - the mistaken perception o f appearances
Despite a widespread apparent rejection of the formulation of ideology strictly 
as a ‘false consciousness’, some understanding of ideology as involving the act of 
being misled by the appearance of reality, rather than reality itself, continues to be put 
forward within analyses of ideology, even those which are set out on the basis of a 
critique of the contradictions of social form. When a theorist such as Lukäcs refers to 
the “vital importance” in seeing “the truth concealed behind” “deceptively one-sided” 
pictures, 107 mistaken perception and falsity seem to merge into one, and the 
importance of these concepts to each other is clearly apparent. Certainly, the 
philosophical procedures of exposure and a type of unmasking apply to both concepts, 
as does the pivotal idea of a general mystification against which critique is 
necessitated. The problems associated with these procedures would also then seem to 
be applicable. We will consider what is entailed in the view of ideology as a type of 
mistaken appearance and consider whether some of the same issues which apply to a 
false consciousness thesis are relevant here as well. We will also begin to see what it 
is that emerges with an increasing theorization of ideology as located within 
externalized structures.
Let us consider an example within a well-known Marxist approach that views 
ideology as mistaken perception. The North American Marxist theorist, Bertell 
Oilman, claims that most of the distortions associated with contemporary ‘bourgeois 
ideology’ are of the kind depicted in Marx’s example of the myth of Cacus. In order 
to steal oxen, Cacus forces the animals to walk backwards into his cave so as to 
mislead anyone in pursuit of the stolen beasts into believing that the tracks left by 
their hooves suggest that they must have moved from the cave into a field and 
disappeared. Reality, Marx demonstrates, can be deceptive. 108 As Oilman states, 
Marx “never criticizes ideology as a simple lie or claims that what it asserts is 
completely false” . 109
While usefully pointing to a contextual basis of ideology in relation to how it 
functions, most discussions of ideology, argues Oilman, have “completely ignored the
107 Georg Lukäcs, Histoiy and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney 
Livingstone (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1972), p. 173.
108 Bertell Oilman, Dialectical Investigations (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 11.
109 In Marx’s analysis, according to Oilman, ideology is generally described as “overly narrow, partial, 
misfocused, and/or one-sided, all of which are attributable to limitations in the abstractions of 
extension, level of generality and vantage point that are used, where neither these abstractions nor their 
implications are grasped for what they are”. Ibid., p. 71.
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misapplication of the process of abstraction that is responsible for its distinctive 
forms”. Examples of distorting vantage points might be the vantage point of the 
isolated individual, the subjective side of any situation (what is believed, wanted, 
intended, and so on) and anything connected with the market. 110 This approach 
usually results in a hodgepodge of mismatched qualities and a view that precludes an 
understanding of processes. Capital is thus seen narrowly as the means of production: 
a commodity - “any good that is bought and sold; profit - something earned by 
capitalists; and the market itself - an over-the-counter exchange of goods and services 
that follows its own extra social laws” . * 111 In other words, for Oilman, processes are 
reduced to supposedly flat abstractions about human nature. 112 We might wonder how 
Oilman is able to so neatly excise the realm of the objective from the subjective to 
know that only the former gives an undistorted, unideological view of the world but 
we are unlikely to have these assumptions clarified for us much further. Indeed, as 
with much theorizing of this nature (both within and outside Marxism) we are left 
with many more questions than answers as to the whole difficult nature of the relation 
between subject and object and the place of our own critical appraisal of this relation. 
It also seems more explicable although very much less satisfying that this issue has 
been effectively abandoned by much contemporary and particularly post-modernist 
theory.
Oilman’s emphasis on theorizing seems, in one sense, an important one. He 
views the basis of the central debate on ideology within Marxism as the adherence to 
different vantage points. 113 He seems to suggest that if we could all just think a little 
bit more about the dialectical relation between those aspects, then ‘bourgeois 
ideology’ would not have quite its grip. 114 At the same time, it is most definitely 
something about the ‘objective’ conditions giving rise to misperception that we must 
consider as the basis of ideology even though it is the subjective understanding or 
misunderstanding of these objective conditions that then furnishes us with the 
ideological. This is presented as if no unresolved tension between what is the 
‘subjective’ (and Oilman has already given us at best a somewhat narrow and at worst
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid., p. 72.
112 For Oilman, one needs to recognize that abstractions are the basic unit of ideology, abstractions 
which distort and obfuscate reality. Ibid., p. 26.
113 It is a difference of preferred vantage points that leads to “the debate over whether bourgeois 
ideology is mainly a reflection of alienated life and reified structures or the product of the capitalist 
consciouness industry, where one side views the construction of ideology from the vantage point of the 
material and social conditions out of which it arises and the other from that of the role played by the 
capitalist class in promoting it”. Ibid., p. 79.
114 Ibid., p. 17.
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an unclear sense of this) and the ‘objective’ of these relations. Oilman’s main point is 
that ideology is that collection of things in society appearing not to change, when in 
reality it is a part of a process. 115 The ideological is the imaginary reversal of real 
relations, what strikes us most immediately is taken as responsible for the more or less 
hidden processes that have given rise to it - in other words, a type of fetishism. 116 
‘Bourgeois ideology’ dismisses, misses, or misconstrues coming qualitative change in 
society. It misrepresents contradiction as a simple opposition, tension, or 
dysfunction. 117 Ideology is a vantage point that either hides or seriously distorts the 
relations and movements a subject has to her perception, in order to adequately 
comprehend a particular phenomenon. 118 Ideology is also, as we have seen, the result 
of examining a phenomenon from only one side, when several aspects are needed 
instead. 119
Quite obviously ideology does involve the process of perception, and 
particular perceptions may indeed be complicit in the reproduction of exploitative and 
oppressive conditions, which ideologies might seek to deny. But what is not clear in 
an approach such as Oilman’s is how ideology as a distorting abstraction is at the 
same time socially real, and how subjective and objective elements interact. Indeed, 
Oilman’s approach suggests almost a misinterpretation of Marx’s concept of 
fetishism. Oilman explains perfectly well the process by which subjects develop a 
distorted and mystified view of the world in relation to capitalism, but this does not 
explain the relation of this to other parts of the process - how and why capitalist 
society is itself a contradictory form, why ideology becomes a manifestation of these 
contradictions, and what other ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ conditions might give rise 
to the acceptance or rejection of a mystification. The appearance of ideology cannot 
be dualistically counterposed to a one-dimensional reality -  even where such an 
apparent reality insists upon presenting itself in this, its crudest form. Such theorizing 
can only result in an endless circularity or tautological explanation of its premises:
115 Ibid., p. 31.
116 Ibid., p. 46.
117 Ibid., pp. 49, 51.
118 Ibid., p. 70.
119 For example, individuals, classes and the human species are merely different levels of generality - 
no level should have an ontological priority - for ‘bourgeois ideology’, according to Oilman, people are 
either all different or all the same. Ibid., pp. 59, 67.
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Either appearances suggest a distance from reality or reality is the basis upon which 
appearances can be judged. 120
As we have already considered, reality seems very much more murky, 
fragmentary and incomplete than such a thesis is able to sustain. Emancipatory theory 
is, of course, bound up with an attempt to make this fragmentation and openness of 
reality more coherent, but more, however, with the purpose of situating that which it 
would see changed, than in claiming its privileged access to some Holy Grail. 
Marxism, or any other theory for that matter, cannot claim to provide a complete 
experience of history that misperception has failed to provide. However, at its base, a 
theory of the misperception of appearances must draw a distinct line between reality 
and the appearance of reality. It is in this way that some model of distorted reality as 
mistaken appearances tends to surface in most critiques of ideology, even those in 
which there is a far broader and indeed sometimes limitless view of what it is in 
society that is mistaken. For much immanent critique it is the social whole that is 
itself the mistaken appearance, or the appearance as it must be of which one will 
always be, in a sense, ‘mistaken’. This has not meant any necessary inability to 
understand the difficulty with an underlying assumption that reality could ever be 
clearly distinguished from its appearance. Indeed, sensing problems with such a 
schema, most contemporary Marxist theorists have devised other concepts for a more 
complete knowledge of compromised appearances -  we have briefly mentioned the 
ideas of ‘totality’ and that of ‘science’ have both been put forward as attempts to 
subvert the problem of perspective. We will consider in the next several chapters to 
what extent such attempts have met with success. Lukäcs, for example, bases much 
of his theory of reification and class consciousness on the idea of the existence of 
different standpoints, where “the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are thrown sharply 
into relief’ . 121 Althusser develops the idea of an internally coherent science, well 
removed from the untrustworthiness of lived experience, which alone can produce a 
knowledge of the way the system functions. As will emerge in the argument later in 
the thesis, both these approaches have serious limitations that are felt in a failure to 
theorize the range of social determinants that comprises the human experience of 
reality. We will need to consider to what extent a dynamic can exist in Lukäcs’s 
notion of an ideal-type potential class consciousness of capitalist reality. Likewise, 
we will be concerned to assess whether Althusser’s reduction of all experience to
120 For an examination of the problems with circular theorizing of this sort, see Richard Gunn, 
“Marxism and Philosophy: a Critique of Critical Realism”, Capital and Class, no. 37 (Spring 1988): 
pp. 87-116.
121 Lukäcs, Histoiy and Class Consciousness, p. 174.
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error (albeit a position somewhat inconsistently argued) 122 manages to convey any 
sense of how a radical theory might approach the difficulty of the problem of 
theorizing reality, other than to insist upon a rather dubious model of a cool, 
dispassionate science, the stem but ultimately comforting father-figure guiding 
experience away from how it is felt and lived into the neutral, authoritative realm of 
scientific, theoretical knowledge. 123
There is nothing necessarily wrong with supposing that a misperception can be 
corrected - indeed, what else would the purpose of theory be other than to uncover 
problems, inadequacies and inaccuracies with perspectives against which a given 
theory is constructed. In this sense a theory might well be held to act as the ‘nitric 
acid’ that ‘dissolves false gold’ . 124 But one of the most apparent failures of a theory of 
misperception is apparent in its inability to consider the ideological function of ‘true’ 
ideas, or ideas that do not deceive or result in misperception, but are perceived 
precisely as they are. Alternatively, some ideas might seem partly true and partly 
false, like an Elizabethan mask both disguising and revealing the face beneath. It is 
also the case that ideas that particular historical conditions might rob of their 
authenticity at one time, might seem more genuine at certain other times. Ideas do not 
need to be completely false to be effective: Indeed, added effectiveness might be lent 
to ideas that are partly true and partly false and are perceived as such. Likewise, a 
theory of misperception or the complete separation of reality from appearance cannot 
fully explain the fact that some ideological beliefs are quite self-consciously held 
precisely as ideological beliefs. There may be no misperception, no mystification, 
and no inaccurate judgements involved. Indeed, these creative fictions, the saying of 
‘things which are not’ , 125 or even, quite simply, lies, might be completely knowingly
122 When it comes to his examination of Marx’s journey into scientific analysis, Althusser talks of 
Marx “freeing himself from the myths which presented themselves to him as the truth, and because of 
the role of the experience of real history which elbowed these myths aside”. See Louis Althusser, For 
Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (London: NLB, 1977), p. 84. Of course in some ways this is a quite 
consistent position for Althusser to develop; with theoretical knowledge - Marxist ‘science’ - one is 
able to undo the grasping clutches of ideological ‘philosophy’, according to Althusser, and it is 
precisely this science which the ‘mature’ Marx is interpreted by Althusser to have developed. What 
this means in terms of place of theoretical knowledge over the so-called “practico-social” is that one’s 
ability to content with ideology is entirely derived from one’s access to science, an odd position for a 
Marxist to maintain.
123 It hardly seems surprising that this separation Althusser makes between science and ideology, 
where only the theorist can be on constant guard against the ‘falsity’ of ideology, has been described as 
“aristocratic”. Pierre Bourdieu, from “In Conversation: Pierre Bourdieu and Terry Eagleton, “Doxa 
and Common Life”, New Left Review, no. 191 (Jan-Feb 1991): p. 113.
124 Bloch, The Utopian Function, p. 255.
125 In Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, the account of the Houyhnhnms states that: “For he argued 
thus; That the Use of Speech was to make us understand one another, and to receive Information of 
Facts; now if anyone said the Thing which was not, these Ends were defeated; because I cannot 
properly be said to understand him; and I am so far from receiving Information, that he leaves me
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constructed. And these lies might not be the dead weight of a mistaken view of the 
truth, the simple privation of truth, or a truth grown stale: lies, even in their worst 
form, as types of blatant, sordid falsity, might possess their own life, regardless of any 
miscorrespondence with reality. What this suggests is that other interests -  both 
subjective and objective - lurk beneath particular ideas, of which an adherent to any 
such idea might be perfectly well aware. What we will see is that this area of 
theorizing particular interests within ideas, consciousness and discourse has tended to 
be resolved in one particular direction -  in that of types of objectivity. We will now 
consider a general sense of objectivity in the relation between ideology and material 
reality as it appears within an immanent critique of ideology.
Ideology and material reality
We have indicated that there is something of a divide between those theorists 
who argue that ideology manifests itself as a type of false consciousness -  
emphasizing a critique of ideology in epistemological terms - and those who are 
primarily concerned with understanding the ideological constraints acting more 
generally within capitalist systems and thus with putting forward a more, what might 
be termed, ‘sociological critique’. As we have seen, although a sense of the falseness 
of ideas and perception is often assumed at some level, the predominant tendency in 
the critique of ideology is to shift the focus of the ideological to a sense of its 
externalized situatedness in a variety of institutions, structures and practices, in ordeT 
to theorize a relation between ‘ideological’ and ‘material’ reality. The idea of 
material reality is often wide-ranging, and has included, in some analyses, the 
imaginary element of, for example, modes of representation of what is deemed as real 
in people’s lives. For Althusser, ideology is not a distorted reality or a false 
consciousness, but is a largely unconscious experience of reality. This emphasis on 
the ‘real’ within ideology, regardless of whether or not this also involves a sense of 
the real within the imaginary, is what distinguishes approaches that have as their focus 
the social dimension of contemporary life. What these different views of ideology 
have in common is an attempt to explain from where certain ideas might be derived, 
and to account for processes through which ideologies are involved in the masking, 
justification, legitimation, naturalization or universalization of internal forms,
worse than in Ignorance; for I am led to believe a Thing Black when it is White, and Short when it is 
Long. And these were all the Notions he had concerning that Faculty of Lying, so perfectly well 
understood, and so universally practised among human Creatures.” Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels, 
ed. and intro. Paul Turner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 242.
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structures or particular interest structures, endemic to a social whole. 126 How such 
views distinguish what is real within ideology, as well how subjective and objective 
elements are theorized as a part of this, needs to be pursued.
What is distinctive about a view of ideology in terms of a consideration of 
systemic constraints and controls within a given system is that this explanation of 
ideology attributes the existence and persistence of ideology to functions of the 
system or ideology itself. This is what we have referred to in a general sense as a 
sociological approach to ideology critique, an approach which seeks to account for 
what is taken to be the justification of the given. It is in fact sociological in a very 
particular sense. It is a reading of social meaning from the point of view of the 
system, and yet from, as it were, ‘outside’ the system. We need to understand 
something about this because most radical theories of ideology have grounded their 
critiques in some essential relation of ideas and practices to a reading of social reality 
or context. We need to comprehend the reasons why this is the case and to be able to 
assess the usefulness of such an approach, as well as being aware of the existence of 
any potential problems that might arise in relation to such ideology critique. More 
specifically for this thesis, we will want to understand where such a view of social 
context becomes transformed into a concentration upon the object being criticized, as 
if this object arises and functions according to some independent logic specific to the 
object itself. This approach we have referred to as ‘immanent critique’.
Let us focus upon the core problem with such an approach. The question that 
needs to be posed is whether those critiques that view ideology in terms of its material 
function - in the sense that it can have real effects which are perceived and understood 
as real -  do so by way of a certain determinism -  an objectivist understanding of the 
motivations and action important to historical outcomes or systemic determinants. 
This is a difficult issue to consider. It can always seem that in theoretical accounts of 
the function of social phenomena a certain imposition of social categories is taking 
place. To some extent, at least, this would seem to be inevitable. It would also seem 
that one arrives at a critique of ideology in this context by presupposing some external 
‘whole’ from which various elements are derived. There is, in addition, the existence 
of the problem of the mediation between subject and object, often viewed, at least in 
most sociological critiques of ideology, as that of how particular configurations of 
social organization unfold within history. What we will see is that a dominant 
tendency in the radical critique of ideology has been to approach these issues by way
126 Many of these accounts of the real within Marxist approaches tend to establish links to ideas either 
explicit or implicit in Marx’s writings, with different periods of Marx’s work often taken as significant 
o f his own intended approach.
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of a type of causal determination in which ideology is reduced to the level of the 
product of the system, and, beyond this, as the product of its own unfolding as a part 
of that system. We can note that this tendency towards an undialectical, or, as it were, 
‘uninterrupted’ explanation of ideology is widespread and is in no sense restricted to 
radical critiques: Within such critiques, however, we can detect the construction of a 
particular conceptual framework in which the system, or activity of people, or 
ideology itself -  each presented as an objectivity -  is the most usual result of this 
undialectical theoretical explanation. Is there a problem with viewing ideology as a 
part of capitalist reality - viewing it as a constituted social reality whose connection to 
other social relations often suggests understanding it on the basis of the relations 
established by people in the social production of their lives? 127 Is ideology this 
general, or is it also a particular form that does not indiscriminately refer to every 
idea, or even every objectionable idea which capitalism produces? We mentioned 
earlier the Nietzschean sense of a suprahistorical vantage point that is as much 
required for any grasping of freedom as is a sense of the historical. Can a view of the 
ideological grounded in a pre-determined social reality (at the very least in terms of its 
constitution) allow for the suprahistorical? Is the problem in trying to accommodate 
both a sense of ideology as seeming to function according to its own reason and an 
attempt to understand the broad pattern of ideology in terms of some uniform whole 
or totality? All these questions are relevant because within the form of sociological 
critique we will encounter (or what we are referring to as immanent critique) there is 
an unintended wavering between an ‘outside’ point of view -  that of the interest 
structure of the system as a whole -  and a concentration upon some internal form 
given to expressing its own independent logic beyond its situatedness within the 
world. Let us look at this more closely.
Althusser, as we will see, frames his theorization of the inexhaustible necessity 
of an objective domination by ideology with a sense of the “privileged domain” of 
class struggle, creating, on the one hand, a basis for transformation and, on the other, 
commandingly unified ideological functions in the service of the perpetuation of 
ideology itself. 128 Lukacs situates a reified reality in a “rigid epistemological doubling 
of subject and object”, a ‘doubling’ which results in the inability of the subject to 
impinge upon the structure of the object and ultimately in this reality possessing its
127 This is what Marx, for example, refers to with the shorthand concept, labour. Marx writes that 
“Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of 
his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature”. 
Most simply, labour is about “acting on the external world and changing it”. See, Marx, Capital, vol. 
1 ,p.173.
128 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (London: NLB, 
1977), pp. 105, 119, 141.
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own ghostly objectivity. 129 The problem seems to be that in finding a single direction 
from which the ideological is derived, a particular mode of operation is then deduced 
upon this basis. The difficulty here is only in any one-dimensionality that arises from 
such a conceptualization, not in grounding ideology within a critical social context per 
se: Although, as we have already considered, where such a view tends to present 
ideology as if it is indistinguishable from reality we are returned to the problematic 
position of how it might be possible to judge such a situation. What tends to emerge 
is a view of ideology in relation to the particular forced requirements of a system of 
exploitation and command. And yet, what I would claim, and what a number of 
radical thinkers has indicated, is the presence of a fundamental paradox at the core of 
a system of compromised freedom, such as capitalism. What this means is that the 
effects of ideology might mean an “ideology of commandment” 130 as much as an 
ideology of the apparent choice of freedom and equality. This suggests something 
critical within the relation between subject and object that theories of the objective are 
at some disadvantage to consider.
The social effectivity of ideology seems, at one level, to function in terms of 
what Zizek describes as “a social reality whose very existence implies the non­
knowledge o f its participants as to its essence” . 131 And yet such an explanation seems 
to imply something too static in the nature of the very effectiveness of ideology. 
Certainly, as an objectified relation, ideology functions most appropriately at the 
abstract level of, what Marx refers to as, its “social (symbolic) property” . 132 
Recognizing this symbolic function as a social category does not mean that any 
element of contradiction needs be sublated, or that a complex process of mediation is 
not involved in this function. The system legitimates itself ideologically when its 
claim on reality is achieved by the suppression of the reality of its existence in 
unfreedom (we might consider other conditions here but, as we have already argued, 
this focus allows us to pose a number of pertinent questions as to the subject/object 
relation within ideology). Importantly this means that reality is not counterposed to 
ideology as such but is held in relation to it under certain conditions -  in this case, 
unfreedom. This can quite obviously take many and varied forms. That this lends to 
ideology a sense of being composed of congealed images, of “a pre-established form”,
129 Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 169.
130 See, “L’ Experience proletarienne”, an unsigned editorial in fact written by Claude Lefort, in 
Socialisme ou Barbarie, no. 21 (Nov-Dec, 1952).
131 Zizek, The Sublime Object o f Ideology, p. 21.
132 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations o f the Critique o f  Political Economy (Rough Draft), trans. 
Martin Nicolaus (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 160.
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as Karl Korsch expresses it,133 is precisely its necessity. This does not, however, make 
of it a determinism. However much it might fail to express a living reality, ideology 
is a fetishized reality not because it is less real but in its very dismemberment and 
atomization of connected relations. It is in this that the problem of the materialization 
of ideology should be most apparent, as too should its potential difference from an 
objectivist account of the material basis of ideology be clear. How then might we 
approach the issue of the subjective displacement of the real within ideology? Can we 
detect a grappling with this problem in any of the contemporary critiques of ideology? 
Let us look briefly at several examples in order to highlight where a sense of interests, 
as potentially subjective relations in the materialism of ideology, might add to an 
understanding of the scope of the ideological.
Ideology as structured interest, form and legitimation
The belief that ideology reflects the interests of certain sections or interest 
structures of society has long informed radical theory. “The ideas of the ruling class 
are in every epoch the ruling ideas”, declare Marx and Engels in their work of 1846, 
The German Ideology.™ Ever since, some idea of class or structured interests has 
often been associated with an understanding of what ideology is within radical theory. 
Of course, in the case just mentioned, if one’s perspective is that class society exists, 
then the presence of class interests and class ideas will come as little surprise. For us, 
this begs the question as to what might constitute any type of coherence within 
interests, but it is nonetheless important to pose the broader issue of significations in 
the service of certain institutional and psychic forms within society in order to know 
something about how ideology functions.
The presence of interests and requirements for legitimation and justification 
within ideology tends to signify something of the nature of particular ideas within the 
reality of society - for most radical theory, that of capitalism or the structures of 
power upon which capitalism rests. At least this is what Marx intended in his 
polemical critique of the various representatives of modem German philosophy who 
became the targets of his criticism of the ‘ideology’ of idealism in The German 
Ideology. Undoubtedly, Marx’s association between ruling material forces and ruling
133 Karl Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, trans. Fred Halliday (London: New Left Books, 1970),
p. 102.
134 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 67. It should be noted that in the same text we find 
Marx and Engels in their critique of Max Stimer state that Stimer wrongly assumes that thoughts, 
which have become independent, objectified thoughts -  ghosts -  have ruled the world and continue to 
rule it. This “history of ghosts”, as the authors’ refer to it, is a “fixed idea” which does not allow the 
unfixed relation between subject and object to emerge. Ibid., p. 173.
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intellectual forces gave rise to the idea that ideology is the essential product of a 
dominant class, a class whose control over the ‘means of mental production’ enables 
it to subject other subjects to its rule by ideas. But such an understanding of ideology 
was certainly not the end-point of Marx’s analysis of ideas, and, as numerous studies 
have suggested, much of Marx’s work tends more towards an analysis of the 
emergence of ideas at the level of the social formation, in other words, as a systemic 
product of unfree society. 135 It is at this more general level that this sense of the 
material basis of ideology serves a purpose for immanent critique. 136
A view of ideology as a set of ideas able to be controlled for the interests of a 
particular group or class, and thus constituting a distorted reality, is certainly a 
dominant view of ideology within radical theory. Even for a theorist such as 
Althusser, for whom ideology as unconscious control is so basic a human element that 
its survival under any social conditions is assured, the view that ideology functions as 
a means for the legitimization and naturalization of relations of domination is put 
forward on the basis that this function works for the reproduction of the position of 
power of the ruling class. This is, however, perhaps due more to the historical 
coincidence that social domination is currently the domain of the ruling class than for 
any reason Althusser articulates suggesting the particular use of ideological power 
within capitalist relations. In his distinction between particular ideologies - legal, 
political, religious, ethical, and so on - and ideology ‘in general’, which has no 
particular history, Althusser also finds the imprint of class interests. Particular 
ideologies “always express class positions” ; 137 whilst ideology in general, like the 
unconscious, is, rather, an eternal condition without particular interests or history. 
But however complicated this process might be, is it not ultimately too unsatisfactory 
to suggest that ideology is that which those with power possess and manipulate (even 
unconsciously so) ? 138 The relation between the particular and the general is so
135 See, for example, John Mepham’s article “The Theory of Ideology in Capital, in John Mepham 
and David-Hillel Ruben eds. Issues in Marxist Philosophy, vol. Ill, Epistemology, Science, Ideology 
(Brighton: Harvester, 1979).
136 Fredric Jameson, for example, considers that this “thrust of Marxism simply aims at breaking the 
spell of the ‘inverted world’ of conceptual thought”. Jameson, Mancism and Form, p. 372.
137 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, 
p. 159.
138 The idea of ideology as class interests shares many similarities with that of viewing ideology as 
apologia. Bikhu Parekh’s work, Marx’s Theoiy o f Ideology, identifies a basic division within Marx’s 
thought between a view of ideology as idealist thought and that as apology for the established social 
order. Parekh argues that Marx, for example, uses the term ‘ideology’ in both senses. Bikhu Parekh, 
Marx’s Theory o f Ideology (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 10. The argument that ideology exists as 
an apology for the particular social order is used by numerous Marxists with different degrees of 
emphasis and for different purposes. The idea of apologia seems at one level to remove any definite 
subject from the articulation of a view which justifies or naturalizes the way the system operates; but at
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sketchily conceived by Althusser that what role class interests play within their 
estuarine points of contact is unclear. What is apparent is that some sense of class 
interest emerges in Althusser’s structuralist approach, even where the consequences of 
such an approach seem marginal to his central theme of a general theory of ideology. 
Whilst we will not turn to this particular aspect of this issue within Althusser’s work 
again, we will see the perpetuation of a sense of a generalized, structured interest as a 
form of objectivism throughout much of his treatment of ideology.
What is important for us to consider is the process by which a sense of an 
underlying interest structure, such as class, becomes transformed into a more abstract 
sense of a relatively autonomous process, such as ideological interpellation, which 
perpetuates itself ultimately by way of the independent logic of its own form. The 
theorization of the subject here is shallow and pre-determined. We will see that this is 
the basis for a ‘negative critique’ of culture. The works of Althusser and Lukacs are 
by no means unusual in displaying this sort of transformation: Indeed, many class or 
power analyses that treat their object as a part of a largely uniform whole, from which 
some external point of view of the interest structure of society is assumed, tend 
towards postulating a type of immanent critique in which the internal form and 
structure of a cultural object, such as ideology, begins to loom disturbingly large. 
And yet, at the same time, we are inevitably struck by the general good sense that 
some consideration of manifestly powerful and influential interests has; the problem 
seems to be how to theorize what it is that is occurring here, in an ideological sense, in 
anything other than parochially objectivist terms.
We can see that what seems most important is how the concept of interests is 
used. If it remains as a one-sided explanation of how problems and contradictions are 
justified, it cannot possibly come to terms with the dynamic processes that are a 
feature of the ideological. If it is too general, as perhaps we might interpret Fredric 
Jameson’s idea of the ‘ideologeme’ (the ‘ideologeme' here meaning a concept which 
conveys a sense of the basic unit of the ideological structure of class discourse as a 
structure) to be, it may not tell us anything more about ideology than it occurs in 
societies in which structures of power exist. 139 The power of ideology is in its playing 
out of tensions and antagonisms that might superficially appear to engage it with some 
external opposition but are in fact reflective of the fundamentally contradictory nature
another level it merely highlights the significance of particular social conditions which give rise to 
certain ideological attachments. An apologia for profit, for example, can be detected in the seeking of 
general justifications for a profit-based system as easily as it is in the failure to explain the basis of 
profit in the theft of time, creativity and labour from one individual or group by another.
139 Jameson defines the ‘ideologeme’ as “the smallest intelligible unit of the essentially antagonistic 
collective discourses of social classes”. Jameson, The Political Unconscious, p. 76.
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of ideology itself. Ideas that are presumed to belong to those who possess the power 
to rule are rarely what they present themselves as in this fashion. 140 With a view of 
interest or apologia as necessary legitimation a limited view of what ideology might 
mean will emerge. This is predominantly because the dynamic within this 
construction is seen to be external to the ideological -  there is no contradiction within 
the ideological itself that could explain a more complex interplay of the objective and 
subjective within legitimating interests. Again, what seems to be assumed is a 
coherence of interest within the ideological, against which reality is pitched. Such a 
view does not allow for any wrestle within the ideological manifestations of realities, 
or enable the suggestion of possibilities, of which their realities might certainly have 
“cheated the objects”, as Adorno refers to it, but which are nonetheless visible in each 
one. 141 It is this dynamic within ideology itself, not its assumed counter with reality, 
that we need to understand in an alternative theorization of ideology.
The significance of an understanding of the structuring of meaning according 
to interests is often in its ability to explain the basis upon which a relation of a type of 
contradiction can be theorized. Thus, as an attempt to draw attention to the falsity of 
a given moment of reality, or as a way of confronting what appears as an 
overwhelming interest structure -  a technocratic reified reason, a psychology of 
subjection, a commodified rationale and so on -  immanent critique has had much to 
offer. Its problem, however, is that ultimately the direction of its critique tends to 
ignore too much of the ambiguity of ideas and the dynamic contradictions of their 
situatedness in history, particularly as this applies to a mediation of any given 
subjective moment within these contradictions. We have seen that if the idea of class 
or totalizing interests suffers from a potential reductionism then the idea of ideology 
serving more particular, internal, although no less systemic interests might be more 
useful, suggesting as it does a divide between ideas that side with the exploitation and 
oppression of the system and those which, by contrast, are directed towards its change 
and transformation. But here some caution needs to be exercised: It is true, as the 
previous example from Eagleton reminded us, that little resort to anything beyond 
common sense is required to know that a system such as apartheid is unjust, and, in 
this sense, an understanding of the system’s historical constructedness is part of the 
truth of its injustice. But in the case where a general division between the ideological 
and the ‘non-ideologicaf is maintained, the certainties of a knowledge of oppression
140 For a discussion of a similar conclusion regarding ideology with specific examples in relation to 
Christianity and fascism, see Zizek, The Ticklish Subject, pp. 186-187. Although Zizek’s use of the 
example of Christianity is conveyed in a somewhat reductionist manner, his discussion of the problem 
of fascism shows much more persuasively the paradoxical nature of ideology.
141 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 52.
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or freedom, or more precisely, of where these conditions reside, may not be quite so 
clear.
It is precisely this condition of generality in relation to ideology, where no 
specific content is indicated, that can cast a knowledge of ideology into the 
meaninglessness of merely some contrast with its equally general, absent opposite. 
What arises from this is often only a more abstract sense of a logic by which ideology 
functions. Indeed, as we have mentioned, a not unusual outcome is to explain 
ideology solely in terms of the seemingly independent logic it is assumed to have 
gained. Thus, ideology seems to function for itself, and those subject to it merely 
imitate its purpose and design. The objective nature of this purpose is theorized as 
prior to, and sometimes exclusive of, any subjective mediation. Any implied promise 
of a theorization of the subjective is instead swallowed pre-emptively by a focus upon 
the extemalization of the ideological. What emerges is a largely ‘negative critique’ of 
cultural forms and practices, most particularly those forms we have already 
highlighted as ‘malaises of unfreedom’. We will look later in more detail at how 
Lukäcs, Althusser and Marx approach the difficulty of this situation. Each of these 
theorists certainly takes seriously the problem of a value system of a class or group in 
which self-centredness and avarice are rewarded, but the extent to which each reduces 
any consciousness which might arise from this to the level of class, system or form 
alone, varies enormously. Sorting through some of the different aspects of this 
general shift into immanent critique will occupy the central part of the thesis.
Dialectical critique and negative critique
At this stage it should be apparent that we wish to argue that a critique of 
ideology requires something other than a negative critique of ideology’s function. We 
will later set out what we will present as an alternative approach to ideology but let us 
here first introduce some pertinent ideas that we feel can facilitate such a critique. We 
have already mentioned the importance of a sense of contradiction for understanding 
the dynamic within constraint or limitation that gives expression to need or 
incongruence. What we also want to indicate are the subjective and objective 
moments of such contradiction. Situating ideology within multi-level contradiction 
means accounting for the relation the ideological has to reality. If the ideological is 
not simply reality itself, even given its existence as ‘ideological reality’, then how 
might it be viewed? What we are wanting to understand are two different although 
not unrelated things -  what identity, if any, or difference there is between being and 
thinking, in other words, if these entities are distinct how we might perceive their 
unity with each other, and how the reality that we create is an objective reality of a
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subjective consciousness, in other words, what the relation is between subject and 
object. In addition to this we are proposing the existence of presentiment, a being-in- 
becoming that we can detect within some ideological realities.
All these matters cause us to question what the relation is that is operating here 
that deploys a play of subjective and objective mediations. What we will later argue 
in relation to ideological alienation is that the real takes on a number of guises. And 
whilst the concepts we will generate might throw some light upon these 
manifestations, the real itself remains a problematic concept that we make no claim to 
have resolved. Of some relevance, however, will be Michel Henry’s particular use of 
the Husserlian idea of ‘irreality’ -  the realm of the existence of a ‘non-real’ 
objectivity or intentionality. 142 With this idea we will be able to situate ideology as 
existing between reality and irreality. Such a conception of the relation between 
ideology and reality obviously has implications for the way in which we will theorize 
subjectivity. Knowledge, and particularly self-knowledge, are a part of real presence 
but also a part of a presentiment or anticipatory consciousness that gives expression to 
need. As we have mentioned, these issues will concern us much more in the final 
chapter of the thesis, but let us here mention, by way of an example, how a critique 
situated outside a negative critique might proceed.
If we look briefly at an example of critique that situates the subject within the 
materialization, or even sensualization, of social life we can see that a dynamic 
conception of subjectivity tends to arise. We want to raise this example merely to 
indicate something of an alternative path through this problem of immanent critique 
rather than to suggest that of itself it provides a dialectical approach to the ideological. 
Let us do this here by considering as an example the work of the radical theorist 
Cornelius Castoriadis. The writings of Castoriadis have consistently attempted to 
question the place of the subject within a dynamic society. 143 Castoriadis recognizes 
that society is always in the process of self-alteration and, at the same time, that social 
imaginary significations -  those aspects of social life which create representations and 
thus shape the psyche of individuals -  exist as creations under various constraints. 
These constraints range from those of an external nature, such as those of a natural or 
biological constitution (which might itself include the manner in which the 
functionality of institutions responds to these external constraints, as in, for example, 
a response to the production of material life or sexual reproduction); to historical,
142 See, for example, Michel Henry, Marx: A Philosophy o f Human Reality, trans. Kathleen 
McLaughlin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983).
143 For a wide selection of Castoriadis’ writings, see Cornelius Castoriadis, The Castoriadis Reader, 
trans. and ed. David Ames Curtis (Oxford, Blackwell, 1997).
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internal and intrinsic constraints. 144 What Castoriadis is able to convey is a sense of 
the risky, often ephemeral, nature of the relation between a social field of signification 
and the realm of the pysche or radical imagination. Within a democratic society, 
ruptures in the closure of meaning exist but are never guaranteed, and, although an 
intense sense of freedom accompanies acts of creativity, for the majority this is a 
freedom by proxy -  people participate in those freedoms created often in a merely 
vicarious manner. 145 Of our present situation, for example, Castoriadis argues that, at 
the level “of the real functioning of society, the ‘power of the people’ serves as a 
screen for the power of money, techno-science, party and State bureaucracies, and the 
media”. On the part of individuals, Castoriadis sees a new form of closure of meaning 
taking place that takes the form of “a generalized conformism” . 146 What Castoriadis 
highlights here, which we will consider in more general terms later in the thesis, is a 
loss of meaning which is, at the same time, a loss of the object and abandonment of 
the search for form. We are presented, then, with an acute sense of the complexity 
and enigmatic character of our present predicament, not by sole recourse to the 
outward materialized forms of a democratic closure of meaning, but to the difficulty 
of the relation between the psyche and its social imagination and its social instituting 
imaginary.
Let us briefly highlight this issue to which we will return in much greater 
detail later in the thesis. I argued at the beginning of the thesis that a critique of 
ideology is primarily concerned with the problem of cultural inheritance. Many 
theorists have indicated some sense of disquiet in relation to aspects of a cultural 
inheritance that are deemed to impinge forcefully upon the creative expression of 
humanity. We mentioned at the outset of the thesis that we would be concerned with 
what we termed ‘malaises of unfreedom’ -  a concern with issues of alienation, 
estrangement, disenchantment, unconscious fear and control, cynicism and 
sentimentality, and so on. We derive this term from Charles Taylor’s critique of what 
he views as “malaises of modernity”, and whilst we can concur with Taylor that 
alienation, a sense of loss, disenchantment and the like are indeed the more significant 
problems of modernity, they are also, we would argue, more general than this. 147
144 For a fuller summary of these constraints see for example the essay entitled “Radical Imagination 
and the Social Instituting Imaginary (1994)”, in The Castoriadis Reader, pp. 319-337.
145 See, for example, Castoriadis’ essay “Culture in a Democratic Society (1994)”, in The Castoriadis 
Reader, pp. 338-348.
146 Ibid., p. 346.
147 Charles Taylor, The Ethics o f Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991),
p. 1.
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Attributing these malaises to unfreedom allows us to more readily return to the 
problem we have already highlighted as to answering the question as to how one lives 
one’s life. Such a question is a profoundly difficult one to consider and yet is, I would 
argue, precisely the sort of question that philosophy must pose. An emphasis upon 
modernity, as we will see most clearly in the chapter concerning Lukacs’s critique of 
the spectacle of commodification, yields numerous useful insights into the technical, 
productivist basis of these malaises and yet, of itself, suggests little about how 
humanity is involved in the issue as to what end life is lived. We hope that an 
emphasis instead upon the malaises of unfreedom is able to indicate a richer and more 
nuanced dynamic between objective conditions, such as methods of rationalized 
labour, bureaucratization and instrumental reason, and the subjective moments of their 
acceptance or denial. For the problem of the existence of such malaises is not only 
one of externally imposed power and social forces acting against the individual, as 
much negative critique tends to suppose: It is also a problem of both an external and 
internal contention with the constraints against, but also the challenge of, freedom. 
The secret compulsion much radical critique takes ideology to be is not entirely that 
of an ultimately externally directed enforcement.
This negative critique involved in conceptualizing ideology is one that I will 
criticize in detail in the second part of the thesis, which will be concerned with some 
major expositions of ideology in relation to the themes of commodification, the 
internalization of fear and control, and the dialectical complexity of need and desire. 
We will, however, mention here two important consequences of a ‘negative critique’ 
in relation to ideology. The first, as we have just dealt with, is that a focus upon the 
external imposition of conditions that militate against freedom seems to be formulated 
upon the basis of a limited sense of what ideology is. We will see in the course of the 
thesis that in the dominant ways in which ideology has been defined, a definite 
tendency emerges leading towards an emphasis on this aspect of external power, and 
thus to the development of a negative critique. Secondly, in the third and final part of 
the thesis, in which we will attempt to account for a central contemporary 
manifestation of the ideological -  in the seemingly paradoxical condition of a 
‘democratic unfreedom’ or ‘voluntary servitude’ -  we will find that, despite offering 
many critical insights into the problem of power, a negative critique seems unable to 
address the more specific issue relating to ideology -  that of a subjectively and 
objectively compromised freedom, in which a wrestle for meaning and interpretation 
exists. It is here that a view of ideology, grounded in a dialectical understanding of 
the relation between subjective and objective within the context of freedom and 
unfreedom, is able to shift considerably forwards the debate on ideology. In the final 
section of this chapter we will attempt to account for the seeming conundrum that
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ideology presents by looking at the central problem facing radical theorists of the 
modem period -  that of a state of democratic unfreedom in which the ideological is 
deeply enmeshed. We will outline in the following section how a dialectical account 
of ideology might approach this problem.
Section Three: Theorizing ‘Democratic Unfreedom’: The 
Problem of Ideology for Radical Critique
Unfreedom and the Ideological
In his seminal work of the 1960s, One-Dimensional Man, Herbert Marcuse 
talks of a “comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom” that prevails in 
“advanced industrial civilization”.148 Although this particular expression of the 
problem of a lack of freedom in Western democracies is something of a product of its 
time - Western democracies seemed very much more ‘comfortable’ in certain ways in 
the 1960s than they do now - the apparent paradox highlighted of a democratic 
unfreedom is precisely one of the consistent central conditions which prompted many 
radical theorists to investigate the problem of ideology.149 The idea of a democratic or 
voluntary unfreedom alerts us to a curious difficulty that is at the basis of ideology -  
the condition of unfreedom to which our constructions of reality and possible reality 
at times contribute and at other times subvert. In this condition we will want to 
consider what the points of contact between subjective and objective dimensions can 
entail. We will pursue this at length in the final chapter of the thesis but will here set 
out some relevant ideas in relation to this investigation.
The sense that there is something significant in our need for freedom 
experienced within lives that are unfree pervades many studies of the condition of 
humanity. For many theorists it is the existence of real and yet often not fully 
appreciated contradictions inherent within this state of enchained freedom or 
voluntary unfreedom that is most striking. We have just seen that this was Marcuse’s 
response to the post-war expansionary period, and so too is an aspect of this paradox
148 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society 
(Boston: Beacon, 1964), p. 1.
149 For a sense of the scope and depth of some of the more contemporary manifestations of a 
democratic unfreedom see Pierre Bourdieu, et. al., The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in 
Contemporary Society, trans. Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson, Susan Emanuel, Joe Johnson and Shoggy T. 
Waryn (Cambridge: Polity, 1999).
The Unfinished Problem of Ideology 83
captured in Taylor’s description of contemporary conditions of alienation as a time of 
“‘soft’ despotism”.150 Indeed most radical theories of the consequences of the 
capitalist experiment have suggested something of this sort. Walter Benjamin’s 
summation of this tendency, which in the 1930s confronted him as “at the threshold of 
the Last Judgment”, makes us aware that little has changed in this sense.151 The 
juxtaposition in capitalist society of seemingly irreconcilable elements had been 
expressed by Benjamin with his claim, thereafter widely quoted, that there is no 
document of civilization that is not at the same time a document of barbarism:152 At 
one level we here encounter a sense that the spoils of cultural practice will always be 
laid claim to by a victorious present and that some dominative spirit will haunt even 
the most genuine of cultural possibilities. The particular form this lengthening 
shadow casts is, within capitalism, a “continuum of history”, a seeming eternal, 
homogenous image of the past; but Benjamin’s apparent despair is as much a 
recognition of the fragility of culture in an unfree world as it is an acknowledgement 
of the ability for the rulers to write history.153 Benjamin indicates for us the 
importance of authentic experience in the murmur of a collective past, in its 
Baudelarian ‘correspondances’, with which we must strive to remain connected.154 It 
is in this constellation of the paradox of unfreedom that tensions, and even the shock 
of the now, create the possibility to “brush history against the grain”.155 Even given 
this possibility, however, the subject remains at considerable risk of succumbing to 
unfreedom and its momentary illuminations. Indeed, what many theorists tend to 
concentrate upon is the irresistibly captivating and yet ultimately stifling allure of a 
world of unfreedom for which no profane illumination is ever sufficient to awaken 
humanity from its endlessly wishful dream. Adorno found in the ready fulfilment of 
the wishes of the masses largely only a repetition of the continually same unfreedom, 
unhappiness and boredom of contemporary capitalist life.156 This unfreedom is, for 
him, imposed, but imposed as if it is something we have desired. It is, in other words, 
a democratic unfreedom. More recently, Claude Lefort has pointed out the essential 
emptiness of democratic power, highlighting a dislocation between the symbolic and
150 Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, p. 10.
151 Walter Benjamin, Schriften II, p. 174, quoted by Hannah Arendt in the “Introduction” to Benjamin, 
Illuminations, p. 37.
152 Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History”, in Illuminations, p. 256.
153 Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History”, p. 262.
154 Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”, in Illuminations, pp. 161, 184.
155 Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History”, p. 257.
156 Theodor W. Adorno, “Something’s Missing: A Discussion between Ernst Bloch and Theodor W. 
Adorno on the Contradictions of Utopian Longing (1964)”, in Bloch, The Utopian Function o f Art and 
Literature, pp. 1-2.
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the real use of power of a specifically modem democratic polity. 157 Again, this 
dislocation is, for Cornelius Castoriadis, a manifestation of unfreedom -  a depository 
of intentions, desires, cathexes, demands, expectations -  unconscious “significations 
to which the individual has been exposed from the moment of conception and even 
before” but who “never allows them to dominate unless he is so willing” . 158
What especially strikes many of these theorists is that there seems to be a 
yawning gap between the freedom that political, social, economic and technical 
developments have promised and the ability of people to grasp this votive freedom or 
counter the development of new forms of control. Adomo concludes that “people are 
sworn to this world” -  they could live as free human beings but instead they identify 
themselves with their aggressor. 159 The phenomenon of ideology is one explanation 
for the way in which both social structures and individual psychologies are involved 
in the problem of unfreedom. As we will see, this strange form of compulsion that 
radical critiques take to be ideology is the form of control most suited to a universal 
and universalizing culture -  a culture of democratic consciousness, in some form or 
another, and yet, at the same time, an identification or unification with the existing 
social condition of unfreedom. The existence of this paradox of unfreedom also 
makes us consider the possibility of a radical ambiguity perhaps at the very heart of 
the question of human existence. These issues will be examined in more detail later 
in the thesis.
In this section of the chapter we wish to focus upon two interrelated themes -  
that of the expansion of a sense of the ideological, and that of a potential expansion of 
a sense of the subjective in relation to this. These themes will be pursued in two main 
areas -  that which is increasingly seen as a cult of the commodity, and that of the 
realm of consciousness. We will begin by situating these ideas within the problem of 
cultural heritage. Let us then first consider more closely the problem of a ‘democratic 
unfreedom’ as an ideological problem of a cultural heritage in which the 
psychological ramifications of a life immersed in unfreedom become increasingly 
apparent.
157 Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory, trans. David Macey (Minneapolis: University of  
Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 228. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have argued a variant upon this. 
See Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution o f Our Time (London: Verso, 1990) and Laclau 
and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.
158 Castoriadis, The Castoriadis Reader, pp. 177-178, 179.
159 Adomo, “Something’s Missing”, p. 4.
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Ideology and the burden of cultural heritage
From early in the twentieth century various radical theorists developed, 
overwhelmingly for the first time since Marx’s 1844 Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts, theorizations of socio-psychological conditions militating against 
freedom. Marx had been repeatedly concerned by that which he summarizes in tenns 
of a “universal mood of fantasy and indifference”.160 In this he sees the development 
of a “totality of desires” through which, rather oddly, the self “denies itself \ 161 As we 
will later see, Marx’s works set out to explain much about the phantasmagorical 
expression of the ideological -  particularly in a sense o f the subject’s psychological 
experience of the object world -  and are, to this extent, representative of the “new 
shivers running through the intellectual atmosphere at this time”, which the surrealist 
writer Lautreamont detected from the mid-nineteenth century.162 By the beginning of 
the twentieth century these new currents were being felt more definitely in 
theorizations of the place of the psyche and its flighty, capricious but nonetheless 
significant imagination, prompted by a renewed urgency in relation to accounting for 
a sense of an increasingly shrivelled freedom. How an assessment was to be made as 
to the potential significance o f such changes, particularly those which were taken to 
be related to capitalism and its burgeoning forms of control, of course, varied 
enormously: Where Georges Bataille saw something beyond the limitations of a 
cramped bourgeois hatred of the sacred and the erotic in a release of depense as the 
transgressive negation of the strictures o f an exchange economy on the part of the 
Many, Max Weber had seen a puritanical spirit paving the way to a sober 
utilitarianism and little else.163 The two sides o f the same coin, as it were, which Marx 
saw in a money economy - wealth and asceticism, self-denial and greed -164 began to 
be theorized, in the twentieth century, in somewhat different terms. What was seen in 
the twentieth century in patterns of ritualized excess and parsimonious hoarding were
160 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 211.
161 Ibid., pp. 272, 265.
162 Lautreamont, quoted in David Gascoyne, A Short Sur\>ey o f Surrealism (San Francisco: City Lights 
Books, 1982), p. 8. As David Gascoyne points out, this was the period not only of Marx’s works but 
those of Walt Whitman, Lear and Hopkins, Lewis Carroll and Rimbaud -  an enormously creative and 
innovative period in the understanding of the role of the imagination and ideas. Ibid.
163 George Bataille, The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy (New York: Zone Books, 
1988), vol. I, Consumption; Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism, trans. 
Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribner’s, 1958). Before Bataille, Werner Sombart had also attempted to 
account for an aspect of the erotic within capitalism. His work of 1913, Luxury and Capitalism 
theorizes the role of eroticism in pleasurable forms of consumption. Werner Sombart, Luxury and 
Capitalism, trans. W. R. Dittmar (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967).
164 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone 
and Gregor Benton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), p. 361.
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tendencies in which undetermined outcomes emerged as a result of the same 
contradictory impulses and complex psychological needs represented in social forms, 
which had already been well understood by an earlier radical philosophy. What began 
to engage some of the twentieth century modems was a sense of the individual’s 
capacity for invention via compulsion, a forced calculation and the imagination, 
which made of seemingly obvious tendencies an unforeseen, unchartered world. The 
modem individual, as Peter Conrad writes, is “imprisoned in idiosyncrasy” . 165 Freud, 
in particular, considered the vast array of dream states as indicative of highly 
particular repressed emotions. Other theorists sought to examine some less clear-cut 
consequences of the phantasmagoric experience of modem reality. Thus Benjamin 
was able to see the dark splendour of the human misery of the increasingly alienated 
city, a profane illumination of unintended potential for its suffering, intoxicated, 
imagining inhabitants. The movement of some other sense of life, subterraneously 
mediated, was there in the affinities and identities humanity created. The task for the 
theorist was to unravel some of the threads of this vast, tangled network of 
psychological interrelationships and apparent symbols.
The theorizations that emerged were to have a lasting impact upon radical 
critiques of capitalism and liberatory theory more generally, and have been 
fundamental to understanding the role of ideology in contemporary politics. Perhaps 
the central contribution to radical philosophy of these new ways of theorizing the 
psyche, particularly to those critiques within Western Marxism and the immanent 
critique of ideology, has been the tendency to theorize the increasing significance of 
what is actually taken to be the ideological. This broadening of the sphere of ideology 
has been felt most acutely in terms of a perception of changes that, within the function 
of capitalism, were indicated by the direction of processes of rationalization and 
bureaucratization, the existence of mass consumption and a widespread social 
alienation -  all of which were then seen as receptacles of a more general ideological 
incursion into everyday life. As well as the nature of these changes there was the 
sheer scale of their insinuation within society that needed to be recognized: Benjamin, 
for example, refers to a transmitted commodity-character onto the universe - the entire 
cosmos is held under the sway of the commodity’s ritualized wish to be worshipped. 166 
The problem that these developments are taken to entail is felt in the fact that, whilst 
each aspect of such change within capitalism gave rise to potential unfreedoms, 
constraints and self-imposed controls, these difficulties also emerged out of a certain
165 Peter Conrad, Modern Times, Modern Places: Life & Art in the 20lh Century (London: Thames & 
Hudson, 1998), p. 253.
166 Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire, p. 166.
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democratization of social life in the modem world. Mass consumption, for example, 
as well as the basis for the expansion of commodity exchange, is a reflection of the 
participation o f the mass of the population within one of the central processes of 
modem life -  the buying and selling of commodities. As this process began to take on 
the numerous complicated inflections of modem life in forms of pleasure, boredom, 
need and distraction - all potentially able to be eroticized, aestheticized or made banal 
within the context of their functioning - something of the extensive difficulty of 
accounting for the intoxication o f the individual within a culture of consumption 
became apparent.
How we might respond to the fact of forms of venal exchange as a basic part 
of our engagement within modem society is of course a difficult issue in itself; but 
this issue is indeed more troublesome than this: Whilst a type of active participation in 
a commodified world certainly exists, it is, at the same time, an emanation that seems 
in many ways to escape the conscious, or perhaps self-critical, control of those 
involved: Or, as Lukäcs noted in an essay written in 1920, people experience the 
rationale and dictates of the system “as the only possible environment o f existence”.167 
How, then, people might do other than support their illusions via the only world that 
seems to exist for them -  that of a world in which people participate largely as 
competitors caught within the insidious grip of the commodity - becomes a pertinent 
issue. As we have mentioned, some of the more critical theorists of this spectacle of 
commodification saw contradictory impulses released by the individual’s experience 
of such a world. By considering the psychological aspect of the cultural heritage of 
this unfreedom the unintended consequences of a commodified life could be 
extended, beyond the functioning and malfunctioning of the system itself, to an 
analysis of the subject’s own entanglement within its labyrinths. Because of the 
consequences of a life given over to venality and an ugly competitiveness, there is, as 
Benjamin writes, a certain “solitude encompassing us in our immersion in that world 
of things”.168 This solitude Benjamin sees as a type of sleep “in which the dream 
image waits to show the people their true faces”.169 Even its boredom is the threshold 
of something beyond, the commodity’s strange lustre the residue of as yet unrealized 
dreams. These tensions and possibilities of a commodified life are able to suggest 
much about the relation between ideology and subjectivity.
167 Lukäcs cited in Russell Jacoby, “Towards a Critique of Automatic Marxism: The Politics of 
Philosophy from Lukacs to the Frankfurt School”, Telos, no. 10 (Winter 1971): p. 120.
168 Walter Benjamin, One-Way Street and Other Writings, trans. Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley 
Shorter (London: Verso, 1998), p. 318.
169 Ibid.
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The cult of the commodity is as much a question of the individual’s relation to 
her own creative involvement in life as it is to the process of commodification itself. 
How people think, act and dream within the camivalesque aspects of their own lives 
depends partly upon what it is that is able to function as an impediment to self- 
knowledge. We will see here that ideology plays a definite although, in many ways, 
open and unpredictable role. The spectacle of commodification assumes an objective 
relation within peoples’ lives and yet is ultimately dependent upon a subjective 
activation and confirmation of the objectivity it presents. This is not a process the 
spectacle, as contrived separation and distancing, can easily anticipate or control. The 
process is not fully determining or able to be determined. We refer to this as a 
spectacle of commodification less in the strictly Debordian sense than as a process in 
which experience is both subjectively and objectively held at a remove. This process 
is not the impossibility of real experiences and feelings that is conveyed in the work 
of many of the Situationists; 170 what we will want to theorize is a place more for what 
Bataille refers to as “sovereign moments that give humanity its countenance” -  
moments of a radical, disenslaving subjectivity within a spectacularized existence. 171 
What is open within the process of this world of separation is, therefore, the mediation 
between subjective and objective relations. But how this mediation is played out and 
what consequences might ensue, as a result of any encounter between subject and 
object, is a largely untheorized domain. One way in which this openness is felt is in a 
sense that “something’s missing”, as in Brecht’s provocative phrase, and in this state 
is the constant potential for struggle over meaning and interpretation. This is where 
we might see the dialectical problem that ideology entails. In ideology, as this thesis 
is presenting, are moments of potentially transformative contact between subject and 
object - a dynamic which requires theoretical investigation.
For many of the radical theorists of the twentieth century the notion of a self- 
reflective subject had been eliminated, if not by the theoretical conundrum the idea of 
a unity of identity provokes, then by the sheer weight of twentieth century history 
itself - a century in which the subject’s ability to uproot, destroy and make void every 
entity outside itself has defiled our sense of humanity like no other. What we will see 
is that, faced with this seeming reality of all sense of otherness obliterated, many
170 With this we do not mean that the Situationists argued for the complete inevitability of a reified 
existence. Quite obviously, in the variety of practices they developed as a counter to reification, they 
conveyed the essential limitations to the reified world they so consistently opposed. What they do not 
allow for, however, is an engagement with the ideological itself, other than by way of its own negation. 
The commodity as a factually real illusion, manifested as the spectacle, can only be countered by a total 
negation of itself. Although we can do no more than mention it here, we are bound to detect in this a 
similar tendency towards objectivism that we find in the work of Lukäcs.
171 Bataille, The Accursed Share, vols. II and III, p. 370.
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theorists of ideology choose, not so surprisingly, to focus upon the experience of the 
object, the external reason for the subject’s demise viewed as an objectivity in which 
the subject is fatally immersed. This world also seems to suggest a type of 
democracy, and, however duplicitous its guises and mocking the gaze of those who 
supposedly control its passage into existence, it represents a critical shift in 
philosophical consciousness. How this significance tends to be read by many of the 
critical theorists of the twentieth century is in a propensity to see a phenomenon 
degraded into a false and beguiling appearance, furnishing the individual with false 
hope and distorted belief -  a type of false or distorted consciousness emanating 
primarily from the fictive and yet all-determining objectivity of the system itself.
One such distinguishing hallmark of this work has been the seriousness with 
which the idea of the commodification of life has been theorized, particularly on the 
basis of understanding this process at the level of the construction of the image and its 
consequences for the psyche. The ‘geistige’ question -  a way of understanding 
consciousness within the confines of the imposition of forms of control -  was 
beginning, particularly from early in the twentieth century, to be transformed into a 
consideration of the unconscious motivations of those so controlled. For some, such 
as Lukäcs, what was seen was some type of connection between the two -  the 
obstacles which needed to be overcome were of the ‘geistiger’ type, and these were 
the ideological remains of capitalist reification in the thoughts and sensibilities of 
people themselves. Reification had begun to be seen as a social form of 
unconsciousness. Such an issue gave a specific focus to what György Markus rightly 
highlights as the central problem of Lukäcs’s work -  that of the question of the 
possibility of culture. 172 To understand something of this is to view culture as a 
question of life, as a matter of experience as well as reflection. An argument of this 
thesis is that understanding the ramifications of so comprehensive and frantic a 
process as the spectacle of commodification is vital to perceiving the place of the 
ideological in contemporary life. This too will enable us to question both the 
immanence and agitated murkiness of meaning in life, a questioning not only of the 
possibility of living a life free from the controlling, stultifying aspects of the 
ideological as constraint but of the possibility of grasping one’s freedom in relation to 
the freedom of humanity.
Whilst critiques of various aspects of a democratic unfreedom have usually 
focused upon the social problem of domination by such a system, it is also to an 
understanding of a politics of fear that the modernist critique of ideology is addressed.
172 György Markus, “Life and the Soul: the Young Lukäcs and the Problem of Culture”, in Lukäcs 
Revalued, ed. Agnes Heller (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 3.
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However, what we find here within many radical approaches to ideology is the 
presence of an often unacknowledged tension; a tension between wanting to 
understand the existence or absence of inner resources with which the individual 
human psyche is equipped - including those which might generally accord with the 
Delphic and Socratic maxim ‘gnothi seauton\ to ‘Know thyself - and the tendency to 
focus upon the imposition of forms of external constraint. Althusser sees people as 
the ‘never forgetful witnesses’ of their situation, bearing within their most hidden 
psychological parts “the wounds, weaknesses and stiffnesses that result from this 
struggle for human life or death” . 173 Because social life impinges upon people via 
ideological structures and images, this process, to which people are witness, is one 
that escapes them. 174 People are ultimately compelled not by their consciousness but 
by their material life. 175 This has been a pervasive argument within critical theory. 
Warren Montag, for example, has argued recently that we “act within a specific 
conjuncture only to see that conjuncture transformed beneath our feet, perhaps by our 
intervention itself, but always in ways that ultimately escape our intention or 
control” . 176 For many theorists this tension is left largely unresolved and it is instead 
to the issue of forms of domination that their more singular attention is given. A 
number of significant consequences flow from this tendency. The one that will be of 
greatest concern to us in the course of this thesis is the matter of what happens to the 
idea of the subject within such approaches.
What such theorizations can usefully remind us of is that reality does not 
always fall seamlessly in line with any given preferences of thought -  this can only 
imply an impossible subjectivism: And yet we will want to consider, in the course of 
the main part of the thesis, whether we might equally argue that the object does not 
and cannot reign in the absence of subjective contradictions. The ‘democratic 
unfreedom’ that has certainly persisted widely throughout the last century (although 
by no means exclusively -  there are, as well, all too many examples of an 
tmdemocratic unfreedom) need not only be an equivocation insinuated in falseness 
and duplicity. More importantly, it need not represent merely the ghostly presence of 
a forceful objectivity as if its very ability to fool most of the people most of the time is 
evidence of the absence of the subject. Formulating critique so as to mould itself to 
the contours of the object seems fraught with pitfalls. At one level there is a sense of 
the real in both what truth grasps and conceals, and yet what exists beyond itself is
173 Louis Althusser, “Freud and Lacan”, in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, p. 189.
174 Althusser, ForMai-x, p. 233.
175 Ibid., p. 107.
176 Warren Montag, “What is at Stake in the Debate on Postmodernism?”, in Postmodernism and its 
Discontents: Theories, Practices, ed. E. Ann Kaplan (London: Verso, 1988), p. 102.
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itself seen as ‘beyond itself -  contradiction is not seen as inherent within the relation 
between subject and object. As a consequence, much radical theory on ideology 
concentrates upon the forms of power and domination that allow the ideological its 
existence. It positions its theoretical exposition of this not on the basis of any 
formulated idea of transformation, or even a sense of a dynamic, but more narrowly 
and defensively upon the notions of relative autonomy of certain relations from their 
economic ‘foundation’, the failure of an economic ‘last instance’ to arrive, the logical 
appropriateness of an ‘imputed’ class consciousness (as distinct from either an actual 
or an ideal consciousness) and so on. Little serious attempt is made to in any way 
prefigure a transformed reality beyond the logic of a dominant and dominating 
ideology or to even consider the possibility of a transformative contact between 
subject and object. The necessity of illusion and an increasingly complete identity 
between an allegedly objective given and our perception or recognition of it, is made a 
rigid part of what a general acknowledgement of the extensiveness of ideology can be. 
This is not to suggest that any theorization of the immensity and significance of 
ideology is inappropriate - highlighting the pervasive nature of the ideological has 
also resulted in many insightful studies of hitherto barely understood tendencies 
towards domination. The fact that radical theory has considered the idea of ideology 
extensively and theorized specific forms of its critique, such as that of a 
psychoanalytic dimension to its functioning, has resulted in difficulties and yet lent to 
its body of thought a commandingly interesting distinctiveness. Let us now turn 
briefly to the first theme we have highlighted in relation to an understanding of the 
ideological -  that of the spectacle of commodification.
A culture of disenchantment -  the impact ofprocesses of commodification at the
level of the image
For many radical theorists, an issue of central importance to the presence of 
ideology within twentieth century life has been the increasingly decisive role of a 
culture of disenchantment. This disenchantment is most immediately located in 
processes of capitalist rationalization for the purposes of a widespread 
commodification of life, but, as we will see, it is also often detected in the 
contradictions emerging out of a sense of the destruction of former individual and 
communal values. The disenchantment of the world is often attributed to the advent 
of modernity and particularly to a sense of loss and disquiet even in the midst of, and 
perhaps because of, a blithe, seemingly satisfied assumption of the ever increasing 
prosperity and development of civilization. We will want to consider this sense of a 
loss of meaning and value, and its unfolding within the encroachment of an 
instrumental reason, in their relation to a sense of a loss of freedom. As we have
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previously mentioned, Charles Taylor refers to the alienation of humanity within this 
condition of disenchantment in Alexis de Tocqueville’s term as leading to a ‘soft 
despotism’, and it is this connection between a culture of disenchantment and a loss of 
freedom that we will pursue.177 Seeking out connections between disenchantment and 
a loss of freedom entails considering a number of apparently contradictory realities. 
The anonymity of social forces governing the modem world is taken to be evidence 
not only of the ascendancy of increasingly impersonal powers within people’s lives, 
but of a certain eclipse of the self-determining individual herself: and yet there is 
something about modernity that enlivens individualism above any other form of 
human existence. The needs of a progressively more mechanized production process 
and administrations in search of greater control over all possible human vagaries and 
inconsistencies led to a variety of types of rationalization over human creativity. At 
the same time, certain human needs have been able to be more fully addressed, and 
new engagements with one’s objective world, particularly those liable to give rise to 
greater knowledge, and perhaps even self-criticism, have inevitably emerged. 
Modernity itself is rightly characterized in relation to a certain questioning, not only 
of tradition, but of the nature of the present as an inheritor of the past.178 This is no 
more obvious than in a sense of the arrival and perhaps more persistent presence of a 
culture of disenchantment, a culture whose various dimensions -  philosophical, 
political, psychological and theological -  are able to reveal much about the 
contradictory operations of the ideological in modem life. Here, as we will see, the 
problems upon which we are focusing of a ‘soft despotism’ -  a ‘democratic 
unfreedom’ and a ‘voluntary servitude’ - make their presence felt most acutely.
In identifying a sense of disenchantment some of the theorists of modem 
society are indebted to Ferdinand Tönnies and the distinction he makes between 
community and society as set out in his work of 1887, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. 
In this work, Tönnies describes the contemporary changes occurring within people’s 
lives in terms of the usurpation of the centrality of interdependent, personal relations 
within communities by the impersonal nature of contractual relations between people 
made in commercial, industrial society.179 Loss, fragmentation and detachment come
177 Taylor, The Ethics o f Authenticity, p. 10.
178 Peter Dews, for example, suggests defining modernity as “the uncompletable task of questioning 
what is handed down”, capturing the sense of past and future in the present moment of modernity. 
Peter Dews, The Limits o f Disenchantment: Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy (London: 
Verso, 1995), p. 59.
179 It should be noted, in passing, that some of the Western Marxists were less influenced by this idea 
of a Gemeinschaft /Gesellschaft split. Indeed, Adorno, for example, accuses Lukäcs of having resorted 
to a form of nostalgia by employing such an antithesis, and by yearning for the return to more 
“meaningful times” of the harmony between subject and object as one supposed existed in medieval 
towns. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 191.
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to characterize the modem. Georg Simmel’s critique, not only of the role of money, 
but of the more general ‘culture of things’, as we will see, influenced Lukäcs in 
particular to focus upon the problem of fragmentation within a rationalized 
capitalism. 180 Simmel detects a strange neurasthenia on the part of people struggling to 
withstand the objectification of culture, ultimately leading to people becoming 
increasingly stranded within an outwardly rational countenance and yet decisively 
removed from the possession of each individual’s own human depth. 181 Max Weber’s 
influence in the development of the idea of rationalization was particularly significant, 
for Weber had theorized the rise of an instrumental reason and forms of bureaucratic 
control via a single logic of formal rationality, and also the widespread formation of a 
disenchantment or de-magicization [Entzauberung] in the Western world in the wake 
of the demise of myth, tradition and the sacred. 182 The ‘spirit of capitalism’ was 
simultaneously one of disenchantment and instrumental calculation. Weber quite 
clearly associated a ‘purposive-rational’ action (zweckrational) with processes of 
increasing secularization. This was modem Western society’s particular form of 
progress. Where Weber approached capitalism as a ‘fateful force’ in modem human 
life, many of those influenced by his work were more equivocal about modem 
capitalism’s arrival. 183 The very question posed by Weber’s work as to why processes 
of secularization within Western culture occurred in relation to the rise of a type of 
purposive rational action was far less associated with the type of supposed objectivity 
Weber found in all his assumed value-neutral processes, but was rather seen as a part 
of a more general culture of disintegration brought about through naked self-interest
180 Georg Simmel, The Philosophy o f Money, trans. Tom Bottomore and David Frisby (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978). See also Georg Lukäcs, “The old culture and the new culture”, first 
published in 1920, reprinted in Telos, no. 5 (1970) pp. 21-30.
181 Georg Simmel, “The Metropolis and Mental Life”, 1903, trans. Edward A. Shils, in On 
Individuality and Social Forms: Selected Writings, ed. David Levine (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1971), pp. 324-326.
182 It is of course worth noting that various theorists have argued for the incompleteness of the 
overcoming of myth. See, for example, Slavoj Zizek, The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on 
Schelling and Related Matters (London: Verso, 1996) and Hans Blumemburg, Work on Myth, trans. 
Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).
183 Max Weber, ‘Introduction’, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism, p. 17. There is an 
extensive literature drawing similarities and contrasts between Weber and Marx on precisely this issue 
of the consequences of instrumental reason. See, for example, the various essays in Robert J. Antonio 
and Ronald M. Glassman, eds., A Marx -  Weber Dialogue (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 
1985); S. N. Birnbaum, “Conflicting Interpretations of the Rise of Capitalism: Marx and Weber”, 
British Journal o f Sociology, no. 4 (1953): pp. 125 -  144; Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern 
Social Theory: An Analysis o f the Writings o f Marx, Dürkheim and Max Weber (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1971); Fredric Jameson, “The Vanishing Mediator; or, Max Weber as 
Storyteller”, New German Critique, no. 1 (1973): pp. 52-89, reprinted in The Ideologies o f Theory: 
Essays, 1971 -  1986, vol. II (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 3 -34; Sayer, 
Capitalism and Modernity.
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on the part of those whose values were most venal. 184 At its most extreme, this 
secularization was believed to be the very consciousness of doom from which 
humanity was unlikely to escape. 185
The theme of disenchantment, then, pervades the work of many theorists of 
the ideological, and yet what disenchantment is taken to mean varies widely. 186 At one 
level the problem of instrumental calculation is seen as a basis for a forced acceptance 
of a type of reason based, not upon the needs of people to enhance and enrich their 
sense of humanity, but to further the interests of an abstract, technical rationale for the 
purpose of the expansion of capitalism. Because an instrumental calculation was not 
able to be presented to people in immediately acceptable terms, an ideological re­
presentation of this ‘purposive-rational’ action was required. A generalized, 
technical, scientistic disenchantment served these purposes well. At another level, the 
same idea of the destruction of some former values and patterns of life is seen as a 
means to a ‘disenchantment’ in another sense -  that of a liberation from illusions. 
Such disenchantment might occur via a stripping away of the layers of false 
consciousness, or via a more positive re-enchantment with emancipatory ideals. 
Disenchantment might in this sense mean both a process of unmasking and one of 
discovery. What becomes increasingly apparent is that a sense of the contradictions 
within disenchantment and its underlying relations does not always emerge along the 
lines of the more straightforward working out of a dialectic of enlightenment -  a 
calculative reason, a fetishism of commodities, a bureaucratic rationality versus the 
freedom of authenticity, emancipation and creativity. Instead the more turbulent and 
dynamic emergence of subjective and objective self-contradictions mark the passage 
of forms of disenchantment. The fetishism of commodities, for example, can reveal 
types of control at the same time as it exposes aspects of creativity.
In each of the senses in which we have highlighted a disenchantment what is 
entailed is some relation to the ideological. With the process of rationalization is seen
184 Max Weber’s essay ‘Science as Vocation’, written in 1917, poses such a question in relation to 
rationalization. This essay appears in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans., ed. and intro. 
H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948), pp. 129-156.
185 Alfred Seidel’s manuscript “Consciousness as Doom” left prior to his suicide as a testimony to the 
complete disenchantment he felt for the analytical consciousness of the 1920s represents one extreme 
of this approach. Alfred Seidel, “Consciousness as Doom”, cited in Bloch, The Spirit o f Utopia, 
pp. 52-55.
186 It is interesting in this context to consider, as Peter Dews points out, that the sense of a 
disenchantment of the world, greeted by many as a destructive if not indeed catastrophic cultural 
trauma, failed to be interpreted as anything particularly turbulent by other theorists. Indeed, the 
perspective of a pragmatic rationalism, as Dews attributes more recently to Richard Rorty, for example, 
might be the basis for welcoming the process of a progressive disenchantment. Dews, The Limits o f 
Disenchantment, pp. 1-2.
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a tendency towards technical perfectability, which would mean, in Adorno’s words, 
“the repetition of the continually same ‘today’” -  to the point where even a sense of a 
tomorrow would be extinguished. 187 For Benjamin, the thought that things might 
remain the way they were signalled the real catastrophe of modem culture. 188 
Modernity’s idea of a technical perfection had, of course, replaced any sense of a 
spiritual perfection or sacred completedness suggesting, in this way, at least less of a 
perpetual continuation than a break from the past, which then became ideologically 
transformed into a notion of concrete, worldly progress. In reality it heralded the 
wearisome possibility of a perpetuation of sameness, a culture of specialization and 
standardization via the elimination of all that is unpredictable, sensuous and 
mysterious, as well as spiritual. It was this reality that alerted various theorists to the 
arrival of a seemingly interminable present suggested not only in the rapid acceptance 
of a standardization and rationalization of creativity but also in the reproduction of 
this in ideological terms. For radical critics alarmed by these directions, a 
rationalization in which people would inevitably define themselves through or for 
something else would unavoidably result in nothing more than a “shabby culture”, 
ultimately revealing the operations of the ideological, for ideology in relation to 
commodification, relied primarily upon a subjugation of the self to abstract, 
objectified relations. 189 For some of the theorists of this tendency the end point of its 
supposed progress was nothing other than the horror of fascism - the complete control 
of thought by a coldly calculating irrationalism. Adomo interpreted the outcome of a 
shabby culture as the loss of the capability of people to imagine “the totality as 
something that could be completely different” . 190 Instead of possessing any possible 
cognition of change, the individual would be perpetually suspended within the 
boredom of seeing herself “almost always deceived” . 191 We will look later in the 
thesis at what we might see as a contemporary version of such suspension -  in the 
example of cynicism. 192
For many theorists of the early twentieth century, the outcome of processes 
based upon the predictions and calculations of the understanding - a systematized 
thought which “claims to be the universal method by which to obtain knowledge of
187 Adorno, “Something’s Missing”, p. 2.
188 Walter Benjamin, quoted in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, eds. Andrew Arato and Eike 
Gebhardt (New York: Continuum, 1985), p. 404.
189 Adomo, Negative Dialectics, p. 367.
190 Adomo, “Something’s Missing”, p. 3.
191 Ibid., p. 1.
192 For a general account of the theory of cynicism, particularly in relation to post-modernism, see 
Timothy Bewes, Cynicism and Postmodernity (London: Verso, 1997).
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the whole of existence” as Lukacs writes193 - is that bourgeois existence is equated 
with reality and existence as such. 194 Abstract, quantifiable and instrumentally useful 
calculations, with an increasingly scant regard for a humanized humanity -  forms of 
rationalization highly susceptible to domination and exploitation - are seen as one 
basis for the growing significance of ideology. There is a materialistic alienation in 
which the once profane is now part of society’s common currency. Exchange and 
domination are tightly intertwined. The power of the banal “extends over the entire 
society”, Adorno writes. 195 For Lukacs, the problem is that these “emptied and 
bursting husks” of bourgeois culture have their own allure, such that individuals who 
might otherwise have access to a culture of more positive contents will most likely 
adapt themselves “ideologically to conform to these, the emptiest and most decadent 
forms of bourgeois culture” . 196 Even those more affirmative aspects of culture, the 
“burden of treasures that is piled on humanity’s back”, does not give people “the 
strength to shake it off, so as to get its hands on it”, argued Benjamin. 197 The more 
accustomed one becomes to the needs of a venal system, the more one will be cast 
adrift from the expectation of change. Ideology succeeds most where an uncritical 
acceptance of the system prevails. Ideology is, then, an expression of this particular 
sort of disenchantment in which the subject becomes increasingly involved in a 
distancing from a critical engagement with reality and one’s perception of reality.
The problem of how one might deal with the contradictions of disenchantment 
within such an overwhelmingly difficult cultural inheritance is of course a widely 
debated issue. Some critics, like Lukacs, theorize the existence of an imputed or 
potential class consciousness that could enable those most dehumanized by the 
reification of culture, the proletariat, to overcome the obstacle of ideology. 
Disenchantment in this sense is taken to be a possible, although by no means certain, 
path to the undoing of ideology. Reified ideas ultimately can provide the trigger for a 
knowledge of humanity’s dehumanized plight, and, in this, the possibility to 
overwhelm the hold of ideas upon those most damaged by a reified consciousness can 
occur. Lukacs’s approach, then, represents something of a type of duality within the 
interpretation of disenchantment. Other theorists take a more singular and less
193 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 114.
194 Ibid., p. 119. Lukacs instead argues that our knowledge and understanding is much more delimited 
and partial. To assume otherwise, to believe that complete knowledge can emerge from a rational 
system of concepts, is fundamentally important for the acceptance of ideological realities.
195 Theodor W. Adorno, “On the fetish character in music and the regression of listening”, in The 
Essential Frankfurt School Reader, eds. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New York: Continuum, 
1985), p. 274.
196 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 208.
197 Benjamin, One-Way Street, p. 361.
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sanguine view of the possibilities for piercing through ideology’s veil and overcoming 
the documents of a cultural history whose pages include the record of barbarism. 
Adorno argues that “the social apparatus has hardened itself against people, and thus, 
whatever appears before their eyes all over the world as attainable possibility, as the 
evident possibility of fulfilment, presents itself to them as radically impossible” . 198 If 
a subjective fulfilment makes banal most aspects of life, this would be made 
inescapably the case by the cunning duplicity of the various social and economic 
institutions structuring people’s lives. That this occurs within upheavals in techniques 
and capacities for the reproduction and acceleration of technological change creates 
further difficulties of ephemerality and repeatability and, as Benjamin sees it, the 
destruction of the ‘aura’ of cultural objects - their unique appearance of a distance. 
With the arrival of the machine age, cultural production could not be but decisively 
affected. 199 Commodities appear both as the symbolic desires of a world of limitless 
abundance and as the extraordinary ability for a transformation of needs and wishes 
into commodities to take place, however newly and superficially acquired these needs 
actually were. 200 Even the more straightforwardly meretricious reproduction of 
culture, in the form of kitsch, is representative not only of a tendency towards the 
reification of the most banal forms of functionalism but suggests some kind of 
democratization or ‘massification’ of sentiment. 201 What this seemingly extreme form 
of disenchantment presented, interpreted in this period in predominantly and 
deservingly negative terms, should have been ideology’s end point; and yet this
198 Adorno, “Something’s Missing”, p. 4.
199 This is unfortunately only all the more the case when duplicity is presented as essentially merely a 
form of unapologetic duplicity, as in the case of kitsch. This is not to suggest that kitsch does not play 
upon eliciting a type of emotion thereby according to the object fake sentiments - but it does so 
knowingly, as it were; it is produced so as to be able to elicit a predictable response. In this sense it is a 
type of fake consciousness or relies on such a consciousness for its consumption. The problem that 
many critical theorists see with this is in the inevitable outcome of a type of cultural homogenization. 
It is here that we see the difficulty involved in a supposed democratization of the market in this sense. 
And this becomes so readily an ideological problem: It is certainly the case that the commodified 
detritus of production is made available to the mass of consumers, but, as Clement Greenberg argued in 
1939, kitsch demands nothing of its customers except their money. Clement Greenberg, “Avant-garde 
and Kitsch (1939)”. In The Partisan Reader: Ten Years o f Partisan Review 1934-1944, ed. William 
Phillips and Philip Rahv, intro. Lionel Trilling (New York: Dial Press, 1946), pp. 378-392. This 
reality is unavoidable, and, as such, we are constantly confronted with the presentation of its 
contradictions in ideological terms. What is interesting is that it is precisely this sort of problem -  
culture as kitsch -  which seems to make the idea of ideology today a persistently relevant problem. 
The same sense of knowingness, which we see in the consumption of kitsch, accompanies ideological 
belief into its realization in thought and activity.
200 As Susan Buck-Morss argues, technology “still held out the promise of a Golden Age”. Susan 
Buck-Morss, “Walter Benjamin -  Revolutionary Writer (I)”, New Left Review, no. 128 (July-August 
1981): p. 128.
201 Raymond Williams refers to the term ‘massification’ to describe new modes of alienation and 
control that help to prevent the development of an authentic popular consciousness. See Raymond 
Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary o f Culture and Society (London: Fontana, 1976).
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simply was not the case. The overt creation of desire rather than its seemingly more 
innocuous supply outwitted any susceptibility ideology might have to a coolly 
reasoned knowledge. What various theorists saw here was the uncertain outcome of 
the pile upon pile of human wreckage, the fawning servility of people before power 
and the general retrogression of much cultural achievement. At the same time, faced 
with the destruction of a sense of the mystery of life, and its substitution with an 
empty, narrow computation in the service of production, the individual is seen as 
increasingly susceptible to ideology’s swarming birds of prey.
In this paradox of disenchantment we have indicated what can be seen as a 
certain alienation of contemporary existence that poses the difficulty of the 
insinuation of the ideological. The gaze of the alienated person, which Baudelaire had 
captured so well in his depiction of the passer-by wandering the modem street, 
represented for many the very type of outlook upon the world that a commodity 
society required. Distracted, fleeting glimpses, half-acknowledged recognition and an 
impulse towards whatever might confront the individual, are the attitudes most 
appropriate to the vicissitudes and disorder of market competition. Competition is the 
necessary outcome of the mass-marketing of ultimately unrealized and unrealizable 
desires. New gratifications could emerge to replace the spent hope of unsatisfied 
dreams within a constant and endlessly tantilizing stream of need and want, dream 
and hope. Here, ideologies of freedom and opportunity could be given full 
expression. Cultural phenomena needed to be understood in terms of their 
overwhelming incorporation into the social process in which they occurred. And yet, 
this process did not imply the complete control of people by the image. The everyday 
shock experiences of the urban industrial phantasmagoria could contain as many 
collective wish-images as distorting illusions. Because this uneasy constellation of 
images is the playing out of a seemingly paralyzed present and a sometimes narcotic 
re-enactment of the past, its future cannot be completely captured. It is something of 
this sense of the problem of ideology in relation to commodification that we want to 
capture in our development of an alternative theorization of the ideological. 
Benjamin’s use of ‘dialectical images’, often the dream images of a collective 
unconscious, highlight this strange paradox of the existence of a protean alienation, 
still capable of awakening into the utopian symbols and dream consciousness of a vast 
and seemingly interminable commodity landscape.202 Whether such images do indeed
202 For example, Benjamin’s range of images, used to denote the original or archaic derived from an 
understanding of the juxtaposition of antitheses, such as the various ‘Ur-images’, conveys a sense of 
this. As Tiedemann argues, the concept of the dialectical image is one o f the central categories of 
Benjamin’s Passagen-Werk. Rolf Tiedemann, “Dialectics at a Standstill: Approaches to the Passagen- 
WerP\ in On Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections, ed. Gary Smith (Cambridge, Mass.:
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lead to the revelation of commodities as fetishes, as was sincerely hoped, the 
important issue is that Benjamin was able to theorize something about the role of 
consciousness in perpetuating an ideological state.203 Bloch’s understanding of 
anticipatory illumination, an incipit vita nova, within much human endeavour, 
indicates a similar cultural contradiction at the heart of commodity society’s 
existence. What disenchantment increasingly presented to some radical theory was 
the problem of a contradictory dialectical reality.
This dialectical character of images and their consciousness is what needs to 
be explained within a critique of ideology.204 As we will see, however, the focus for 
many radical theorists is more upon ideology as a form of distortion that places 
barriers in the way of any ability to grasp the dialectical nature of these lived 
experiences. This tendency runs counter to the development of a ‘philosophy of the 
future’ which is deliberately directed towards an appreciation of the experimental, of 
the world as a venture, as Bloch considers it. 205 It also fails to understand what 
Nietzsche, for example, had seen as an ‘enticement’ or ‘temptation’ 206 with “rash 
fingers for the ungraspable” 207 to realize positive creative resources. The immanent 
critique of ideology has instead, in the main, concealed the art of experiment with the 
problem of theorizations of social control and domination. To mention this is not to 
suggest that theorizations of a more one-dimensional sense of power have been 
completely unwarranted, as we have already said. A confrontation with a new world
MIT Press, 1991), p. 284. Susan Buck-Morss views them as “a revolutionary gesture which exploded 
the historical continuum and caught the phenomenal elements thus freed in new constellations”. The 
images “provided a model on the cognitive level for the act of social transformation”. Susan Buck- 
Morss, “Walter Benjamin -  Revolutionary Writer (II)”, New Left Review, no. 129 (Sept-Oct, 1981): 
p. 87.
203 Likewise, Benjamin saw in the destruction of the aura of an erstwhile autonomous work of art not 
only a tailoring to the needs of mass reproduction but also a basis, in the dissolution of “its parasitic 
dependence on ritual”, for the politicization of art. Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction”, Illuminations, p. 226.
204 Whether this was ever attempted by theorists such as Benjamin or Bloch is more open to argument. 
Certainly, Habermas considers that Benjamin, for example, developed a ‘rettende’ critique that 
diverged from ideology critique in a number of areas, most significantly with the use of Benjamin’s 
understanding of the impulse towards rescuing. Jürgen Habermas, “Walter Benjamin: Consciousness- 
Raising or Rescuing Critique”, in On Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections, ed. Gary 
Smith (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 90-128. We might add here that the basis of 
Habermas’ own distinction between ‘rettende’ and ideology critique is put forward very much on the 
assumption that ideology critique is necessarily posited on the foundation of a form of consciousness as 
self-reflection. The work of a theorist such as Bloch would, however, seem to suggest otherwise.
205 Bloch, A Philosophy o f the Future, p. viii.
206 In Walter Kaufmann’s translation of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche’s play on the words 
‘ Versuch’ (hypothesis or experiment) and ‘ Versuchung’ (seduction or enticement) is acknowledged as 
such; in R. J. Hollingdale’s translation the same meanings are captured in the words ‘attempters’ and 
‘temptation’. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, par. 42.
207 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, par. 44.
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of power and enslavement gave rise to numerous perceptive studies of aspects of the 
problem of human domination. In an acknowledgement of the deeply interrelated 
functions of the processes of exchange and domination is a sense of the insinuation of 
ideology directly within everyday conscious and unconscious experience. As we will 
now see, a part of an understanding of the problem of domination has been extensive 
investigations of the part played by unconscious desire and need in an acceptance of, 
and confrontation with, domination. Such a shift in the critique of ideology has 
enabled a much fuller sense of how ideology is instantiated and realized in 
contemporary life.
A psychology of control -  the problem of the unconscious
The issues of a ‘democratic unfreedom’ and a ‘voluntary servitude’, as part of 
broader tendencies towards domination and control, presented radical theorists with 
considerable reason to examine the workings of psychological conditions and the 
sense of an interiority in the construction of meaning and the function of ideology. 
The apparent immediacy of constraints upon freedom could reveal much about the 
way the social system worked, and yet this often failed to address the place of the 
individual as a subject within a system of command and as a participant in the 
moulding of meaning within the context of one’s particular circumstances. Whilst the 
necessity of an abolition of fear was paramount amongst the concerns of many radical 
theorists, an account of the presence of fear and self-control often proved somewhat 
elusive. 208 To understand aspects of this, various theorists turned to an analysis of the 
workings of the psyche, and, in particular, to that of unconscious thoughts and desires 
in the development of meaning. In this subsection we will consider this one central 
concern of the significance of unconscious experience to the development of a theory 
of ideology. We will first examine, by way of a brief example, why this concern with 
interior experience came about, and will then look at some of the influences giving 
rise to new theorizations of the unconscious and ideology.
Thus far in the chapter we have seen that what concerns many of the radical 
theorists of the modem period is what Marx indicates, in a general sense, as the 
problem of the denial of the accomplished being. We exist in a strange state of a
208 Adorno, for example, wrote in a letter to Benjamin in 1936 that “the goal of the revolution is the 
abolition of fear”. Theodor W. Adorno, “Letters to Walter Benjamin”, in Aesthetics and Politics, ed. 
and trans. Ronald Taylor (London: Verso, 1986), p. 125.
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“semblance of humanity” .209 How to understand the reasons for this denial began to 
occupy many theorists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century period. The 
issue that perhaps most prompted such investigations was that of seeing, in an 
increasingly socially empowered humanity, a strangely craven accommodation by 
individuals to conditions of control. The ability to consciously control one’s own life, 
so blithely promised in notions of progress and technological development, had failed 
to materialize: Not only this but it also began to appear more remote and more 
compromised than ever before. No doubt this situation occurred partly because 
greater philosophical credence had been given to the whole idea of the importance of 
the subject and her conscious and unconscious motivations, and partly as a result of a 
fundamental questioning of the idea of any formal barrier between conscious and 
unconscious life. Residing over this, however, was the issue of the imposition of an 
array of forms of control to which the individual seemed, regrettably, to succumb. In 
this climate, a variety of theorists exposed the necessity to alter, or the possibility of 
radically changing, the course of modem life.
What emerged in the writings of theorists as diverse as, for example, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Wilhelm Reich, Georges Bataille and Erich Fromm, was an attempt to 
explain the strange dialectic of submission and control in which seemingly increasing 
numbers of people were involved. This tendency towards a ‘forced acceptance’, as 
Marx had already understood, was not only to be detected in the bleak obviousness of 
failed revolutionary zeal but was perhaps, more confusingly, to be found in a quiet 
acquiescence to the failed promise of bourgeois ideals. It was this new reality that 
these modem theorists of the psyche sought to understand.
There would develop something significantly different in these investigations 
from the master-slave dialectic, outlined by Hegel, with what became, in the twentieth 
century, an attempt to account for aspects of the human psyche that were hidden by or 
defied outward appearances. The delusions of the consciousness, through which truth 
as the corrected error could be realized, were transformed by a newly found sense of 
unconscious intentions harboured deep within an unsuspecting psyche. This latter 
tendency would reach new areas of analysis with the influence of Sigmund Freud’s 
theorization of the unconscious.210 Previously largely unexplored realms of the 
marvellous, the fantastic, dream states, hallucinatory perception and the unconscious
209 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Holy Family, or Critique o f Critical Criticism: Against Bruno 
Bauer and Company, trans. Richard Dixon and Clemens Dutt (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 
p. 44.
210 A sense of the unconscious is, of course, in no sense restricted to the arrival of Freud’s 
theorizations. For an analysis of the broader history of the concept see, for example, Henri F. 
Ellenberger, The Discoveiy of the Unconscious (New York: Basic Books, 1979).
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now became a part of an understanding of what humanity’s relation to the world could 
mean. The surrealist writer, Andre Breton, acknowledged the influence of Freud for 
the “human explorer” wanting to investigate beyond mere superficial realities and the 
sway of “absolute rationalism”, where experience continued to pace “back and forth 
in a cage from which it is more and more difficult to make it emerge”.211 Breton was 
surely not the first theorist to be struck by the clear images, the ‘admission of the 
consciousness’, that the workings of the psyche presented - he was later to recall a 
phrase about ‘a man cut in two by the window’ as being particularly significant in his 
realization of the workings of the unhampered mind: But when, in his 1924 Manifesto, 
he wrote of the critical spirit of spoken thought he was amongst an early, emerging 
group of theorists for whom a different and novel aesthetic was deemed vital for the 
future of humanity.212 Here, it was felt, was a new opportunity to read the confessions 
“that lay hidden under their masks of images”, as Louis Aragon expressed it: In this 
observation of the mind was “a power that they did not know they had, an 
incomparable freedom, a liberation of the mind, an unprecedented production of 
images”213 - a world, in short, which forced the onlooker to behold reality anew.
This positive, still inchoate, recognition of the unconscious was particularly 
relevant to the development of a critique of ideology. Where ideology had been 
conceived as some sort of false consciousness or constructedness, to which a contrast 
with reality could be drawn, the realm of the unconscious opened up an area beyond 
this stark division between ideology and reality - a cloudy, ambiguous realm of felt 
effects and yet no clear certainties. The idea of the separateness of the rational and 
the irrational and their simple correspondence to the realms of reality and ideology 
would also, then, be subjected to a fundamental reappraisal. Ideology could now be 
located in a nether-world of neither reality nor illusion, neither reason nor the realm of 
the idola, but in something else altogether. The partly-concealed, partly revealed 
sphere of fetishized, reified reality was thus to gain a whole new aspect - that which 
was not only deeper than the superficiality of appearances but that containing the 
seemingly infinite. The arena of the imagination presented a shoreless expanse. 
Numerous studies began to appear in which some sense of the unconscious and the 
imagination was increasingly important.
211 Andre Breton, “Manifesto of Surrealism (1924)”, in Manifestoes o f Surrealism, trans. Richard 
Seaver and Helen R. Lane (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 1972), p. 10.
212 Ibid., p. 21.
213 Louis Aragon, “Une vague de reves”, in Commerce (Autumn 1924), quoted in Maurice Nadeau, 
The Histoiy o f Surrealism, trans. Richard Howard (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978), p. 88.
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From the period of the first few decades of the twentieth century a shift into a 
recognition of the psyche and its decidedly unstraightforward manoeuvrings was to 
take on myriad forms. Reich’s investigation into the character of the ‘little man’ - the 
fascist archetype of the person who is enslaved, who craves authority but, at the same 
time, exhibits a type of rebelliousness - was very deliberately entitled, The Mass 
Psychology o f Fascism. When Reich explained the purpose of his analysis of mass 
psychology as being the need to understand the widespread acceptance of fascism, he 
pointed out that the issue is not one of explaining why the hungry person steals or that 
the exploited strike; the point is to understand “why the majority of those who are 
hungry don’t steal and why the majority of those who are exploited don’t strike”.214 
There is something operating in a powerful manner that enables such control and self- 
control, Reich indicates, which we need to more fully understand. Bataille’s writings 
of the 1930s also sought to understand the psychological manifestations of 
contemporary capitalism - in particular the nature of the various passions unleashed 
by competition and the symbolic value of commodities and their constitution within 
the unconscious.215 The critical theorist Erich Fromm traced, from the 1930s also, a 
rapidly embedded tendency for the individual to adopt the psychology of the 
requirements of capitalist competition. With capitalism, all vestiges of the Epicurean 
ideal of pleasure as ataraxia or the stillness of the soul have been grounded into 
illusions bom of egotism, selfishness and mindless greed. A state of ‘having’ - 
avarice and a grasping to possess - has replaced the condition of ‘being’, but has, at 
the same time, made the yearning for ‘being’ ever greater.216 Characteristically 
precursory, Nietzsche is the radical philosopher of this late nineteenth, early twentieth 
century period who is most uncompromising in his criticism of the psychological 
manifestations of modem life.217 Nietzsche’s most provocative fillip is offered in his 
examination of forms of ressentiment - a slave morality unable to open itself to a
214 Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology o f Fascism, trans. Vincent R. Carfagno (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1975), p. 53.
215 See, for example, “The Notion of Expenditure” (1933), in Georges Bataille, Visions o f Excess: 
Selected Writings, 1927-1939, ed. Allan Stoekl, trans. Allan Stoekl with Carl R. Lovitt and Donald M. 
Leslie, Jr. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), pp. 116-129.
216 Erich Fromm, To Have or To Be? (London: Abacus, 1979).
217 Nietzsche often referred to himself as a Psychologe, meaning a writer who was concerned with an 
understanding of the human psyche. In this pursuit he counted Stendhal, and most particularly 
Dostoevsky, as exemplars. See Shlomo Pines, “Nietzsche: Psychology vs. Philosophy, and Freedom”, 
in Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker: Papers Presented at the Fifth Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter, 
April 1983, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), pp. 147-148. Nietzsche’s 
analysis of power and self-overcoming is very different from Freud’s psychoanalysis and yet areas of 
commonality certainly exist. According to Freud’s biographer, Ernest Jones, Freud “referred to 
Nietzsche as to the man who had a more penetrating knowledge of himself than any other man who 
ever lived or was likely to live”. Ernest Jones, Sigmund Freud: Life and Work, vol. II (London: 
Hogarth, 1955), p. 385.
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sceptical but self-knowing conquest of freedom. A psychology of mean-spirited 
weakness and fear has made people the victims of external commands and 
dependence. To shy away from an account of this would be, for Nietzsche, to “stroke 
the effeminate ears of our modem weaklings” . 218 At its most basic, Nietzsche’s 
philosophy claims quite clearly that what is good is that which “heightens the feeling 
of power” in people; what is bad is everything that is bom of weakness.219 The feeling 
of power or realizing one’s will is being able to command something within oneself; it 
is not the abuse of power over other beings. 220 It is this sense of a strange lack of 
power in relation to the self that seemed to act as the trigger for a number of theorists 
to explore divergent and sometimes quite new avenues of critical explanation of the 
psychological aspect of social life.
The absence of sufficient examples of the command of one’s own self gave 
many of these theorists reason to examine how this problem actually became 
manifest. The issue of control, and more particularly self-control, was firmly on the 
agenda and thus acknowledged as a hitherto under-theorized aspect of social life. 
Various Marxists had taken from Marx’s work insights into the psychological 
component of human activities and desires, although, as we will see in a later chapter 
dealing with Marx’s work, much misunderstanding or interpretation of a highly 
particular sort tended to result, giving an unnecessarily narrow view of Marx’s 
treatment of the problem of the psyche.221 Upon this, in some cases, more or less 
contrived basis, emerged an otherwise rightfully acknowledged need to forge freshly 
perceived connections between what was taken to be the ideological and that of the 
social and economic factors of its existence. Unfortunately, such a gap within social 
theory often resulted merely in couching this relationship in terms of relating a 
‘superstructure’ to its ‘base’. Of the more contemporary period Michel Pecheux 
comments on what he sees as a failure to fully comprehend the relation of ideology 
and the psychoanalytic dimension of the unconscious to the formation of subjectivity 
as having led to some types of highly particular narrowing within radical theory. 222
218 Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, trans. Francis Golffing (New York: Anchor, 1956). sec. 
3, par. 19.
219 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, par. 2.
220 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, par. 19.
221 See, for example, the work of the Belgian theorist, Hendrik de Man, whose work written in 1927, 
On the Psychology o f Marxism, interpreted Marx as putting forward a purely utilitarian psychology, de 
Man was influential within German radical university circles in the 1930s, lecturing at Frankfurt. The 
work mentioned appears as Hendrik de Man, The Psychology o f Marxian Socialism, trans. Eden and 
Cedar Paul (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1985).
222 Michel Pecheux, Stating the Obvious: Language, Semantics and Ideology, trans. Harbans Nagpal 
(London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 104. Although I would agree with the general point made by Pecheux,
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Some theorists who took a particular interest in the psychological conditions 
of social life, such as Fromm and Walter Benjamin, looked not only to Freud but to an 
array of theorists of matriarchal culture writing in the 1920s, such as Robert Briffault 
and Bronislaw Malinowski, as well as to the much earlier work of the Swiss 
anthropological theorist, Johann Jacob Bachofen, whose studies within matriarchal 
theory had been first published in the 1860s.223 From these writers such theorists as 
Fromm, Reich and Benjamin were to develop their own understanding of the 
importance of social factors in the construction of the self. The importance of this 
emphasis in their work would gradually place these theorists, most particularly 
Fromm, at an increasing distance from the Freudian left of the period. The Frankfurt 
School theorists, Horkheimer and Adorno, took a more orthodox Freudian position on 
such issues as the importance of early childhood trauma, the significance of sexual 
repression, and a generally pessimistic view of the continuation and saturation of 
authoritarian tendencies - Adomo himself savagely castigating Fromm’s own critique 
of Freud’s patriarchalism in notably heightened terms that perhaps only a period of 
the reality of fascist barbarism could evoke. Finding Fromm’s claim that 
competitiveness gave rise to conflict fatuous, Adomo appealed to Freud’s greater 
sensitivity to the problem of the threat of violence, declaring that: “In the age of the 
concentration camp, castration is more characteristic of social reality than 
competitiveness”.224 Interestingly, in spite of his more overtly materialist theoretical 
intentions, Althusser too found aspects of the Freudian orthodoxy appealing, 
incorporating into his theorization of ideology ideas such as that of childhood 
imitative learning (not unlike Adomo and Horkheimer’s view of mimesis),225 
structures of repression functioning unconsciously and the general idea of the 
interplay of the real and the imaginary. Whilst, for Freud, the unconscious is very
his particular assertion that this failure has resulted in the return to a fatally narrow Hegelian dialectic 
and the reproduction of the idea of an absolute order was neither really true of the time nor has it stood 
the longer test of time.
223 Robert Briffault, The Mothers: A Study o f the Origins o f Sentiments and Institutions (1927), an 
abridged version of which is published as Robert Briffault, The Mothers: A Study o f the Origins o f 
Sentiments and Institutions, intro. G. R. Taylor (London: Allen & Unwin, 1959); Bronislaw 
Malinowski, Sex and Repression in Savage Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953), Johann 
Jacob Bachofen’s Das Mutterrecht, is published as Johann Jacob Bachofen, Myth, Religion and Mother 
Right: Selected Writings, trans. Ralph Manheim, preface George Boas, intro. Joseph Campbell 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967).
224 Adomo, “Social Science and Sociological Tendencies in Psychoanalysis”, April 27, 1946, quoted in 
Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A Histoiy o f the Frankfurt School and the Institute o f Social 
Research, 1923-1950 (London: Heinemann, 1973), p. 105.
225 For an informative examination of Adorno’s view of imitation and mimesis see Martin Jay, 
“Mimesis and Mimetology: Adomo and Lacoue-Labarthe”, in The Semblance o f Subjectivity: Essays in 
Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, eds. Tom Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1997), pp. 29-53.
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definitely that pertaining to the individual, for both the Frankfurt School theorists and 
Althusser, a certain type of mass unconsciousness is theorized as existing. For 
Adorno it is the consumerist, impotent mass, while, for Althusser, a mass 
unconsciousness, a subjected subject drowning in a nimiety of institutionalized, 
structural repression, can also be assumed in the workings of ideology.
Freud’s influence on philosophy had been of considerable importance since 
the 1920s. Through his work new conceptualizations of the role of ideas emerged as 
an explanation of a variety of human behaviours; for example, a greater appreciation 
was given to the theorization of the ‘ideogenic’ basis of some behaviours, the ability 
for early trauma to return in later life, the significance of desires and impulses, 
particularly as repressed wishes or recollections within the individual’s life, and the 
power of unconscious thoughts to direct a broad range of apparent behaviours. In one 
of the following chapters we will look more specifically at the influence of 
psychoanalytic themes in the work of Althusser.226 Flere we can state that, for 
Althusser, the unconscious reveals the subject irreconcilably divided against herself, 
the unavoidable effect rather than cause of her source of disempowerment - ideology. 
This is, however, no simple slide into the belief in a noetic world apart - for 
Althusser’s examination of the ideological includes in it a sense of the ideological’s 
imaginary of the repressed, an almost dialectical anticipation of the relation between 
dominating and dominated, out of which a knowledge, a ‘science’, must assume an 
uncompromised distance. This sense of a “dialectic in the wings”, as Michael 
Sprinker notes of Althusser’s Reading Capital, appears repeatedly throughout 
Althusser’s understanding of the psychoanalytic dimension of ideology.227 It is in this 
imaginary of the repressed that we also encounter in Althusser’s work the very 
Freudian theme of an almost existential guilt, a senseless, nameless, juridical guilt, 
and its necessary abstraction, complicity. These issues, as we will see, are 
fundamental to a type of ideology critique in which complicity and necessity are seen 
as the basis of subjective interaction with the object world. They will be useful to us 
in a somewhat different way in attempting to understand the traces by which the 
subject is able to track her own experience, including that of a seemingly mysterious
226 Althusser, as we will see, chooses only partly to interpret the unconscious in quite the Freudian 
fashion we have just briefly outlined. Having broken decisively with a view of ideology in terms of a 
false consciousness/true reality divide, he nonetheless reintroduces the certainty of a realm untainted by 
ideology (and thus presumably the unconscious) with his bifurcation between ‘science’ and ‘ideology’. 
But perhaps, even more strangely, he outlines a reduction of the imagination to a type of slavery, a state 
of ideological self-control from which an account only of ‘what is’ rather than ‘what could be’, can be 
given.
227 Michael Sprinker, Imaginary Relations: Aesthetics and Ideology in the Theoiy o f Historical 
Materialism (London: Verso, 1987), p. 290.
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complicity or necessity, within the conditions, both conscious and unconscious, of her 
existence.
There are a number of elements that this emphasis upon the psyche gives rise 
to for the theorizations of ideology we will encounter in the second part of the thesis. 
There is much in Althusser’s view of the presence of domination, for example, that 
expresses similarities to Freud’s depiction of the presence of neurosis as the outcome 
of social repression.228 For Althusser, the question necessarily arises as to whether 
ideology can be seen as neurosis or as a cover for neurosis. It can be noted in passing 
that Lukäcs’s view of Freud rests clearly on the assumption that Freud misunderstood 
the psychology of everyday life: Lukäcs believes that Freud had wrongly inverted the 
analysis of symptom formation - for Lukäcs, “mental abnormality” is clearly a 
deviation from the norm, whereas Freud had, in Lukäcs’s opinion, mistakenly 
attempted to understand ‘the workings of the normal mind’ from the study of 
pathological conditions.229 For Althusser, ideology interpellates individuals as, or 
into, subjects, and it is as constituted subjects that the role of the unconscious comes 
into play for the individual. The acceptance and reproduction of ideology is, 
according to Althusser, an unconscious process because ideological identification 
relies upon the presence of unconscious structural positions in which recognition can 
take place. In this sense, Althusser assumes the existence of a ‘common language’ 
with which the subject both identifies and is given recognition. Just as the concept of 
the unconscious revealed for Freud a new definition of sexuality and of humanity, for 
Althusser, the unconscious is a structural part of the processes of symbolic 
‘subjectivation’ and imaginary identification in which the subject of capitalism can be 
defined. Freud, Althusser argues, “has discovered for us that the real subject, the 
individual in his unique essence, has not the form of an ego, centred on the ‘ego’, on 
‘consciousness’ or on ‘existence’”; for Althusser, the subject is constituted “by a 
structure which has no ‘centre’”, “except in the ideological formations in which it 
‘recognizes’ itself’.230 As we will consider in a later chapter, Althusser makes much 
use of this notion of the unconscious not only to explain the basic process of 
identification between the individual and the individual as subject (in other words,
228 Freud’s generalized analysis of the repressed is the same process of uncovering as Althusser’s 
reading ideologies. In both we can detect the underlying theorization of the structure of the social 
whole and a scientism evident in the approach to the process of unmasking the real reality from its 
ideological and dreamed variants. We will look later at Althusser’s various ideas of structural 
causality, metonymic causality (in terms of parts taken for the whole) of what becomes expressed as 
knowledge effect (Darstellung) society effect, and so on.
229 See Georg Lukäcs, The Meaning o f Contemporary Realism, trans. John and Necke Mander 
(London: Merlin Press, 1963), p. 30.
230 Althusser, “Freud and Lacan”, Lenin and Philosophy, pp. 200-201.
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ideology as rationalization, justification, systematization, and so on) but also as a 
process of transference from social need to individual desire. For Freud, fantasy is 
both the imposition of the constraint of belief upon the subject and the response of the 
subject to her own desire: Indeed, for Freud, fantasy is more a wishful fantasy, which 
he indicates with the concept, Phantasie. Likewise, for Althusser, the imaginary of 
ideology is a nexus between the constituted subject and the material basis of the 
process of identification and recognition. The process of the interpellation of subjects 
is ‘always already’ a part of the structure of ideology, just as, for Freud, interpretation 
and even its ‘tendentious revision’ are already a part of the mechanism that unifies the 
material of the dream.231 For Freud, of course, ‘phantasies’ are erected on the basis of 
memories, they are ‘psychical facades’; whereas the mechanism for the emergence of 
ideologies for Althusser are more instantiated in the institutions - the various 
apparatuses of power - of which they are a part. Various other Freudian ideas were 
used by Althusser, many of which have, since Freud, been further developed by 
Freudian, psychoanalytic and linguistic theorists - the ideas of linguistic failure and 
systematic distortion in Saussure and Lacan; the idea of the omni-presence of the 
unconscious in Lacan, and his particular understanding of the mechanisms of 
subjective identification from early childhood.232
A shift towards an analysis of the unconscious allowed a number of theorists 
to develop an explanation of phenomena that fail to become transparent, and also 
freed them from a sense of the real only as the apparent.233 In terms of a theorization 
of ideology, what an emphasis upon the psyche prepared the ground for was some 
regard for the process of the instantiation of ideas as experience and ideas as 
imagination. That this approach to experience and imagination extended beyond the 
seemingly apparent immediacy of conscious expression into the realms of dreams and 
the unconscious meant that ideology could be more easily viewed in terms of the 
contestation that encapsulated experience, rather than any sense of a falseness of 
present consciousness. In this way, an understanding of a ‘democratic unfreedom’ 
could make sense of not only the sorts of constraints that the social relations of an
231 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation o f Dreams (London: Hogarth, 1953), pp. 274-275.
232 Lacan’s influence on radical theory has been extensive. From his particular importance for 
Althusser, through the various contributors to the journal Screen in the 1970s, to Fredric Jameson in the 
early 1980s and more recently to Slavoj Zizek, Lacan has been a decisive figure.
233 We will consider in the chapter on Althusser’s ideas of ideological control whether this implies a 
particular reading of the philosophical basis of reality that is then attributed to other approaches to the 
nature of reality more generally. Certainly, in Althusser, there is some implied sense of the limitations 
within the sort of Marxist theory with which he was familiar - largely an economistic, scientistic, 
reductivist Marxism ill equipped to deal with the complexities of questions of cultural value. For this 
reason a turn to theorists other than those Marxists was a necessary development for him and allowed 
an appreciation of aspects of newly emerging cultural conditions that required further theorization.
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unfree system entailed but also the vulnerability of the individual psyche faced with 
such realities. It is this emphasis that we will pursue in greater detail as a component 
of a dialectical theorization of the ideological later in the thesis.
Conclusion
This chapter has presented ideology as an unfinished theoretical problem for 
philosophy and cultural theory. It has investigated the meaning of the concept of 
ideology and its critique, and has considered why ideology critique continues to 
provide a basis for a critical understanding of the problem of unfreedom. It has 
argued the latter by opening out the meaning of ideology to a sense of contradiction 
both within ideology and that through which the ideological is realized and with 
which it contends. Contradiction, this chapter has argued, is an inherent part of the 
ideological. Through the course of the chapter we have extended this argument by 
considering the importance of a dialectical relation between freedom and unfreedom 
and between subject and object, understanding that this often involves situating 
ideology both within the sensuous supersensibility of its content and the accidental, 
transformative nature of its movement. Ideology, we have argued, is fundamentally 
concerned with experience and a contestation in relation to meaning -  much more so 
than it is with falseness and illusion.
We argued that by the 1970s an impasse had developed within the area of 
ideology critique mainly as a result of the types of objectivist analysis that had come 
to characterize much twentieth-century theorizing in relation to ideology. At the same 
time, the abandonment of ideology critique by most post-modernist criticism we view 
as a largely misplaced understanding of the concept of ideology; it is a critical 
understanding of the problem of false consciousness rather than an engagement with 
the consequences of objectivism. We have thus, in putting forward a critical analysis 
of the marginalization of ideology critique within many post-modernist approaches to 
cultural theory, argued for a renewal of the meaning of the ideological.
We have summarized two major perspectives on ideology in which a tendency 
towards objectivism is apparent as epistemological and immanent critiques. In both 
these perspectives we encountered ideology as some kind of justification of the given 
order of things, derived ultimately from the nature of the object world. A 
consideration of epistemological type questions - the questioning of ideas of truth and 
falsity, reason and irrationality, illusion and reality, essence and appearance - have 
been a basic part of most radical thought and yet have also been the subject of
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extensive criticism. What can generally be termed a immanent critique approach to 
ideology - specifically that which considers ideas or ideological practices in terms of 
their function within particular configurations of social existence - has also been a 
feature of radical approaches to ideology but has been subjected to less criticism by 
those critics of the critique of ideology. What emerges from immanent critique is a 
largely ‘negative critique’ of cultural forms and practices, most particularly those 
forms we have already highlighted as ‘malaises of unfreedom’. Ideology is taken as 
suggesting some sort of compulsion in relation to these malaises. The consequence 
of this way of viewing ideology is that a rather one-dimensional view of the 
ideological is presented. There is thus no real treatment of the limitations, failures or 
unintended consequences of ideology, nor any sense of the antagonism, contradiction 
and refusal which marks the form of ideology itself. In relation to this, I have 
mentioned the dominance of a form of immanent negative critique within most radical 
approaches to ideology critique, which we will consider critically in the chapters 
dealing with the work of Lukäcs and Althusser and Marx.
We then put forward an alternative perspective on ideology - that of a 
dialectical or liberatory critique of ideology. This understanding of ideology we 
derived from considering the problem of unfreedom as a decisive aspect of a 
contemporary cultural inheritance in which the nature of a mediation between subject 
and object remains to be theorized. We suggested that the ideological resides within 
the relation between reality and irreality. We indicated here the idea of constraints 
upon freedom, including that of self-constraint, as most applicable to understanding 
aspects of the subject’s own role in the perpetuation of ideology. We theorized here a 
relation between need and limitation. Of particular use to us with this is the focus we 
have upon a state of ‘democratic unfreedom’, or a ‘voluntary servitude’ for it is this 
ambiguous state that ideology critique best explains. It is also through this state that 
the ideological problems of the spectacle of commodification, a psychology of control 
and inventive need are most apparent. This focus is better able to indicate for us 
something about how humanity is involved in the question as to what end life is lived.
We have introduced two significant areas in which the critique of ideology 
plays a vital role in suggesting the place of both the constrained and the imaginable 
within human aspirations. For this we have isolated the increasing pervasive problem 
of a generalized acceptance of commodified constraint and considered the 
psychological ramifications of the problems of fear and control, particularly as these 
are given expression to within the unconscious. Through the issues covered we can 
see that the difficulty the problem of ideology presents in terms of commodification, 
consciousness, emancipation, the relation of thought and being, and the adequacy of 
philosophical concepts to pursue an understanding of the contradictions and
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disjunctures between ideas and reality, the imaginable and the constrained, is 
considerable. In order to make these issues clearer we have focused on some of the 
major themes through which contradictory moments of the ideological are expressed. 
Through a theorization of commodification, the understanding of the psychology of 
unfreedom, and the internalization of fear we are able to extend a contemporary 
critique of ideology. In the following chapters we will investigate what it is that has 
been of enduring interest in theories dealing with these themes, and what, in 
particular, has led to difficulties for such critique.
What we have found to be of great importance with the areas of focus of a 
spectacle of commodification and a psychology of control are their relevance for a 
critique of the condition of a democratic unfreedom and a voluntary servitude. The 
principal strength of a theory of commodification is that it explains the pervasive 
impact of the spectacle of commodified life, in the form of exchange relations, 
money, the sense of ‘having’ rather than ‘being’, and so forth, upon the human 
psyche. In doing this it captures an aspect of the relationship between economic and 
political processes. The relevance of a theory of commodification to ideology critique 
is in its ability to consider how this spectacle gives concrete form to imagined desires 
and thoughts. We have considered the example of a sense of disenchantment 
precisely in order to capture something of the contradictory nature of desire and the 
imagination within a commodified world whose premise is the very fear of the self 
from which humanity has repeatedly sought escape. The weakness of an immanent 
critique approach to this is that with such a theorization life experience is made 
explicable only through the prism of reification and alienation, which tends towards a 
generalization of the outcome of commodification (as reification) from the 
perspective of economic interest. The implications of this approach to 
commodification to ideology critique are that ideology is often understood merely as 
an outcome of objective processes of the fetishization of commodities and that 
ideology is thus seen as a necessary consequence of ruling class interest. The idea of 
the internalization of fear and control would seem to usefully re-situate the problem of 
ideology within the psychology of the individual, and yet what we see is that without 
a sense of a dynamic within ideological practices we are left with an analysis of this 
purely from the perspective of the abstract power and capacity of the system to 
control and direct behaviour.
PART TWO
APORIAS OF REALIZATION:
SUBJECTIVE POSSIBILITY 
AND OBJECTIVE NECESSITY
CHAPTER TWO
THE FRACTURING OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT: 
IDEOLOGY AS THE SPECTACLE OF 
COMMODIFICATION
Introduction
Estrangement’s true field of activity continues to be the preparation of a mirror image 
that reflects in striking and unfamiliar fashion the all too familiar aspects of our 
world.
Bloch, Literary Essays
In this chapter we will consider the importance of the idea of the ‘spectacle of 
commodification’ for a theorization of ideology and expand much more fully upon the 
argument we presented in the previous chapter - that in the relation between ideology 
and commodification a reliance upon a subjugation of the self to abstract, objectified 
relations represents the ultimately unappeasable hunger of a world disenchanted with 
itself. What we will want to consider here is an example of this condition as an 
involuntary servitude for which a self-knowledge is still possible. This variant upon 
the critique of ideology is an important one for us to evaluate. It presents us with a 
number of issues that have been deemed a necessary part of how the ideological is 
understood. Most crucially it will enable us to ask what sort of relation we are dealing 
with between subject and object that the spectacle itself must assume. Such an 
approach to the problematic nature of alienation is well theorized by the Hungarian 
philosopher Georg Lukäcs whose work we will engage with in the course of this 
chapter. For it is Lukäcs, perhaps more than any other philosopher of modernity, who 
considers the enormity of the problem of the transformation of the subject into an 
object via types of alienation.
In this problematic estrangement we can detect a struggle for meaning 
expressed through ideology: For whilst a severing of connections between subject and 
object has seriously threatened the viability of any significant knowledge of self, this 
impending danger has itself been translated into the ideas by which we find meaning
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for our endeavours. In addition, the spectacle introduces into the world a new, 
unparalleled extension of the capabilities of reification -  a range of processes in which 
the self becomes transformed into a thing rather than having the capacity to imbue the 
objects of her world with her subjectivity. These processes that involve the exchange 
of human freedom for reified reality give expression to a dissatisfied equilibrium, a 
discomfort and uneasiness about the world. This tension is also a part of the 
ideological. As such we find in it the traces of contradiction of everyday life. The 
spectacle engages us in a form of recognition that involves a range of needs we 
express as a part of our humanity -  competitive, alienated needs but also, importantly, 
our imaginative needs. In this chapter we want to understand the significance of the 
particular kind of alienated homelessness commodification entails -  a fragmented, 
beguiling sense of loss, which, at the same time, carries with it an unavoidable 
presentiment of a former or perhaps future wholeness and otherness. In the work of 
Lukacs we are shown a highly particular examination of the immersion of the 
imagination into the realm of having. It is first and foremost a reified potentiality that 
is an inescapable renouncing of a remembered unity. This flight from the self has two 
distinct and interrelated aspects -  a paradoxical knowledge of the idea of the self and 
an involuntary enslavement by the commodity. Both these matters are important to 
Lukacs and both need to be considered in order to understand the occurrence of an 
ideologically alienated existence.
The central approach to this material will entail viewing both the self and 
commodification as philosophical problems; for it is within these realms that a 
playing out of the problem of freedom and unfreedom is expressed. A spectacularized 
commodification, we will argue, is an outward sign of an internal state of a 
tempestuous, ultimately dissatisfied egocentrism. The basis of any divestiture of the 
self by way of selling, exchange, or as a form of exteriority, is a disconnectedness -  a 
mechanism for an effective alienation. A shift towards an inexorable exteriority is not 
always the same thing as an estrangement of the self, which can involve quite another 
sense of suffering and strangeness, but it often becomes interwoven with a self­
estrangement the more relations between people and of the self become overwhelmed 
by relations of exchange value. Once this seeming autonomization of a commodity 
consciousness becomes normalized and a separation between sensuality and 
understanding occurs, the independence of the self attenuates and a whole range of 
compensatory factors arise: The most obvious today perhaps being felt in forms of 
escapist fantasy - from various types of an assumed knowing, self-parodying cynicism 
to the cloying sentimentality of superficially experienced emotion.
A flight from emptiness as a way of life makes of the ideological a peculiarly 
fractured and unfinished process. In estrangement itself there is something
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unpredictable and unintentionally figurative, as all compensation for dissatisfaction 
must be. This is fertile ground for the struggle for meaning we have highlighted in 
relation to the ideological. We will attempt to theorize this by first considering in 
detail a critical examination of the relation between commodification and ideology in 
the work of Lukäcs, who, as we mentioned in the previous chapter, is one of the first 
major theorists of the twentieth century to have theorized a uniquely ‘reified’ state of 
consciousness, a ‘transcendental homelessness’, characteristic of a disintegrating 
civilization.
What we will present here then is a philosophy of the commodity, a 
metaphysics, as it were, explaining the importance of the emergence of this peculiarly 
modem form of the estrangement of the self. In the first section we will consider 
three main issues. The first concerns the significance of Lukäcs’s theorization of 
alienation as a particular form of the fracturing of subject and object in relation to a 
philosophy of the commodity. The second issue we will highlight is the problem of a 
philosophy of the commodity, of which we will have much more to say throughout 
the chapter. The final matter to be considered is that of how Lukäcs’s brings his two 
quite different theorizations together, in other words, how we might understand a 
paradoxical knowledge of the self in relation to the involuntary servitude of a 
spectacularized reification. Let us first, however, consider the importance of Lukäcs’s 
contribution to what was a new way of theorizing ideology.
The Significance of Lukäcs
Lukäcs’s work published in 1923, History and Class Consciousness, his 
seminal work on the problem of alienation and reification, was to influence the 
generation of Marxist theorists of the period. The work has often been described, as 
Mihailo Markovic refers to it, as “one of the most original philosophical works in this 
century”.1 Lukäcs’s theorizing on reification provided the basis for numerous other 
studies of the effects of commodity fetishism - most notably for the work of the 
Frankfurt School theorists and later for the writings of the Situationists, most 
particularly, those of Guy Debord.2 The influence of Lukäcs’s work is undoubtedly
1 Mihailo Markovic, “The Critical Thought of Georg Lukäcs”, in Lukäcs Today: Essays in Marxist 
Philosophy, ed. Tom Rockmore (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1988), p. 25. Ferenc Feher claims that: 
“Friends and foes alike admit nowadays that History and Class Consciousness was the most important 
event in the history of Marxist philosophy since the death of Karl Marx”. Ferenc Feher, “Lukäcs in 
Weimar”, in Lukäcs Revalued, ed. Agnes Heller (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 75.
2 For a well argued short essay on the relation between Lukäcs and his impact upon the Frankfurt 
School, see Joseph B. Maier, “Georg Lukäcs and the Frankfurt School: A Case of Secular 
Messianism”, in Georg Lukäcs: Theory, Culture, and Politics, eds. Judith Marcus and Zoltan Tarr
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extensive. * 3 Theorists with approaches to modem social life as distinctive as those of 
Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Lefebvre, Marcuse and Habermas have all made 
reference to Lukacs’s work on reification, 4 and, as George Steiner has recently 
commented, it is “no exaggeration to say that the developments of modem European 
thought from Gramsci to Sartre, from the Frankfurt School to Walter Benjamin, 
Foucault and even, at certain points, to Heidegger, would have been different without 
Lukacs’s seminal analysis” .5 The principal editor of the works of both Benjamin and 
Adorno, Rolf Tiedemann, argues similarly that “like many other left-wing 
intellectuals of his generation, Benjamin largely owed his Marxist competency to the 
chapter on reification in History and Class Consciousness” . 6 Given the extent of this 
influence it is perhaps not surprising that despite little critical investigation of 
Lukacs’s work appearing during the last several decades, a more recent resurgence in
(New Brunswick: Transaction, 1989), pp. 53-61. See also Jean Grondin, “Reification from Lukäcs to 
Habermas”, trans. David Lang in Lukäcs Today: Essays in Marxist Philosophy, ed. Tom Rockmore 
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1988), pp. 86-107. A more substantial examination can be found in Andrew 
Feenberg, Lukäcs, Marx and the Sources o f Critical Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) 
and Andrew Arato and Paul Breines, The Young Lukäcs and the Origins o f Western Marxism (New 
York: Seabury, 1979). A useful account of Lukacs’s legacy for the Situationists is presented in 
Bracken, Guy Debord: Revolutionary; and a work which considers something of the influence of 
Lukäcs specifically upon Debord is Anselm Jappe, Guy Debord, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith
(Berkeley: University of California, 1999).
3 Andrew Feenberg, for example, refers to it as “an underground classic” in relation to its reception 
during the first half-century after its publication and claims that it rivalled Capital as the text of 
reference for Marxists in the West. Feenberg, Lukäcs, Marx and the Sources o f Critical Theory, p. ix.
4 Heidegger’s use of ‘objectification’ (Verdinglichen) is derived from Lukäcs; Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Critique o f Dialectical Reason (London: New Left Books, 1976); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Adventures 
of the Dialectic, trans. Joseph Bien (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973); Henri Lefebvre, 
The Sociology o f Marx, trans. Norbert Guterman (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972); Herbert Marcuse, 
One-Dimensional Man, and “The Reification of the Proletariat” (1978) reprinted in Critical Theory and 
Society: A Reader, eds. Stephen Eric Bronner and Douglas MacKay Kellner (New York: Routledge, 
1989), pp. 288-291; Habermas, The Theory o f Communicative Action. Numerous theorists have 
commented on Lukäcs’s influence upon many radical theorists. Tom Rockmore, for example, 
comments on Habermas’ approach to Marx being mediated through Lukäcs’s History and Class 
Consciousness. See Tom Rockmore, Habermas on Historical Materialism (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1989), p. 110.
5 George Steiner, “True Leninist: The Apologia of Georg Lukäcs”, TLS, October 13, 2000, p. 7.
6 Tiedemann, “Dialectics at a Standstill: Approaches to the Passagen-Werk’\  p. 276. It might of 
course be argued that Benjamin declined from taking the same generally abstract and indeed 
melancholy consequences from a theory of reification as he encountered in Lukäcs, despite the two 
theorists’ shared attempt to base their own works on some view of a radical subjectivity. Whereas 
someone such as Adorno, who explicitly abandons the idea of an emancipatory subject of history, very 
clearly bases his critique of the culture industry upon a theory of reification. Indeed, according to 
Andrew Arato, Adorno fundamentally “accepted and worked with Lukäcs’s exposition of the 
immediate forms of reification under advancing capitalism”. Andrew Arato, “Esthetic Theory and 
Cultural Criticism”, in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, ed. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt 
(New York: Continuum, 1982), p. 198. Perhaps these differences attest to the flexibility of Lukäcs’s 
theory of reification but they also suggest the depth of the influence his ideas were to have.
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interest in Lukäcs has resulted in a current reassessment of the relevance of his work.7 
Etienne Balibar, for example, has talked recently of his own regret that a former 
hostility to Hegelian Marxism prevented him from seriously considering Lukäcs’s 
theoretical contribution: “I am now and have for some time been in a process of re­
evaluating the importance of Lukäcs in the intellectual history of the twentieth 
century. To my own surprise, possibly because I was too ignorant, too naive, or too 
sectarian, I have now become aware of the fact that he is a very central figure, to say 
the least”.8 Stuart Sim’s recent work on Lukäcs situates Lukäcs’s attack on 
modernism within a tradition ultimately inherited by post-modernism.9 Terry 
Eagleton has lately commented on his gratification “that a serious turn back to Lukäcs 
has been increasingly on the agenda”.10 George Steiner, whose previous work dealing 
with Lukäcs has concentrated mainly on the later works, now comments that “I have 
great joy in trying at least to approach some of the early material”.11
For much of its existence Lukäcs’s work has been fiercely fought over 
theoretically and politically, but it is not so much in the relative importance of the 
figure in such terms that provokes our interest here as it is in discovering why he 
chose as his focus the theme of the spectacle of commodification and how he 
theorized its importance for an understanding of ideology. For this purpose, attention 
in this chapter will be given mainly to Lukäcs’s early writings - Soul and Form, 
published in Hungarian in 1910; the Theory of the Novel, first written in 1914 and 
published in German in 1920; and the 1923 History and Class Consciousness - with 
specific focus given to History and Class Consciousness, the work which is often
Whilst much Lukäcs research appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s, particularly after Lukäcs’s 
death in June 1971, less work emerged within the 1980s and for much of the 1990s. There are, 
however, some important exceptions such as Löwy, Georg Lukäcs; J. M. Bernstein, The Philosophy o f 
the Novel: Lukäcs, Maiväsm and the Dialectics o f Form (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1984); Lee Congdon, The Young Lukäcs (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983); 
Feenberg, Lukäcs, Marx and the Sources o f Critical Theory, Mary Gluck, Georg Lukäcs and His 
Generation 1900-1918 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); Agnes Heller, ed., Lukäcs 
Revalued (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures o f a 
Concept from Lukäcs to Habermas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Judith Marcus, 
Georg Lukäcs and Thomas Mann (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987); Rene Welleck, 
Four Critics: Croce, Valery, Lukäcs and Ingarden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981); 
more recently we have seen Arpad Kadarkay, Georg Lukäcs: Life, Thought, and Politics (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1991) and Eva L. Corredor, Lukäcs After Communism: Interviews with Contemporary 
Intellectuals (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997).
8 Etienne Balibar, Inteview, Lukäcs After Communism: Interviews with Contemporary Intellectuals, 
ed. E. L. Corredor (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 117.
9 Stuart Sim, Georg Lukäcs (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994).
10 Terry Eagleton, Interview, in Lukäcs After Communism: Interviews with Contemporary Intellectuals, 
ed. Eva L. Corredor, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 128.
11 George Steiner, Interview, in Lukäcs After Communism: Interviews with Contemporary 
Intellectuals, ed. Eva L. Corredor (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 67.
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described as “one of the most important theoretical documents in the history of 
Marxism” . 12 Although we might want to agree with George Steiner that Lukacs’s 
later works exhibit a style characteristic of exile and that in them the language he uses 
“has grown brittle and forbidding” , 13 the main reason why we will look predominantly 
at the earlier works is because it is here that we encounter some of the central ideas of 
his life’s work - that of the quest for meaningfulness in conditions which militate 
against it; that of the problem of an objectivity imposing itself by ideological means 
without a recognition of it as such; and that of the problem of a subjectivity in relation 
to a world which both denies and offers the promise of meaning and resolution. It 
will no doubt become obvious that in these pivotal ideas this thesis argues that a type 
of continuity rather than a stark and complete division of unrelated periods marks 
Lukacs’s work. 14 This is not to say that a shift of focus does not occur, or that a more 
hostile attitude to a variety of non-objectivist radical theories does not take place. 15 
There is also, from History and Class Consciousness onwards, a distinct change in 
tone, from the more lyrical, metaphysical approach of the earlier works to 
increasingly pedestrian and abstract modes of expression. However, a type of 
continuity can be seen, most obviously in Lukacs’s attempt to understand what he 
takes to be ‘objective’ relations and in his desire to find meaning for the subject. As 
Andrew Arato notes, Lukäcs has always been engaged “in a theoretical and practical 
search for the ‘subject’ of world revolution” . 16 Gy orgy Markus also notes the 
persistence of “a series of subjective motifs of radical change” . 17 Whilst this is 
certainly a part of the type of continuity that I argue exists in Lukacs’s work, of equal 
importance, although much overlooked, is his tendency towards objectivism. We will 
begin our examination of this in the following section of the chapter.
12 Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth and Dissolution, vol. Ill, The 
Breakdown, trans. P. S. Falla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 260.
13 George Steiner, Language and Silence: Essays 1958-1966 (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), p. 359.
14 One of the main critics to have recognized this sort of continuity in relation in particular to Lukacs’s 
literary work is Fredric Jameson. See Jameson, Marxism and Form, especially chap. 3. Critical 
commentaries on Lukäcs by Istvän Meszäros, Andrew Arato and Paul Breines should also be 
mentioned in this context. See, for example, Istvän Meszäros, “Lukäcs’ Concept of Dialectic”, in 
Georg Lukäcs: The Man, His Work and His Ideas , ed. G.H.R. Parkinson (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1977), pp. 34-85; Andrew Arato, “Georg Lukäcs: The Search for a Revolutionary Subject”, in 
The Unknown Dimension: European Marxism since Lenin, eds. Dick Howard and Karl E. Klare (New 
York: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 81-106; Paul Breines, “Lukäcs, Revolution and Marxism, 1885-1918: 
Notes on Lukäcs’ ‘Road to Marx’”, The Philosophical Forum, vol. Ill, nos. 3-4 (Spring-Summer, 
1972): pp. 401-421.
15 For all these differences it is not the case, however, that History and Class Consciousness fails to be 
a work of philosophy but is instead a dogmatics, as Congdon argues. Congdon, The Young Lukäcs,
p. 186.
16 Arato, “Georg Lukäcs: The Search for a Revolutionary Subject”, p. 81.
17 Markus, “Life and the Soul: the Young Lukäcs and the Problem of Culture”, p. 2.
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Lukäcs senses in the devaluation of the world, a devaluation which 
commodification entails, a unique type of disorientation with which the individual is 
faced. The twentieth century has ushered in a fateful change with the 
commodification of life, a change which Lukäcs views as alien to the human soul. It 
is a complex philosophical unravelling of the problem of the object’s relation to the 
subject that persists throughout much of Lukäcs early writing. In it we encounter 
Lukäcs’s struggle with the problematic issue of how the subject might find within this 
life an authentic experience that both institutes the transformation of society and 
allows for some way to regain the experience of freedom and community which has 
since been alienated in modem, industrialized commodity life. In this way what we 
will see is an attempt to bring together the two themes that I have highlighted as 
distinctive in Lukäcs’s approach to ideology critique -  the difficulty of self- 
knowledge tom between separation and community, and the potentiality, and yet very 
definitely reified potentiality, of the subject’s reification within conditions of a 
spectacularized commodification.
In the first section of this chapter we will attempt to uncover why it is that 
Lukäcs finds the spectacle of commodification so all-pervasive and so necessary to 
the persistence of the ideological and thus why commodification and the antinomies 
of thought it provokes becomes a peculiarly philosophical problem. We will do this 
by way of examining Lukäcs’s particular approach to alienation. We should note that 
this extensive concern with a fetishized, commodified world in Lukäcs’s work is not a 
thematic interest shared by all other radical theorists of ideology, even where their 
field of inquiry owes much to the writings of Marx. Althusser, in whose theorization 
of unconscious control we will be engaged in the following chapter, indeed considers 
the entire theory of fetishism to be itself ideological. 18 It is apparent then that a 
theorization of the spectacle and its decisive relation to a sense of the destruction of 
community is one particular way in which ideology comes to be understood as 
involved in reshaping a fissile, laminable, fragile sense of self. It is this sense, as we 
will later come to argue in the thesis, that provides a forceful, illuminating basis for 
understanding the fractures and divides that in turn can challenge humanity to respond 
to their own vulnerable, friable existence by creating potentialities within and 
interruptions to this reality. What we need first explore, however, is the way in which 
Lukäcs’s own theorization of the tendency towards a spectacularized commodification 
suggests the manifestation of a colossal compromise extracted from the subjects of 
ideology -  the reification of the very self. In this discussion we will briefly consider 
the issue of Lukäcs’s politics to the extent to which it might shed some light upon the
18 Louis Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, trans. Grahame Lock (London: NLB, 1976), p. 126.
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increasingly objectivist form of romanticist critique he espouses. The second section 
of the chapter will deal with the issue of Lukäcs’s method as a means by which he 
addresses the two issues we have highlighted -  the paradoxical knowledge of the self 
and reified potentiality, and will explain something of Lukäcs’s approach to dialectics, 
totality, subjectivism and consciousness. The third section will consider how 
Lukäcs’s theory of commodification is able to critically engage with the idea of a 
liberation from ideology. The chapter will thus proceed from a discussion of what 
Lukäcs sees as the central ideological problem - the all-pervasive image of fetishized 
mass commodification - to an examination of the method he develops for 
understanding this phenomenon and, finally, to an analysis of how he theorizes a basis 
for both the experience of a reified estrangement and intimations of something beyond 
an alienated ideological world. In other words, we will consider how Lukäcs 
theorizes liberation from an alienation whose very basis is an estrangement from the 
idea of, and capacity for, liberation. The chapter will conclude with an assessment of 
the continuing usefulness of a focus upon alienation and commodification for a 
critique of ideology. We will thus first consider Lukäcs’s relationship to romanticism, 
his critique of the processes of alienation and rationalization. We will then be able to 
consider more specifically what Lukäcs means by reification.
Section One: The Philosophical Problem of 
Commodification
Lukäcs will follow to the end the road charted by Tolstoy and Dostoevsky.
Bloch, Zur Rettung von Georg Lukäcs
Dealing with the ‘concrete specificity of the aesthetics in social being 
Lukäcs, Ideology Critique and a Philosophy of the Commodity
The work of Georg Lukäcs falls very definitely, even if with unavoidable 
difficulty, into the category of a modernist, aesthetic critique of ideology. 19 With its 
Baudelarian ‘reservation against the metropolis’ and its dialectical intent towards the 
problem of alienation, Lukäcs’s theorization of the phenomenon of reification and the 
problem of a commodified life serves as a commanding example of an early attempt
19 On this point, it is worthwhile considering Fritz Stem’s argument that Lukäcs in fact conceals his 
anti-modernity. See Fritz Stem, The Politics o f Cultural Despair (New York: Doubleday, 1965).
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to theorize the ‘alienated gaze’. Lukacs is particularly sensitive to the discontinuity of 
the epoch, to the disjunctures of thought and consciousness and the punctuated, fitful 
expressions of a faltering grasp of the processes occurring all about his world, 
processes themselves anacoluthic, disorderly and spasmodic.
In this patchy, discontinuous world, Lukacs recoils from its predictable 
outcome - a state of tedious specialization and differential schema. This could be only 
all the more intensely the case when the purpose of new technologies became 
increasingly apparent. The reduction of the individual to a meaningless social reality, 
often degraded to the level of the machine, indicated the real purpose of modernizing 
ideals. Serving the interests of profit, control and warfare more abundantly than could 
ever have been wished for, technological inventions and the labour required for their 
production sickened the prescient few. 20 In the production of armaments, the 
fetishism of machinery more generally and the massive scale of consumption upon 
which this technological escalation rested, Lukacs saw constant reverberations of 
Fichte’s ‘age of absolute sinfulness’ . 21 The war laid bare the falseness and inhumanity 
of all those static views of the world that had endorsed a simple progress. 22 The 
transformation of human ingenuity into the hardened realities of mechanized 
rationalization seemed to cast reason into little more than the objective needs of a 
sordid, base and humanly impoverished grasping for monetary gain. It is in this 
lonely, tragic world that Lukacs becomes aware of the ideological -  an often insidious 
playing out of ideas to foster a “withered, sterile existence”, a dullness and a 
meaninglessness.23 Here the tormented creature devoured by longing has the 
incognito of her soul turned into the “dehumanising function of the commodity
20 For a useful article on Lukacs’s attitude to the war in relation to his anti-capitalism see, Ferenc 
Feher, “The last phase of romantic anti-capitalism: Lukacs’ response to the war”, New German 
Critique, no. 10, (1977): pp. 139-154.
21 Various pieces written during this period attest to Lukacs’s critical view of the First World War. He 
agreed with Rosa Luxemburg, for example, that the war signified the path towards barbarism taken by 
the West and in his monograph, “German Intellectuals and the War” (1915), claimed that the atrocities 
revealed the soul-destroying inner contradictions of war. Georg Lukacs, “Die deutschen Intellektuellen 
und der Krieg”, Text und Kritik, nos. 39/40 (1973): pp. 65-69; quoted in Kadarkay, Georg Lukäcs, 
p. 157. At the same time, he responded to the call for military service, returning to Budapest from 
Heidelberg and was to serve as a military mail-censor from October 1915 until July 1916, having 
gained an exemption from front-line duty through the influence of family connections. How Lukacs 
was to personally reconcile these opposing activities is difficult to gauge. Certainly this disconnection 
between ‘soul and deed’ was to appal Bloch, for example, who took the far more principled action of 
removing himself to Switzerland where he continued to oppose the war in both theory and practice.
22 Georg Lukacs, Record o f a Life: An Autobiography, ed. Istvän Eörsi, trans. Rodney Livingstone 
(London: Verso, 1983), p. 154.
23 Georg Lukacs, The Theory o f the Novel: An Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms o f Great 
Epic Literature, trans. Anna Bostock (London: Merlin, 1971), pp. 57, 51.
124 Ideology Critique and A Philosophy of Freedom
relation”.24 One’s very honour and sense of responsibility becomes turned into “an 
inhuman, standardised division of labour”.25 In this ideological state immediacy slips 
away and we become vulnerable to a fracturing of the subject/object relation.26 
Endorsing the sentiment within Bloch’s idea, which we have already mentioned, of 
the opacity or ‘darkness of the lived moment’, Lukäcs describes the ideological as just 
such a moment in which the transformation of people into commodities and a 
commodity consciousness is realized.27
In directing his critique towards an aspect of the phantasmagoric spectacle of 
commodified life and its transformation via the realization of class consciousness, 
Lukäcs came to occupy an important place in the development of a more specifically 
Marxist theory of ideology: But in saying this it is also perhaps worthwhile to 
emphasize the sheer novelty of such an approach to ideology critique within the 
Marxist milieu of Lukäcs’s early period. From the early 1920s, Lukäcs believed that 
he had embarked upon a “genuine aesthetics of Marxism”28 and was aware, in this 
sense, not only of the theoretical difficulty such a project entailed but of its divergence 
from much theorization then in existence. A number of theorists well attuned to the 
changes occurring around them realized that the bourgeois vision of continuity and 
happy assurance had ended. A sense of a European crisis of the destitution of the 
spirit fuelled much of this concern. Lukäcs set out upon a passage of life-long 
critique of this cracking, faltering world and, in the nausee he finds, attempts to locate 
its precise derivation for the purpose of its radical transformation. This he detects in a 
complicated condition become manifest in an unreconciled antinomy of the self, as an 
individual subject, and history. In the early works at least, there is a critical 
engagement with the problem of modem, industrialized, diffracted life across which 
the most basic integrity of the individual is strewn and dissipated. In stinging, 
uncompromising fashion we encounter the problem of the utter disorientation of 
values that this world of barbarous chaos represents.29 It is a crisis not only in values 
but, of necessity, of valuation itself.
We mentioned in the previous chapter the pivotal issue in relation to Lukäcs’s 
work -  that of the question of the possibility of culture. Understanding this question
24 Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 92.
25 Ibid., p. 99.
26 Ibid., p. 203.
27 Ibid., p. 222, n. 68.
28 Lukäcs, Record of a Life, p. 152.
29 Although some of the power o f this critique attenuates with a narrowing o f focus we witness in the 
course of History and Class Consciousness and beyond, there is still much to be valued in his critique 
of ideologies attributed more specifically to the problems of a fractured economic existence.
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for the sort of critique of society Lukacs develops is a fundamental part of our enquiry 
into the significance of commodification and its relation to ideology. For it is 
something about the nature of a society given over to a spectacularized form of 
commodification that is seen to threaten the viability of a meaningful culture, or, at 
the very least, a culture that is able to refrain from the deception and dissembling so 
basic to the ideological. 30 It is a culture devoid of a true mythos and one that instead 
succumbs to the ideological. Its rift between ethical values and their realization has 
become too great, its lonely, alienated passivity too problematic for any 
straightforward tragic-heroic spirit to arise. This is the ground upon which Lukacs’s 
critique develops. Let us consider this in more detail.
Lukacs and Romantic Anti-capitalism
Lukacs’s work can certainly be interpreted as influenced by romanticism. 31 In 
his use of the concept of alienation there emerges an almost Rousseauean concern for 
the separation of the self from those conditions in which the individual might be fully 
and creatively engaged.32 But having said this what we encounter is a wavering, at 
times almost agitated, engagement with the romanticist critique of capitalist society. 
Various aspects of Lukäcs’s critique follow a revolutionary romanticist sensitivity to 
the threat faced by a cultural heritage held claim to by an alienating rationalism. We 
find in his writings repeated mention made of the tragic consequences of a world 
where ‘soul’ and ‘deed’ have fatally diverged. But what we will want to consider is 
what sort of world he feels has been ushered in with the advent of capitalism -  is it a 
world of quite dispersed and yet menacing power that is an extension of our own bad 
faith, or a world of false promises the self-estranged spirit confronts only because a 
lack of fulfilment indicates some resolution beyond reification’s own logic?
Lukäcs’s belief that a cultural and moral vacuum exists at the heart of modem 
society and that human creativity needs to be rejuvenated via a thorough
30 In so doing we need to take into account that aspect of theorization we have highlighted as the 
central problem for ideology critique - how to theorize the complex dynamic of acceptance and refusal, 
ideology and ‘anti-ideology’, the imposition of forms of control and a liberation from ideology, within 
social practice. Within an examination of the significance of commodification we need, then, to 
consider how successfully this dialectic of acceptance and refusal, unfreedom and freedom, has been 
understood.
31 For a good overview of this connection, see Paul Breines, “Marxism, Romanticism, and the case of 
Georg Lukacs: notes on some recent sources and situations”, Studies in Romanticism, no. 16 (1977): 
pp. 473-489.
32 It should be noted that in History and Class Consciousness Lukacs argues that Rousseau attributes to 
nature too much that is in opposition to the reification of the world. Lukacs, Histoiy and Class 
Consciousness, p. 136.
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transcendence or radical freedom, echoes many of Nietzsche’s ideas of a pampered, 
empty, complacent culture flirting with a “chaotic jumble of all styles” . 33 For both 
Nietzsche and Lukäcs, culture is primarily about a “unity of artistic style in all the 
expressions of the life of a people”, as Nietzsche defined it, 34 arrived at by way of a 
complete transvaluation of the reification of the human spirit that has so plagued the 
modem world. What modernity has instead made us accustomed to is a decadent, 
valueless life, one that is emphasized all the more within the false foundations and 
spurious justifications with which it continues to deceive itself. As with many 
theorists of a radical freedom Lukäcs’s sense of the future outcome of any 
transvaluation remains unsure - a profound emptiness looms as large upon the horizon 
as does a sense of a potential creative freedom. As well as a deep fear that the world 
of which they were a part was, without the will to change, destined for complete 
exhaustion, both Lukäcs and Nietzsche saw in the metaphysics of tragedy a type of 
perfection.35 Both theorists depict the disconsolate place of culture and a mobilization 
against it in terms of what it means to be human in a world that seems directed 
towards suffocating the human and promoting the most inauthentic aspects of the all 
too human.36 For Lukäcs, this means a fundamental questioning of the separation of 
the subject of consciousness and the object upon which the subject acts. 37 There is in 
his romanticist critique not only a recognition of life and its value beyond its service 
to the interests of wealth, but a sense too that at this particular time in history that the 
stakes for humanity are perilously high.
Lukäcs was amongst a number of theorists whose very different works 
suggested humanity’s intense unease and some sense of a need to overcome this 
state. 38 Many theorists viewed the period up to and including the time between the
33 Friedrich Nietzsche, “David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer”, in Untimely Meditations, p. 6.
34 Ibid., p. 5.
35 As Löwy argues, Lukäcs’s despair was not concerned with predicting any imminent economic 
catastrophe but was more that capitalism would steadily continue in its manner of ensuring a type of 
cultural exhaustion where it was impossible to realize alternative values. Löwy, Georg Lukäcs, p. 109.
36 The need and yet objectionable need ‘to dance in chains’ saw both theorists attempt to pinpoint what 
the difficulties with grasping life entailed.
37 This concern would become a central facet of his life’s work: And once this subject/object duality 
had been significantly challenged, by various theorists, including Lukäcs, twentieth century Western 
philosophy could not remain unchanged. This sort of concern in Lukacs’s work has somewhat 
erroneously been interpreted as his seeking out the possibility to recover an absolute within the flux of 
history. Merleau-Ponty, for example, argues this. See Merleau-Ponty, Adventures o f the Dialectic, 
especially chap. 2. Although this sense is present in Lukacs’s writing it is not put forward in strictly 
Hegelian terms or even terms more akin to Weber’s theory of ideal types and a resolution to the 
problem of understanding. Lukacs’s theorization involves both of these and a more objectivist 
understanding of the aesthetics of life.
38 Lucien Goldmann claims that Lukäcs was one of the first to perceive the impending crisis of 
capitalist society. Lucien Goldmann, Tri-Quarterly, no. 9 (Spring 1967): p. 170. But as we have just
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two world wars as a twilight of reason, truth and understanding, a period of an 
“awareness of danger and loss”, as Karl Jaspers expressed it.39 At the close of the 
nineteenth century Emile Dürkheim had written of the abandonment of possibility and 
the valuelessness of reality in a world of feverish greed.40 In 1910 Heinrich Mann had 
expressed the deep need for a spiritualization of politics.41 Husserl’s ‘Vienna Lecture’ 
highlighted what he viewed as humanity’s estrangement from its rational sense of life 
and the precariousness of a fall into barbarity.42 Freud’s examination of the 
‘unhappiness in civilization’, which was to become his Civilization and its 
Discontents, caught this mood of an external crisis internally perceived. Even Oswald 
Spengler’s abolition of “the unity of the historical process”43 had yielded a critique of 
humanity’s quest: The cult of heroism he endorsed in the form of the brave knights of 
industry could not prevent him from seeing a ‘closing-down’ of culture.44 The works 
of conservative neo-romantic writers such as Ludwig Klages, Leon Bloy and Stefan 
Georg were all influential critiques of the problems of capitalism. Georg’s poetry, in 
particular, prompted a sensitive treatment of the poet’s alleged impassibilitie in which 
Lukäcs saw a capturing of a new form of solitude that represented not only types of 
going astray but possible points of arrival.45 The problem of the ‘wretchedness’ of the 
people that Thomas Mann felt for his fellow Germans was too a subject of more 
general and yet passionate concern to Lukäcs. Lukäcs himself, with hindsight or 
perhaps persuasion, allowed only for his “philosophical starting point” to be openly 
acknowledged as provided by “Hegel, Goethe and Romanticism”. Here, he assures us
mentioned and as Löwy points out, Lukäcs was far more concerned with the stability of the system and 
its destructive capabilities rather than any looming catastrophe. See Löwy, Georg Lukäcs, p. 109.
39 Karl Jaspers, Die geistige Situation der Zeit (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965), p. 79, quoted in Dagmar 
Bamouw, Weimar Intellectuals and the Threat o f Modernity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1988), p. 13.
40 Emile Dürkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, trans. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson 
(New York: Free Press, 1951), p. 256.
41 Heinrich Mann, “Geist und Tat” (Spirit and Act), Pan, 7(1910), pp. 137 -  143.
42 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis o f European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. D. 
Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 299.
43 Lukäcs, The Theory o f the Novel, p. 16.
44 Spengler had outlined the decline of Western civilization in generally despairing albeit exceptionalist 
and positivist relativist terms. Oswald Spengler, The Decline o f the West: Form and Actuality, vol. I, 
trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1926). The work was first published 
in 1918.
45 Georg Lukäcs, “The New Solitude and its Poetry: Stefan Georg (1908)”, in Soul and Form, trans. 
Anna Bostock (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974). It is interesting to note that late in 1919 when 
Lukäcs, having sought political asylum from ‘The White Terror’ of the Hungarian Horthy regime, was 
living in Vienna under police surveillance and was extradited to Hungary an appeal to ‘Save Georg 
Lukäcs’ was instituted and signed by many of the leading writers of the period such as Heinrich and 
Thomas Mann, Richard Beer-Hofmann and Alfred Kerr. Lukäcs’s extradition, as was made clear, 
would have certainly meant his judically sanctioned murder. Stefan Georg was invited to add his 
support to the appeal but refused. See Kadarkay, Georg Lukäcs, pp. 243-251.
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that his opposition to the barbarity of capitalism harboured no form of misguided 
sympathy.46 The reality, however, was that he had long wrestled with the problem of 
the void, the dead heart at the centre of society and very substantially within the 
individual herself, in overwhemingly the same form as that in which many of the 
romantic anti-capitalists had developed their critiques.
In Lukacs’s work we see many of the issues engaged in by the romantic critic 
of the given: A sense of tragic being and that of the existence of an ethical will; 
spiritual emptiness and spiritual community; a republican spirit but also a sense of the 
moral dilemma of the future; a Schopenhauerist and Feuerbachian acknowledgement 
of the importance for philosophy of the motif of death; a divided hostility to all that 
was ‘cheerful and warm’ in bourgeois society; an outraged rejection of philistinism; a 
troubled sense of the direction that the centreless, confused Many needed to deliver 
themselves from their own futility as well as from life. All these aspects of 
romanticism combined in an uneasy philosophy of change. The problem Lukacs saw 
was the problem of a world in which one was actually involved: “We live”, Lukacs 
stated, “in the crisis of our reality”.47 This issue would indeed become a focus for his 
increasing tendency to want to grasp reality in terms of what had become actual. In a 
dispute in 1921 with Bloch over Schopenhauer’s view of the necessity of value within 
truth, Lukacs was to stress the need to find in the actual the criterion of truth, whereas 
Bloch felt closer to Schopenhauer’s view that the existing world was, in the sense of 
human value, untrue.48 This dispute was merely a fragment of a growing rift between 
the ‘concrete utopian’ Bloch and the increasingly objectivist Lukacs. It indicated an 
important adherence to a material, graspable telos in Lukacs’s work which would 
influence the sort of romanticist critique of capitalism he developed.
Lukacs’s critique of romanticism reveals aspects of this tendency towards 
wanting to establish a more ‘objective’ foundation for his ethics. He considers that 
romanticism allows only one way to culture - an inner way, a revolution of the spirit. 
This he increasingly distinguishes from reality, real events and real life. Those who 
merely “played games with bold possibilities in the mind” developed a deep and 
subtle understanding of interiority but failed to see outward circumstances.49 Lukacs’s 
problem with the questing spirit was that in its single-minded, almost religious,
46 Lukacs, The Theory o f the Novel, p. 20.
47 Lukacs, Baläzs Bela es akiknek nem kell (Bela Baläzs and his detractors) (Gyoma: Kner Izidor, 
1918), p. 116, quoted in Kadarkay, Georg Lukacs, p. 196.
48 See Michael Löwy, “Interview with Ernst Bloch”, trans. Vicki Williams Hill, New German Critique, 
no. 9 (Fall 1976): pp. 35-45.
49 Lukacs, Soul and Form, p. 50.
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inward fervour the actual question that life was presenting, and, indeed, had been the 
question that had given rise to a quest in the first place, was rarely entered into: 
Schlegel, he felt, had merely believed that a myth-engendering force only needed to 
be awakened into life in order to provide the ground for all expression.50 For Lukäcs, 
this was not enough. Life was presenting new possibilities -  with a will to change, “a 
new world seemed to be in the process of creation” . 51 Instead of acting within this 
world, the romantics, Lukäcs felt, sought an ethic of genius, viewing genius, as 
Novalis had, as the natural condition of humanity. By contrast, in Goethe Lukäcs saw 
a transcendence into action, but perhaps also a certain type of acceptance of social 
reality that had begun to impinge on Lukäcs’s own sense of the harmonious balance 
with reality which he felt the subject should seek.
At one level, Lukäcs’s critique of the desire for too ultimate a state of harmony 
seems perfectly justified - culture cannot be other than subject to accident, to open 
possibility and indeed impossibility. At another, we are left questioning what the 
‘actual reality of life’ really is. We might recognize his frustration with the 
romantic’s attempt to ‘resolve tragic situations in an untragic way’ and yet still not be 
able to appreciate Lukäcs’s own sense of the destiny of humanity. By the time of 
History and Class Consciousness, the substance of his critique of romanticism would 
become a more general attack upon those radical theorists, such as Bloch, who 
developed a utopian, Messianic form of Marxism. Here he sees arguments as to the 
place of an awakening of humanity’s inwardness for the revolutionizing of social 
reality as ignoring an economic reality that is a ‘‘system of forms objectively defining 
this real life” . 52 We will shortly see the transformation that his earlier romanticist 
emphasis upon estrangement undergoes as he begins to draw particular links between 
alienation and a reified consciousness. His romanticist critique becomes not only 
politicized in ever more constrained directions but steadily more objectivist in its 
philosophical approach. Lukäcs’s sad form of political compromise is perhaps most 
evident in the need he feels to criticize revolutionary utopianism. Where Bloch argues 
that such economics is the sort of objectivity to which an inwardness should be 
thoroughly opposed, Lukäcs claims that he is merely evading the problem of the
50 It is interesting to consider whether Lukäcs is not here writing out the revolutionary messianic 
dimension of Friedrich Schlegel’s thought. For Schlegel was moved to write that: “The revolutionary 
desire to achieve the Kingdom of God is the beginning of modem history. Anything which is not 
related to the Kingdom of God is for it just marginal”. Friedrich Schlegel, Seine prosaichen 
Jugendschriften (Vienna, 1966), quoted in Michael Löwy, “Revolution against ‘Progress’: Walter 
Benjamin’s Romantic Anarchism” in On Changing the World: Essays in Political Philosophy, from 
Karl Marx to Walter Benjamin (New Jersey: Humanities, 1993), p. 146.
51 Lukäcs, Soul and Form, p. 45.
52 Lukäcs, Histojy and Class Consciousness, p. 193.
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restructuring of life. And yet it is precisely a restructuring of life that Bloch proposes 
and not the fake restructuring of ‘economics’ to which Lukäcs succumbs. 53 Thinking 
“purely in economic terms like the merchant but against the merchant implies the 
homogeneity of the detective and the criminal”, Bloch tells us.54 Ultimately, it is this 
doleful homogeneity which Lukäcs offers us as an increasingly party political 
inflection upon his attitude to romanticism becomes apparent.55
Reflecting briefly upon this issue might allow us to view more clearly the 
philosophical position we find in Lukäcs of a “sometimes unresolved ambiguity”, as 
Steiner says.56 The overwhelming need to survive, which Brecht’s Galileo gives such 
keen expression to, explains something of Lukäcs’s tragically entangled choice to at 
times mimic a party-led triumphant objectivism. 57 The ‘soul’ for which Lukäcs
53 The two major theorists of ideology to be considered in this thesis, Lukäcs and Althusser, were both 
troubled members of Communist Parties, organizations which were linked to Soviet Communist Party 
(CPSU) doctrine in their support of the Third International or Comintern (1919-1943). By the time 
Althusser had joined the PCF in 1948 the Comintern had been dissolved for five years but individual 
parties continued to give support and loyalty to the Soviet Union by endorsing CPSU Congresses. Of 
the two, Althusser was perhaps the more active and public critic of his party, condemning its position 
on a range of political and theoretical issues, but the nature of each respective theorist’s involvement 
and the particular political conditions that existed for each makes any such comparison fatuous. Like 
Lukäcs, Althusser frequently refused to adopt a public position on issues of an overt and immediately 
political nature.
54 Ernst Bloch, Geist der Utopie (1918), p. 406, quoted in Sändor Radnoti, “Bloch and Lukäcs: Two 
Radical Critics in a ‘God-Forsaken World’”, in Lukäcs Revalued, ed. Agnes Heller (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1983), p. 67. In the Nassar translation of The Spirit o f Utopia this is rendered as “in order to 
be able to think purely economically alongside capital, against its injustices, just as the detective is 
homogeneous with the criminal -  where nothing but the economic aspect has to be considered”. Bloch, 
The Spirit o f Utopia, p. 242.
55 It should of course be said that Lukäcs occupied a particularly unenviable position in relation to the 
only party he felt able to fight fascism giving tacit support to the CPSU but at the same time haunted no 
doubt by the spectres of murdered Left Oppositionists in 1920s Russia. Lukäcs writes in his memoirs 
of his belief that “one could only fight effectively against fascism within the ranks of the Communist 
movement”. “I have always thought”, Lukäcs said in an interview in 1970, “that the worst form of 
socialism was better to live in than the best form of capitalism”. Lukäcs, Record o f a Life, pp. 178-181. 
This sentiment was to encapsulate Lukäcs’s half-hearted role within the party, unable to give 
unconditional endorsement but equally never willing to forego the possibility of continued 
participation.
56 Steiner, “True Leninist: The Apologia of Georg Lukäcs”, p. 7.
37 Lukäcs joined the Communist Party (MKP) (what would shortly become the merged Hungarian 
Social-Democrat and Communist Parties (HCP)) in December 1918 a few weeks after it had been 
founded. By the following year he had been appointed Deputy Commissar for Education in the rapidly 
formed, and what would be the very short-lived, Hungarian Soviet Republic. Already at this stage 
Lukäcs’s tendency towards political compromise was apparent: Prior to the peaceful formation of the 
Socialist-Communist coalition government led by Bela Kun in March 1919, Lukäcs had been a part of 
the underground second Central Committee comprised largely of ‘ultra-leftist’ and anarcho-syndicalist 
members who had been plotting the overthrow of the government through armed insurrection; but by 
March Lukäcs had shown sufficient loyalty to the leadership to assume his post in the government. Any 
such compromise was to come to a standstill when in August of the same year the Kun government was 
overthrown by the military forces controlled by Admiral Horthy. The chilling brutality of the fascistic 
Horthy regime could barely have been predicted. Within a matter of months five thousand 
revolutionaries had been murdered, seventy-five thousand had been gaoled and more than one-hundred
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theorized so troubled a longing in its quest for creative possibility, a life-capacity 
which turned inevitably upon the invocation of ghostly memories and the repetition of 
forgotten gestures, was also the soul which he was able to reconcile to moments, 
however fleeting, of instrumental barbarism. 58 Victor Serge, one of the more
thousand had been forcibly removed from within Hungarian borders. See George Lichtheim, Lukäcs 
(London: Fontana, 1970), p. 47. Lukäcs was arrested in Vienna in October 1919 but was released 
several months later following a campaign directed largely by German writers, most notably Paul Ernst 
and Thomas Mann. Living in exile in Vienna, Lukäcs took part in the illegal meetings of the 
Hungarian Communists and increasingly allied himself with Jenö Landler who was seeking to replace 
Kun as leader of the party.
58 If we reflect for a moment upon the issue of how one might assess Lukäcs’s choice of darkened 
political roads we can see something of the objectivist path he chooses to follow. For Lukäcs the 
choice was clearly seen as that between socialism, even a defective socialism, and capitalism, “the 
choice between two world systems”. Lukäcs, Record o f a Life, p. 158. Many of the main contributors 
to the Western Marxist body of knowledge were themselves more or less uneasy advocates of variants 
of Stalinism, in the sense of varying levels of support for the Soviet Union, other Eastern Bloc 
Communist regimes, or the Communist Party of the country in which they resided. To whatever degree 
it was given, this support occurred within the context of the recognition by most Marxists of the need 
for collective opposition to fascism and a profound sense of the need for and imminent possibility of a 
socialism capable of overturning social misery. This sense of hope and enthusiasm for future change 
cannot be underestimated as a fundamental part of the motivation for involvement in a mass party such 
as the Communist Party, even when such partisanship placed barely tolerable strains upon what various 
Western Marxists took to be the basis of the socialist tradition - an humaneness and a search for 
authenticity against alienation. With freedom judged to be swaying in the scales adherence to 
problematic and ever darkening party manoeuvres is, if not entirely convincing, at least more 
understandable. The genuine attempt at a new and startlingly different world was always conceived 
more broadly than a revolutionary Russia, and although the dissolution of the soviets would come to 
denote shattered aspirations, the attempt to replace capitalism was itself seen as the unleashing of an 
inescapably redemptive power. Even those who glanced at the failed attempt with the knowledge of 
one from whose eyes the scales had long fallen, still sought to discern in the now hollow space any last 
remnants of a world they had, however briefly, once experienced. It is perhaps not surprising that with 
the outward world no longer appearing as it might have been, for some of the Western Marxists, the 
gaze turned inward. It is always easy to express contempt and frustrated despair for those Marxists 
who seemed fooled by the trajectory taken by “actually existing socialism” beyond the Russian 
revolution: But this can only be done by neatly decontextualizing and depoliticizing the events and 
ideas of the period. Marxists of this period who maintained some adherence to Communist party ideas 
often did so principally on the laudable basis of expressing their commitment to a critique of 
capitalism. It was much less a matter of a poor and wretched expediency convincing itself of every 
political twist and turn. The fact that it was indeed a choice often necessitating tormented fears, 
despairing pride, monumental courage and the knowledge that one struggled for a doubtful prize, is 
often erased from any calculation of the complicity of the times. The alternative was the unacceptable 
self-righteous barbarism of Western capitalism, a fact so underplayed that one suspects that a 
realization of the extent of its horror, cruelty and its very life-devouring existence is avoided at any 
cost. The First World War witnessed the murder of at least fifteen million people within three years of 
barbaric and pointless imperialistic fighting; at the height of the Depression just under fifty percent of 
German workers were unemployed. Should socialists have thought this was preferable to the 
possibility of a failed revolution? Most socialists of the period saw no viable organized opposition to 
fascism other than in the Communist parties. The Western capitalist response to fascism from both 
church and State, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, had been one of steadfast compliance. Western 
governments had welcomed the victorious violent dictatorship of Franco in Spain in 1939. Pope Pius 
XII spoke to Franco of ‘lifting up our hearts in thanks’ for the fascist victory. The British government 
had sought ‘appeasement’ with Nazi Germany throughout the 1930s supposedly on the basis of 
maintaining a bulwark against Russian ‘communism’ but at the same time found nothing contradictory 
with their own position when the same Nazi’s formed a pact with Stalin in August 1939. Fascism in 
France and Italy had been well nurtured by Western allies and Western capital. Socialists were not in
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reflective commentators on the early twentieth century period of European 
revolutionary change, writes movingly of Lukacs’s “physical survival” during the late 
1920s, writing “spiritless articles in Comintern journals”.59 Walking in the streets of 
Moscow beneath the spires of the Votive Church, Lukacs implored Serge not to act in 
defiance of the party. Revolutionary Marxism, Lukacs told him, does “not need pride. 
The times are bad, and we are at a dark cross-roads. Let us reserve our strength: 
history will summon us in its time”.60 Both Serge and Lukacs were to die before their 
wished-for history could make its voice heard. Reserving his strength meant for 
Lukacs a strangely vacillating attitude to his party, veering from withering high- 
minded contempt to calculated compromise and back, again and again, until finally in 
his eighties and shortly before his death he was to put forward a more unyielding 
statement of anti-Stalinist politics. Encouraged by the events in France in 1968, 
Lukacs spoke of the necessity of a “complete rupture” with Stalinism.61
Our ability to carefully critically assess this objectivist turn in the form of an 
acceptance of deeply disturbing events is hampered if we cannot see the multiple 
factors acting upon Lukacs’s choice. We might well feel frustrated by a tendency to 
veil harsh political realities and dictatorial tendencies with a certain wishful-thinking 
in relation to an alternative to fascism but this carries with it not only the romanticist 
lament, the “sensuous breath”,62 of humanity’s failure to comprehend itself but also a 
certain painful calculation that freedom as a process is hard won. Benjamin’s claim 
that, since Bakunin, “Europe has lacked a radical concept of freedom”63 is a poignant 
reminder of this difficult need for the creation of freedom anew. If, at its most 
charitable, Lukacs seems paralyzed by the events around him and by the distance 
between idea and reality, it is perhaps because hovering before him is not only an
any sense mistaken in believing that Western democracy had failed to hold out a real and 
uncompromising opposition to fascism. This difficult reality is the basis of what would otherwise 
appear a paradoxical situation in which many of the same Western Marxists who championed humanist 
Marxism also defended aspects of Stalinism. To simply join forces with Western criticism of Russian 
‘communism’ would have meant accepting indefensible hypocrisy. However blurred the boundaries 
began to appear to be, the choice between Hitler or Stalin still presented itself as a necessary choice in 
what were increasingly difficult times, a choice between capitalism and its incarnation in the form of 
fascism and the hope, although, as it turned out, only the hope, of a new world of humane socialism.
59 Victor Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary 1901-1941, trans. Peter Sedgwick (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1967), p. 188.
60 Ibid., p. 192. This meeting took place according to Serge in 1926, but, as Löwy suggests, this must 
be a mistake on Serge’s part. It is likely that this conversation between Lukacs and Serge took place in 
Moscow in 1929. Löwy, “Lukacs and Stalinism”, p. 69.
61 Lukacs, Record o f a Life, p. 173.
62 This is Benjamin’s term for the great sorrow of the speechlessness of nature. Walter Benjamin, 
Refections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, ed. Peter Demetz, trans. Edmund Jephcott 
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), p. 329.
63 Ibid., p. 189.
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Orphic sense of divinity and incarnation but also the necessity to drink selectively 
from the fountain of memory. In an interview shortly before his death he conveyed a 
sense of his position as both orthodox and non-conformist.64 Agnes Heller perhaps 
best explains this tendency exhibited in her teacher and mentor as a choice to engage 
in a masquerade - behind the mask of ‘the history of philosophy’ “was hidden a 
confession of his commitment to the human species” .65 This is perhaps the most 
important point to make in relation to Lukacs’s politics. His consistent need to pursue 
what it is within human values that gives meaning to a struggle for the meaning of life 
eventually shines more brightly than his political expediency, which ultimately could 
only resolve itself in “punitive forays into one’s own consciousness”, as Steiner 
suggests.66 The tension it brings to his work is felt most forcefully in an ever more 
easy resort to an objectivism of the subject theorized on the basis of an objectivism of 
the system itself. And again this too is not without its difficulties, as the rest of the 
chapter will endeavour to convey. Lukacs’s commitment to find a dialectical 
certainty amongst the ruins of humanity’s abandonment is not always open to the 
phantasmagoric gifts or the guiding images of a renewed freedom, the very need for 
which his critique of commodification so forcefully brings into being.
It is here that we see the steadily faltering ground of Lukacs’s engagement 
with romanticism. For in his own wavering, necessarily brought about by many 
difficult, pressing conditions of his time and commitments, we see the echo of his 
theorization of the interconnected and yet divergent paths revealed by the alienation 
process. In the renouncing of self that alienation involves, a seemingly unresolvable 
paradox emerges -  that between a knowledge of self in which separation is deeply 
inscripted in life itself and a knowledge that some yearning for a world of 
connectedness exists. We cannot simply choose one rather than the other but are 
situated somewhere upon the “long road” that unfolds before us, and thus must 
acknowledge that a perfect knowledge of the world’s paths is not open to us. There is 
much that is alien to meaning.67
It is important to remember that added to Lukacs’s romantic critique of 
capitalism is, as Feenberg writes, “the Hegelian critique of that critique” .68 We see, 
most clearly in Lukacs’s History and Class Consciousness, the modem “‘post-
64 Lee Baxandall, “Georg Lukäcs and the Dangling Man”, The Philosophical Forum, vol. Ill, nos. 3-4 
(Spring-Summer 1972): p. 503.
65 Agnes Heller, “Lukäcs’ Later Philosophy”, in Lukäcs Revalued, ed. Agnes Heller (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1983), p. 178.
66 Steiner, Language and Silence, pp. 369-70.
6 Lukäcs, The Theory o f the Novel, pp. 33, 32.
68 Feenberg, Lukäcs, Marx and the Sources o f Critical Theory, p. x.
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romantic’ reconciliation with rationalist necessity”69 that had characterized Hegel’s 
response to romanticism. This direction in Lukäcs’s work has many critical 
consequences for his treatment of ideology, most particularly in his theorization of 
subjectivity. We need also briefly note here a shift in Lukäcs’s work to an 
increasingly hostile attitude to what he sees as, at best, the ambiguity of a romantic 
anti-capitalism.70 In a manuscript written on romanticism in the early 1930s, Lukäcs 
distinguishes between an early ‘ambiguous’ and at times ‘leftist’ tendency within 
‘romantic reaction’ (represented by Nietzsche, Tönnies, Simmel, Weber and 
Lebensphilosophie more generally) and a later openly reactionary, fascist tendency 
(represented by Heidegger, Ernst Jünger, Spengler, Bäumler, Freyer and Rosenberg). 
Lukäcs considers the connection between the two to be in work that veers towards 
irrationalism and myth.71 The problems with this sort of schematizing are many, but 
from the point of view of a critique of ideology they are particularly stark. Where 
irrationalism and myth are placed on the side of the ideological in counterposition to 
the rationality of reasoned belief, we are unlikely to encounter a dynamic within 
ideology.
This same problem applies to Lukäcs’s relation to modernism. There is in his 
critique of Expressionism, for example, the same familiar criticism that an overly 
subjectivist account of reality and truth has marred the movement’s direction. By the
69 Ibid., pp. x - xi.
70 Lukäcs first uses the term ‘romantic anti-capitalism’ in an article on Dostoevsky written in 1931. In 
a similar way to his much altered treatment of Nietzsche, Dostoevsky becomes transformed in his 
estimation from revolutionary hero to reactionary representative of tsarist imperialism. See Georg 
Lukäcs, “Uber den Dostojewski-Nachlass”, Moskauer Rundschau, March 22, 1931. This revised view 
of Dostoevsky was to change again with an article written in 1943 where a more sympathetic attitude 
towards the revolutionary possibilities of romanticism is presented; but again by the late 1940s Lukäcs 
has reverted to his previously hostile treatment of Dostoevsky. What one is to conclude from all this 
theoretical toing and froing is probably not a chronic lack of philosophical decisiveness but some 
degree of subservience to political expectations. In addition, as we have mentioned in the text, 
Lukäcs’s consistent problem seemed to be with coming to terms with the difficulty of reason and 
irrationality, which he tended to view in overly one-dimensional and static terms. In The Meaning of 
Contemporary Realism Lukäcs partly distances himself from both ‘romantic anti-capitalism’ and 
Dostoevsky by accusing the writer of endorsing the former as a sophistry that condemns humanity to 
the fulfilment of capitalism by way of humanity’s isolation. With Dostoevsky, Lukäcs tells us, “this 
isolation is to some extent concealed by his pan-Slav clerical mysticism”. Lukäcs, The Meaning of 
Contemporary Realism, p. 62. In 1934, Lukäcs considers the case of Nietzsche in more specific terms 
in his article, “Nietzsche as the Forerunner of Fascist Aesthetics”. The article is reproduced in Franz 
Mehring and Georg Lukäcs, Friedrich Nietzsche (Berlin: Aufbau, 1957). The text that deals more 
directly with Lukäcs’s view of Nietzsche’s criticism of the shallowness of contemporary values and his 
unfortunate interpretation of this as leading to Hitler’s demagogy, is his 1954 work, The Destruction of 
Reason. See Georg Lukäcs, The Destruction o f Reason, trans. Peter Palmer (London: Merlin, 1980), 
see especially ch. Ill, “Nietzsche as founder of irrationalism in the imperialist period”.
71 See, for example, Lukäcs, “Grösse und Verfall des Expressionismus (1934)” (The Grandeur and the 
Decadence of Expressionism), in Essays über Realismus (Neuwied, 1971), quoted in Löwy, Georg 
Lukäcs', p. 51.
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time of his well-known exchange with Bloch’s 1938 response to Lukacs’s own essay 
on Expressionism four years earlier, Lukacs was of course championing a realism 
with dubious political overtones.72 Here we see the presentation of a caricature, a 
form of reductionism equating every radical fragment of Expressionism’s corpus with 
a pre-determined ‘petit-bourgeois’ outlook. Lukacs hives off a contrived, one­
dimensional ‘reality’ from a fuller sense of the imagination, portraying the 
imagination as some lesser realm tarnished by its distance from the real. In the 
wizened, aesthetically impoverished sense of reality with which he leaves us, it is not 
surprising that Lukacs is unable to present the contradiction internal to ideology. In 
the angular, fragmentary montage of the imagination Lukacs sees only the flatness of 
fascism and imperialism, and, if not quite the decadence the Nazi’s chose to see, then 
certainly an elitist inaccessibility. Lukacs can appreciate none of the traces of radical 
portent which Bloch so tellingly perceives within the dynamics of cultural heritage.73 
But already by the mid-1920s Lukacs’s philosophical position was becoming clearly 
divergent from that of Bloch and Benjamin.74 We begin to sense this division clearly
72 See Ernst Bloch, “Discussing Expressionism” and Georg Lukacs, “Realism in the Balance”, in 
Aesthetics and Politics, ed. Ronald Taylor (London: Verso, 1986), pp. 16-27, 28-59.
73 The incident in which Bloch and Benjamin discussed the importance of a belief in fairy-tales and 
sought Lukacs’s response - which was to emphasize the importance of objective material circumstances 
- was merely indicative of the increasing distance between Lukacs’s objectivism and Bloch’s more 
nuanced investigation of the relation between subject and object.
74 Lukacs’s most decisive political intervention in the 1920s was in his writing of the ‘Blum theses’ in 
1928 - a set of proposals for the overthrow of the Horthy regime and the institution of a democratic 
republic. In essence these proposals amounted to an alliance with the now again legalized Social 
Democrats and an abandonment of the idea of the re-establishment of the Soviet Republic but also, and 
most controversially, a shift away from the idea of the necessity of the new government instituting 
socialism. Lukacs’s theses are often seen as a form of Bukharinism - a right-wing, opportunistic, 
populist attempt to ensure political survival at the expense of socialistic principles. Lichtheim for 
example, argues this. See Lichtheim, Lukacs, p. 49. Bukharin’s opportunism was seen by the left 
opposition in mid-1920s Russia as a Thermidorian danger which threatened the viability of the 
revolution. Trotsky, further to this, accused the Bukharinists of being Thermidorian manques, lacking 
all conviction of their beliefs but placing the revolution at risk of degenerating into Bonapartism. 
Bukharin’s well-known address to the peasants at the time when the policies of the New Economic 
Policy were failing to produce the desired results involved the memorable invocation “Enrich 
yourselves!”, meaning that the wealthier peasants should strive for more private wealth. See Isaac 
Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky, 1921-1929 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 
p. 233. In a general sense perhaps this is the case but it is much more significant that Lukacs’s views 
merely reproduced the rightwards shift of the Comintern during the period 1924-1927. Michael Löwy 
argues this point well in his article “Lukacs and Stalinism”, p. 66. Lukacs’s concern that in the 
immediate term any prospective democracy in Hungary “not go beyond bourgeois society” was 
precisely the shrivelled, stunted, offering of the Russian regime, the utter failure of the Comintern to 
ensure the survival of communism. Russian society had very quickly transformed into a form of 
capitalist society, albeit one whose highly centralized State form was a new departure for capitalism 
generally, and a massive shift within Russia itself, a country for which serfdom was a recent memory. 
Notwithstanding peculiarities and particular differences between different countries, state-controlled 
industrialization was soon to indicate a general form of capitalism to emerge in the wake of laissez- 
faire. It was not a form restricted to those regimes who merely called themselves ‘socialist’, although 
the extent of such industrialization in these countries was in many cases considerably more extensive. 
It would be easy to extrapolate from the sentiments of naive socialists at this time that many were
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with Lukacs’s response to Bloch’s writings on the problem of Vulgärmarxismus in 
relation to fascism. Where Bloch understands how omissions and sheer inattention on 
the part of a vulgar Marxism benefited the forces of reaction, Lukacs counters with an 
unfortunately predictable reiteration of the mechanical objectivist belief that such 
Marxism rose above the impoverishment of bourgeois culture and had attained a 
genuine form, and was clearly understood as such. For Bloch, the vulgar Marxist 
belief that cultural myths could be abstractly cordoned off rather than dialectically 
transformed is National Socialism’s gain. Thus he writes, “since Marxist propaganda 
lacks any opposite land to myth, any transformation of mythical beginnings into real 
ones, of Dionysian dreams into revolutionary ones, an element of guilt also becomes 
apparent in the effect of National Socialism, namely a guilt on the part of the all too 
usual vulgar Marxism” . 75 In contrast, according to Lukacs, this Marxism had achieved 
its aim in both elevating revolutionary traditions of popular movements and fully
simply confused by the direction that the revolution took and on this basis managed to equate socialism 
with state control of industry and interventionist economic policy: But this would be a grave distortion 
of the existence of clear divisions amongst the Marxist left and in particular a denial of the existence of 
significant debates as to the future of socialism. Lukacs’s 1928-29 ‘Blum theses’ were a contribution 
to this debate and they represented a reiteration of the earlier right-wing position of political 
compromise on the part of the Comintern. From the mid-1920s Stalin was pronouncing upon the 
impossibility of further revolutions and, according to Trotsky, claimed that the Comintern would carry 
out no revolution even in ninety years. See Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 288-293. Stalinism had effectively quashed even the idea of world 
communism. Such a position was also that of Lukacs’s depiction of a future Hungary in which the 
proletarian revolution was “now a long way off’. Georg Lukacs, Political Writings, 1919-1929, trans. 
Michael McColgan, ed. Rodney Livingstone (London: New Left Books, 1972), p. 248. Whether this 
was a reasonable appraisal of Hungarian politics of the period or an attempt to toe the Stalinist line is 
more difficult to say. In one sense, Lukacs’s argument is a realistic counter to ultra-leftism; the HCP, 
he argues, must be the party that fights “seriously for bourgeois democracy”. Ibid., p. 241. But even 
this apparently reasoned commitment to the better aspects of democratic bourgeois rule is 
fundamentally problematic for his Marxism. Why does Lukacs believe that it is a compromised 
bourgeois democracy that must be fought for? On what basis does he assume its universal application 
in any given state and that it will result from a democratic republic rather than from, for example, a 
monarchy? One senses here a muddled view of the Hegelian theory of history of the gradual, 
progressive development throughout successive historical periods, to which Lukacs on occasion feels 
compelled to turn and reinterpret for his own purpose. The consequences of the ‘Blum theses’ were to 
determine much of the rest of Lukacs’s political career - Lukacs would come to refer to these 
consequences as “my political destruction”. Ibid., p. 162. A common understanding of the theses, 
influenced no doubt by Lukacs’s own later interpretation, has been that they represented an opposition 
to both the HCP’s leadership under Bela Kun and to the ‘Third Period’ of the Comintern; but this is a 
misleading view. See, for example, Lukacs, Record o f a Life, p. 178. Lukacs wrote the theses in 
Vienna at some remove from immediate Central Committee debate but, more importantly, they were to 
emerge out of discussions amongst those Hungarians living in exile who wished to apply the newly 
formed realpolitik of the mid-1920s phase of the Comintern. Lukacs’s 1928 ‘Blum theses’ were the 
product of appalling timing; no sooner were they made available for general discussion within the party 
than the party itself was being shifted towards the sectarianism of the ‘Third Period’ which had begun 
several years before Lukacs’s intervention and lasted into the early 1930s.
75 Ernst Bloch, Heritage o f Our Times, trans. Neville and Stephen Plaice (Cambridge: Polity, 1991),
p. 60.
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overcoming “the old forms of their ideologies”.76 Lukacs can thus declare that the 
need for myth is a purely bourgeois pursuit; the revolutionary proletariat is beyond 
such mystification. Indeed, any such myth would be a merely false consciousness: 
“Proletarian revolution, whose vehicle and driving force are the working class and its 
vanguard and whose actions are based on sound knowledge of the economic 
processes, on awareness of the economic processes, is ab ovo capable of defining the 
aims of the revolution.77 It does not need ‘false consciousness’, it does not need 
myth”.78 Expressionism had as well veered too much towards the mythological for 
Lukacs, its distance from ‘realism’ making it inaccessible and without any ‘organic 
connection’.79
Lukacs here sees a clear division between proletarian and bourgeois culture, 
no doubt for him historically supported on the basis of his view of the existence of a 
triumphant proletarian culture in Stalinist Russia, even though this view is somewhat 
at variance with his literary criticism from this period of the 1930s onwards.80 It is
/6 Georg Lukacs, “Die Erbschaft dieser Zeit”, in Ernst Bloch und Georg Lukacs - Dokumente zum 100. 
Geburstag, Budapest: 1984, Lukacs Archives and Library, quoted in Läszlö Sziklai, After the 
Proletarian Revolution: Georg Lukacs’s Marxist Development, 1930-1945, trans. I. Sellei (Budapest: 
Akademiai Kiadö, 1992), p. 120.
77 For an analysis of the relation between Lukacs’s concept of totality and his presentation of a 
‘proletarian standpoint’ see Assen Ignatow, “Is There a ‘Proletarian Standpoint’?”, trans. Thomas .T. 
Blakeley, in Lukacs Today: Essays in Marxist Philosophy, ed. Tom Rockmore (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 
1988), pp. 157-166
78 Georg Lukacs, “Karl Marx und F. T. Vischer”, in Probleme der Ästhetik (Darmstadt und Neuwied: 
Luchterhand, 1969), p. 294, quoted in Sziklai, After the Proletarian Revolution, p. 120.
79 Lukäcs supports his view as a continuation of the task Marx outlined in his notes on Friedrich 
Theodor Vischer, the aesthetician whom he viewed as an apologist for Bismarck: But this interest in 
Marx’s ideas on aesthetics is much more a reflection of his closeness to the Russian art critic Mikhail 
Lifshitz with whom Lukacs worked in the early 1930s on translations of Marx’s abstracts. See Mikhail 
Lifshitz, The Philosophy o f Art o f Karl Marx, trans. Ralph B. Winn (London: Pluto, 1973). After 
studying at the Moscow Art School in the 1920s Lifshitz worked at the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute 
from 1929 to 1941. He was then made a member of the Institute for Philosophy at the Academy of 
Sciences in Moscow. At the level of his theoretical work, Lifshitz had a perhaps more integrated view 
of Marx’s work on aesthetics than Lukacs appeared to develop, although his own otherwise important 
work for the period on Marx’s theorization of art suffers from an overly schematic periodization of the 
progression of Marx’s writings. It is more in his regard for the ‘classics’ of art and German literature 
that Lifshitz provided considerable stimulus for Lukacs’s own classicist tendencies, no doubt helped by 
the high esteem in which Lifshitz was himself held by the regime.
80 This position needs to be seen in relation to the so-called ‘Third Period’ line which revolved around 
the Comintern’s fixation on reformism as a form of ‘social-fascism’, and the denial of a distinction 
between democratic regimes and repressive dictatorships. Stalin’s cynical and surprising address to the 
fifteenth congress of the party in December 1927 set out the dogma of capitalist crisis and imminent 
world revolution. On this basis, Social Democratic parties were to be viewed as the real enemies of 
communism, and the more left-wing they were the greater the threat to communism they were claimed 
to pose. Although this amounted to little more than a “mock fight” on the part of the Comintern, the 
consequences of this position were significant. See Lukacs, Record o f a Life, p. 178. The fate of 
Lukacs’s ‘Blum theses’, and indeed that of Lukacs himself, was caught within this historical vice. 
Lukacs’s now historically dated and politically compromised views were to see his marginalization 
from the party. Threatened with expulsion, Lukacs gambled on retraction as the only move to make
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another unfortunate aspect of Lukacs’s relation to Stalinism that his own views on the 
superiority of the classical heritage in art and literature - held for a variety of reasons, 
some more worthwhile than others - fitted well with the narrow, stale, stiflingly 
conventional cultural policies of the Comintern, with its pathological fear of the 
‘heretical’ and ‘irrational’ and its sickly adulation of petit-bourgeois mediocrity in the 
guise of workerist worthiness (perhaps not surprisingly at all, a position merely 
echoed in some of the important aspects of the cultural attitudes of fascism) . 81 This is 
not to suggest that the issues of metaphysical content and the place of a cultural 
heritage, which during this period inevitably involved a simultaneous commitment to 
fighting fascism, were in any sense straightforward. The ‘devil’s pact with history 
and necessity’ George Steiner writes of in relation to Lukäcs, senses well the 
complicated mesh of political and theoretical concerns which so marked Lukacs’s 
development. 82 Lukäcs believed that a ‘dark cross-roads’ unfolded before any Marxist 
caught in the difficulties of early twentieth century European history and that he 
himself lived his life as a witness to some of its worst episodes. 83 But, as we have just
whilst still being permitted to play the game, the end-game of Stalinism. The example of Karl 
Korsch’s fate, removed from any political influence on the party he had criticized, weighed heavily 
upon Lukacs’s mind. See ibid., p. 163. These were difficult times, left-wing politics was at the dark 
cross-roads, even some of the most courageous opponents of Stalin were now singing his praises, 
seeped in the frantic terror of fear and mistrust: But the fact that any such recantation took place cannot 
do other than to suggest a certain half-heartedness in Lukacs’s initial position, leaving one to conclude 
that Lukäcs was at the very least a confused partisan. His memoirs, “stamped with specks of 
sunshine”, as in Louis MacNeice’s words, do of course suggest otherwise - Lukäcs claims that he 
maintained this view inherent within the ‘Blum theses’ throughout the rest of his political life and that 
his retraction was “absolutely cynical”. Lukäcs, Record o f a Life, p. 178. But cynicism is a difficult 
sentiment to trust and the other side of cynical acquiescence is the failure of conviction. We can 
perhaps become somewhat further enlightened on this move by Lukäcs with the recent publication of 
his defence of History and Class Conciousness originally composed in 1925 or 1926. See Georg 
Lukäcs, In Defence o f “Histoiy and Class Conciousness”: Tailism and the Dialectic, trans. Esther 
Leslie (London: Verso, 2000).
81 This discussion necessarily diverts our attention to the issue of Lukäcs’s changing political stance, a 
subject which will be kept to a bare minimum given restrictions of space and the fact that it is a topic 
which has been well covered elsewhere as we have already mentioned. What we can briefly state is 
that whilst Lukäcs’s consistently classicist tendencies help to explain significant parts of his 
denouncing of modernism and what he saw as its reckless absorption of ill-founded, ‘irrationalist’ 
values, his attributing to every modernist expression which falls outside a selective canon of classical, 
‘realist’ culture a paving of the way to fascism seems also to suggest a narrow and somewhat 
disingenuous political stand. Lukäcs’s opposition to fascism was undoubtedly committed and entirely 
laudatory but it is hard not to view it also in terms of a submission to an equally repressive and 
culturally idealised and most certainly anti-utopian catechism in the shape of Stalinist ‘actuality’. The 
supreme need to “strengthen and expand the anti-fascist front” seems to have weakened Lukäcs’s 
otherwise revolutionary resolve. Quoted in Kadarkay, Georg Lukäcs, p. 336.
82 George Steiner, “Georg Lukäcs and his Devil’s pact”, in A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1984), pp. 54-67; first published in Kenyon Review (Winter, 1960): pp. 1-18.
83 Where Lukäcs veered from the appropriate party line on aesthetics it was only in his too high regard 
for Western exponents of the classical approach rather than exhorting proletarian and more populist 
versions of the same cultural position. It is precisely against Lukäcs’s critique of a supposedly 
dangerously modernist Expressionism that Bloch was to develop his considerably more enlightened
The Fracturing of Subject and Object 139
argued, it is more that at a more strictly theoretical level he seems to present us with, 
the prospect of never-ending cross-roads in which our choice of any repeatedly 
reinforces the renouncing of self that the path of alienation has paved for us.
Whilst, by the 1960s, Lukäcs would refer to a romantic anti-capitalism in 
terms of its philosophically and politically uncertain attitude, unable to draw for 
himself a clear distinction between reactionary apologetics for past empires and the 
critique of the more barbarous aspects of capitalism, the sense of the earlier 
subversiveness of such a rejection certainly comes through in the early works in a 
powerful manner. What we want to consider is whether the sort of critique Lukäcs 
develops enables him to perceive a range of elements, both subjective and objective, 
in which a reduction of life to the scattered, fragmented reality of disenchantment 
takes hold. As we have previously mentioned, even in the early 1930s, what he 
sensed as an apparent opaqueness of intention caused Lukäcs to draw links between 
German fascism and the theoretical arsenal of ‘romantic anti-capitalism’.84 To draw 
such links where they existed was no doubt the duty of any theorist coming to terms 
with the nature of fascism, but not to be able to ‘hold the stick at both ends’ as it were 
- to understand that fascism was equally able to make use of a romantic anti-capitalist 
view and put it to barbarous ends, as was a genuinely emancipatory theory able to use 
such a value in the cause of utopian liberation - gives one cause for doubt as to the 
substance of Lukäcs’s rejection of romanticism. Lukäcs seems to have drifted 
decisively away from the Kierkegaardian dialectic of paradox he had once held so 
dear - the ‘point at which reality and possibility intersect’ never ends; indeed, the end 
is never ‘standing still’.85 It would, in time, seem merely unfortunate that Lukäcs 
tended towards viewing such a critique as a form of hopeless and naive utopianism 
that had aimed at an outdated fusion of what he saw as ‘left’ ethics and ‘right’ 
epistemology.86 It would indeed be telling that he justified his own partial
views of the role of changing currents within art and literature. Lukäcs’s criticism of Expressionism 
first appeared in the journal Internationale Literatur in January 1934. Bloch skillfully tore apart 
Lukäcs’s argument, decisively opening up Western Marxism to a more reflective aesthetic debate. As 
we have mentioned, the debate between Bloch and Lukäcs appears in the collection Aesthetics and 
Politics.
84 Löwy argues cogently that Lukäcs’s hostility to romanticism did not really occur until the late 1920s 
as a result of a ‘forced reconciliation’ with Stalinism and specifically such events as Stalin’s Five-Year 
Plan (1928-1933) which replaced any romantic nostalgia with a fondness for industrialization in stark 
fashion. Michael Löwy, “Naphta or Settembrini? - Lukäcs and Romantic Anticapitalism”, in Georg 
Lukäcs: Theory, Culture, and Politics, eds. Judith Marcus and Zoltan Tarr (New Brunswick: 
Transaction, 1989), p. 193.
85 Lukäcs, Soul and Form, pp. 29, 17.
86 See, for example, Lukäcs’s ‘Preface’ to his The Theoiy o f the Novel, p. 21; and Lukäcs, Record o f a 
Life, p. 155, where Lukäcs explains what his early philosophy “all comes to: left-wing ethics combined 
with right-wing epistemology”.
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accommodation to Stalinist politics and reductionist aesthetics as more fruitful than 
the views of a resident of the “Grand Hotel Abyss”, such as Adorno, and more 
progressive than someone such as Bloch.87 Nonetheless, elements of utopian and 
revolutionary forms of romanticism can be detected both within Lukäcs’s consistent 
critique of capitalism and in aspects of his problematic relationship to the materialist 
orthodoxy of Second International Marxism. Indeed, it is no doubt precisely this sort 
of consistency that Lukäcs has in mind when he claims that there is a dialectical unity 
of continuity and discontinuity in his lifework. Everything in his development he felt 
was “the continuation of something else”.88
It is of course well to remember, as Fredric Jameson argues, that Lukäcs had 
always been hostile to a futurist, machine-oriented moment in modernism.89 This was 
nothing new in his critique and it did not, therefore, represent any easy alignment with 
Stalinist anti-modemist dogma. His particular struggle with rationalism as well 
predated any party political argument of convenience. This opposition to modernism 
might partly explain his hostility to the avant-garde, at least as it was initially put 
forward: But Lukäcs maintained this position well into the 1960s without ever turning 
his attention to those most machine-oriented systems of the East. What we find are 
some consistent inconsistencies characterizing Lukäcs’s work. If his liberal- 
rationalist ideology of progress - a classical Aufklärung tendency - wins out in the end 
it is only because it is in constant battle with his romantic anti-capitalism.90 As we 
will shortly see, Lukäcs was in many ways as questioning of reality and the rationality 
it presented as he was hostile to any sense of the irrational, depending upon whether 
his target was philosophy, aesthetics or politics. The most important legacy of 
Lukäcs’s engagement with ‘romantic anti-capitalism’ is the sensitivity it gave him to 
the significance of alienation within contemporary society. A way of life in which 
people were able to exert elements of control over their work and cultural pursuits 
was increasingly being denied despite the modem world’s promises of renewal and 
democratic authenticity. Lukäcs’s response to this, in terms of a thorough rejection of 
bourgeois pretence and injustice via the influence of romanticism, was to 
fundamentally set the ground-work for his later investigations of the ideological 
nature of reality. With this tergiverating romanticist critique of capitalism by Lukäcs 
in mind let us now look more specifically at the developments in this sort of critique 
for an analysis of the problem of the commodity.
87 For this critique of Adorno , see Lukacs’s ‘Preface’, The Theoiy o f the Novel, p. 22.
88 Lukäcs, Record o f a Life, p. 81.
89 Fredric Jameson, Interview, in Lukäcs After Communism: Interviews with Contemporary 
Intellectuals, ed. E.L. Corredor (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 87.
The Fracturing of Subject and Object 141
The Disenchantment of the World and the Philosophical Problem of
Commodification
In Lukäcs’s work, History and Class Consciousness, considerable emphasis is 
given to the pervasiveness of ideological forms o f capitalist social relations. In the 
early decades of the twentieth century, Lukäcs was one of the first amongst a growing 
number of social theorists to express an increasing concern to understand what it is in 
the ambivalent demands of modem capitalism that becomes etched in the matrix of 
consciousness. That the purpose of this work of the early 1920s is a radical rejection 
o f the reified consciousness, upon which capitalism depends, is a perfectly explicable 
development from the concerns of Lukacs’s earlier 1910 work, Soul and Form.9' In 
the latter work, Lukäcs criticizes the inability o f German romanticism to have broken 
decisively with ‘reality’ despite having created a seemingly organic realm o f spiritual 
and aesthetic values.92 This reality from which a decisive severance is required is the 
reality of the disruption between self and world. Likewise, Lukacs’s work of 1914- 
1915, The Theoiy o f the Novel, published in 1920, sets out a view of a life world that 
has been rendered alien to the subject.93 Culture has become fragmented, mystified 
and disoriented, resulting most importantly in a fracturing between interiority and 
reality. There is, then, an attempt to recapture the whole person beyond her reduction 
to an object of consumption and away from the emptiness of a dissipated, 
individualistic culture.94 The work has been noted for its revolutionary elements in 
embryonic form hidden within an otherwise romantic and apocalyptic vision of 
history derived from sources such as Dostoyevsky, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sorel, 
mysticism, Jewish messianism and what Bloch refers to as the ‘imaginary Russia’.95 
As well, Lukäcs himself refers to the importance o f Goethe, Schiller, Friedrich 
Schlegel and Solger’s aesthetic theories in the development of this early work,96 with 
Hegel or a ‘Kierkegaardized’ Hegel as its ‘general methodological guide’.97 Indeed,
90 Löwy, “Naphta or Settembrini? - Lukäcs and Romantic Anticapitalism”, pp. 193-194.
91 For a general overview of the works of the early Lukäcs, see Congdon, The Young Lukäcs.
92 Lukäcs, Soul and Form, p. 50.
93 For a general approach to this work, see Bernstein, The Philosophy o f the Novel.
94 David Gross argues that it is precisely these sorts of intentions that Lukäcs shared with Bloch at this 
time. See David Gross, “Ernst Bloch: Dialectics of Hope”, in The Unknown Dimension: European 
Marxism since Lenin, eds. Dick Howard and Karl E. Klare (New York: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 109- 
110.
95 Cited by Michael Löwy in an interview with Ernst Bloch. See Löwy, “Naphta or Settembrini? - 
Lukäcs and Romantic Anticapitalism”, p. 191.
96 Lukäcs, The Theory o f the Novel, p. 15.
97 Ibid., pp. 18, 19. It should perhaps be mentioned that, as Paul Honigsheim points out, Lukäcs’s 
interest in Kierkegaard “was one of the first places in which Kierkegaard, who was almost completely 
forgotten, experienced a resurrection”. Lukäcs, he says, “was one of the very few who brought notions
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perhaps these revolutionary and romantic elements, despite suggestions otherwise, are 
not so antithetical at all - for here Lukäcs theorizes an open, heterogeneous and 
uncontained world “richer in gifts and dangers” and the compulsion of the individual 
to “make the leap” into the unknown. 98 We can sense both Hölderlin’s ‘place of 
danger in which salvation arises also’ and the struggle the subject encounters in 
illuminating the darkness by which she is surrounded in this problem Lukäcs sets for 
himself.
The central issue we face in reading Lukäcs’s work is in understanding this 
seemingly uncompromising view that we can no longer breathe in a world that places 
before us a closed essence of life. For life to mean anything to us we must engage 
both with the unease with oneself (Ichschmerz) with which individuals are confronted 
as well as with our unease with the world (Weltschmerz). At the same time, Lukäcs 
sees this as fraught with difficulty - there is no easy passage into the incomplete. 
Because we have invented forms, completedness is beyond our grasp; because we find 
substance within ourselves and the creativity of the spirit, “we have to place an 
unbridgeable chasm between cognition and action, between soul and created structure, 
between self and world”: Our essence “has to become a postulate for ourselves” 
creating a still deeper, more menacing “abyss between us and our own selves” . 99 Here 
Lukäcs sees the utopian impulse to move beyond the problems of industrial 
capitalism, a system which has given us “irreparable cracks in the edifice” but also, 
importantly, “the dream of new unities” . 100 In clearly Nietzschean terms we are told 
that we will never return to the ‘integrated civilization’ of the Greeks - roundedness 
and being at home within oneself and one’s world is gone101 - we now live within an 
epoch of irredeemable and ‘absolute sinfulness’, as in the Fichtean sense, but an 
epoch too of “impossible yet certain redemption” . 102 Lukäcs might seem to us 
nostalgic for a type of Homeric greatness but he is also quite clear as to what the
of Kierkegaard back into view before the war”. Paul Honigsheim, “Memories of Max Weber”, in his 
On Max Weber, trans. Joan Rytina (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 27.
98 Lukäcs, The Theory o f the Novel, pp. 34, 33.
99 Ibid., p. 34.
100 Ibid., p. 37.
101 In claiming that German philosophy is the most fundamental form of romanticism and 
homesickness Nietzsche argues that “One is no longer at home anywhere; at last one longs back for 
that place in which alone one can be at home, because it is the only place in which one would want to 
be at home: the Greek world! But it is in precisely that direction that all bridges are broken -  except 
the rainbow bridges of concepts!”. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 225.
102 Lukäcs, The Theory o f the Novel, p. 37.
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problem of modem existence is - our life is a rift between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, it is 
the incongruence of soul and deed.103
This is indeed the central issue brought painfully into being by the 
commodification of life. We can gain much from an understanding of this forceful 
critique of what continues to be the brutal severance between our inner and outer life, 
subjective and objective existence, soul and deed. Our current life requires renewal. 
We need a transparency “that no image would be capable of expressing completely” - 
an “imagelessness of all images”, as Lukacs had expressed it in Soul and Form.'04 We 
need to be like Dostoevsky’s Prince Myshkin and Alyosha Karamazov or 
Kierkegaard’s Abraham -  “their knowledge became realized in deed”.105 Capitalist 
existence offers us a ‘nonculture’ (Kulturlosigkeit), Lukacs argues in his 1919 essay, 
“The Old and the New Culture”.106 This non-culture has been destructive not only of 
what has gone before it but of the more fundamental sense of what it is to be human. 
Capitalism is essentially anti-human. It speaks of an empty, spiritually sterile 
‘having’ rather than ‘being’. It is the today of “the big lie”, for which one awaits the 
‘truth of tomorrow’, as in the words of the Hungarian romantic-revolutionary poet 
Endre Ady, who so influenced Lukacs’s early development.107 Its reproduction as an 
ideological world is in the contradiction inherent within its anti-human form. We 
have then an articulation of the basic problem a commodified world brings into being 
for the divided, separated self -  a knowledge of ourselves and the world has been 
made too paradoxical for it to successfully contend with the ravages of the spectacle. 
We, as knowing beings, no longer exist in the spectacle’s reflection. Our potentiality 
becomes itself too reified for us to resist the enslavement that commodification 
imposes.
It is worthwhile noting too the influence of Judeo-Christian spiritual ideas for 
Lukacs’s developing critique. Lukacs maintained a lifelong intellectual interest in the 
spirituality of the Franciscans, most particularly their vow of poverty - Nihil habentas, 
omnia possidentos (Those who have nothing own everything) and, according to 
Kadarkay, made extensive notations in his copy of Chesterton’s St. Francis o f 
Assisi.108 Mätyäs Särközi reveals that Lukacs urged the young Mannheim to read
103 Ibid., p. 29.
104 Lukacs, Soul and Form, p. 5.
105 Georg Lukacs, “On Poverty of Spirit: A Conversation and a Letter”, trans. John T. Sanders, The 
Philosophical Forum, vol. Ill, nos. 3-4 (Spring-Summer 1972): p. 375. Originally published in Neue 
Blätter, nos. 5-6 (1912).
106 Lukacs, “The Old Culture and the New Culture”.
107 Endre Ady, quoted in Kadarkay, Georg Lukacs, p. 62.
108 See Kadarkay, Georg Lukacs, p. 12.
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Thomas ä Kempis’ The Imitation o f Christ (the 1624, Cardinal Päzmäny translation) 
considering it the greatest source from which he could learn the language of 
philosophy.109 Cornel West has written persuasively of Lukäcs’s “quasi-religious” 
quest for meaning and his understanding of the spiritual blindness of modem capitalist 
society.110 Sandor Radnoti comments on how both Bloch and Lukäcs used the 
expression of the problem of a ‘world abandoned by God’ in their theorizations of 
modem society, although what this expression meant to each philosopher differed 
significantly.* 111 Both certainly took from a theologian such as Meister Eckhart ideas 
of an engaged inner sense of spirituality. Lukäcs had long devoted his attention to 
some of the leading Jewish thinkers of his time. Martin Buber’s Hasidic works, The 
Tales o f Rabbi Nacham and The Legend o f the Baal-Shem were particularly important 
to Lukäcs, as was Buber’s influential theological text, I  and ThouT2 The central issue 
he found here was a rejection of the existing order of things. In its place was the idea 
of deliberate intention, often in the face of enormous adversity, to achieve a type of 
metaphysical oneness. This spiritual achievement was also to be found in 
communality. The struggle for one’s very self within community was to haunt 
Lukäcs all of his life.
The significance of this struggle was no doubt to make him only all the more 
aware of the ideological problem of reification - a vast and powerful source of 
confusion, distracting all within its grip from the attempt to find oneself in the midst 
of one’s distorted relation to others. Such a view of the world gave him also an added 
perspective upon the limits of rationalism. The idea of redemption and the need to 
transcend given modes of perception and experience seriously undermined what was 
taken for granted within rationalist and empiricist accounts of existence. Beyond this, 
however, messianic thought was able to offer, what Anson Rabinbach refers to as, 
“the missing dimension of cultural experience”.113 In Lukäcs’s essay of 1912, “On 
Poverty of Spirit”, the idea of caste is used as a spiritual concept attributed to
109 Mätyas Särközi, “The influence of Georg Lukäcs on the young Karl Mannheim in the light of a 
newly discovered diary”, Slavonic and East European Review, no. 7 (July, 1986): p. 436.
110 Cornel West, Interview, in Lukäcs After Communism: Interviews with Contemporary Intellectuals, 
ed. E.L Corredor (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 96. See also Cornel West, The Ethical 
Dimensions o f Marxist Thought (New York: Monthly Review, 1991), especially chap. 6, “The 
Hegelian Marxist Position: Lukacs’s Ontological Quest”.
111 Radnoti, “Bloch and Lukäcs: Two Radical Critics In a ‘God-Forsaken World’, p. 155.
112 Lukäcs’s correspondence with Buber appears in the Magyar Tudomanyos Akademia Filozofiai 
Intezet, Lukäcs Archivum es Konyvtar (Philosophical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
Lukäcs Archive and Library, Budapest), and is mentioned in Kadarkay, Georg Lukäcs, p. 115.
113 Anson Rabinbach, “Between Enlightenment and Apocalypse: Benjamin, Bloch and Modem 
German Jewish Messianism”, New German Critique, no. 34 (Winter 1985): p. 102.
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Hinduism and to argue for a somewhat more restricted sense of redemption. 114 Here, 
inspired by his own personal experience of loss, Lukacs puts forward the idea of the 
necessity of a recognition of levels of intensity of tragedy and ethical position that 
cannot be understood, equally and in the same manner, by all. 115 Likewise, arguing 
against the Kantian assumption of a categorical imperative, Lukacs could see no 
democracy of values. Such a morality is seen as oblivious to social difference, as a 
constraint upon human communion and as a mere moral code of the ‘living dead’. 
Most importantly, it is seen as propounding a false equality. In Lukacs’s realm of 
tragedy the poor in spirit cannot enter. In his work The Metaphysics o f Tragedy, he 
argues that Dante’s door of hell rightly refuses them access - the claim of an equal 
right of all to be tragic is futile. Although he was to later see this type of analysis as 
reaching an inevitable ‘cul-de-sac’ , 116 the fact that he prefaced it with a sense of the 
spiritual revival of the caste system was significant for the openness Lukacs felt 
towards a wide range of spiritual ideas. All of these influences amount to a 
considerable engagement with a sense of an alternative to the venal and the profane of 
commodified life, an alternative put forward on the basis of more spiritual accounts of 
humanity’s reason for being.
Capitalism, for Lukacs, is the destruction of meaning and culture, the reason 
for the widespread disenchantment which Weber had noted. 117 But it is also a 
superficial replacement with forms of fake enchantment. Adorno would come to 
theorize here a disappearing enchantment, undermining itself by its attempts to ‘settle 
down’ . 118 Lukacs tends more towards wanting to firmly grasp the mediation involved 
in the reification of a consciousness entrammelled within processes of the de­
magi cization of culture. We will have cause to ask whether Lukacs is able to theorize 
this substitution of values substantially enough - but we can certainly note here his 
clear rejection of forms of disorientating cultural disenchantment. For Lukacs, the 
only hope for renewal is for life to cease to be dominated by the impulse towards 
commodification and for the artistic spirit to again provide culture with the reason for 
its existence. For various reasons Lukacs’s History and Class Consciousness seems
114 Lukacs, “On Poverty of Spirit”, p. 384. See also Löwy, Georg Lukacs, p. 125.
115 Lukacs was to suffer the deaths of two close friends during his early life -  that of his friend Leo 
Popper with whom he had an intensely close intellectual relationship and who died from consumption 
in November 1911 and his lover Irma Seidler who suicided in May o f the same year after having been 
spumed by Lukacs.
116 Lukacs, Record o f  a Life, p. 153.
117 As we considered in the previous chapter the way in which Weber approached the idea of 
capitalism was fundamentally different from Lukacs’ critique.
118 See, for example, Adomo, “On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listening”, 
pp. 270-299.
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to shift appreciably from this concern with a cultural disenchantment and posits 
instead the vitality of a consciousness emerging out of this disenchantment in an 
apparent destruction of former myth and illusion: And yet, if the most important 
aspect of this anti-capitalism is the critique of capitalism as a form of distorting 
rational calculation and mechanization in the service of commodity production, then 
this is precisely the major point of Lukacs’s work on reification. 119 Here, the 
influences of other so-called romantic anti-capitalists is clear - echoes of Tönnies, 
Weber and Simmel, whose ideas we considered in the previous chapter, abound. It 
might be that what we see here is a “subtle Platonism wrapped in Marxism”, as 
Kadarkay argues120 but it is also well worth asking, as Michael Löwy does, whether 
Lukäcs is not in fact attempting to recover the lost romantic dimension (lost in 
particular to neo-Kantian Marxists) of Marxism. 121 Lukacs’s theorization of 
disenchantment contains at least two distinct senses of the term -  a critique of 
alienation and a critique of illusion. It could well be argued that a more consistent 
engagement with the problem of myth is not only warranted but indeed necessitated 
by the combination of these uneasy strands of Lukacs’s understanding of 
disenchantment. The destruction of myth via the self-realization of the proletariat -  
their ability to disenchant a world of reified objects -  is, after all, a difficult task in the 
presence of a culturally disenchanted existence -  a cutting off from the bonds and 
identities giving alternative points of reference to a world of venal and self-limited 
desire. These problems appear all the more marginal to Lukacs’s purpose the more he 
theorizes the logic of the reification of life.
Perhaps Lukacs’s most important concern becomes the need to understand the 
obstacle of reification that stands in the way of attempts to establish an egalitarian 
society. Here, Lukacs’s emphasis on the effects of commodification upon 
consciousness underscores a deep appreciation of the enormous, and in many ways 
quite sudden, changes in social relations themselves - most obviously in the 
particularization of the functions of the State, and the sheer expansion of forms of 
economic, political and social domination for capital. Most importantly, Lukäcs seeks 
to explain why the individual had been reduced so rapidly to an object of 
consumption, to the role of a spectator in one’s own life. An acute awareness of this 
problem of the substitution of human with commercial values at so early a stage in the
119 It is here, o f course, that we see the development of at least two different senses of the term 
ideology in Lukacs’s work -  in the Leninist positive sense o f a class position in which the proletariat 
can fulfil its realization and in the sense of a critique of reification. There is also, although less 
importantly, the use of an historicist sense of the term.
120 Kadarkay, Georg Lukäcs, p. 270.
121 Löwy, “Naphta or Settembrini? - Lukäcs and Romantic Anticapitalism”, p. 193.
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spectacle’s charge through twentieth century life, could not have been so easily made 
without Lukacs’s profound initial understanding of elements of the revolutionary- 
utopian sense of romantic anti-capitalism. We need, then, to further explore what it is 
that Lukäcs believes becomes an ideological reality for people living out this crisis of 
a riven soul. We will first consider the general sense of alienated life which Lukäcs 
develops before looking at his focus upon its particular form as reification.
Alienation
History and Class Consciousness, a work Kadarkay describes as summoning 
“the revolution to the Burning Bush”,122 was first published in 1923. It is a work 
comprising eight essays written during Lukacs’s period of exile in Vienna, mainly 
during the period 1919-1921 but with some important corrections made in 1922.123 
We have already seen in the previous chapter something of the social conditions in 
which the work appeared. The expansion of State power and authoritarian control, the 
impact of rationalizing thought and bureaucratic instrumentalism, as well as a general 
political and social instability, all provide the backdrop to Lukacs’s writing of this 
period. One of the major themes developed in this work involves an attempt to 
understand the ideological constraints placed upon immediate and spontaneous 
challenges to the economic and social reality of capitalism. This reality is an 
ideological reality whose most fundamental feature is alienation - a profound 
displacement and disempowerment of the individual from her world and her sense of 
herself, a situation in which reality appears to be beyond the individual’s own creative 
control.124
Lukacs’s conceptualization of alienation is used to convey a sense of its dual 
role to disconcert and to effect a realization, to imply both a displacement of the self 
and a type of lost relation to that by which it is produced.125 The theme of alienation is
122 Kadarkay, Georg Lukäcs, p. 269.
123 History and Class Consciousness, along with many of Lukacs’s works from the period of the work, 
Soul and Form, (published in Hungarian in 1910 and in German in 1911) was written in German.
124 For a detailed analysis of Lukacs’s concept of alienation, see Jean Hyppolite, Studies on Marx and 
Hegel (New York: Basic Books, 1969), chap. 4.
125 It is worth noting that a number of different concepts are often used or implied when theorising this 
problem of alienation - estrangement (Verfremdung); alienation {Entfremden)', strangeness {Fremdes)', 
objectification {Vergegenstdnd); and extemalization {Entäusserung), are merely some of the concepts 
involved. These different concepts are sometimes used interchangeably, sometimes with distinct 
meanings in mind. Lukäcs uses the term reification {Verdinglichung) in History and Class 
Consciousness, which, as we will see, is developed to mean a particular type of alienation. Whilst 
Lukäcs tends to use the terms ‘reification’, ‘alienation’ and ‘objectification’ interchangeably he also, in 
various instances, uses them quite selectively as well. Arato points out that ‘reification’, 
‘objectification’ and ‘objective nature’ should each be treated as different levels of the problem of
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pursued in terms of an investigation of both the difficulties in overcoming the forces 
of an alien existence and also by understanding forms of conscious power in relation 
to the experience of this displacement arising from the reality of capitalism. 126 This 
theme can be taken as a part of Lukacs’s concern to establish an understanding of 
some of the dominant features of commodity society and the emergence of 
consciousness. 127 With History and Class Consciousness, we witness very clearly 
Lukacs’s attempt to bring together a concern for the processes of alienation and 
estrangement with a methodology capable of both unravelling their problematic and 
of indicating their resolution. 128 At the same time, however, we can see much in his 
use of the concept of alienation that is a continuation of earlier themes in his writings. 
Lukacs’s theorization of the reduction of the spirit to commodified values is a critique 
of a pattern of everyday life as much as it is a more specific critique of everyday 
capitalism. For Lukäcs, reification exists in many forms. The two dominant forms he 
considers are related to the insoluble economic contradictions of capitalism and the 
contradictions of social reality - of ideas, culture and rationality. All of its forms tend 
towards the same outcome - a contrived opposition of components. Thus subject and 
object, soul and deed, the internal and external, milieu and human activity exist as the 
fraught antinomies of a fractured consciousness. And it is here that the processes of
alienation in Lukacs’s work. Arato detects tendencies in this direction within Lukacs’s writing, 
particularly where Lukäcs argues that reification has varying effects upon different types of 
relationships. See, Andrew Arato, “Lukäcs’ Theory of Reification”, Telos, no. 11 (1972): pp. 41-43. 
Lukäcs himself was later to claim in the 1967 Preface to History and Class Consciousness that the 
terms reification and alienation were used, synonymously, in error. Lukäcs, History and Class 
Consciousness, p. xxv. This he corrects to an understanding of reification as “closely related” to 
alienation but neither “socially nor conceptually identical with it”. Ibid., pp. xxiv-xxv. Lukäcs’s 
attempt here to castigate himself for his own alleged idealism in conflating the terms is not the reason 
why we might wish to draw some distinction between them, nor is the reason to engage in a type of 
particularizing bom more of pedantry than expansiveness. Not only is reification used by Lukäcs to 
mean a type of alienation peculiar to capitalism but some of the other terms associated with alienation 
also have usefully specific meanings.
126 It is in this sense a recuperation of a “Kantian-Hegelian-Marxist reading of Entfremdung of human 
consciousness under the regime of modem capitalism and its commodity structure”, as George Steiner 
argues. Steiner, “True Leninist: The Apologia of Georg Lukäcs”, p. 8.
127 This concern has been referred to by some commentators as an attempt to establish a Marxist 
orthodoxy, albeit one of a particular kind. Parkinson, for example, argues that the context of Lukäcs’s 
‘return’ to orthodoxy is an attempt to emphasize the Hegelian aspects of Marxism against the influence 
of neo-Hegelian philosophy. Parkinson, Georg Lukäcs, p. 35. These Hegelian aspects concern not 
only a sense of the ‘negation’ of the subject but, most particularly, the development of a dialectics of 
society - an understanding of historical change in terms of the unity of continuity and discontinuity. 
This preoccupation with dialectics in Lukäcs’s work certainly emerges within the context of the 
growing dominance of a dogmatic mechanical materialism within parts of organized working class 
movements throughout Europe and elsewhere, which not infrequently indulged in attacks upon a 
dialectical approach and its relevance to socialist politics.
128 In this sense Gareth Stedman Jones’ claim that History and Class Consciousness “represents the 
first major irruption of the romantic anti-scientific tradition of bourgeois thought into Marxist theory” 
is rather misleading. Gareth Stedman Jones, “The Marxism of the Early Lukäcs: An Evaluation”, New 
Left Review, no. 70 (Nov/Dec, 1971): p. 44.
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commodification in their reified, spectacularized form become fatally set. We will 
pursue these different aspects of the problem of ideology and particularly its attendant 
use of dialectics which Lukäcs sets for himself by first considering more deeply his 
understanding of the concept of alienation.
The problem of alienation is one that had concerned Lukäcs well before his 
acquaintance with Marxism. In Lukäcs’s work written between 1906 and 1909 and 
published in 1911, A History o f the Development o f Modern Drama, he talks o f the 
horrifyingly logical combination of things that results in a world which is indifferent 
to human values. Alienation gives rise to the “lonely island” that is the human being, 
her voice drowned out and distorted, even her most desperate gestures of arms out­
stretched against a raging sea of loneliness and isolation misunderstood by those 
around her. In this work it is Ibsen, Lukäcs feels, who had pinpointed the relevance of 
these issues and the kinds of questions humanity must ask o f itself.129 It is also here in 
this work, as Löwy notes, that the concept of reification is first used.130 In The Theory 
o f the Novel, as we have already considered, Lukäcs writes of the torment o f the 
creature condemned to the solitude o f a fragmented subjectivity who is at the same 
time “devoured by a longing for community”.131 It is not simply that the individual 
exists in the “midst o f the boundless, chaotic waste-lands of life”132 but that she yearns 
for a more genuine substantiality. Alienation is fundamentally an awareness that one 
is no longer at home within one’s self-created existence but has indeed created for 
oneself a prison.133 A dissatisfaction with what exists and a profound sense of loss and 
tomness comes to characterize the individual’s struggle for meaning in the world. 
There is, as in Plato’s sense, a Tie in the soul’, an inauthenticity and depersonalization 
from which we seek escape. Of what this enslavement or, in Rousseau’s terms, 
“perpetual restraint”134 consists, is very much Lukäcs’s purpose to discover. In 1912 
in his most personal investigation into the problem of the self in the world, “On 
Poverty o f Spirit”, Lukäcs returns repeatedly to the issue o f the separation between 
knowledge and deed, arguing stridently for the need for us to become “Gnostics of 
deed”, “wherein subject and object collapse into one another”, where we no longer 
interpret the soul of the other but read it as we would read our own, where the
129 György Lukäcs, A modern drama fejlödesenek törtenete, 2 vols. (Budapest: Franklin, 1911), quoted 
in Kadarkay, Georg Lukäcs, p. 31. See also Löwy, Georg Lukäcs, pp. 97-98.
130 Löwy, Georg Lukäcs, p. 98, n. 28.
131 Lukäcs, The Theory o f the Novel, p. 45.
132 Ibid., p. 50.
133 Ibid., p. 64.
134 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 122.
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individual has indeed “become the other” . 135 This sense we will want to return to later 
in the thesis where we will attempt to theorize a contemporary view of subjectivity in 
relation to ideology.
In History and Class Consciousness, alienation is what, in an abstract sense, 
characterizes a society whose economic structure generates commodity fetishism. 
Lukacs’s conception of alienation is based on the idea of the loss or displacement of 
an interior subjectivity to an external objectification of human objectivity. This 
external objectification arises in the form of the commodification of the worker’s very 
self within the specialized and rationalized labour process under capitalism, a process 
where social relations are lost beneath the superficial objectivity of exchange value. 
The concept of alienation, or its manifestation as reification is, for Lukäcs, the only 
meaningful way of understanding the material reality of capitalism. 136 Alienation is 
evident in the fragmentation and depersonalization people experience within capitalist 
society. It is the single most important consequence of the modem process of labour, 
a process where the worker’s “own labour becomes something objective and 
independent of him, something that controls him by virtue of an autonomy alien to 
man” . 137 This aspect of the theme of alienation is derived directly from Marx. 138 
Indeed, with Lukacs’s sometimes excessive paraphrasing of passages from the first 
volume of Capital, we are at times confronted with a redundant analysis. And yet 
Lukäcs attempts to transform Marx’s theorization of the fetish character of 
commodities to suggest that this same ideological process characterizes all human 
activities and relationships. 139 Marx too generalizes from what he sees as a process of
135 Lukäcs, “On Poverty of Spirit”, p. 375.
136 Lukäcs was himself later to refer to this as an “attempt to out-Hegel Hegel” but in History and 
Class Consciousness human alienation is the key to understanding the position of workers under 
capitalism. See ibid., p. xxiii. The development of capitalist forms brings with it the transformation of 
all social relations between individuals into commodity relations and, at the same time, endows these 
relations between people and things with a ghostly objectivity. See ibid., p. 100. This is the general 
character of capitalism - its ability to weave a skein of reified knowledge covering over the most basic 
interactions between people and their world.
137 Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 87.
138 Marx only once uses the term reification (Verdinglichung) in a passage explaining the conversion of 
social relations into things, in Capital, vol. Ill, p. 830. It is used here in such a way that the concept of 
alienation is also implied within the surrounding passages.
139 Lukäcs accepts the fetishism of commodities as fundamental to the economic structure of capitalism 
but also sees this process of reification in all of social life. It will become clearer in the chapter dealing 
with Marx’s dialectic of freedom that Marx sees alienation and, importantly, self-alienation, as a 
widespread phenomenon of modem society but he does not extrapolate from the specific process of the 
fetishism of commodities in an attempt to see quite the same mechanism of fetishization occurring in 
every aspect of the ideological within social existence. As mentioned, he does detect a dynamic of 
fetishization and defetishization that in certain circumstances applies to broader social instances of the 
ideological but the emphasis as we will see is upon a dynamic, dialectical process, not upon one aspect 
of an abstract mechanism.
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fetishization and defetishization to show something of this ideological dynamic at 
work in a number of related social relations emerging out of capitalism: He does not, 
however, suggest that one aspect of this - fetishism - is able to operate to the exclusion 
of the rest of the dynamic of which it is a part. 140 What can be detected here is 
Lukacs’s gradual shift into theoretical territory in which an involuntary type of 
servitude comes to be understood as the ideological basis of alienation.
Lukacs’s approach to the problem of alienation in History and Class 
Consciousness undergoes various developments from an earlier concern with 
processes of modem rationalization. His early treatment of this theme, in keeping 
with a number of German sociologists of the period, focuses upon the dehumanization 
that occurs under modem conditions of mechanization and a money economy. Georg 
Simmel’s influence is apparent in these concerns. 141 Simmel, as we have seen, argued 
against a sort of capitalism where the power of money enabled the incorporation of all 
sorts of other values into values of commodities. Money distorts everything, reduces 
every edifying thing to the level of venality. 142 This, for Lukäcs, is the problematic 
nature of modernity; creativity is implicated in so much human potential and activity 
and yet it is the outcome of this dialectical reality that subjects various forms of 
subjective creativity to an inevitable alienation. 143 The potentiality of creativity is 
thoroughly reified, so much so that the reality of enslavement must be taken as the 
basis of all ideology.
140 According to Marx, the universal nature of the commodity form requires that the value of a 
commodity represents human labour in the abstract, that is, abstract in the sense that the labour 
embodied in its value counts only in the sense of it being expenditure of the human capacity to perform 
labour. The value of one commodity is made equivalent or commensurable to another without regard 
to its qualitatively different nature (the general value-form “represents all products of labour as mere 
congelations of undifferentiated human labour”) and the labour involved is reduced to a fragmented, 
specialized, partial operation in order to achieve large-scale commodity production of the type which 
characterizes modem capitalism. See Marx, Capital, vol. 1, p. 72.
141 Lukacs’s other borrowings are also important to consider in this context; not only the idea of the 
reified nature of values ensnared in the pervasiveness of money exchanges from Simmel but also the 
concepts of rationalisation and ascribed consciousness from Weber, and a general hostility to the 
natural sciences derived from Dilthey and German vitalism.
142 Simmers view of the immorality of money as a peculiarity of capitalist society is expressed thus: 
“Here the more money becomes the sole centre of interests, the more we see honour and conviction, 
talent and virtue, beauty and the health of the soul mobilized on its behalf, all the more will a mocking 
and frivolous mood arise regarding these higher goods of life, which are offered for sale for the same 
kind of value as goods on the weekly market.” Simmel, The Philosophy o f Money, p. 264.
143 This theme could be said to reassert itself in Lukacs’s piece “The Ideology of Modernism”, written 
in 1955. Here the alienation of the individual is turned into an absolute, rather than an understanding of 
it as a social and historical process. It seems here that, for Lukäcs, a totally subjective understanding 
can only lead to an attenuation of reality. See Georg Lukäcs, “The Ideology of Modernism,” in The 
Meaning o f Contemporaiy Realism, pp. 17-46.
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Within modem society the capitalist process of transformation requires not 
only a structured form of labour but “must embrace every manifestation of the life of 
society”. This is because a “complete self-realisation of capitalist production” 
necessitates the extension of forms of alienation into a wide variety of social 
structures that function in ways that harmonize with the structure of capital 
accumulation itself: “Thus capitalism has created a form for the state and a system of 
law corresponding to its needs”, Lukacs argues. 144 It is the capitalist system that 
exacts this “total submission” to a structure of modem legal reality. 145 We can see 
quite clearly the sort of theoretical manoeuvre that Lukacs makes: Because an array of 
social structures bear a relation to the structure of accumulation, all forms of social 
life for him must obey the command of capital. The issue here is not so much that 
Lukacs sees a diversity of social interaction reduced to the level of exchange - this 
being something with which we could readily agree - it is more that he views the 
ideological process of a largely one-dimensional fetishism as the basic mechanism for 
the ideological nature of all social life. For Lukacs, the horror of a system based upon 
a dehumanizing rational calculation is very much expressed in the horror of the 
capitalist system. It is not that such tendencies have never existed before: It is more 
that capitalism reveals these tendencies in concentrated form. 146 The contrast here 
with the more generalized critical stance of Simmel and Weber is apparent. The iron 
cage of what is an undeniably crushingly administered, money-centred world is 
attributed beyond a generally constructed sense of what has turned out to be the 
modem world, to being located specifically within what Lukacs sees as the central 
economic processes of this world, the processes of the production of commodities 
within capitalism. 147 The key to Lukacs’s emphasis upon the particular problem of 
capitalist alienation is in understanding his re-interpretation of Marx’s concept of
144 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 95.
'45 The “formal standardisation” of, for example, the division of labour within apparatuses of the State, 
“signifies a comparable reduction of all social functions to their elements”. Ibid., pp. 99, 98.
146 Lukacs argues that at this particular stage of history “there is no problem that does not ultimately 
lead back to that question and there is no solution that could not be found in the solution to the riddle of 
commodity-structure’'. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 83.
147 This specificity in Lukäcs’s thesis is what is recognized in Habermas’ critique of more abstract 
accounts of reification which separate the process of reification from the context of human relations, 
thereby transforming its critical capacity into a generalized acknowledgment of the instrumentalized 
function of the subject/object relation. This tendency Habermas sees in the work of Adorno and 
Horkheimer. Of course, Habermas himself argues for the need to reinterpret the concept of reification 
because it remains a category of Bewusstseinsphilosophie (a philosophy of consciousness). Habermas 
seeks to base his critique on communicative intersubjectivity rather than on what he sees as the 
problem of the subject in the face of the object. For this reason Habermas substitutes reification with 
what he views as the insinuation of a functionalist or systemic reason. See Habermas, Theory o f 
Communicative Action, passim.
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commodity fetishism. 148 Alienation is considered as an objective process in which the 
individual is reduced to the level of the rationale of capitalism as a system. It is in this 
objectiveness that enslavement as an involuntary servitude is ensured. Let us look 
further at this tendency by examining the process which Lukäcs theorizes as being 
fundamental to a loss of the self -  the commodification or reification of all life.
The commodity as a philosophical problem
We have mentioned that the issue of the relation between subject and object is 
central to Lukäcs’s development of a critique of ideology. Informing much of his 
work is the theme of how a reintegration of the subject into the world might take 
place. The problem the subject faces in achieving this is in part the evidence of the 
existence of ideology. As we will see, Lukäcs pursues the problem of reification in 
terms of both the fundamental contradictions of an economic system of exploitation 
and of unresolvable contradictions at the social level. We first need then to 
understand more precisely Lukäcs’s focus upon commodification. In doing so we will 
be able to better appreciate what it is that Lukäcs feels is distorted and suppressed 
within commodity society and how it might overwhelm and distort self-knowledge. 
We will then be able to consider Lukäcs’s contribution to a critique of ideology. We 
have considered the problem of commodification as emerging out of alienation and 
reification, we will now look at processes furthering this commodification, in 
particular, rationalization and objectivity.
We have already touched upon the concept of commodification - the process 
by which all kinds of social relations become articles of exchange - and have 
mentioned the idea of the spectacle in terms of the tendency for this process of 
underlying exchange, basic to the commodification of any aspect of life, to become 
one of abject passivity. We will see that these two notions have always been linked 
by certain radical theorists. Commodification has increasingly entailed a type of 
passive absorption of images - the spectacle - overwhelming and thereby diminishing 
more direct, active forms of individual determination of aspects of creativity and
148 Lukäcs takes up the theme of the centrality of commodity relations to life within modem capitalism 
which Marx outlined in Capital. It is important to note here that despite Lukäcs’s preoccupation with a 
theme commonly more associated with the work of the early Marx - namely, alienation - this idea is in 
fact derived from Lukäcs’s reading of Marx’s Capital and not the early writings. Many of Marx’s early 
writings, and most particularly the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts were not published until 
nearly a decade after the publication of History and Class Consciousness. Goldmann, for example, 
argues in relation to this that despite the absence of any knowledge of the still unpublished manuscripts 
of the young Marx, Lukäcs had “recovered their content”. See Lucien Goldmann, The Human Sciences 
and Philosophy, trans. Hayden V. White and Robert Anchor (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969), p. 149, n. 
50.
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social life. Accompanying this process is what various theorists have suggested to be 
a withering of experience or lack of authenticity. 149 There is something only hazily 
and indirectly felt within what is experienced as the diremption of subject from object 
within a disenchanted world. Consciousness, as Hegel had noted, has become to itself 
‘a dark riddle’ . 150 Lukäcs contends that “most people live without life, but don’t 
notice the difference”; they live by way of the fulfilment of duties, as upon a “bridge 
that separates” “upon which we go back and forth, always coming upon ourselves, but 
never meeting anyone else” . 151 This disconnection from others is, as we will theorize, 
a central aspect of what is viewed as a threatened eclipse of self-knowledge. 
Disillusionment as much as hope is experienced in compensated, sublimated forms. 
But so too, as we will see, are remembrance, immediacy and transience experienced 
as what they actually are in the fusion of images and symbols, creativity and 
imagination through which the ideological struggle for meaning is played out. Here, 
in the rest of this section, we want to look at one instance of this densely varied 
experience of the interplay between oppressive control, imagination and creativity -  
that of the symbolic significance of commodification.
The problem of the spectacle of commodification as a philosophical problem 
is the problem of commodification for the subject, its pervasiveness within the 
landscape of activity and consciousness, and most particularly its centrality within an 
array of psychological needs and dilemmas. We will start out on an understanding of 
the importance for ideology of what is a complex montage of processes involving 
commodification by considering some of the most general characteristics that struck 
Lukäcs and many of the early theorists of commodity society as both novel and 
alarming. Only by appreciating some of these general characteristics can a 
theorization of the more peripheral and shifting elements - elements which require 
renewed theorization - be understood. In order to recognize the problem of ideology 
today, we would argue that we can gain much from an engagement with an 
understanding of commodification as a philosophical problem. Indeed, Lukäcs’s 
strident critique of the spectacle’s most self-sufficient form forces us to consider just 
where we might find entanglements of subject and object and their more difficult,
149 The concept of the experience {Erfahrung) o f a dislocation between universal and particular, truth 
and consciousness is most associated with Hegel’s philosophy. See in particular G.W.F. Hegel, 
Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), including the 
translator’s introduction in which Hegel’s concept of experience is discussed, pp. 52-60. Various 
twentieth century philosophers have used this idea in a number of different ways, most notably Adorno 
and Benjamin.
150 Hegel argues that: “Consciousness, therefore, through the experience in which its truth ought to 
have come to light has instead become to itself a dark riddle; the consequences of its deeds are to it not 
really its own deeds”. Hegel, Phenomenology o f Mind, p. 388.
151 Lukäcs, “On Poverty of Spirit: A Conversation and a Letter”, pp. 373, 374.
The Fracturing of Subject and Object 155
inexplicable mediations in so seemingly complete a process. It is from this concern 
with the very real dependencies that the commodity spectacle promotes that we find 
much substance for a renewed theorization of ideology.
Our central purpose is to make apparent the radical aims of a project that 
viewed as fundamental not simply the rejection of a mode of production but a 
thorough-going critique of the rationale for an unffee culture and the means by which 
it was reproduced. In this sense we have made clear one of the bases for a critique of 
ideology in general. We argued in the previous chapter that a fundamental theme 
shared overwhelmingly by various radical theorists was that of an emancipatory 
project or intent. Many of these theorists made explicit their attacks upon a system 
believed to be intrinsically unjust and lacking in freedom. Confronting these writers 
was a world they viewed as increasingly corrupting and destructive of the human 
spirit - a brittle, hollow world of artificial and pusillanimous conformity. In their 
theorizations of unfreedom were attempts to account for the repressive or constrained 
elements that intrude upon everyday life in sometimes unforeseen and unaccustomed 
ways. It is here, it was felt, that the ethical being could confront the withering of the 
central value of life. Thus - and this is a fundamentally important point - was 
inevitably generated a commitment to the critique of ideology (Ideologiekritik). 
Having situated themselves in clear opposition to a necessary ontological given and 
its justifications and sublimations, these theorists were bound to enact a theoretical 
unravelling of ideological instances of distortion and control. 152 That these 
examinations often amounted to ‘decisive blows delivered with the left hand’, to use 
an expression of Benjamin’s, 153 has only added to the continuing interest of these 
formulations of ideology critique. For what these ideology critics embarked upon 
were investigations of new and changing phenomena. The positivism of the left 
which had preceded them, that of Kautsky, Plekhanov, Bernstein and Lenin, had not 
provided the basis for a praxis, or even a life philosophy, which came to terms with 
the strange lure of commodity society, phantasmagorical and unconscious illusions 
and the sheer extent of alienated life. The project of the critique of ideology at once 
opened its theorists to the vulnerability of attack from all those who were unable to 
recognize tendencies in their incipient forms, and, at the same time, allowed for the
152 Many different ways of examining the ideological were to emerge - from accounts of distorted 
consciousness and inauthenticity, to an engagement with “the surrealism of lost glances”, as Bloch puts 
it - but all were inspired, at least in general terms, by an emancipatory spirit. Ernst Bloch, 
“Recollections of Walter Benjamin”, in On Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections, ed. 
Gary Smith (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), p. 344.
153 Benjamin writes: “These are days when no one should rely unduly on his ‘competence’. Strength 
lies in improvisation. All the decisive blows are struck left-handed.” Benjamin, One-Way Street and 
Other Writings, p. 49.
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development of potentially devastating dialectical thinking which could make explicit 
the need for a struggle for freedom. Lukäcs’s critique of an unfree world has been 
described as a spiritual-ethical combat against the seemingly inexorable logic of an 
objective culture, and it will now be a specific aspect of this opposition to cultural 
alienation that we will explore. 154 On this basis we will consider why Lukäcs’s work 
has been regarded as a fundamental contribution to a contemporary ideology critique 
and then will be able to question whether a sufficient ontology of freedom is theorized 
as an alternative to the crushing weight of the logic of the commodity.
Rationalization
In Histoiy and Class Consciousness, Lukäcs’s use of the theory of commodity 
fetishism is most particularly directed towards a criticism of the rationalization and 
fragmentation of the processes of work under capitalism and their effects upon 
consciousness. This is important for us to consider. As a part of the critique of 
ideology, a sense of the effects of rationalization upon the consciousness is 
particularly relevant. We will want to ask how Lukäcs’s awareness of the problem of 
rationalization allows him to further clarify in what ways consciousness might counter 
this reduction of life to economic values and whether it is here that a broadening out 
of the process of reification is viewed as something necessitated by the realities of the 
widespread insinuation of rationalizing tendencies. It is here then that we must 
ponder what kind of potentiality Lukäcs senses exists within a reified world.
Rationalization is seen as a basic requirement of modem capitalism. For 
Marx, a system that is based upon a recurring need to increase the social 
productiveness of labour will always operate at the expense of the individual. This 
means that the production of surplus-value will inevitably “mutilate the labourer into 
a fragment of a man, degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, destroy 
every remnant of charm in his work and turn it into a hated toil” . 155 Likewise, for 
Lukäcs, it is the fragmentation of the worker’s life that transforms activity into 
alienated activity. These processes of the atomization and isolation of the worker are 
relations that develop with the rise of commodity production. The structure of a 
commodity economy requires the large-scale supply of labour power and the formal
154 Arato and Breines, The Young Lukäcs, p. 17.
155 Marx continues by explaining that its processes will “estrange from him the intellectual 
potentialities of the labour-process [...] they distort the conditions under which he works, subject him 
during the labour-process to a despotism the more hateful for its meanness; they transform his life-time 
into working-time, and drag his wife and child beneath the wheels of the Juggernaut of capital.” Marx, 
Capital, vol. 1, p. 604.
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independence of separate enterprises. This leads to the establishment of social 
relationships among things rather than people. 156 The atomistic nature of commodity 
society and the absence of any direct social regulation of production and working 
activity more generally, means that social labour is manifested in the depersonalized, 
private exchange of the products of labour. 157 Ultimately, this means that the material 
relations arising from the social division of labour and the direct connections between 
individual, autonomous commodity producers are realized merely through the 
products of labour, in other words, through commodities. The significance of this 
development is, for Lukäcs, in what he considers to be the reified character of the 
immediate manifestations of capitalist society confronting the worker: “The 
quantification of objects, their subordination to abstract mental categories makes its 
appearance in the life of the worker immediately as a process of abstraction of which 
he is the victim, and which cuts him off from his labour-power, forcing him to sell it 
on the market as a commodity, belonging to him”. In this, the individual is reduced to 
the level of the commodity “by selling this, his only commodity, he integrates it (and 
himself: for his commodity is inseparable from his physical existence) into a 
specialised process that has been rationalised and mechanised, a process that he 
discovers already existing, complete and able to function without him and in which he 
is no more than a cipher reduced to an abstract quantity, a mechanised and 
rationalised tool. ” 158 This process of the “splitting up of man into an element of the 
movement of commodities” applies to both the capitalist and the worker but for the 
worker the process takes place as an activity over which she has a limited degree of 
control. Rather, for the worker, the split is perceived as “his being preserved in the 
brutal form of what is in its whole tendency a slavery without limits. ” 159 This slavery 
emerges out of the reifications that such a world constructs and the reified 
consciousness which people develop in their understanding of their place within this 
world. This place, and any consciousness of it, would, however, seem to be that more
156 Marx expresses this problem with his comment that “the labour of the individual asserts itself as a 
part of the labour of society, only by means of the relations which the act of exchange establishes 
directly between the products, and indirectly, through them, between the producers”. Ibid., p. 78. 
Lukäcs expresses a similar idea in the view he puts forward that: “In every aspect of daily life in which 
the individual worker imagines himself to be the subject of his own life he finds this to be an illusion 
that is destroyed by the immediacy of his existence”. Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, 
p. 165.
157 This idea is conveyed in Marx to Annenkov, December 28, 1846. Collected Works, vol. XXXVIII, 
pp. 95-106.
158 Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, pp. 165-166.
159 Ibid., p. 166.
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particularly in which a process of exploitation takes place. For it is here, Lukäcs 
would seem to argue, that “history is forced into the present” . 160
We have seen so far that Lukacs’s general concern with human alienation 
proceeds immediately in History and Class Consciousness to a critique of the central 
contradiction of commodity society - the transformation of the individual herself into 
a commodity via processes of rationalization. In this process the individual becomes 
alienated from social production. As we will see later in the thesis, Marx retains as 
well a more general sense of what constitutes alienation - it is, at its most 
fundamental, alienated freedom. Lukäcs does not completely depart from this issue 
but his concentration upon the specific processes of capitalist objectification tends to 
attenuate an emphasis upon the more general issue of freedom. What emerges 
strongly in Lukacs’s approach - and this is an important development for a theory of 
ideology - is a clear emphasis upon the immediacy that reified realities assume. This 
immediacy, which makes of the ideological a simply taken for granted set of ‘facts’, is 
the successful domination of objectivity. We will see shortly that it is, for Lukäcs, 
only the ability to pierce through this veil of immediacy that can be considered the 
basis for a liberation from ideology. Bernstein refers to reification as a metaphysics 
of ‘presence’ , 161 it is governed by the category of objectivism in which social 
appearance is externalized from the range of social conditions of which it is a part. 
Does this mean that, for Lukäcs, reification implies a correspondence theory of truth 
in which the relation between a representation and what it represents is 
straightforwardly assumed and ideology is merely mistaken perception? His sense of 
reification seems to imply that it succeeds where it can depend upon a servitude to a 
‘second nature’ it has created162 - what we might argue Nietzsche calls “the blind 
power of the actual” . 163 For Lukäcs too, reification becomes a type of blind power, a 
lost recognition of a human totality, which consciousness so requires for the cessation 
of all antinomies of thought. To understand what it is that quite comprises the 
ideological, what is mistaken in this sense, we need to explore Lukäcs’s concept of 
reification more deeply. We will now consider how Lukäcs further specifies a sense 
of the ideological in his theorization of reification.
160 Ibid., p. 158.
161 J. M. Bernstein, “Lukäcs’ Wake: Praxis, Presence and Metaphysics”, in Lukäcs Today: Essays in 
Marxist Philosophy, ed. Tom Rockmore (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1988), pp. 167-195. As reification 
implies a metaphysics of ‘presence’, so too Bernstein argues, does a philosophy of praxis in Lukacs’s 
work mark a refusal o f the tropes, rhetoric and entire conceptual apparatus of a metaphysics of 
presence. Ibid., p. 169.
162 Lukäcs, Histoiy and Class Consciousness, p. 86.
163 Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”, p. 106.
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Reification ’s Phantom Objectivity
Reification (Verdinglichung) is the transformation of relations between people 
into the character of things. 164 Lukäcs uses the term ‘reification’ to express the bizarre 
occurrence within capitalist society that relations between people take on the character 
of a ‘thing’ and in so doing effectively conceal what it is that gives form to relations 
between people. 165 Lukäcs writes that, in this process, a reified form “acquires a 
‘phantom objectivity’, an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing 
as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people” . 166 
People thus experience a world of seemingly autonomous objects and functions in 
what are, rather, the products of their own creative labour. The process of 
commodification takes on a spurious immediacy that tends inevitably towards its role 
in creating a naturalizing ideology. In reification the world appears as present-to-hand 
(Vorhandenheit) . 167 The fetishized character of commodity society expresses itself 
“both as an objective form and also as a subjective stance corresponding to it” . 168 It is 
only by understanding these objective and subjective forms of reification, Lukäcs 
emphasizes, that we can “obtain a clear insight into the ideological problems of 
capitalism”. For some Marxists, the social relations of value, money and the State 
most signify this material and symbolic objectivity: For Lukäcs, this dehumanizing 
process seeps into every aspect of social life. All the practices in which people are 
engaged, including their cognitive understandings, are marked by the dominance of a 
commodified culture in which the processes of reification take hold. 169
For Lukäcs, it is necessary to understand that a rational mechanization extends 
“right into the worker’s ‘soul’”; even the psychological attributes of people are 
separated from their personalities and are “placed in opposition to it so as to facilitate 
their integration into specialised rational systems and their reduction to statistically
164 The term is derived from the Latin, res facere, meaning the transformation into a ‘thing’ of 
something that originally did not have the mode of being of a thing.
165 It is also sometimes argued that Lukäcs had in mind a relation to the German word ‘bedingen’, as in 
to imply or require, as well as the Kantian term ‘Ding-an-sich', the condition of ‘things-in-themselves’. 
See, for example, William L. McBride, “Reification Re-examined”, in Lukäcs Today: Essays in 
Marxist Philosophy, ed. Tom Rockmore (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1988), p. 111.
166 Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 83.
167 Bernstein points out the particular use of this Heideggerian theme of ‘presence-to-hand’ and 
‘readiness-to-hand’ in Lukäcs’s concept of reification. Bernstein, “Lukäcs’ Wake: Praxis, Presence 
and Metaphysics”, pp. 170-173.
168 Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 84.
169 The critical theorist Alfred Sohn-Rethel expresses this same sentiment in his statement that “the 
formal analysis of the commodity holds the key not only to the critique of political economy, but also 
to the historical explanation of the abstract conceptual mode of thinking and of the division of 
intellectual and manual labour which came into existence with it”. Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual 
and Manual Labour: A Critique o f Epistemology (London: Macmillan, 1978), p. 33.
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viable concepts”. In this world of pure calculation, human qualities and 
idiosyncrasies increasingly appear as “mere sources of error” . 170 People cease to be 
the authentic masters of the processes in which they are engaged: Instead they have 
become a mechanical part of a suffocatingly mechanical system in which they are 
incorporated. The system is already pre-existent and self-sufficient. 171 With the 
progressive rationalization of labour and the elimination of various human attributes 
from the process of work, the individual’s activity becomes more and more 
controlled, and this process of control represents, according to Lukacs, a “perfectly 
closed system”. It is a system that “reduces space and time to a common denominator 
and degrades time to the dimension of space” . 172
Lukacs captures the very modernist expression of capitalism in his 
understanding that the process of rationalization requires that “every manifestation of 
life shall exhibit this very interaction between details which are subject to laws and a 
totality ruled by chance.” Society must be so structured; competition between 
commodity owners necessitates “an exact, rational, systematic mode of functioning 
for the whole of society to correspond to the rationality of isolated phenomena” . 173 
The commodity owner must effectively possess the laws that regulate every detail of 
production. The laws of the market, the rate of profit and thus the amount of 
exploitation, must all be calculable in relation to laws of probability. All these ‘laws’ 
are evidence of an involuntary servitude that has descended upon humanity. In turn, a 
reifred fragmentation of subject and object within capitalism results in the 
increasingly jarring expression of the antinomies of bourgeois thought - the fractured 
existence of form and content, fact and value, will and deed, individual and 
community, subject and object -  these couplets fray and wither in sedgy deformation, 
lacerated by the harsh sterility of their lack of any real or enduring connection. All 
that exists is an inhuman world of calculation made ideological in its being mistaken 
for necessity, for the natural order of things.
The problem of the outcome of this process of reification is clear enough, and 
yet what it is that occurs within the fetishization of subject and object -  what it is that
170 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, pp. 88, 89.
171 The part the worker plays is entirely mediated by the rationalization o f work to the dictates of  
mechanized production. It is, as Marx wrote, that “Time is everything, man is nothing; he is at the 
most the incarnation of time.” The predominant distinguishing feature between one worker’s labour 
and that of another is in the length o f time each takes to perform his or her work: “Is your hour’s labour 
worth mine? That is the question which is decided by competition”, Marx concludes. Karl Marx, The 
Poverty of Philosophy, intro. Frederick Engels, eds. C. P. Dutt and V. Chattopadhyaya (New York: 
International, n.d.), pp. 47, 46.
172 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 89.
173 Ibid., p. 102.
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enables a sense of a “second nature” to occur - is not immediately apparent in 
Lukäcs’s work. We need to know what it is that imitates so well the function of 
ideology and what ideological legacy this process is depending upon. We also need to 
ask what sort of conceptual distinctions in the reification of subject and object in 
Lukäcs’s theorization of commodification would enable us to see the ideological in 
this fashion. All these issues are important for the way in which we might see any 
dynamic at work in Lukäcs’s approach to the depth and solidity of the ideological. 
Lukäcs tells us that the “strong point” of the ideological is also its “weak point” 
because it is a phenomenon “reflected in the consciousness of the people” 174 and it will 
be this idea that we must pursue most closely in order to understand the nature of his 
ideology critique.
Lukäcs’s theory of the reified nature of these relations is one of the first major 
developments in a Marxist theory of ideology. It is an attempt to deal with the 
problematic position of the consciousness in relation to the alienating and objectifying 
effects of modem commodity society. In so doing it tells us much about a particular 
set of shared symbolic and real values humanity gives to the desires it pursues. 
Lukäcs’s philosophical position within History and Class Consciousness upholds the 
idea that there is some definite sense of what should constitute a fully developed 
human existence against impoverished forms of human interaction given in 
commodity relations. Reification somehow takes possession of the individual making 
her less able “to be a human being” . 175 Aspects of “human inwardness” remain, or at 
least longings for such a state. Authentic humanity is a humanity in the process of 
overcoming the dichotomies between reason and the senses, form and content, upon 
which false, mechanizing forms of society rest. The authentic individual is one “for 
whom freedom and necessity are identical” . 176 Schiller’s view of the ‘natural forms’ 
of which humanity was once a part and to which it should return, is implied here in 
Lukäcs’s work. Lukäcs reminds his reader that this longing is “a very real and 
concrete field of activity” and not merely a “nostalgia inhabiting the consciousness” . 177 
Does this then mean that by frequently setting out the objective and subjective 
elements of humanity’s path through the ideological that he is able to theorize the 
problem of subjectivity within a society of disenchantment? 178 There is certainly no 
clear sense here of some kind of dialectical commitment to having all of life
174 Ibid., p. 261.
175 Ibid., p. 136.
176 Ibid., p. 137.
177 Ibid.
178 See, for example, ibid, pp. 87-88.
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metamorphose into things in order that the phantasmagoric enchantment of the 
commodity will finally reveal itself. If this Benjaminian turn is ever taken by Lukäcs 
it is instead by way of theorizing a proletarian being-in-becoming arising so as to 
break the Circean spell. We will see later, however, that once transformed by Circe 
thus, a then life-time of swilling at the trough is much more likely to make for greedy 
pigs than enlightened proletarians, even in Lukäcs’s wishful estimation. We are 
constantly reminded that the fragmentation of the object within capitalist relations 
necessarily entails the fragmentation of the subject and that this fragmentation 
produces a specific consciousness - an alienated consciousness - and yet where and 
how the subject is at work within these processes is, rather strangely, left unsaid. The 
subject in Lukacs’s construction seems less a subject of the mediation of the elements 
of reification than it is the result of the existence of the object. This object is the 
universal element of commodification -  a state of having rather than being. Far from 
the object in Lukacs’s work being “swallowed by the subject”, as Abram Deborin has 
claimed, something closer to its opposite is much more the case. 179 Reification 
becomes a fact of an alienated consciousness, alienated because of the structure of 
commodity society. Ideology here is a determinate fact of the objective existence of 
reification. And we are left with the sense that the very meaning of life is not merely 
located in but fixed to the existence of the commodity.
As we mentioned earlier in the chapter, Marx gives much attention to the issue 
of the value of freedom to creatively express one’s individuality. Lukäcs tends to 
introduce this issue more obliquely; it hovers beyond the specificity of a critique of 
capitalism as if the problem of capitalism is itself a sufficient basis for an 
understanding of a tarnished promise of freedom, unrealized and unrealizable. We 
might feel the outcome of our escape from freedom but only as an involuntary 
renouncing of self, not as any form of engagement with the ideological. The 
argument of the chapter can now be more clearly stated - that what this means for a 
sense of the internal and external dynamic within ideology is a matter which is 
problematically constructed by Lukäcs. What is possible to perceive is that the 
external manifestation of ideology as reification takes precedence over an 
examination of the vexed issue of subjectivity in relation to ideology. The dialectic is 
effectively halted not in the sense of producing an ambiguity in what the ideological 
might represent but in removing the subjective as equally determinate of the objective 
as the objective is of the subjective. This can perhaps be partly explained by Lukäcs’s
179 Abram Deborin’s attack on the supposed idealism of Lukäcs’ History and Class Consciousness 
appears in an essay, “Lukäcs und seine Kritik des Marxismus”, in Abram Deborin and Nikolai 
Bucharin, Kontroversen über dialektischen und mechanistischen Materialismus (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1968), p. 192, and is quoted in Feenberg, Lukäcs, Maivc and the Sources o f Critical Theory, p. 203.
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need to emphasize the abstract, independent existence of commodities in the process 
of exchange that is the very basis of their reified character. Marx had himself referred 
to the ghostly nature of this process, to the “heavenly existence” of commodities180 
but, at the same time, attempted to integrate more sensitively the subjective and 
objective, the construction of images and their interpretation. It is in this sense that 
Marx speaks of the need for people to be awakened from their “self-stupefaction”, to 
be confronted by their own image - their image has become one of the reduction to 
transaction relations, but individuals themselves need to recognize this perversion. 181 
Specifically, they need to recognize their involvement in a process that requires their 
technical complicity but ultimate detachment from human values.
In this detachment is something elusive -  something sensuous and yet 
simultaneously non-sensuous. Without this recognition, objectification becomes 
alienation and alienation a form of involuntary servitude. Lukacs’s problematic point 
of entry into this understanding of commodification is at the end-point, the outcome, 
of reified existence. This problem in his analysis is not due to any inability to see a 
variety of consequences of processes of reification upon consciousness. Indeed, 
Lukacs is reasonably clear in his view that reification replaces the human w'ith the 
inhuman, a result which fundamentally alters the broad experience of social life. 
Human consciousness is , however, a highly particular thing. Although Lukacs finds 
useful Spinoza’s attributing to a thrown stone a certain freedom if it had 
consciousness, he also wants to understand in what way ‘the doer’ acts in history in 
order to fundamentally alter consciousness. 182 The problem is more that he seems to 
equate a subjective struggle for freedom with that of the outcome of reification itself - 
the individual is a passive observer, a virtuoso of her own objectified and reified 
faculties who inevitably lapses into a contemplative attitude in relation to the 
workings of these faculties. This view leads him to conclude that “there is no natural 
form in which human relations can be cast, no way in which man can bring his 
physical and psychic ‘qualities’ into play without their being subjected increasingly to 
this reifying process” . 183
If Lukacs’s analysis appears too heavily focused upon the denial of freedom 
that the existence of commodification represents, it is worthwhile acknowledging that 
the forces creating the drift towards a rampantly bureaucratized, commodified society 
were the dominant tendencies of the age. That he seeks to capture this deeply
180 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 63.
181 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 363.
182 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 146.
183 Ibid., p. 100.
164 Ideology Critique and A Philosophy of Freedom
troubling spread of authoritarian aptitude and consumerist co-option is a thoroughly 
laudable intention and prescient philosophical pursuit. The problem that emerges 
with the particular way in which he hunts his quarry is in his attributing a 
compromised freedom to commodification primarily as an abstraction. The subject of 
the scenario has been neatly cut from all the important scenes leading to the 
denouement of a reified consciousness. Lukäcs cannot contemplate admitting any sort 
of abdication of subjectivity in the face of prosaic disenchantment because it is not 
really the subject who plays in any of these scenes.
In its intention to theorize beyond the idea of ideology as false consciousness 
and to consider, in theoretical terms, the source of reified thought, Lukäcs’s theory of 
ideology offers some important developments for Marxist criticism. 184 Subjectivity 
becomes a commodity like any other, transformed by processes seemingly beyond the 
individual’s construction. The subject has become an object of exchange. The 
production process is not only at the centre of social activity, according to this view, 
but is the basis of all social activity. As we have mentioned, Lukäcs sees alienation 
not only at the centre of the labour process but extends an account of reified social 
relations into every aspect of social life. 185 What he intends with this deliberately
184 Lukäcs’s attempt to extend a Marxist critique of ideas beyond the notion of false consciousness is 
perhaps the first of a number of such analyses written during this period. Also writing at this time is 
the Italian revolutionary Antonio Gramsci whose well-known analysis of hegemonic thought allowed 
for the concept of ideology as a terrain of political and economic struggle rather than that merely of 
false ideas. In addition to this, Gramsci understood that a hegemonic ideology will articulate some of 
the aspirations of the proletariat in order to secure its dominance. Again, such an analysis is in contra­
distinction to the idea of ideology as false consciousness. See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the 
Prison Notebooks o f Antonio Gramsci, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971). Also around this period is the work of Franz Jakubowski. In 
contrast to the idea of a true and false consciousness an understanding of ideology in terms of the 
interconnectedness of social reality is what characterizes Jakubowski’s work of the 1930s, Ideology 
and Superstructure in Historical Materialism. For Jakubowski, the historical specificity of the 
category of ideology means that it cannot be reduced to a defined set of immutable facts. The category 
of ideology derives its meaning from its constant interaction with other phenomena. Thus ideology has 
no rigidly defined essence which can be expressed in terms of static concepts. Rather, ideas and 
material relations can only be understood in conjunction with one another, the reality of both being 
expressed by their social efficacy. For Jakubowski, contra functionalism, this interrelatedness of social 
phenomena particularly applies to the base/superstructure metaphor, which in the hands of many a 
vulgar materialist is turned into quantitative, static calculations made to fit social phenomena. Not only 
are categories such as base and superstructure, or consciousness and material reality, historical and 
therefore neither definite nor fixed, but they do not inhabit separate spheres of social reality. These 
categories are primarily interconnected dynamic relations which give rise to determinate processes. 
See Franz Jakubowski, Ideology and Superstructure in Historical Materialism, trans. Anne Booth 
(London: Pluto, 1990), p. 57, and especially pp. 30-65.
185 This extension of the concept of commodity fetishism is both a theoretical and a political issue in 
Lukäcs and needs to be understood accordingly rather than dismissed as theoretically inappropriate to a 
critique of ideology. This latter view can be found in Nikolas Rose’s article “Fetishism and Ideology” 
in Ideology and Consciousness no. 2 (1977). A more contemporary echo of this concern with the 
extension of the commodification of social life is most apparent in the work of the Situationists. Guy 
Debord, for example, characterizes modem society as an accumulation of spectacles, “a permanent
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extended concept of reification in relation to a totality of social relations is to 
understand the vast expansion of forms of economic activity and the absorption of 
previously non-economic forms into the realm of the economic, in the light of the 
most basic of human interactions within capitalism - that of the exchange of 
commodities. This sense of a vast network of reification, an echo chamber in which 
the values of greed, dependence, competitiveness and having take place, resonates 
very strongly with us today. But the end result of such an extension is an inability to 
see any role of mediation of the elements of reification which the subject can and 
should play.
It is important in this context to further explain Lukäcs’s derivation of the 
problem of commodification from Marx. In the first chapter on “Commodities” in the 
first volume of Capital, Marx explains the mysteriousness of the commodity form in 
terms of the “phantasmagoric” form it is able to assume. Marx’s use of the term 
‘phantasmagoria’ is directly related to his intention to convey the strangeness of 
certain processes of the ideological - in this case, the transposition of values accorded 
to the commodity. The phantasmagoric transformation of the object is what creates 
its illusory character; it exists, as Benjamin puts it, as an ‘ornamental enclosure’, “as if 
in a lined case”.186 What is put forward in Marx’s treatment of the phantasmagoria is 
the sense not only of the illusory or deceptive character of the object of the 
commodity within the exchange process itself (a sense which is not unlike that which 
had emerged with the performances of Etienne-Gaspard Robertson, the Belgian 
‘doctor-aeronaut’ who coined the term ‘phantasmagoria’ in the 1790s to describe his 
spectacle of optical illusions produced by magic lanterns), but also, and perhaps more 
importantly, the sense of phantasmagoria as suggesting the crucial role of the 
imagination in constructing this ideological effect. It is through an understanding of 
the imagination that theorists such as Benjamin will later refer to the process of 
‘awakening’ as the synthesis of ‘dream consciousness’ and ‘waking consciousness’, 
and Bloch will theorize an anticipatory illumination, a world of ‘not-yet’ conscious 
meanings and dreams which indicate the possibility of counter-moves capable of 
contradicting ‘the badly existing’. Such theorists sense in the power of the 
imagination a capacity to positively reserve freedom as much as a tendency to 
genuflect at the altar of deception and unfreedom. Most importantly, this focus upon
opium war which aims to make people identify goods with commodities and satisfaction with survival 
that increases according to its own laws”, a “consumable survival” which has attained the “total 
occupation of social life”. See Debord, Society o f the Spectacle, pars. 1, 44, 42.
186 Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. VI, p. 588, quoted in Hermann Schweppenhäuser, 
“Propaedeutics of Profane Illumination”, in On Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections, 
ed. Gary Smith (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), p. 44.
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the place of the imagination within ideology, which we will return to later in the 
thesis, will allow us to pose the question as to why people look at things as if ‘through 
glass’ - why the glinting lustre of the magic lantern is more absorbing than the objects 
themselves, free from the distraction of reification.
Lukäcs, we can see, recognizes subjective and objective elements in reification 
and indeed their fractured opposition as reified elements, but centres his initial 
analysis upon reification’s basis within what is taken to be an objective dimension of 
social reality. Having established this basis for the concept, Lukäcs then applies this 
sense of the term to his analysis of class consciousness with, I will contend, 
problematic results. The subjective becomes a form of objective consciousness rather 
than the challenge of a transformation and an extension of the consciousness into new 
forms of the imagination and awakened mind. His theory of ideology is a theory of 
practice in this sense, as Feenberg argues, but it is posited on a limited sense of what 
this practice can be. 187 Let us first consider, however, how Lukäcs theorizes 
reification as a process that emanates specifically as a cultural product of capitalism, 
for perhaps here we might find a stronger sense of the mediation between subject and 
object.
Reification as Process
Lukäcs’s depiction of the source of reified thought is frequently couched in 
terms of it being a part of the process of the ideological within capitalism. This 
process depends upon the emergence of the free worker in possession of the 
commodity of her labour power that can be freely offered for sale on the market. The 
decisive separation of the producer from the means of production leads to the 
destruction of those relations “which exhibit human relations more plainly”, replacing 
them instead with “rationally reified relations”, Lukäcs argues. This is, for Lukäcs, 
the principle role of ideology - to render this exploitation unrecognizable to the 
exploited in a process in which subjective and objective exist in disjunctural 
immiscibility. Principles of rational mechanization and calculability begin to embrace 
every aspect of life, making any recognition of this ideological world further removed 
from everyday existence. Production that was once a part of an organic process of 
community life is transformed into the apparent result of fragmented and isolated acts 
of commodity exchange. What now appears is, on the one hand, “abstract members 
of a species identical by definition with its other members and, on the other hand, [...] 
isolated objects the possession or non-possession of which depends on rational
187 Feenberg, Lukäcs, Marx and the Sources of Critical Theoiy, p. 100.
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calculations.” The fate of the worker in this process increasingly becomes the 
“typical fate of the whole society”. The reification of work unfolds in more 
pronounced form as the rational mechanization of society develops. “Reification 
requires that a society should learn to satisfy all its needs in terms of commodity 
exchange”; and, as Marx had also noted more than half a century before, it seems to 
learn this lesson rapidly and well.
What Lukäcs takes this requirement to mean is not only that the whole of 
society must be subjected to a unified economic process, as we have seen, but that the 
fate of every objectified member of society will be determined by unified laws. In 
this process, value acquires a new objectivity, a new “substantiality” that destroys its 
“original and authentic substantiality”. This rational objectification acts by 
concealing the real qualitative and material nature of relations between people, and 
the nature of things. The individuality of people is substantially distorted in this 
transformation of human functions into commodities. Indeed, what is left is “in all its 
starkness the dehumanised and dehumanising function of the commodity relation”. 
There is a withholding of being in a reified world. But do we glean from this that a 
renouncing of being has been fully realized? In a statement that one would imagine 
might gladden the heart of many a post-modernist, Lukäcs declares that real relations 
“have faded to the point where they can be neither recognised nor even perceived” . 188 
Reification is, therefore, the reality that has replaced ‘real relations’: It is the process 
through which an ideological reality claims its supremacy. This transformation is the 
fundamental shift Lukäcs’s work prepares us to consider -  reality has itself become 
reified, which means that potentiality and the paradoxical aspects of being have 
become reified as well.
It is because he sees reification as a process by which dehumanization is 
assured that Lukäcs’s emphasis upon commodification leads him to view reification 
as the ‘universal category of social being’ within the capitalist epoch. 189 It is not 
simply the existence of reification but that its processes cannot allow any reality other 
than that of a reified response. In his essay on “Reification”, Lukäcs considers the 
question of the extent to which commodity exchange relations are able to “influence 
the total outer and inner life of society” . 190 This is more a qualitative than a 
quantitative distinction for Lukäcs as, in capitalist society, the commodity form is a
188 See Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, pp. 91, 92, 93.
189 Ibid., p. 91. A process of reification systematically distorts relations between people, the relation 
people have to the objects they produce and thus to society more generally, as well as to the 
individual’s own practical and intellectual confrontation with a society in which one is, from the 
perspective of the system, an owner or buyer of labour-power as a commodity.
Ibid., p. 84.190
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dominant rather than a merely episodic or periodic event. In this sense, the 
commodity form is constitutive of capitalist society in the most general sense. What 
we see here is an ever greater level of abstraction through which the subject is deemed 
to experience the objective condition of reification. Given this dominance of the 
commodity form what is the basis of the relations of which it is comprised? For 
Lukäcs, the most important aspects of the capitalist production process for the 
dominance of the commodity form are to be found in the modem processes of labour - 
specifically those processes of the isolated, apparently ‘free’ labourer and the division 
of labour. The dominance of these relations is necessarily related to the incorporation 
of other social relations within the commodity form’s orbit. Thus fetishization and 
reification are a part of the total process of the dominance of the commodity form, 
where production is seen primarily as a part of the totality of social relations which 
encompass given capitalist societies. For Lukäcs, the processes of labour cannot 
operate in any other way - an almost complete reification must take place in order that 
the system can function. Ideology in this sense is thus reducible to each complete 
moment of objective delusion and mystification. We are left feeling that there is little 
of the actually phantasmagorical in Lukäcs’s concept of ideology. The 
phantasmagorical landscape of externality and intemality is one characterized by 
ambiguity. And yet there are no real dream images here in Lukäcs’s construction of 
ideology. Reification is a purely objective relation. 191 What Lukäcs was able to 
anticipate, of course, was the ‘continuity of the spectacle’ of which Debord was later 
to speak: ' 92 But the intensification of the existence of commodified realities does not 
lead Lukäcs to question what might be happening here at the level of the unconscious, 
of the unshaped dreams of an inner world. It merely makes him more certain of the 
cold, hard weight of ideology as objectivity.
There are clearly both subjective and objective aspects to reification for 
Lukäcs, as we have mentioned. In an objective sense, there is the appearance of a 
world of things, the emanations of the processes of exchange relations. Within the 
subjective realm, there is the process of depersonalization that this reification entails. 
This depersonalization presupposes a process of the decomposition of subjectivity. 
But does decomposition involve an abdication of the individual’s sense of humanness 
or a subsumption to the ‘objective’ imperatives of the rationalization process? Lukäcs
191 In this sense Berger and Luckmann’s contention that “reification is a modality of consciousness, 
more precisely, a modality of man’s objectification of the human world” is not the complete picture as 
it applies to Lukäcs. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction o f Reality: A 
Treatise in the Sociology o f Knowledge (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 89.
192 See Guy Debord, Comments on the Society o f the Spectacle, trans. Malcolm Imrie (London: Verso, 
1990), p. 7.
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theorizes the subject in terms of a type of passive spectator but he also recognizes that 
this is precisely the reified reality that rationalized work needs to produce in order to 
be effective. We will look in the next section of the chapter at the concepts of 
mediation and totality which Lukacs develops in order to subject reification to a 
critical theorization. What we have then is the central conundrum of an understanding 
of fetishized reality, of a critique of ideology -  that what the reality of a commodified 
world and the exploitation upon which it rests is, is also a fetishized, ideological 
reality. This then means that the subject of this reality is also the subject of an 
ideological reality. The problem for a critique of the ideological subject seems to be 
in being able to distinguish between an ideological subject and a subject capable of 
challenging and existing in opposition with an ideological reality. Lukacs creates 
space for such an analysis but does so in a highly particular way - for the Lukacs of 
History and Class Consciousness, the subject who qualifies to do battle with 
reification is, and can only be, the proletarian class subject.
At one level, Lukacs’s theorization of reification as a universal category of 
social being would appear to be an historical deepening of Marx’s theorization of 
fetishism and alienation. The pervasiveness of commodification is theorized in terms 
of the centrality of exchange relations to all social processes. This does not mean that 
Lukacs gives any necessary primacy to the realm of the economic; rather, it is the 
dominance of reification - itself a result of the fetishism of exchange relations - which 
transforms all types of social activity. We can see that, for Lukacs, it is, however, the 
objectiveness of the dialectic of economic processes that must be understood beyond 
and almost in spite of what he then views as merely the phenomenal level of the ideas 
or actions of individuals. The subject within this process has become an object of the 
events of which she is a part. In this sense, people confront a reality made by 
themselves which appears to be a natural phenomenon alien to themselves. Activity 
becomes “confined to the exploitation of the inexorable fulfilment of certain 
individual laws” for one’s own egoistic interests. 193
As we have indicated, what is interesting in this account of the subject’s role 
in this objectification is that Lukacs does not feel the need to investigate the nature of 
the subjective aspect of consciousness. Instead, alienation is deemed to be the result 
of the subject having been cut off from an ossified pre-constructed objectivity. The 
subject “takes up a position” in which the effects of this construction can be best 
exploited - the subject becomes little more than a ‘receptive organ’ . 194 It is important
193 Lukacs, Histoiy and Class Consciousness, p. 135.
194 Ibid., p. 130. Lukacs’s lack of an examination of the subjective within consciousness is not the 
result of believing that consciousness is a mere epiphenomenon of economic reality as, for example,
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to note that this shortfall in Lukacs’s concept of consciousness and subjectivity is not 
the result of simply an overly developed concentration upon reification -  which for 
Lukäcs, as we have seen, is primarily a dynamic process. It is more that his 
theorization of reification gains the intensity it requires at the expense of an 
investigation of its psychological ramifications in anything other than the most 
abstract sense.
Thus far we have considered what it is about a generalized alienation and a 
more specific reification which Lukäcs finds decisive for a systematic imposition of 
external constraint. Despite the fact that he considers this alienation reaches into the 
very soul of the individual, the problem of its taking up residence here is largely 
theorized from the point of view of the ability of capitalism to function in so 
rationalized and so total a manner as to prevent a recognition of it in any way other 
than this. Ideology, for Lukäcs, is the external imposition of the rationale of a system 
that operates by making its rationale unrecognizable. Perhaps there is something here 
that Lukäcs has touched upon that, however uncomfortable it might make us feel, 
demonstrates something very telling about the way in which ideology provides a 
certain legitimacy for symbolic values. But perhaps we might also attribute this 
direction in his thought to the particular way in which he theorizes the terrain of the 
ideological. Let us now look more closely at the methodology that leads to the sort of 
abstraction we are considering.
Section Two: The Problem of Philosophy as Method
O nly the dialectical conception o f  totality can enable us to understand reality as a 
social process. For only this conception dissolves the fetishistic forms necessarily  
produced.
Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness
The Construction of Reality
In this second part of the chapter we will consider the problem of the role of 
the subject as a part of a methodology which Lukäcs outlines for a critique of
Lenin had asserted in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Vladimir Lenin, Materialism and Empirio- 
Criticism: Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1977). 
There is little o f the mechanical necessity implied in Lenin’s thesis in Lukacs’s depiction of class
The Fracturing of Subject and Object 171
ideology. This focus upon a way of conceptualizing subjectivity is chosen because it 
is a particular view of subjective experience that Lukäcs theorizes as fundamental to a 
creative unravelling of ideological servitude. It is important for us to consider the 
effectiveness of such a way of viewing social being because with this we have a 
significant understanding of the problem of a spectacularized commodification in 
relation to the ontological. We will start out by situating Lukäcs’s method in relation 
to his view of reality and the relation between subject and object and will then explain 
how he views the relationship between life and form in terms of a dialectics. We will 
then consider what Lukäcs is able to tell us about conceptualizing social relations as 
totalities, before proceeding to a discussion of his view of consciousness. This will 
bring us back to a reflection upon the issue of subjectivity in relation to ideology in 
Lukäcs’s work and to what we might want to take from his consistent emphasis upon 
the objective conditions of the formation of a reified consciousness. It will also 
enable us to assess the distance we have travelled in Lukäcs’s theorization of ideology 
into the realm of a reconstruction of a singularity in relation to the totality of 
involuntary servitude that, somewhat ironically, it is also deemed the function of 
ideology to possess. What will eventually concern us here is whether the theoretical 
subject is understood in such a way that some open mediation between subject and 
object is theorized as a part of this totality or whether what we are given is only one 
highly cohesive subject capable of positing a wholeness or totality of being. Some of 
the difficulties with such a transformation of the purpose of critique will hopefully 
become apparent in this section.
The Critique of Positivism
Lukäcs’s writing represented an essential break with the dominance of 
positivist thought within Western European philosophy and more specifically with 
elements of the prevailing neo-Kantian schools of philosophy - particularly those of 
Marburg and Heidelberg which had dominated German philosophical life throughout 
the second half of the nineteenth century and at least until the end of the first decade 
of the twentieth. 195 Lukäcs’s decisive break with these traditions was to question the 
basis of all existing reality. He wanted to shift philosophy away from what he saw as
consciousness. It is perhaps more the result o f his own approach to what he views as an ‘imputed class 
consciousness’.
193 The Marburg school is best known for its theorizations of science and development of philosophical 
logic and method - disciplines led by such figures as Hermann Cohen, Paul Gerhard Natorp and Ernst 
Cassirer. The Heidelberg or Baden school theorized the place of universal values within both the 
‘natural’ and the ‘historical’ ‘sciences’ whose most important exponents were Wilhelm Windelband 
and Heinrich Rickert.
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“the petty two-dimensionality” of positivism. 196 In the refusal of reality that he puts 
forward there is a strong playing out of the subjective element of any construction of 
reality. Lukäcs sees a tension between reality and our critical participation within the 
real that positivism was unable to fully countenance. Life is “an anarchy of light and 
dark” - the mixture that emerges is “uncontrolled and impure”. “Real life”, Lukäcs 
tells us, “is always unreal, always impossible, in the midst of empirical life” . 197 It is 
not the “flat rationalism” of the positivists. 198 Lukäcs was to bring together various 
generalized existentialist philosophical themes from Dilthey, Simmel, Lask and 
Kierkegaard, 199 as well as the sociology of Weber, and even some elements of 
Husserl’s phenomenological thought, as he developed a distinctly Hegelian form of a 
Marxist analysis of commodity society.200
The problematic passage of life required something other than the abstract 
certainties that positivism held out. This was particularly the case because, just as at 
the turbulent end of the eighteenth century, once again, in this fin-de-siecle period, 
everything “seemed out of joint”. As the new century progressed, conditions seemed 
to become more scattered and reckless: “Every summit projected into empty space”, 
Lukäcs opines. 201 In a world of “opaque depths”, in which very little could have 
concrete meaning, those theories that offered rigid certainties needed to be questioned. 
For although the times produced a “sea of moody, untamed individualisms”, it was the 
effects of rationalism which had been more destructive. Rationalism “had dethroned 
all existing values” leaving those who opposed its deceptive tyrannies with little to 
guide them.202 Lukäcs worried that a path to irrationalism was often taken by those 
who attempted to overcome the problem of rationalism, seeing this tendency in 
particular in Simmel and Dilthey.203 The influence of Nietzsche who, along with 
Ibsen, the young Lukäcs had declared to be the greatest prophet of the age, 204 should
196 Lukäcs, The Theory o f the Novel, p. 13.
197 Lukäcs, Soul and Form, pp. 152, 153.
198 Lukäcs, The Theory o f the Novel, p. 15.
199 Luden Goldmann indeed argues that Lukäcs was the founder of modem existential philosophy. 
See Lucien Goldmann, Lukäcs and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy, trans. William Q. 
Boelhower (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 4.
200 For a short article explaining some of the shared ground between Lukäcs and Husserl, see Mihäly 
Vajda, “Lukäcs and Husserl”, in Lukäcs Revalued, ed. Agnes Heller (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 
pp. 107-124.
201 Lukäcs, Soul and Form, p. 43.
202 Ibid.
203 Lukäcs, The Theoiy o f the Novel, p. 15.
204 Quoted in Kadarkay, Georg Lukäcs, p. 56.
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not be ignored in this context. 205 Nietzsche’s profound questioning of values 
characterized an age in which a deep sense of the crisis of humanity was beginning to 
be held by an increasing number of theorists. The need to shift one’s understanding 
beyond good and evil, beyond rationalism and irrationalism, saw both theorists 
question the basis of human values. Rendering all categories problematic by this, 
Lukacs chose the path of an Hegelian historicization of aesthetic categories that would 
then lead to a particular concern with dialectics. For without any sense of historical 
dynamism, he felt, ultimately only a static view of the problem of humanity could 
emerge. 206
Against a reconciliation with reality
In his Record o f a Life, Lukacs refers to the importance of Hegel to the 
development of his own work but also mentions that aspect of Hegel’s thought which 
he had always rejected - his Versöhnung mit der Wirklichkeit - his reconciliation with 
established reality. This reconciliation Lukacs saw as the problem which Marx 
addresses with his “materialisation of Hegel’s philosophy” .207 Marx, Lukacs claims, 
had in this sense given a material basis to the Hegelian dialectic. 208 For Lukacs, an 
irreconciliation with reality is an acknowledgement of the mediation of subject and 
object, which, under conditions of a spectacularized commodification, has meant the 
loss of the subject within the object. This reality the subject can never be reconciled 
with -  not in the present nor in any possible manifestation it might assume. This is a 
very useful statement of what Lukacs takes the renouncing of self via alienation to be 
-  the self exists unreconciled with her own existence. And yet it is interesting that 
Lukacs’s view of an irreconciliation with reality is often reduced to that of a clash 
with a reality unable to be theorized by way of its materialization. It is in this sense of
205 Lukacs’s seeming complete about-turn on this issue of rationalism and irrationalism, particularly in 
terms of his interpretation of Nietzsche in this light, is as we have already mentioned one of the less 
worthy outcomes of the politicization of his thought.
206 Lukacs detected in Oswald Spengler, for example, this abolition of history - “a succession of 
completely disconnected cultural cycles which always end and always start again”. Lukacs’s critique 
of Spengler is interesting as in it he sees a ‘radical historicisation’ of all categories and at the same time 
a refusal to recognize the existence of any “supra-historical validity”. Lukacs, The Theory o f the Novel, 
p. 16. We will see that this tension between types of categories pervades much of Lukacs’s writing 
with various problematic consequences.
207 Lukacs, Record o f a Life, p. 181.
208 This idea of Marx’s supposed inversion of Hegel’s dialectic, retaining its same form merely 
“divested of its idealist wrappings”, as Engels argued, is, as we have earlier indicated, a 
misinterpretation of Marx. We will return to some of this in the later chapter dealing with Marx. 
Frederick Engels, “Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique o f Political Economy’, in Karl Marx, A 
Contribution to the Critique o f Political Economy, ed. and intro. Maurice Dobb, trans. S.W. 
Ryazanskaya (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1970), p. 225.
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a materialization that we see a creeping compromise with reality in his work rather 
than a rejection of its forms. Let us first look at how Lukacs approaches this issue.
Lukacs’s dialectic, which proceeds theoretically on the basis of this 
‘irreconciliation’ with existing reality, would at one level appear to be hostile to the 
easy schematizing of unresolvable tensions within the world of commodities. 
Reification is, accordingly, a clear indication of the very tensions that the dialectic 
attempts to capture. What then of the ‘various articles of catechism’, of which 
Adorno speaks in relation to what he sees as Lukacs’s ideologically sanctioned 
reflection theory of knowledge and his dogma “of the automatic progress of 
mankind” ? 209 Questioning Lukacs’s work in the light of such possible problems will 
bring us directly to the core of his theorization of ideology: For behind both charges 
which Adorno levels at Lukacs (more specifically directed at his aesthetic theory, it 
should be said) lurks the difficult suggestion of some ultimate ability to penetrate 
through a realm of seeming obviousness (but in reality one of mystification) to a new 
appreciation of truth and meaningfulness. A mere presumption of a category beyond 
that of isolated subjectivity - for Lukacs, that of a proletarian consciousness - is the 
problematic leap which he makes under the guise of dialectics. It is here, ultimately, 
that Lukacs situates truth. For Adorno, this seeming transformation of ‘the unhappy 
consciousness’ is little more than “the force of conviction into a happy collusion”, 
fraught not only with sinister party political overtones but with the deliberate ignoring 
of “objective social and technical factors” governing the production of ideas. We can 
certainly attempt to unravel some of the difficulties that this criticism presents but we 
also should point out that these are very real difficulties with which Lukacs grappled 
and with which any theorist of a subjective theorization of ideology faces. The 
question of how to situate the creative and created power of the subject against 
objective ‘creation’ and destruction of such power (in Lukacs’s terms, the limits 
imposed by the interplay of objective possibility and possible consciousness) is not 
easily resolved by transforming the theoretical subject into a particular function of its 
own objective existence. This is only all the more the case where we must 
acknowledge that power in potential is more difficult than any form of power to 
theorize. What we are confronted with here is a sense of the openness of the subject, 
her potential, given form to in a particular type of practice. The subject is thus 
validated by a tendency, a tendency towards fulfilling her role as the realization of the 
end of reification.
209 Theodor W. Adorno, “Reconciliation under Duress”, in Aesthetics and Politics, trans. and ed. 
Ronald Taylor (London: Verso, 1986), p. 172.
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We have already indicated that the Lukäcsian theorization of reification 
involves an understanding of ideology which merely toys with a conception of a type 
of false consciousness. Here we can see that the abstraction which Lukäcs construes 
reality to be again suggests some sense of a consciousness both inside and outside 
reality. We can certainly say that the Lukäcsian approach to ideology represents a 
significant shift from the idea of false consciousness in terms of an Engelsian 
reduction of ideology to a superstructural mechanism. Lukäcs’s main contribution to 
ideology critique is to generalize Marx’s treatment of fetishism. For Lukäcs then, 
ideology is socially necessary fetishism or reification. In addition, he sees as 
problematic a subject/object dualism that mistakes theory for reality. A unity of 
theory and practice can only be attained where neither subject nor object is privileged. 
In this sense Lukäcs indeed argues against a reconciliation with reality. He also 
argues that social appearances are mediated by distortions through which interests can 
be revealed. All of these ways of approaching the ideological were to be influential 
for the generation of Western Marxists of this period: But however grounded in a 
critique of existing reality this understanding of ideology is, it is important to consider 
whether it still relies to a significant degree upon a construction of an externally 
generated self-critique of reality - in a consciousness or a philosophical self-critique 
capable of self-actualization or the abolition (Aufhebung - as it is referred to by Hegel 
and Marx) of philosophy. 210 Lukäcs’s subject is not a subject whose self-validation 
can emerge from self-knowledge; it is only in an ability to realize a particular relation 
with practice that the subject’s ‘truth’ will be revealed. Critique here cannot redeem, 
it must be realized through its own abolition. Is there lurking beneath this approach to 
the critique of reality a sense of the falsity of ideology as unrealized ideals, and the 
necessity of a true falseness and false truth of a reified reality introjected into what 
one might otherwise take to be the psychic structure of the individual or class? 211 
Lukäcs has difficulty in postulating any future overcoming of ideology except upon 
such a basis in which the falsity of a reified existence will become apparent as the 
truth of reality takes form. Such a counterposition between ideological, reified falsity 
and the truth of reality after the end of ideology, seems problematic. Let us consider a 
further aspect of this within the theoretical relation between subject and object.
210 See Arato and Breines, The Young Lukäcs and the Origins o f Western Marxism. Arato and Breines 
argue that here Lukäcs turns to an understanding of the dynamic of reification in terms of a conceptual 
dialectic of subject and object, bringing to bear a sense of Weber’s formal rationality with a critique of 
capitalism. Ibid., p. 123.
211 Lukäcs does not of course refer to any kind of psychic structure upon which he would make various 
assumptions as to a particular class-based vulnerability to ideology, but, unstated or otherwise, this is 
what in general terms he still proceeds to do.
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The Subject/Object Duality
What is interesting in this context is that Lukacs’s approach - like that of much 
Marxism to follow him - started out from a particular interpretation of Marx on 
ideology in terms of the relation between subject and object. Very schematically, this 
interpretation is that ideology reveals the problem not of the subject’s particular 
(illusory) apprehension of the object but of the object’s peculiar effect upon the 
subject’s knowledge of it. In basic terms, Lukacs interprets Marx’s theorization of 
ideology in epistemological terms. Consciousness becomes a question of distorted 
and misapprehended knowledge because the object - the social context of being - is 
itself distorted. 212
The individual, Lukacs warns, “can never become the measure of all things” .213 
The problem as he sees it is that the individual confronts an objective reality, a reality 
which is a “complex of ready-made and unalterable objects”. This complex allows 
the individual “only the subjective responses of recognition or rejection”. The 
individual in Lukacs’s construction is unable to relate to the whole of reality in a 
revolutionary way. For this individual, reification and determinism are 
“irremovable”. The class, as an abstraction of consciousness, can only manage to 
achieve such totality when it can see through the reified objectivity of this world “to 
the process that is also its own fate”. Here we encounter Lukacs’s central problem 
with the concept of freedom, of which we have already made mention: According to 
his philosophy, freedom in the sense of an ‘inner freedom’ presupposes that the world 
cannot be changed. On this basis, the process of becoming for the individual will 
revolve around an interminable chasm between ‘is’ and ‘ought’; the problem of the 
external world remains.214
Grasping the relation between thought and being, subject and object, is no 
easy task. Lukacs’s attempt to do so via a distinctive Bildung of imputed class 
consciousness, which can overcome ideological thought arising out of distorted social 
being, is a definite shift to very different terrain from Marx’s insistence that history or 
life needs to be consciously made. Lukacs’s quite divergent view is that beyond 
ideology there must exist a realm of extra-philosophical understanding or ‘science’ -  
a practice which provides a recognition of reified forms. We thus need to consider 
various relevant issues in Lukacs’s theorization of such a realm - most particularly,
212 We will return to this view of ideology in relation to Marx later in the thesis to examine whether 
Lukacs is justified in this interpretation of Marx.
213 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 193.
214 Ibid., pp. 193 -194.
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the place of thought within reality as some sort of ‘superstructural’ phenomenon 
which exists in structural and often contentious relation with commodity exchange. 
We also need to reflect upon his particular concern with the concept of totality - as a 
dialectical method by which reality, as a structured, unfolding and forming and re­
forming whole, can be understood. Does Lukäcs intend with the concept of totality a 
disclosure of as yet unrealized possibilities through which a sense of wholeness could 
reveal their very absence within present subjectivity? Certainly his appreciation of 
subjectivity and the context of subjective action in alienation and reification is an 
attempt to build a broad interwoven picture of what effect the commodification of life 
has upon subjectivity. And it should be said that this attempt to construct a totality is 
partly done so as to address what Lukäcs himself found to be the limitations of non- 
dialectical conceptions of history and totality. But do we find too static a picture 
drawn of the processes that make up the whole? In the light of this do we encounter 
an overly finished relation between subject and object?
Of all the directions in his work that these various above-mentioned influences 
were to provoke, it is this last issue of the relation between subject and object that is 
of most significance and pertinence to our discussion of the critique of ideology. 
Lukäcs was certainly not the first Western philosopher to see thought and reality, 
subject and object, as interrelated and reflective of a dialectical process - indeed, it is 
for good reason that his approach has been likened to a “quasi-Spinozistic form of 
Marxism” 215 - but Lukäcs’s particular elaboration of an Hegelian Marxist attack upon 
idealism was significant for the direction of much twentieth century thought. As we 
shall investigate further throughout the chapter, Lukäcs was to bring the insight which 
he had derived from Hegel and Marx - that the subject is not counterposed to the 
object but that subjectivity gains its meaning within the world in which the subject 
acts - directly to his theorization of ideology. Lukäcs’s attempt to theorize the 
problem of meaning within alienated life starts out from this simple premise - that 
people are inseparable from the world they act upon and through which they are 
constituted. We will now examine this in detail.
Life and form
In one sense it is strange that abstraction should be the outcome of Lukäcs’s 
theorization of reification committed as it is to a thorough critique of types of analysis
215 Tom Rockmore, “Lukäcs and Marxist History of Philosophy”, in Georg Lukäcs: Theory, Culture, 
and Politics, eds., Judith Marcus and Zoltan Tarr (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 
p. 36.
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which assume a merely abstract relation between different aspects of the system of 
capitalism - most specifically, for Lukäcs, mechanical materialism in the name of 
dialectical thought. 216 The difficulty Lukäcs sets for himself is in wanting to 
understand relations between phenomena without reducing the specificity of historical 
context and meaning to determinist generalizations. This general problem of the 
relationship between life and form is one that, as we have seen, had haunted Lukäcs 
from early on and would persist throughout much of the rest of his life’s work. 
Without ever finally resolving the tension between them, Lukäcs investigates different 
aspects of the meaning of life and form in an attempt to more satisfactorily theorize 
their relationship. In History and Class Consciousness, this intention is given 
substance in a theorization of totalities. This interest had of course already engaged 
the Lukäcs of Soul and Form. Here, Lukäcs had talked of the difficulty of human 
knowledge as a “psychological nihilism”: “we see a thousand relationships, yet never 
grasp a genuine connection” .217 The need for some synthesis is not because meaning 
and value inevitably escape us - what Lukäcs laments is that the “landscapes of our 
soul exist nowhere, yet in them every tree and flower is concrete” .218 We seek form, 
according to Lukäcs, because life presents us with glimpses of the dark abyss into 
whose depths we will one day fall: “Things happen and we do not know why” .219 And 
yet the question of why has a compelling force. Forms are thus “natural necessities”; 
the question has “life all round it”, the silence a rustling, “universal singing all round 
it” 2 2 0  g ut situation cannot make knowing any easier: “Is it possible”, Lukäcs 
asks, “to extract an essence from the abstraction of forms, and to do it in such a way 
that today’s life is not wholly drained from it?”; are we not then attempting to petrify 
“the colours, the scent, the flower-dust of our moments”? Lukäcs draws our attention 
to a persistently relevant point -  there is an unresolved problem at the heart of an 
unfree existence whose very content indicates something other than this existence; but 
in theorizing this we can become caught in the difficulty of pushing thought too close 
to reality and in so doing creating an abstraction. Bloch refers to the problem of 
grasping reality “either by crawling empirically under it or speculating from above 
reality” , 221 and both these tendencies would appear to apply to Lukäcs.
216 See, for example, Lukäcs’s critique of Bukharin’s mechanical materialism. Georg Lukäcs, “N. 
Bukharin: Theorie des historischen Materialismus”, Archiv für die Geschichte des Socialismus und der 
Arbeiterbewegung, 1925.
217 Lukäcs, Soul and Form, p. 87.
218 Ibid; (translation slightly altered).
219 Ibid., p. 113.
220 Ibid., p. 114.
221 Ernst Bloch, On Karl Marx, trans. John Maxwell (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), p. 137.
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In examining an instance of the difficulty involved in trying to grasp some 
inner essence that “even we ourselves may not know”, Lukäcs turns his attention, in 
Histoiy and Class Consciousness, to the question of ideology. In this work he 
develops a methodology in order to explain what he feels is wrong with a 
commodified culture, to have, as it were, some unified insight into the core problems 
of this world. For this reason, he searches for a basis for knowledge, for a truth about 
the system that can enable a critical theory to seriously contribute to social 
transformation. As we will shortly consider, Lukäcs takes this search for knowledge 
to the issue of consciousness and theorizes a situation in which consciousness can 
become self-knowledge. It is important for us to realize that this is partly because he 
recognizes certain limitations with reducing a sense of the world to that of the product 
of its theoretical formulation. Contradiction, he feels, in “fed from deeper sources: 
from the necessary attitude of people toward the reality in which they live, in which 
their activities develop or are inhibited in their development” .222 In this way we see a 
continuation, in a different version, of the type of concern for historical situatedness 
we have earlier encountered in Lukäcs’s work. But once his idea of the contradiction 
of life is transformed from a sensitivity towards an alienated modem culture to that of 
a certain historical class destiny then the problem of reconstructing history from the 
perspective of an ordered and meaningful whole begins to become apparent. We will 
look later at the determinist tendencies of such an analysis of consciousness but first 
we need to consider the broad methodology that links Lukäcs’s critique of the 
consequences of commodification and reified knowledge with his concern with 
consciousness - this is the development of a dialectical approach to the analysis of 
society in general and the use of the concept of concrete totality.
Dialectics
We can restate Lukäcs’s broad intention throughout his work as it applies to 
the particular issue of dialectics in the following terms. Lukäcs’s starting point is that 
life and its ideas constitute the mediated product of a creating subject. Between the 
subject and its creations is the world of commodification and its fragmenting and 
alienating strictures. Object and subject thus exist in tension with each other, a 
dynamic tension whose movement needs to be understood as something other than at 
the level of a synchronic appearance of social forms. A dialectical approach to the 
‘social totality’ allows for an understanding of the diachronic movement - including
222 Georg Lukäcs, “Die Eigenart des Aesthetischen”, 2 Hbb., Werke 12 (Neuwied, 1963), 2, p. 763, 
quoted in Bemd Witte, “Benjamin and Lukäcs: Historical Notes on the Relationship Between Their 
Political and Aesthetic Theories”, New German Critique, no. 5 (Spring, 1975): p. 25.
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both the movement of opposites and that which is separate or shifting apart - of social 
forms. Lukacs’s intention here is clearly to not reduce the world to any prescriptive 
notion of its functioning. Indeed, he argues that with the idea of immutable laws, 
history “becomes fossilised in a formalism incapable of comprehending that the real 
nature of socio-historical institutions is that they consist of relations between men” .223 
But it is his intention to theorize the dialectical necessity of the totality of historical 
processes in which the possibility of the transcendence of the reified world of 
capitalism is given in its form as a fundamentally divided system of exploitation. For 
it is from this reality that he is able to theorize a type of practice that for him holds a 
guarantee of transformation whilst also containing a requisite immanent 
meaningfulness. Emancipation is itself thus the “total process” .224 It is partly for this 
reason that his work has been interpreted as veering towards a type of historical 
determinism.225 A type of consciousness (an imputed class consciousness) becomes 
identified with self-knowledge because Lukacs has already deemed dialectical theory 
to be the knowledge and truth of existence. But let us consider the problem in greater 
depth.
This critique of an assumption of eternal laws just mentioned is also evident in 
Lukacs’s brief excursus on Engels’ treatment of the subject of dialectics in the work 
by Engels referred to as the Anti-Diihring. Against Engels’ attempt to apply the 
dialectic to the study of nature, Lukacs argues that a dialectical understanding of 
society necessarily involves a conception of the interactive relation between 
subjective and objective: In nature there is the absence of the subject, thus rendering 
any conception of a dialectic untenable.226 We might wish here to point out Bloch’s 
more daring take on the ‘dialectics of nature’ issue with his argument that within 
nature there exists a subject in process, a not-yet conscious subject.227 A naturalized 
humanity as much as a humanized nature is the basis of any transformation of an 
alienated world. 228 This revolutionary understanding of the subject’s place in nature 
was not at all that which Engels had put forward, which in some senses makes 
Lukacs’s main issue still worthwhile considering: The role of the subject is vital to an 
understanding of the dialectic of social relations - a dialectic that cannot be grasped
223 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 48.
224 Ibid, p. 23.
225 See, for example, Markovic, “The Critical Thought of Georg Lukacs”, p. 22.
226 See Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, pp. 132-133, 165.
227 Jay also makes this point in his Marxism and Totality, pp. 184-185.
228 See, for example, Bloch, A Philosophy o f the Future. Bloch refers to a wide ranging mystical 
tradition to show the importance of the idea of the subject in nature. See, Bloch, The Principle o f 
Hope, vol. I, passim. The idea of a naturalized humanity and a humanized nature is derived from 
Marx. Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 350.
The Fracturing of Subject and Object 181
through spurious claims to science, which, in Lukäcs’s view, were inevitably bound 
up with the reified world of assumptions of objective neutrality and rational 
contemplation.229 This dialectics must be “the eternally vigilant prophet proclaiming 
the relation between the tasks of the immediate present and the totality of the 
historical process”, argues Lukäcs.230 But if this subject is overwhelmingly and, 
indeed, merely an economic subject then Lukäcs’s conception of history seems to be 
unnecessarily restrictive. We are social subjects whose unfortunate existence as 
economic subjects we know only all too well, but we are also, as well as potentially, 
much more than this. Dialectics, for Lukäcs, is primarily the way to understand the 
interrelation of subjects with their objectified world, of which nature is merely a 
‘social category’ .231 We need, then, to ask whether this means that Lukäcs’s 
conception of totality harbours this fundamental reductionism and indeed an inability 
to see that humans are a part of a natural reality as much as they are social beings?
It is certainly the case that Lukäcs wished to reintroduce the problem of 
subjectivity back into Marxism. His work is centred upon the view that vulgar 
Marxism tends to elevate various laws of development specific to capitalist society to 
the status of universal laws, thereby “conferring immortality upon capitalist society in 
practice”, presumably leaving a lacunae within a theorization of the subject’s relation 
to this practice.232 But whilst Lukäcs seems well justified in his criticism of types of 
‘scientistic’ determinism, his own theorization seems vulnerable to a similar sort of 
criticism. As we will consider shortly, it is perhaps the particular conception of the 
subject which Lukäcs puts forward that results, somewhat ironically, in an ultimately 
reified notion of what the subject is - for Lukäcs, a collective subject/object entity 
capable of total knowledge. We might want to mention here that Marx’s in any case
229 Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 132.
230 Ibid., p. 24.
231 In Lukäcs’s review of WittfogeTs, The Science o f Bourgeois Society, he refers to nature as a social 
category. Moreover, he writes that “to believe that one can detect anything supra-historical or supra- 
social in this context is to disqualify oneself as a Marxist”. Lukäcs, Political Writings, 1919-1929, 
p. 144.
232 Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 245. Lukäcs refers, for example, to vulgar Marxist 
theory as a block to the proletariat’s “vision of the right course to adopt”. This theory, a “petty 
‘Realpolitik’”, detaches itself from the central point of view of an ‘historical materialist’ analysis - that 
is from “the point where a proletarian class consciousness arises”. By misunderstanding the issue of 
the class consciousness of the proletariat, vulgar Marxists destroy the unity of theory and practice, 
thereby cutting “the nerve that binds proletarian theory to proletarian action”. Lukäcs continues: “They 
reduce theory to the ‘scientific’ treatment of the symptoms of social change and as for practice they are 
themselves reduced to being buffeted about aimlessly and uncontrollably by the various elements of the 
process they had hoped to master”. See Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, pp. 68-69. Here, 
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scientistics, followers of Max Adler, and the mechanistic fatalism and voluntarism more generally of 
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rather misunderstood concept of a ‘species essence’ (Gattungswesen) was only later to 
have an impact upon Lukäcs’s development.233 But whatever use Lukäcs might have 
made of this idea, in his own work we find a failure to theorize being as a living 
possibility of anything beyond the “limitation of homogenization” Bloch detects, 
which the social dimension of life concretizes. 234 In History and Class Consciousness, 
the category of class is put forward to the exclusion of any conceptualization of either 
the individual or humanity generally. Lukäcs’s stress upon the importance of the 
subject certainly prepares the ground for a sense of the processes of history in which 
the subject’s involvement gives rise to the idea of the openness of creative and 
unpredictable human practice - but when he proceeds to theorize this subject a 
determinist tendency creeps fatally into his work.
Lukäcs’s concern with dialectics needs also to be viewed in the context of his 
perception of the pervasive state of an ‘irrationalistic’ mystification of developments 
in society, against which only a dialectical rationality is capable of putting forward 
any fundamental challenge. As we mentioned earlier, for anyone attempting to come 
to terms with the seeming ‘irrationalism’ of Nazism, such a problem was bound to 
present itself in such terms. And yet Lukäcs’s identification of everything ‘irrational’ 
with fascism mistakes the nature of the problem. Equating the ‘irrational’ with 
fascism not only simplifies and distorts the varied play of the irrational but equally 
allows the so-called ‘rational’ to proceed without scrutiny. In a society characterized 
by what he was to later view as “an extraordinarily complicated complex of 
complexes”, Lukäcs insists that only a rational theory can explain the relation between 
the determining domination of the whole over the parts (the concept of a concrete 
totality) and that of a complex of mediations of human activity. 235 Lukäcs’s critique of 
Hegel notwithstanding, a consistent theme within his work is that of the defence of the 
true category of reality, “the conceptual reproduction of reality”, against all 
undialectical fragmentation. The relation of form to content is one of understanding 
the relation of totality to activity, a dialectical process “enacted essentially between 
the subject and the object” . 236 Lukäcs’s argument is that without any dynamic concept
233 Agnes Heller argues that Lukäcs’s discovery of Marx’s conceptualization of a ‘species essence’ in 
the Manuscripts (made after his writing History and Class Consciousness) was the cause of a “great 
intellectual shock” for Lukäcs. See Heller, “Lukäcs’ Later Philosophy”, pp. 177-178.
234 Ernst Bloch, “Aktualität und Utopie: Zu Lukäcs’ Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein”, Der Neue 
Merkur, October 1923-March 1924, pp. 475-477. This review is reprinted in his Philosophische 
Aufsätze zur objektiven Phantasie (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, 1969), pp. 598-621. Bloch’s 
particular critique of the problem of Lukäcs’s theorization of Being referenced to this later edition 
occurs on pages 620-621.
235 Georg Lukäcs, Gespräche mit Georg Lukäcs (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1967), p. 101. Quoted in 
Meszäros, Lukäcs’ Concept o f Dialectic, p. 44.
236 Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, pp. 8, 142.
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of totality one will be inevitably drawn into viewing the world of fragmented, isolated 
things in a static, unconnected manner, which can only generate a static conception of 
totality - what Istvän Meszäros refers to as “a nostalgic value-postulate of unity” . 237 
According to Lukacs, the undialectical tendency applies as much to Feuerbachian 
humanists as it does to the more superficially “daring” relativists.238 Hence, for 
Lukacs, “relativism moves within an essentially static world”. Relativism necessarily 
assumes its own absolute against which its positions are made meaningful: It is 
therefore a relativism which “only abolishes the absolute in appearance”. Only a 
dialectics of history is able to dissolve these forms of existence into processes and 
view them as “concrete manifestations of history so that the absolute is not so much 
denied as endowed with its concrete historical shape and treated as an aspect o f the 
process itself \ 239 We need, then, to consider how Lukacs theorizes these processes 
and their relation to a broader dialectics of history. This we will consider with his 
analysis of the category of ‘totality’.
*The whole unravelled in an instance Concrete Totalities
The importance of Lukacs’s conceptualization of totality has been frequently 
noted. Martin Jay, for example, refers to it as “one of those rare synthetic visions that 
launch a new paradigm or problematic in thought” . 240 The fundamental issue at stake 
within the concept is that of seeing a supremacy of the whole over the parts, such that 
the relatedness of parts may be theorized from the point of view of their overcoming. 
To do otherwise, according to Lukacs, would be to succumb to a fetishism of the 
‘facts’, to isolated aspects of social life. Such an understanding is precisely the 
ascendance of a fetishized reality upon which the ideological depends. Rather than 
being an abstract collection of unrelated facts, reality is the ‘unity of diverse 
elements’ .241 The complexity of reality, according to Lukacs, can only be understood 
as a concrete totality. Lukacs’s theory then, as Bubner describes it, consists in
237 Meszäros, Lukacs ’ Concept of Dialectic, p. 64.
238 In a cursory aside, Lukacs refers to Nietzsche and Oswald Spengler, for example, as espousing a 
“decadent version of the very rationalism or religiosity they mean to oppose”. By failing to make 
reality dialectical, he argues, the ‘relativists’ merely “ossify into an ‘eternal’ limit of a biological or 
pragmatic sort” the philosophy of human essence they present. The culture of the class that they assail 
is always presented as that which “embodies the authentic spiritual values”, rather than one which is in 
“a state of flux”. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 188.
239 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, pp. 187-188.
240 Jay, Marxism and Totality, p. 103.
241 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 9.
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“harnessing together conscious reflection and the structural totality of the whole” . 242 
Truth is both substance and subject, as Lukäcs interprets Hegel, and this truth must 
both provide an “overall view” and a means by which reality can be transcended. 243
The idea of dialectical unity is fundamental to this understanding of the 
knowable. In it is implied not only a dialectical unity of subject and object, cause and 
effect, as well as what Lukäcs refers to as the “mirror and motor” of the historical 
process, but also a dialectics of time. Thus, in his work is theorized the Marxian, and 
indeed Nietzschean, view of a will to the future. In the totality must be the 
“overcoming [of] the present”, argues Lukäcs. 244 This totality is the unity of theory 
and practice. The totality is concrete in the Hegelian sense of being many-sided, fully 
related and complexly mediated. Lukäcs’s particular conceptualization of the totality 
has, for this reason, been referred to as ‘expressive’, in the sense that the whole is 
understood as a product of its own creation. 245 The relation between subject and 
object must be a constant mediation between past and future. 246 A knowledge of the 
present, a self-knowledge of the subject’s social situation and an elucidation of its 
necessity, must all connect with an equally concrete sense of an historical future. 247
It is important to note that Lukäcs’s concept of totality, emerging as it does 
from a critique of the fragmentation of contemporary life, is not in any sense the 
suggestion of the possibility of revealing a hidden wholeness, rationality or necessary 
coherence of experience. In Soul and Form, Lukäcs makes it quite clear that those 
who search for an order or “unison of all dissonances” embark upon a fruitless 
journey. 248 Such attempts are bound to flatten and distort the very real and valuable 
tensions and contradictions that arise from a dissonant world. 249 What the concept of 
totality is able to do is to account for such contradictions. It is nonetheless 
worthwhile considering whether the concept of totality can allow for contradictions 
for which no resolution might exist. According to Kadarkay, Karl Jaspers’ criticism 
of Lukäcs’s concept of totality concerns more generally what such a concept might 
mean for the idea of human freedom, which Jaspers feels presupposes the inability to
242 Rüdiger Bubner, Modern German Philosophy, trans. Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), p. 169. See Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 12.
243 Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, pp. 39, 38.
244 Ibid., p. 316.
245 Stedman-Jones, “The Marxism of the Early Lukäcs”, p. 39.
246 Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 159.
247 Ibid., pp. 159,203.
248 Lukäcs, Soul and Form, p. 48.
249 Ibid., p. 49.
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fully grasp the truth or a complete understanding of ultimate questions. 250 But as we 
will consider shortly, as momentously transforming as Lukacs makes his concept of 
consciousness, it is not really for the purpose of ultimate knowledge but for 
proletarian self-knowledge.
It might be argued that Lukacs inevitably equates these two by seeing a 
realization of the telos as a potential outcome of a true subject-object identity, but this 
issue is somewhat clouded by an equally insistent emphasis upon the open nature of 
any transition. There is, for Lukacs, as much as there was for Benjamin, a clear 
recognition of only “a weak Messianic power” with which their generation had been 
endowed.251 Leaving open the question of whether Dostoevsky’s place as a theorist of 
the new world is that of a beginning or already a completion, Lukacs finds in our 
hopes for this new world beyond the age of absolute sinfulness, “hopes which are 
signs of a world to come, still so weak that it can easily be crushed by the sterile 
power of the merely existent” . 252 Lukäcs’s concept of totality is specifically pitched at 
the level of social existence, which, as we have seen, means for him an understanding 
of subjectivity within processes of objectification. In History and Class 
Consciousness, this is taken to be the subjectivity of classes within capitalist relations 
of exploitation. Any attempt to account for a type of totality in individual terms is 
dismissed by him as a form of psychologism, bound ultimately to result in an 
unproductive nihilism. Totality is then, for his philosophy, very much an historical 
concept. To broaden out its applicability to all social existence would be to 
universalize the particular - whereas capitalism he considers to be a specific and 
unique occurrence within the history of human societies. It is partly for this reason 
that he found economic determinism, such as that of the orthodox Marxists, to be a 
mistaken generalization of historically specific interrelationships.
What the concept of totality does suggest is that a methodology for a critical 
understanding of society is of primary concern to Lukacs. Correctly perceived, the 
totality could entail a conceptual reproduction of reality. The totality is a “real 
historical power”, even where it has not become conscious; it is “the real, ultimate 
ground” of the reality of factual existence, the basis of this reality’s “knowability” . 253
250 Kadarkay refers to various annotations Jaspers made to a copy of History and Class Consciousness 
conveying these criticisms. Kadarkay, Georg Lukacs, p. 272. Jaspers argues against the tranquility of 
any fixed, stable element in the world because of a tendency for such a conceptual element to become 
absolute. See, for example, Karl Jaspers, Reason and Existenz: Five Lectures, trans. William Earle 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956).
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Whilst realities can differ according to subjective stances from which an immediacy 
of reality is perceived, there is, for Lukäcs, an “authentically objective reality” 254 
which the totality can reveal. Lukäcs stresses that this does not mean that the totality 
should be understood as some sort of mechanical aggregate of historical events - 
history’s totality “is itself a real historical power”, a power whose changing forms are 
able to determine “the objective nature” of one’s inner and outer life.255 By ignoring 
the interrelatedness of historical objects and subjects that the concept of totality 
explains, we merely prolong a state of “pure immediacy”. The complicated process of 
mediation as an aspect of dialectical reality can allow one to comprehend “the real 
tendencies” of objects themselves.256 Lukäcs argues that a failure to take such 
mediations into account results in the elevation of basic antinomies of thought - 
between subject and object, form and content, freedom and necessity, phenomena or 
appearances and noumena or essential things-in-themselves - as an unquestionable 
reality. Such a situation is the basis of the ideological structure of reification in 
consciousness - its etemalization as a natural, external outcome of a phenomenon that 
has done away with mediation and instead ensured a chasm between the subject and 
object of knowledge - what Lukäcs describes, in Fichtean terms, as a dark and empty 
murky void.257 It is not merely an unbridgeable gap in thought or conceptualization 
but is, as in Lukäcs’s use of Bloch’s expression, a ‘pernicious chasm’ within life.258 
But having theorized the basis for understanding the ‘real tendencies’ within objects 
themselves, what does Lukäcs have to say in relation to the ‘real tendencies’ of 
subjectivity?
The critique of the distance wrought between subject and object becomes, for 
Lukäcs, the basis of his critique of ideology. Quoting Hegel, Lukäcs refers to the 
enigma that consciousness can become to itself, where consciousness ceases to 
“regard the effects of its deeds as its own deeds” . 259 This is precisely the type of 
consciousness required for ideology to work effectively. In place of a situated, 
dialectically mediated conceptualization of the interrelatedness of subject and object 
must arise an abstract, alienated, empty sense of the mere immediacy of all
254 Ibid., p. 150.
255 Ibid., pp. 152, 153.
256 Ibid., p. 153.
257 Ibid., p. 157.
258 Ibid., p. 158.
259 Ibid., p. 159. Lukäcs also considers this understanding of experience in Hegel at length in his work 
on Hegel. See Georg Lukäcs, The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and 
Economics, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin, 1975), especially Part IV, chap. 3. For 
reasons of space we will not refer to this work in any substantial manner. It contains, however, many 
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phenomena. It is both an acquiescence to what is and a distance from any 
engagement with a present in which the future also resides. Lukacs’s concept of 
historical totality perhaps is, then, a way to grasp both hope and memory contained 
within the relation between subject and object in the present. The way to seize this 
totality is to act consciously, to bring together knowing and acting. It is no doubt for 
this reason that Mesterhäzi considers Histoiy and Class Consciousness to be a secular 
version of St. Augustine’s City o f God.260 Redemption can come to those who seek a 
path out of the alienated homelessness of the present. But the problem is in the way 
in which this redemption is approached or in what it is that clouds its attainment. We 
can look out upon the horizon of the infinite but, as Nietzsche reminds us, still be 
homesick for the land “as if it offered more freedom” and even do so when there is no 
longer any land.261 As a methodological counter to reification it is not surprising that, 
for Lukacs, an engagement with history is a matter of consciousness. For it is only by 
knowing one’s suffering that one can see the rest of the world clearly. It is this 
dynamic reality that Lukacs believes can be conceptualized via the totality. The 
necessary first step towards a conceptualization of this totality is a conscious 
recognition of one’s place within an alienated present in order to achieve a possible, 
transformed future. For this reason Lukacs explores the matter of consciousness. It is 
to a conceptualization of consciousness that we will now turn in order to assess how 
successfully Lukacs’s use of the idea of consciousness addresses the problem of 
alienation.
Section Three: Liberation from Ideology
We must always emphasize that our soul is the only essence, and that all a priori 
eternal objectifications o f the soul are (in the words o f Ernst Bloch’s fine metaphor) 
only paper-money whose value depends on their convertibility into gold.
Lukacs, Letter to Paul Ernst
A Philosophy of Consciousness
Turning the modus vivendi of modem existence into that of buying and selling 
would come to alter all the significant relationships people have with their sense of
260 Miklös Mesterhäzi, A messianizmus törtenetfilzöfusa: Lukacs György munkässäga a huszas evekben 
(Budapest: Lukacs Archivum, 1987), quoted in Kadarkay, Georg Lukacs, p. 273.
261 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, par. 124.
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self, their relation to other people and to their relation with the world. That around 
this pattern of venal, simoniacal exchange there would develop curious forms of 
attachment -  some have argued ‘enchantment’ -  is a development that has served only 
to make the issue of commodification of more intense, if not indeed unnerving, 
interest. Some of the aspects of this attachment appear vividly, if not gaudily, in the 
imagination, as Benjamin, for example, has theorized in the ‘profane illumination’ of 
contemporary existence; other aspects seem more distant and remote to our immediate 
comprehension -  perhaps most particularly within the so-called ‘estrangement effect’ 
itself, the moments of self-realization and discovery through the winding ideological 
detours and distancing of a nauseating alienation.262 The strange forms of attachment 
and allure that developed around a commodified world gave rise also to an 
unmistakable disenchantment. This jarring, often traumatic experience of the promise 
and simulation of a type of satisfaction and active participation in the midst of a 
perpetual dissatisfaction - a constant, gnawing hunger without really knowing why 
one hungers - would come to characterize much experience within the world of 
commodified lives. This state of stupefied distraction, an alienated unknowing, 
provided and continues to provide a conducive medium for the perpetuation and 
reinvention of ideological forms through which meaning is congealed and 
decomposed. It is this situation that we want to understand more thoroughly. What is 
it that Lukäcs is able to offer a critique of ideology that encompasses this 
understanding of the spectacle of commodification and the disenchantment of the 
world? Lukäcs has provided us with a number of provocative ways in which we can 
begin to situate the problem of a spectacle of commodification. Thus far we have 
considered something of the process by which a fracturing of subject and object 
comes about and some of the reasons why this fracturing is able to displace a 
knowledge of self and to result in a certain renouncing of the self. We have also 
looked at how Lukäcs views this subjectivity of a commodified world in relation to a 
sense of wholeness or totality as a potential process of the self-undoing of the 
ideological. What we now want to consider is how Lukäcs theorizes a counter to 
ideology within such a deeply ideological world, and specifically how he allows for 
the role of the consciousness as a significant counteraction to an otherwise seemingly 
inexorable drift towards the eclipse of self-knowledge.
262 For a reference to this ‘estrangement-effect’ (Verfremdungs-Effekt), see Ernst Bloch, Literary 
Essays, trans. Andrew Joron and others (Stanford: Stanford University Press), p. 245.
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Consciousness as Ethics
We have already considered that Lukäcs’s work is a critique of the reification 
of social relations and, as such, seeks to reveal the bleak, immense expanse of 
alienation, often in forms in which it appears at its most distilled, against the backdrop 
of the history of class politics, a history which constantly threatens alienation’s 
comfortable continuation. We have also just noted that Lukäcs theorizes a knowledge 
of the world in order to suggest a path to its overcoming and transcendence - grasping 
the totality is the means to unravelling its alienating power. It is on the basis of these 
ideas that Lukäcs theorizes the place of an agent within history capable of bringing 
about the fundamental change he believes necessary to rid society of its alienated 
condition. Lukäcs theorizes an identity between the subject and the object that can be 
realized historically through the consciousness of those whom he feels have greatest 
reason to change their conditions, the working class. Whilst capitalism has created a 
deep paralysis of the will, turning all its subjects into passive spectators of the 
commodified spectacle, it has also given enormous reason for the development of 
self-awareness or consciousness, which, for Lukäcs, is ultimately the power to 
transform one’s conditions.
That Lukäcs installs such a momentous historical task in the working class is 
perhaps less curious than it might at first seem from the perspective of contemporary 
philosophy. As we will shortly consider, the sort of consciousness which Lukäcs 
believes possible for the proletariat to possess is an ‘imputed’ class consciousness: It 
is not an actual class consciousness nor that which he feels the proletariat ought 
necessarily to have. It is imputed in the sense of being theoretically derived from the 
particular totality of historical conditions in which the subject exists. Whether this 
actually helps his analysis of consciousness is of course a relevant question; the 
somewhat defensive sense of an ‘imputed’ consciousness would, somewhat 
worryingly, seem to be presented as possessing a more empirical, rationalist basis 
than the notion of a moral imperative. I have already indicated a determinist tendency 
in this kind of theorizing which Lukäcs presents, but, as it is put forward, it is a 
perfectly logical conclusion for Lukäcs to derive from his own understanding of 
totality. Consciousness is imputed because it derives fundamentally from the totality 
in which the commodified, reified subject exists.
Secondly, it is important to appreciate something of the period in which 
Lukäcs was writing. Far too many commentators seem somewhat bewildered by 
Lukäcs’s continued emphasis upon a proletariat whose demise they have merely 
prematurely presumed, largely, it would seem, upon the basis of taking stock of
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shifting philosophical interests rather than any engagement with the events of the 
period. We mentioned in the previous chapter something of the historical situatedness 
of Lukäcs’s concern with consciousness. Let us briefly summarize some of this 
terrain here. Lukäcs began writing History and Class Consciousness just two years 
after the 1917 October Revolution in Russia and less than one year after the 
revolutionary upsurge of November and December 1918 in Germany; during the 
popular rise of the nationalist and socialist groupings in Ireland in the same year; 
during both the 1919 German and Hungarian Revolutions, the working class 
occupations of factories in Italy in 1919 and 1920; during the 1921 revolution in 
Germany, the Turkish Revolution of 1921-1922; and at the time of the workers’ 
uprisings in the early 1920s in both Spain and Portugal. The scope of types of 
working class activity and its consequences cuts searingly into this period. 
Monarchical and autocratic regimes were toppled,263 democratic republican 
constitutions were established, elections were inaugurated and some extension of the 
franchise occurred.264 Land reform and redistribution was undertaken,265 labour laws 
were introduced and some recognition of trade unions took place. 266 Where the threat 
of socialism existed, capital and its military responded mostly with brutal 
suppression.267 The 1918 Finnish Civil War,268 the defeat of working class
263 As well as the fall of the Tsarist rulers and the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, socialists in 
Luxemburg attempted a coup in 1918 aimed at toppling the monarchy. The Greek monarchy was 
overthrown in 1924.
264 For an analysis of the various patterns of democratisation in Europe and elsewhere see Göran 
Therbom’s article “The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy”, New Left Review, no. 103 
(May/June 1977): pp. 3-41. It is well worth pointing out that a number of European countries did not 
extend the franchise to women until well into this century - Britain in 1928, France and Italy, 1946, 
Belgium, 1948, and Switzerland, not until 1971. Other groups, such as immigrant workers were, and in 
most places continue today to be, excluded from the right of suffrage.
265 Land reform took place in Finland from 1922 with the expropriation of properties of the traditional 
Swedish ruling class landowners as well as in Lithuania. In Greece, land expropriation and 
redistribution to peasants began in 1923.
266 The International Association for Labour Legislation was first set up in 1900. Its office was 
centralized in Basel before the First World War and it then was funded under the League of Nations 
charter to later become the International Labour Organisation. The purpose of the 1LO was largely to 
ensure the even conditions of labour for the interests of capital but the existence of labour laws in 
themselves is also the recognition by capital of the united identity of labour.
267 After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution the foreign policy of France, Britain and the United States 
promoted the idea of using Germany as a bulwark against further uprisings. The eastern states from 
Finland to Poland and Rumania were seen as a potential cordon sanitaire against communism. The 
brief experience of revolution and five months of democratic rule in Hungary was to alarm most 
Western powers. Hungary was blockaded by the West and military action was threatened. When the 
Rumanians advanced on Budapest, Bela Kun, the leader of the Communist and Socialist government, 
fled the country. The new government appointed Admiral Miklös Horthy de Nagybanya, commander 
in chief of the army, and in 1920 proclaimed Hungary a monarchy with a vacant throne. Horthy 
conducted a terror campaign against communism and murdered both communists and liberals. 
Hungary descended in this period into a semi-fascist dictatorship.
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organizations with the institutionalization of fascism in Italy in 1922, the defeat of the 
German Revolution, the crushing of other communist uprisings, were all undertaken 
with a savagery newly motivated by the realization of the revolutionary potential of 
the working class. Economic conditions in Europe at this time shifted from the 
feverish activity on stock exchanges and low unemployment during the boom period 
o f 1919 and 1920, to increased unemployment, the dramatic fall in what had been 
rapidly soaring prices, and generalized recession in the first few years of the 1920s.269 
This was, if anything, a time of ideological instability. It was simply not the case that 
the traditional function of a revolutionary working class had withered and died.
At the same time, tendencies towards the integration o f the majority of people 
into the spectacle of commodification were becoming apparent - as it is indeed this 
general trend which Lukäcs so presciently captures. There is, then, a profound 
difficulty which Lukäcs’s focus upon proletarian consciousness suggests: It is as if the 
historical subject, in the form of a revolutionary proletariat, moves in and out of focus, 
in its moments of absence revealing more a subject of the spectacle, o f consumption 
and passive acquiescence. At the same time, it is only the historical class subject, a 
Promethean subject, and its revolutionary destiny which Lukäcs can explain. Given 
Lukacs’s emphasis upon the problem of reification within a commodified world, it is 
indeed ironic that he does not theorize a ruptured subjectivity entwined within the 
processes of reification, other than to suggest the subject’s suffocation by reification 
or resuscitation via class self-knowledge. These alternatives do not explain the 
persistence of an everyday existence within ideology that no doubt includes both a 
slow asphyxiation beneath consumption’s insistence and episodes of a self-aware 
rejection of its demands, but which also involves various levels of accommodation 
and resistance. But are we perhaps mistaking the essential meaning of a proletarian 
consciousness for Lukäcs? Is it, at its most fundamental, an unveiling of the “human
268 The 1918 Finnish Civil War was fought between the White Guard led by General Mannerheim and 
backed by Germany, and the Red Guard supported by socialist workers and Russians. After a series of 
brutal attacks Mannerheim headed a government recognised by the Allies and then proceeded to 
conduct an anti-socialist terrorist campaign. The anti-communist Lappo Movement was formed and 
later (in 1930) the Communist Party was outlawed.
269 Generally, the initial boom was more dampened and the recovery slower in Eastern Europe. The 
currency crash in Germany in 1923 was nothing less than catastrophic. The German mark depreciated 
from 20,000 to the dollar in January 1923 to 100,000 in June and 5 million in August. When it fell 
from 50 million in early September to 630,000 million in early November it brought complete 
economic breakdown. Savings, paper investments, annuities and pensions became worthless overnight. 
See David Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 607. This was in 
every sense, as Thomson argues, “a psychological as well as economic collapse”. Ibid.
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‘We’”, that we are presented with, as Bloch argues - a collective subject or otherness 
we find unfolding itself in history? 270
The issue to consider is what type of being or possibility Lukacs theorizes as 
embroiled in the problem of reification. Certainly Lukacs’s concern with the issue of 
consciousness is an intensely interesting way in which the problem of ideology can be 
approached. What Marshall Berman refers to as Lukacs’s “Socratic demand for 
communal self-knowledge” , 271 continues to engage us today, as does the idea of some 
form of redemption from an alienated world. For Lukacs, the specific influences of 
Kant and Fichte on consciousness and self-consciousness, as much as Hegel and Marx 
on freedom, are a fundamental part of this theorization. On this basis, some 
expectation of the development of a theorization of a consciousness of possibility 
arises. Why the conception of imputed class consciousness he then puts forward is 
quite so devoid of an analysis of particularities of conscious desires, wishes and 
values on the part of the subject of his investigation, is not entirely clear. Certainly, it 
can be explained partly on the basis of Lukacs’s overwhelming focus upon the object 
of domination and the general mechanics of a commodified system: But equally so we 
are confronted with the idea of a self-contained subjectivity that delimits rather than 
extends our sense of what consciousness might be - and particularly what it might be 
beyond the sort of objective determinants Lukacs so tightly pins it to. There is 
ultimately too homogenous a depiction of this subject, a subject who seems unable to 
move within the circumstances of a reified existence, and unable to realize a ‘human 
We’ beyond an engagement with the logic by which it is commanded.
Lukacs’s interest in consciousness clearly does not derive from any 
enthusiastic engagement with psychoanalysis. We mentioned in the previous chapter 
that he considered Freud to have misunderstood the psychology of everyday life with 
what he saw as a wrongly inverted analysis of symptom formation - by attempting, for 
example, to understand ‘the workings of the normal mind’ from the study of 
pathological conditions.272 The central problem with a psychoanalysis is that it starts 
out, according to Lukacs, “from the ontological dogma of the solitariness of man” . 273 
Although this view accords suspiciously well with the Stalinist hostility to 
psychoanalysis, this response is little different from Lukacs’s much earlier views of
270 Bloch, “Aktualität und Utopie”, p. 599.
271 Marshall Berman, “Georg Lukacs’s Cosmic Chutzpah”, in Georg Lukacs: Theory, Culture, and 
Politics, eds., Judith Marcus and Zoltan Tarr (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1989), p. 142.
272 See Lukacs, The Meaning o f Contemporary Realism, p. 30.
273 Ibid.
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the problems associated with an emphasis upon subjective claims to totality.274 
Lukacs not only sees an intersubjectivity - each action “the consequence of many 
thousands of waves” 275 - but that the totality could only be achieved through the 
objectification of subjectivity. Lukacs takes as given the possibility of a 
consciousness connecting the subject and object of experience in a way not unlike 
Plato’s concept of the metaxy, the in-between of subject and object, except, in 
Lukacs’s case, this assumption is taken a step further by his insistence upon a subject 
whose knowledge of the whole is a part of a collective destiny based upon economic 
experience. Lukacs’s reading of Vico’s verum-factum principle has been cited as the 
basis of this universalization of the subject, 276 but the attempt to find a subjective basis 
for the process of the recognition of objectification in the shape of the proletariat is as 
much the result of Lukacs’s particular interpretation of Leninism. Certainly, in 
History and Class Consciousness we are presented with the idea of the ultimate unity 
of subject and object: But this interest in the subjective is as it exists in universal 
terms, as a universal collective will. Any emphasis, he argues, upon the individual 
level of attempts to achieve wholeness can give only an insubstantial account of 
activity - an alternation of the kingdoms of Lilliput and Brobdingnag. At its best it 
will be ambiguous, at its worst little more than fanciful imagining. “Where 
psychology begins”, warns Lukacs sternly, “there are no more deeds but only motives 
for deeds” . 277 As much as there might be good reason to highlight this divide it is 
obvious that Lukacs steadfastly refuses to consider a level of the unconscious within 
consciousness or of individual aspects of consciousness. As we have already 
mentioned, given Lukacs’s deep sensitivity to the effects of reified realities this 
avoidance of the impact of commodification upon different aspects of consciousness 
appears somewhat odd and often, indeed, mistaken.
In History and Class Consciousness, Lukacs quite obviously considers any 
notion of the isolated individual to be an example of reification: But what exactly 
does he mean here? It is one thing to subject to critique presumptions regarding the 
isolated existence of individuals - those accounts which give no regard to the 
connectedness of people as social beings - but it is another entirely to then upon this 
basis assume that any consideration of the self is unwarranted. Lukacs seems to make
274 It should be mentioned here that Ferenc Feher argues that Lukacs’s hostility to psychology was a 
rejection of its empiricism “which explains nothing because the ‘soul’ [...] is a result of free action; it 
is not determined by any external factors”. This is obviously a very different and interesting 
interpretation of Lukacs’s position. Feher, “Lukacs in Weimar”, p. 91.
275 Lukacs, Soul and Form, p. 112.
276 See, for example, Jay, Marxism and Totality, pp. 107-108.
277 Lukacs, Soul and Form, p. 39.
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this category mistake with his insistence that the realm of the self is necessarily 
reified. It is only the proletarian class subject he argues who can cease to be “a 
detached spectator of the process” .278 Hence he declares in his otherwise entirely 
justified critique of bourgeois notions of ‘negative freedom’ that: “Above all one 
thing must be made clear: freedom here does not mean the freedom of the individual”. 
Let us, however, consider this a little more carefully: Lukäcs is not arguing against the 
attainment of the freedom of the individual - he believes that it is possible for this to 
become a reality. What he argues against is a type of freedom which he considers is 
compromised by capitalist social relations. It is a freedom of the egoist, a freedom 
vis-ä-vis other equally isolated individuals. This freedom Lukäcs feels is the 
renunciation of real freedom.279 But this is precisely the crux of the problem which 
Lukäcs creates for himself by situating any conscious steps on the part of the self 
toward the realization of freedom as the ultimate denial of true freedom. Individual 
freedom, he claims, cannot be anything other than “corrupt and corrupting”, it can 
only be “a case of unilateral privilege based on the unfreedom of others”; for this 
reason there must be a conscious subordination of the self to that of the collective 
will, which, according to Lukäcs, is simply “destined to bring real freedom into 
being” . 280 Although we will not consider this issue, which could comprise a lengthy 
study in its own right, this conscious collective will is, for Lukäcs, the Communist 
Party. Where Dilthey had posited death as the complete and only moment of 
totalization, for Lukäcs, it is the will of the party.
It is as if Lukäcs cannot countenance the idea of a freedom of the individual 
that is not an egoistic conceit steeped in selfishness. And yet is one’s own struggle for 
freedom necessarily the disregard either of others or of the structure of unfreedom in 
which people exist? Lukäcs seems to think it is, misunderstanding, I would argue, the 
paragraph he quotes from Marx in which Marx talks in messianic terms of the need to 
make room “for people who will be equal to a new world” .281 We are bound here to 
see in Marx’s comment echoes of Jesus’ warning to the Pharisees.282 It is only those 
who can traverse the narrow gate to “the road that leads to life” who will find 
freedom. Those who will be equal will be those who have recognized the unfreedom 
of society but also those who have consciously grasped their own freedom. In The 
Theory o f the Novel, Lukäcs had understood “the perfect immanent distancelessness”
278 Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 21.
279 Ibid., p. 315.
280 Ibid.
281 Lukäcs quotes from Marx’s Class Struggles in France. See Lukäcs, Histoiy and Class 
Consciousness, p. 315.
282 “For many are called but few are chosen”. Matt. 22: 14.
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of Dante’s figures who, as individuals, consciously place themselves in opposition to 
a reality that is becoming closed to them.283 In Histoiy and Class Consciousness, even 
while acting out their lives, people remain “the object and not the subject of events” .284 
Reality as an impinging, constitutive form - a sense which Bloch recognized in 
Lukäcs’s early work285 - has been transformed from a ‘mythologising transcendent 
construct’ into a ‘concrete totality’ that is “oriented towards the concrete content of its 
material substratum” . 286 Here, subjects are capable of ‘action’ and can be 
‘reconstituted’ beyond the realm of disintegration and fragmentation and become one 
with the “real, ultimate ground of their reality and their factual existence” .287 As 
Radnoti argues, Lukacs consistently seeks a standard outside the self. 288 It would, 
however, seem more appropriate to seek this standard both within the self and outside 
the self and in the relation between them.
We are again left in no doubt that, for Lukacs, ideology is the eternal 
imposition of a seeming unity. It is not the fractured disunity of internal and external 
compulsions and desires which Marx sees the self as increasingly susceptible to: For 
Marx, as we will see in a later chapter, the subject is a ‘calculating slave’. For 
Lukacs, the subject ultimately cannot impinge upon the structure of the object, not 
even a perceiving subject who possesses an adequate understanding of the object. 
Thus he argues that when a slave becomes conscious of herself as a slave this is not a 
question of self-knowledge: “Between a ‘thinking’ slave and an ‘unconscious’ slave 
there is no real distinction to be drawn in an objective social sense”, Lukacs 
declares.289 The only self-knowledge that qualifies is the practical self-knowledge of 
the worker understanding herself as a commodity, according to Lukacs. Knowledge 
that counts is only that knowledge which brings about an objective structural change 
in the object of knowledge. But how is this to be judged? For Lukacs, it is the 
process that allows consciousness to awaken and become social reality - nothing else 
qualifies. What then is Lukacs able to tell us of the subject who he believes can be 
ideology’s undoing?
283 Lukacs, The Theory o f the Novel, p. 68.
284 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 135.
285 Ernst Bloch, Essays on the Philosophy o f Music, trans. Peter Palmer (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), p. 14.
286 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, pp. 137, 145, 137.
287 Ibid., p. 152.
2S8 Radnoti, “Bloch and Lukacs: Two Radical Critiques in a ‘God-Forsaken World”’, p. 163.
289 Lukacs, Histoiy and Class Consciousness, p. 169.
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The Proletariat as the ‘angel of history’290
In History and Class Consciousness, those who are chosen are members of the 
class that has been most subjected to the ideological ramifications of capitalist society. 
This class has become a universal class because of its place in history. The historical 
role of the proletariat assumes a central significance in Lukacs’s theory of reification 
both as an objective part of the structure of the reified ideology of bourgeois society 
and as a part of a political process of revolutionary change. The proletariat is never 
simply a detached spectator, nor just the active and passive part of the process of 
history. The proletariat as subject is also a part of the materiality of social reality. 
There is no ultimate goal or essence of the proletariat; this would only mean a relapse 
into a “utopian dualism of subject and object” .291 But it is in this sense that Lukacs’s 
construction of a proletariat as some kind of ideal force - an ‘angel of history’, as it 
were - pitted against a largely static view of reified relations, constitutes a new turn 
for Marxist theory, a turn whose consequences are problematic. 292
290 The ‘angel of history’ is Walter Benjamin’s phrase. He describes an angel whose “face is turned 
toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps 
piling wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and 
make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in the 
wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him 
into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward.” See 
Benjamin, Illuminations, pp. 257-258. For Benjamin, the angel is the class of the oppressed, “the 
depository of historical knowledge”. See ibid., p. 260.
291 Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 22.
292 Lukacs’s abstraction of the idea of alienation in order to theorize the pervasive nature of reification 
within capitalist society, and the particular dialectical method he employs to account for the relation 
between reification and consciousness are the two central contributions made within History and Class 
Consciousness to what is taken to be an ‘historical materialist’ theory of ideology. These contributions 
have, however, received much criticism, particularly from those theorists who argue that the conception 
of class consciousness Lukäcs develops for this analysis reveals an underlying idealism within his 
philosophical approach. Such idealism is more usually detected in Lukacs’s claim that the proletariat 
represents an identical subject-object of history. This approach to Lukacs’s work occupies much of the 
critical treatment of History and Class Consciousness. Very broadly, it divides critical response 
between those who argue that Lukäcs suppresses an account of the actual consciousness of the 
proletariat to Communist Party wishful thinking, and those who argue that the expression of proletarian 
practice can never be fully equated with ‘scientific’ theory. Löwy, for example, argues that a divide 
exists between the empiricist and the theoreticist critics of Lukäcs. See Löwy, Georg Lukäcs, pp. 176- 
177. Others, such as Alex Callinicos, reject Lukäcs’s concept of an identical subject-object because it 
is the reintroduction into Marxism of the Hegelian ‘Absolute Idea’. In other words, for Callinicos, this 
is the idea of a transcendental subject, an idea which cannot be maintained alongside the idea of class 
within capitalist society, which he views as being as much a creation as it is a creator of that society. 
Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy, pp. 77-78. Whilst the general argument concerning Lukäcs’s 
idealism has been an important exercise in establishing one’s position within the idealist/materialist and 
Hegelian/anti-Hegelian divides, it has nonetheless somewhat unsurprisingly left a number of important 
questions unanswered. For Lukäcs, the identical subject-object of the historical process refers to the 
process by which the class consciousness of the proletariat becomes real in practice, in other words, the 
process by which the proletariat becomes capable of an adequate social consciousness. See his essay, 
“Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat”, History and Class Consciousness, especially 
pp. 171-209. This emphasis upon desired activity has its own problems, however, particularly in
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For Lukäcs, it is the proletariat who, with an awareness of its situation, will by 
this very realization overcome ideology and thus capitalism itself. Such a view of the 
proletariat is, in general terms, nothing particularly novel for a revolutionary to hold, 
but what is new in Lukacs’s writing is the attempt to give a precise ontological basis 
to the subject of class consciousness in a purely economic sense. In his depiction of 
the proletariat, Lukäcs is fundamentally concerned with avoiding any compromise 
with both vulgar empiricism and what he sees as utopianism. Thus, in the reworked 
1922 version of his essay “What is Orthodox Marxism?”, he writes: “Every attempt to 
rescue the ‘ultimate goal’ or the ‘essence’ of the proletariat from every impure contact 
with - capitalist - existence leads ultimately to the same remoteness from reality, from 
‘practical, critical activity’, and to the same relapse into the utopian dualism of subject 
and object, of theory and practice to which Revisionism has succumbed”.293 Lukacs’s 
rejection here of any sort of idealist voluntarism in explaining the role of the 
proletariat is significant for a revolutionary dialectics explaining the function of 
reification. Löwy interprets this dualist counterposition within Lukacs’s method as 
the basis for defining class consciousness as an “objective possibility”.294 But by 
ridding himself of any sense of the utopian within consciousness, Lukäcs is left with 
only the hope of a collective will whose messianic power is weak and whose action 
and knowledge may not coincide with any realization of socialistic freedom.
The concept of historical change upon which Lukäcs’s depiction of class 
consciousness rests is that of the unity of continuity and discontinuity. There is an 
interactive relation between the subject and object, this relation being fused in the 
realization of consciousness. Importantly, this class consciousness implies for Lukäcs 
a “class-conditioned unconsciousness of one’s own socio-historical and economic 
condition”.295 By this we can take Lukäcs to mean a lack of awareness and knowledge 
of one’s situation that is, however, the most important element of the subject’s 
existence. Herein, of course, resides the ideological. There is at the same time the 
determining domination of the whole over the parts of social reality which underlies 
the idea of a totality which is mediated by human activity. Of this Lukäcs writes: “In 
every aspect of daily life in which the individual worker imagines himself to be the 
subject of his own life he finds this to be an illusion that is destroyed by the 
immediacy of his existence.”296 In order to change this social reality, history from the
relation to where the ideological of a commodified existence might fit within a theorization of how 
consciousness is ‘imputed’.
29j Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 22.
294 Löwy, Georg Lukäcs, p. 175.
295 Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 52.
296 Ibid., p. 165.
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standpoint of the proletariat must be realized. 297 Once such a raising above the role of 
the object occurs, one’s consciousness becomes “the self-consciousness of the 
commodity” - in other words, the self-knowledge of a society founded upon 
commodification. Here, Lukäcs deliberately introduces a level of understanding of 
consciousness beyond that of a consciousness ‘o f an object. The sort of 
consciousness he outlines is a particular kind of self-consciousness - a consciousness 
that is capable of modifying the way in which consciousness and object are related.298
This is obviously not a false consciousness thesis of ideology and yet its 
division between types of class consciousness expresses parallels with such a view. 
Lukäcs recognizes that under everyday capitalist circumstances ruling ideologies act 
not upon an otherwise ‘true’ consciousness but more upon a consciousness in the 
process of becoming. It is, however, what this consciousness becomes that gives us 
cause for concern. Lukäcs needs to rid his idea of self-consciousness of anything too 
spontaneously outside the purview of a known process of self-revelation in relation 
strictly to a system of commodification. Without this tightly (self)-controlled process, 
the subject “might still ‘accidentally’ choose itself for an object” .299 Lukäcs convinces 
us of the “deadening effects of the mechanism of reification” but ultimately presents 
us with a similarly deadening view of subjectivity. 300 Of all that subjectivity might be, 
Lukäcs sees only a self-identity with the object of the subject’s reification. Lukäcs 
freezes the potentiality of any moment of awakening, restricting it to a unilateral 
capacity to perceive nothing more, unfortunately, than the process of exchange itself. 
In addition we can see that in the transition to a revolutionary consciousness a greater 
awareness of objective class situations is considered to emerge. Such a view must 
therefore suppose that revolutionary proletarian ideologies attain a decisive distance 
from the dominant capitalist ideology so as to achieve the end of one consciousness 
and the beginning of another. Such a view sets class ideologies against each other 
rather than seeing that ideology, as it functions within capitalist relations, is merely a 
form in which an array of antagonistic relations and ideas is played out. Subjectivity 
exists in and against social relations. For Lukäcs, it is as if we exist either inside the 
illusions of the system or outside their possible function. There is little sense in his 
concept of alienation of this form existing in a state of constant establishment and re­
establishment; rather, there is the established reality of capitalism’s reification, to be 
accepted by the proletariat or finally denied.
297 Within contradiction the concepts of ‘is’ and ‘what ought to be’ are transcended.
298 Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 168.
299 Ibid., pp. 168, 169.
300 Ibid., p. 139.
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The usefulness of Lukacs’s account of the historical role of the proletariat here 
is limited to theorizing a social, active agent in the processes of social change, and in 
seeing such change not merely as the progressive interaction of objects but as “a 
change in the form of objectivity itself’ . 301 Lukäcs posits an uneasy version of 
ideology critique, firstly by conceptualizing ideology in relation to the objectified 
processes of commodification, but also because his theorization of the outcome of 
class antagonism for ideology is unclear. Viewing ideology merely in relation to 
ruling class interests is an insufficient basis for a theory of the function of ideology. 
Whilst Lukäcs sees ideology as the system’s veil, recognizing its power in terms of its 
function for capitalism, it is, he argues, through the “ideology of the ruling class” that 
people confront reification, rather than confronting it in terms of one’s own multi­
faceted relation to the system itself. 302 Lukacs’s use of the idea of reification certainly 
moves beyond the idea of singular, unified interests. The idea of multiple layers of 
interests is in essence that conception found in Marx’s Grundrisse, in which he 
explains social phenomena in terms of their many and different determinations.303 
Despite Lukacs’s sometime emphasis upon gradations of consciousness an oddly 
objectivist subjectivism within his approach remains. 304 What Lukäcs sees as 
‘authentic’ within the class consciousness of the proletariat is formulated in projected 
and theoretically external terms. Thus he arrives at a view of essentially class 
contested ideologies rather than contested ideology itself in relation to subjectivity.
301 Ibid., p. 13. These critical insights make arguments as to his inescapable idealism seem less urgent. 
It is also the case that the general argument as to Lukacs’s philosophical idealism tends now to cover 
somewhat sterile ground and, as Löwy’s brief defence of Lukacs’s theoretical position in History and 
Class Consciousness shows, can easily be countered with statements to the contrary. See Löwy, Georg 
Lukäcs, p. 174. Löwy, for example, extracts a number of quotes from Lukacs’s essay “What is 
Orthodox Marxism?” which express arguments against voluntarism and the idea of abstract ideals. 
Moreover, it is more interesting to consider whether Lukacs’s conception of ideology is able to theorize 
contradiction as intended by his formulation of a dialectical method, and whether this conception of 
reification theorizes the contradictory nature of ideology and its relation to subjectivity as centred 
within capitalist relations.
302 Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 14.
303 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 85. Even common elements are split and “segmented many times over”. The 
point of theory is to trace out the inner connexion of social phenomena. See Marx, Capital, vol. 1,
p. 28.
304 Lukacs’s remark in his self-criticism is telling in relation to this point. He explains that what he 
intended to do with the idea of an authentic class consciousness was that which Lenin had done in What 
is to be done? Like Lenin, Lukäcs wanted to explain an implanted consciousness from outside 
economic antagonism and capitalist relations in contrast with the idea of a spontaneously emerging 
consciousness. In his criticism of his own use of this idea, Lukäcs merely chastises himself for 
transforming this notion into “a purely intellectual result and thus something contemplative”, and 
applauds Lenin’s “authentic Marxist analysis of a practical movement”. Lukäcs fails to appreciate 
similar difficulties with Lenin’s notion of ‘consciousness from outside’, a notion which is just as 
susceptible to a contrived counterposition between ‘spontaneous’ and ‘authentic’ activity. See Lukäcs, 
Histoiy and Class Consciousness, p. xviii.
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What we have lost from view is any greater sense of a gradual unfolding of 
humanization - what Steiner refers to as that “immensely difficult attempt by man to 
become man” . 305 We are left very unsure as to by what it is we might judge an 
authentic humanity.306 The coherence which Lukäcs assumes in an authentic 
consciousness must imply an overcoming of every fractured sense of what it means to 
be human, including that of one’s existence in any ideological expression of human 
strivings. And yet we are not given any real appreciation of how the individual might 
struggle to achieve this, or particularly how a psyche so damaged by the ravages of 
reified thought might recover sufficiently in order to realize its imputed form.
At one level, it is apparent that Lukäcs avoids the gilded trap of fatalism by 
subjecting the determinations of capitalist society to the transformative potential of 
the agency of a subject. At another level, this methodological requirement of a 
transcending and authentic political practice on the part of the proletariat immediately 
suggests that the reified ideology that the proletariat must overturn is a coherent, 
impervious whole, a monologic demanding complete compliance or rejection. The 
problem is that the very persistence of forms of ideology seems to suggest that the 
character of ideology is otherwise - that it is at times flexible to the point of risking its 
continuation, that it is weak, vertiginous, inconsistent and often prone to crises of 
legitimation. It is not simply that the consciousness which faces an ideological world 
approaches with gradations of class consciousness and self-realization: Ideology has 
its own gradations; its murky sediment and its more penetrable suspension; its 
cumbrous ballasts and its gossamery textures. The precariousness of ideology does 
not necessarily weaken its function for capitalism; it may in fact accord superficially 
well with a generalized interiorization of contradiction which grips the modemist 
subject. In the light of this critique let us now lastly consider in what ways the idea of 
a liberation from ideology might come through in Lukäcs’s critique of a commodified 
world.
Ideology and the Spectacle of Commodification
Lukäcs offers us a philosophico-aesthetic theorization of the spectacle of 
commodification in order to explain something about the problems the contemporary 
subject confronts in seeking meaning within life. That this resolves itself in an 
examination of the impact of an unavoidable objectivity is hardly an unpredictable
305 Steiner, Language and Silence, p. 172.
306 In a sense, Lukäcs’s resolution of humanity in an ‘authentic class consciousness’ plays a similar 
role to that of the concept of nationalism, which, as Steiner reminds us, is “the venom of our age”. It 
spares the individual the need to examine what she is and where her humanity lies. Ibid., p. 177.
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outcome. There was and continues to be much in the objectivity of commodified life 
which we need to understand. Lukacs’s great contribution to ideology critique has 
been to make quite clear the problem of a subject/object dialectic that the commodity 
form reveals. If he ultimately presents us with an objectivist view of the relation 
between subject and object it is not because he has sought out a mistaken realm of its 
ideological resolution. The spectacle of commodification is precisely the area in 
which any contemporary theorist must look to understand why so difficult and yet 
quite ambiguous an abdication of subjectivity in the face of ideology appears to have 
emerged. That Lukäcs could sense something of this has enabled us to now pursue 
this problem more rigorously -  to take from his understanding of an involuntary 
servitude, to which the subject is subjected, some sense of the very real 
determinations of commodified existence the contemporary self faces. Whether this 
means that the concept of the commodity needs to be redefined, as Schmidt argues,307 
more in terms of its lack of connection to those who produce it, or whether it suggests 
a greater need for a theorization of a produced and producing subjectivity, signifies 
stimulating new areas of research in this field. With some of these ideas in mind we 
will return to some of this analysis in the final chapter of the thesis.
Lukacs’s work reveals to us an aspect of this problem of an emphasis upon the 
‘objectivity’ of commodification. The idea that Lukäcs develops conveying a sense of 
the perpetuation of reified knowledge - that of ideology as a necessary illusion - as 
well as a testimony to Lukacs’s own barely confronted despair as to the possibility of 
the creative liberation of the proletarian spirit can also, of course, be interpreted as an 
ideological necessity imposed upon an otherwise obviously erratic system. The 
necessity of the illusions of the system are generated by the constant pressures of 
contradictory social and economic forces, forces which frequently take on 
philosophical and psychological guises in order to reduce all contradiction to a 
deceptively flat, immobile plane of imposed respect and dependence by consent. 
Contradiction is either rendered dull, blunt and without form or it is repeatedly 
transposed from social and economic realms to the realm of the individual psyche and 
back again, without ever coming to terms with what the problem of endless 
contradiction might indicate. Lukacs’s writing of the 1920s, as with that of many 
radical theorists, attempted to understand the fundamental nature of such contradiction 
and to theorize some sort of alternative.
In Lukacs’s case, rather than pursuing a theorization of an ideology of consent, 
he is primarily concerned to pitch reified knowledge against an imputed
307 James Schmidt, “The Concrete Totality and Lukäcs’ Concept of Proletarian Bildung”, Telos no. 24 
(Summer 1975): p. 39.
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consciousness of the proletarian class in a battle for the end of history, an end realized 
in the return to a part of humanity its apparently stolen essence. If this proletarian war 
is not won then, at most, what is left is a hazy longing marking the regret that a 
‘rational’ conquering of the world is not possible. Reification is, for Lukäcs, what 
amounts to the necessary illusion of atomization within capitalism. 308 But other than 
putting forward a generalized sense of a proletarian alienation defined purely in 
relation to what it is not - a ruling, wily, controlling sense of domination given in the 
capitalist process of reification - we are no clearer as to what a liberating 
consciousness might amount to or need to possess. Perhaps, even more tellingly, if 
we are forced to accept the future which Lukäcs outlines if his proletarian resolution 
of history cannot be reached - an endless continuation of an alienated existence and a 
reified knowledge to match - then we are left not really understanding the persistence 
of the connection between this inner state of reification and the outer imposition of a 
world of commodified emptiness. This absurdity that has become the human 
condition seems to exist without sufficient reason partly because it exists in the 
absence of any striving for meaning. It comes as little surprise that various radical 
theorists began to find such a theorization inadequate for an understanding of the 
human psyche and most particularly for an understanding of the accommodation of 
individuals to conditions of increasing control. As Bernstein argues, “the we who are 
the objects of (present) history are not the same as the we who are the subjects of 
(future) history” . 309 It is this sense of a future or anticipatory subjectivity that we will 
pursue later in the thesis.
In the sense that Lukäcs generalizes from the existence of reification to 
understand tendencies within capitalism itself, his work has much value.310 Lukäcs’s 
theory of the extension of reified relations seems partly correct. Certainly - if they 
exist at all - limitations to what can become incorporated within commodity relations 
appear fragile. Commodification and its required consciousness exist well beyond the 
realm of capitalist production. There is, as Lukäcs claims, a “capitalist social order”, 
or more appropriately, disorder, which envelops the lives of most people throughout 
the world.3" Whilst we can easily agree with the existence of the problem of 
extensive commodification which Lukäcs highlights, a tendency so presciently
308 See, for example, Lukäcs, Histoiy and Class Consciousness, p. 92.
309 Bernstein, “Lukäcs’ Wake: Praxis, Presence and Metaphysics”, p. 184.
310 For example, he argues that with the universal dominance of the commodity, the “fate of the worker 
becomes the fate of society as a whole; indeed this fate must become universal as otherwise 
industrialisation could not develop in this direction”. Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 91.
311 Ibid., p. 12. Within modem society the capitalist process of transformation requires not only a 
structured form of labour but “must embrace every manifestation of the life of society”.
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perceived seems to hurtle towards boundless exaggeration, or, if not exaggeration, 
then a type of feverish singularity. For Lukacs, this tyrannically rational 
systematization of conditions must govern the whole to the most feasible extent, but, 
importantly, this process must not be absolutely complete. Such ‘laws’ must appear, 
rather, as suggestive and yet evasive, as the unconscious product of mutually 
interacting coincidences and not as the thoroughly rational outcome of conscious 
organization. In addition, these ‘laws’ will operate more effectively if they do not 
seem to be imposed, despite the wishes of individuals otherwise, and, for this reason, 
it is advantageous if they appear to be neither fully nor adequately knowable.312 What 
we are presented with here is an astonishingly regulated and self-directed system, a 
system not only able to play out a wondrously manipulative game of pre-figured 
moves but one which is quite consciously able to do so. This performance simply 
fails to tally with what is instead a frequently haphazard and poorly controlled attempt 
to exert a form of authority over wayward and often unpredictable conditions. Any 
break from Lukacs’s almost complete system seems to rest in a rational coincidence 
of proletarian class activity with an authentic knowledge of the whole, in other words, 
only in proletarian self-consciousness. Only then can what was perceived as gestural 
be revealed in its aggressive, mordantly manipulative actuality. Objective 
contradiction within these social relations themselves (including how any objective 
contradiction itself can give rise to class consciousness) is excluded from any 
consideration. Lukacs’s conceptualization of a “perfectly closed system” is also 
closed to this view of inherent contradiction within social relations. Ideology is never 
so complete, not even ever ‘almost complete’. It is a process subject to forms of 
constitution and reconstitution and as such constantly open to incompletedness and 
forms of antagonism. As a near perfect whole, the function of alienation as 
antagonism fades beyond recognition.
What we have here is reified knowledge seen as inclusive of all social 
relations to a point just short of complete monopolization. It is hardly surprising that 
such a process transforms the basic categories of people’s attitude toward the world. 
But is the process so unilateral? The problem is not that Lukacs’s dichotomy between 
this world of capitalist ideological horror and a possible future is not descriptive of a 
real division between characteristics of capitalist society and those of its passing. It is 
more that such a division between the real and the ideological, just like Marx’s 
camera obscura metaphor of ideology, is unable to theorize a basis of reality within 
ideology - when ideology takes some definitive hold within one’s experience of
312 “For the complete knowledge of the whole would vouchsafe the knower a monopoly that would 
amount to the virtual abolition of the capitalist economy”, Lukacs writes. Ibid., p. 102.
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everyday life and appears barefaced but often undetected, as ideology. Lukäcs is of 
course aware of the problem of proclaiming the falseness of consciousness because 
this means “an inflexible confrontation of true and false”, but he nonetheless pursues 
the idea of a false consciousness albeit as a concrete aspect of the historical totality. 313 
It is clear that a liberation from this experience of the ideological is theorized as 
occurring only in limited circumstances. We will now consider whether this is 
because Lukäcs’s critique of ideology deals with both subjectivity and the ideological 
purely at the level of an abstraction of a conceptualization of a self-consciousness of 
the production and exchange of commodities.
Anschaulichkeit against the abstract concept
We have already indicated that the major problem with a tendency to view 
ideology as a closed system comprised of almost completely commodified relations 
against which the consciousness of the proletariat must contend is apparent in a failure 
to extend a dialectical analysis to the interrelationship of object and subject. In 
Lukäcs’s work on reification this problem manifests itself in the absence of an 
analysis of contradiction inherent within subjectivity and thus inherent within 
ideology itself. As a result of this absence of a sense of contradiction, Lukäcs’s 
analysis is inadequate in relation to the realities of the contradictions within ideology, 
not merely those giving rise to ideology. Although the more usual outcome of such 
an analysis is not fully realized - in a melancholic resignation to an overwhelming 
sense of a fully rationalized and ideologically controlled world - there is nonetheless a 
certain pessimism in Lukäcs’s account of the continuation of reified relations. Lukäcs 
argues, as we have seen, that due to the reified nature of relations under capitalism the 
real relations between people including those concerning the real needs of people 
“have faded to the point where they can be neither recognised nor even perceived” . 314 
What is it, we are left wondering, that happens to a consciousness so deformed by this 
reified immediacy? Lukäcs can see the seriousness of the consequences of this 
sufficiently to tell us that “if this atomisation is only an illusion it is a necessary 
one” , 315 as we have mentioned, but seems unable to explain what it is that is occurring 
at the level of self-consciousness which is capable of producing this necessity. It is 
difficult to theorize how, from such a situation, a rejection of dominant ideologies
313 Ibid., p. 50.
314 Ibid., p. 93. Likewise he states that: “Just as the capitalist system continuously produces and 
reproduces itself economically on higher and higher levels, the structure of reification progressively 
sinks more deeply, more fatefully and more definitively into the consciousness of man”.
Ibid., pp. 93, 92.315
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might occur, let alone how an historical subject might realize its role against such an 
obstacle. This is certainly not the only way in which Lukäcs describes the reach and 
scope of reification, but it is an approach to the concept which appears repeatedly in 
his work and creates fundamental problems for a theorization of a liberation from 
ideology.
In the work of Benjamin we find a grappling with the problem of a fidelity to 
the being-in-itself of the subject matter (Anschaulichkeit) with that of a conceptual 
understanding of history. This is precisely what leads Benjamin to an understanding 
of “the crystallization of the totality in the analysis of the small, individual 
elements” .316 It is this attention to a greater Anschaulichkeit that is missing from much 
of Lukäcs’s central theorization of commodification. We are presented with an 
abstraction of the concept of commodification in its relation to production rather than 
with any intense scrutiny of the fragments of an everyday consciousness in the grip of 
the spectacle. Lukäcs is aware of the problem which he has constructed for himself 
but seems unable to situate his theorization on any but the most straightforward of 
tracks towards the abstraction of generalities.
Lukäcs rightly insists that history cannot be immediately grasped as a unified 
process, that understanding particular relations is understanding their connections to 
other processes. “For it is perfectly possible”, he argues, “for someone to describe the 
essentials of an historical event and yet be in the dark about the real nature of that 
event and of its function in historical totality” .317 However, the reified nature of the 
structure is always viewed in terms of an incompleteness of consciousness against 
objectivity, as if the fate of the future of capitalism is that of a battle for a deliberate 
determination of a unified self-consciousness against its objective structure. We 
know that consciousness alone does not make history malleable and yet it is certainly 
subjectivity that has made the ideological ambiguous. This ambiguity within 
consciousness and what the consciousness perceives, as well as within the object 
itself, is missing in Lukäcs’s work. This seems to be Lukäcs’s dilemma: that what he 
sees coagulating in reified forms as opposed to the reality of self-conscious political 
activity, needs this point of counterposition in order to preserve the dynamic nature of 
the political action and knowing of the subject: But in so doing he condemns this 
ideological component of consciousness to an almost absolutist existence.
316 Walter Benjamin, Passagenwerk, vol. I, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983), p. 574. Quoted in 
Tiedemann, “Dialectics at a Standstill”, p. 265 (translation slightly altered).
-’I7 Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 12.
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Contradiction within ideology does not exist; the dominant has no dominated, 318 
Alienation without inherent contradiction drifts towards a purgatorial image of 
history.
Conclusion
In this chapter on the spectacle of commodification we have highlighted some 
of the consequences of viewing ideology as a closed system of the commodification 
of life against which the consciousness must come to self-knowledge, such as we 
encounter in Lukacs’s theory of ideological reification. Such an analysis reveals the 
stark reality of the alarmingly tentacular reach of commodification into any potential 
aspect of social life but it also leaves little room for a sense of liberation from 
ideology, save that achieved through an ultimate resolution between an abstract and 
singularly cohesive subject and its equally abstract object. The major problem 
associated with this tendency is apparent in a failure to extend a dialectical analysis to 
a consideration of the ways in which ideology works and to what impulse might 
propel the subject towards any radical transformation of ideology.
What Lukacs’s theorization of reification is able to do is to allow us to see that 
the consequences of a commodified world perpetuate a sense of the inability of people 
to participate within a creative emancipation. Whilst we might have difficulty with 
accepting Lukacs’s view of the need for an imputed class consciousness to realize an 
engendering capable of overcoming reification, his emphasis upon a subjectivity with 
the power to seek an active creativity helped to proclaim a renewed interest in the 
necessity of subjective freedom and to acknowledge more fully the particular 
constraints acting upon potentials for freedom. This interest aided in shifting 
emancipatory aspirations from social and economic realms to include those of cultural 
and psychological concerns. This is indeed what Lukacs’s philosophy of 
commodification was able to indicate, almost in spite of its own proclivities -  the 
need for a theorization of aspects of social life that extended theory beyond a narrow 
economic sense of the importance of commodification.
318 In attempting to explain both the presences and absences of the concept of ideology within Marx’s 
work, Balibar insists upon the necessity to explain, wherever the concept of a dominant ideology is 
developed, the presence of a corresponding dominated ideology. See Etienne Balibar, Masses, Classes, 
Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and After Marx, trans. James Swenson (New York: 
Routledge, 1994), pp. 96-100.
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There is an understandable sense of urgency in Lukäcs’s hope for an ultimate 
resolution between the subject and the alienated world she has hitherto inhabited. It 
could still seem for many radicals at this period that a cohesive proletarian subject 
might realize this hope and provoke the necessary transformation. Whether this 
subject was a creative being capable of self-transformation or the producer of the 
object of knowledge, as became the case for most modem theorists, was not a 
distinction generally considered. This did not necessarily mean the problem of the 
relation between this generalized, abstract, epistemological subject and actual 
humanity or human individuals was not ever examined: Such a question has been, at 
the very least, an implicit part of most post-Cartesian philosophy, with Spinoza’s 
early theorization of the human condition as one of both freedom and causal 
determination perhaps establishing this very tendency for modem philosophy. What 
emerged as the problem of forms of foundationalism with a need to ground the 
knowledge of the subject in some safe, predictable, often scientistic, guarantee was 
not the only way of addressing the issue. Nor was the idea of the will as that carrying 
with it the weight of the Fall the only way of viewing individual action and 
responsibility. Indeed, the issue continues -  in what sense might we theorize a 
relation between the subject of ideology and the actions of the human person? As we 
will consider later in the thesis, the culture of cynicism with which we are currently 
familiar merely sidesteps this issue, and that of contradiction more generally, by 
retreating from an engagement with the idea of the transformation of the individual. 
This cynicism is, as Nietzsche found its manifestation in his own time, little more than 
a justification for the course of history. It is a pleasant refuge in which one may be 
convinced that “as things are they had to be” and in order to seal this invention, one 
believes that “none may resist this inevitability” . 319 It is hardly surprising that 
Nietzsche sees such a view of life as that of weak followers, their “incorrigible 
stupidity” of ‘thus it is’ a mere forbearance of their limited sense of life to the grave: 
It is, by contrast, only the “fighters against history” who have a future. 320 For our 
central theorists, including Lukäcs, the fight against history is primarily a fight against 
a reality consisting largely of abstract, external conditions -  commodity fetishism or 
reification and interpellation of the subject as a subjected subject. It is too 
infrequently a struggle with oneself within the given conditions of one’s existence.
If we do have cause to view Lukäcs as a theorist of domination more than of 
liberation then this is partly because he presents to us so well a reason to be disturbed 
by the tendencies of contemporary commodified life. This is indeed perhaps Lukäcs’s
319 Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”, p. 107.
320 Ibid., p. 106.
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greatest achievement, to have so powerfully warned us of a trend to which we have 
become all too susceptible. That he indicates the problem of commodification as an 
ideological problem, a problem of spectacularized existence that severs much 
connection between subject and object, is fundamental for a contemporary 
understanding of both the meaning of a current instance of the ideological and for a 
sense of its objective contradictions. But in this we may also detect a tendency to 
abstractly delimit the territory in which ideology is presumed to function. We can 
perhaps see this tendency more clearly with Lukacs’s approach to subjectivity in 
relation to ideology. A stable, unified content of the subject is assumed to operate in 
relation to ideology, resulting in a near-complete reification or the possibility of total 
transcendence. And yet there is certainly something that we must face in the fact of 
the subject being separated from herself for us to ever be able to pose the question of 
our encounter with ourselves as another. It is indeed this idea of the profound 
ramifications of such a separation that we take from Lukacs’s analysis for our own 
theorization of the ideological.
Habermas reminds us that Lukäcs, as with Bloch, Adorno, Horkheimer and 
Marcuse, perceived that “the ongoing beginning opens up a view of the still 
outstanding end” . 321 It is for such a vision that any critical theorist today is indebted to 
Lukäcs. Lukäcs seemed to understand the significance of the spectacle in a way that 
only a mere handful of critical thinkers were then, in the first few decades of the 
twentieth century, able to take seriously. Even now, at the start of the twenty-first 
century, we can find few critiques that provide as critical an insight into the enormity 
of commodification - as a philosophical problem - as we encounter in Lukäcs. He 
brought into more generalized recognition the stealthily synthetic operations of an 
ideological order that was capable of sealing the fate of the individual within a 
depersonalized, instrumental disenchantment. The crisis of twentieth century 
capitalist culture was well theorized by him as a crisis of the peculiarly fetishized 
entanglement of subject and object. Individuals transformed into things are the 
mutilated fragments of a world directed towards rationalization and mechanization for 
the primary motive of profit. It is, for Lukäcs, only critique that can recognize and 
bring to self-consciousness a mediation of reified reality. On such a basis he theorizes 
the possibility of the processes of de-fetishization, an undoing of ideology in the form 
of self-consciousness. The path to liberation from ideology is one that must not 
merely contend with the obstacle of reification but must await a consciousness of it: 
Thus, for Lukäcs, freedom is not a gratia irresistitibilis - “the realm of freedom
321 Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profiles, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1983), p. 40.
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cannot be given to us as a present all at once” . 322 We must first overcome the present 
before we can realize any future.
Ady, the poet whom Lukäcs so admired, spoke of the individual being “in one 
branch liberation and shackle” .323 Lukäcs shows us much outside the individual of 
that by which she is shackled. He also indicates a path, equally external this thesis 
would argue, through which a type of liberation might be realized. If we ultimately 
conclude that Lukäcs encounters too many problems in his analysis of this, we are still 
indebted to his attempt to bring together ‘protesting faith’ and ‘messianic veto’.
322 Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 316.
323 Ady’s Nietzschean-inspired words read:
I am in one branch, liberation and shackle 
Protesting faith and 
A messianic veto.
- Endre Ady, quoted in Kadarkay, Georg Lukäcs, p. 62.
CHAPTER THREE
THE DELIBERATE UNCONSCIOUS: IDEOLOGY AS 
IMAGINED INNER EXPERIENCE AND A 
PSYCHOLOGY OF CONTROL
Introduction
Devoured by feathers and obedient to the sea 
He has let his shadow pass in the flight 
Of the birds of freedom.
Paul Eluard, Max Ernst
We mentioned in the previous chapter the need that arose for a theorization of 
social life in which not only the question of social and economic realms could be 
addressed but those of cultural and psychological concern as well. The shifting, 
oscillating presence of ideology and its relation to the subject had suggested this 
necessity. What had presented themselves here were the realms of the imagination 
and the unconscious. These facets of human experience were deemed to have an 
importance that the eclipse of meaning and the concern for falsity and deception had 
not even begun to consider. The most basic sense of existence was now a question of 
meaning in a fundamentally altered manner. Reality, Breton told us, “is in the fingers 
of that woman who used to blow a dandelion on the first page of certain dictionaries” . 1
It is in this broader psychological analysis of reality and subjectivity that the 
present chapter is interested. We want to consider how an analysis of ideology began 
to entail an engagement with fear and control as internalized facets of the social 
consciousness and unconsciousness of the individual. We choose this emphasis upon 
the problem of fear and the internalization of control because we feel that there is 
something significant in these issues for a sense of how we might understand the self 
and her sense of the world, and thus also for the way in which we might theorize a 
critique of ideology. The focus for the chapter will be upon the work of the French
1 Breton, Surrealism and Painting, p. 11.
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philosopher Louis Althusser - for in his extensive treatment of ideology we find the 
fascinating conjuncture of the theoretical near-obliteration of historical consciousness 
- the need to “suppress every origin and every subject” 2 - together with an intense 
interest in the inner experience of a psychology of control. In the course of this 
chapter we want to pursue this seeming paradox, ultimately suggesting that it is a 
rather more reflective or deliberative subjectivity which is the basis of the psyche and 
its conscious and unconscious motivations in relation to ideology. What such an 
examination will enable us to do is to see the fundamentally important role of the 
imagination and desires, including, in both their familiar and more enigmatic 
instances, their manifestation in a struggle for meaning through which the ideological 
is played out.
We saw in the previous chapter a general sense of the problem of an 
identification with an external, universalized consciousness in the form of a 
spectacularized commodification and what this then meant for the mystification of 
meaning. Here in this chapter we want to look more at the process of how desires are 
directed inwards in the internalized singularity of an imaginative unconscious. 
Where, for Lukäcs, the epistemological subject-object problematic and its attendant 
sense of the relation between history and subjectivity is fundamental to a sense both 
of what the ideological consists and of what its dissolution would require, for 
Althusser, it is this very problematic and its suggestion of a continuity between 
history and subjectivity which must be dispensed with for a theoretically rigorous 
critique of ideology to take place. Whether Althusser ultimately merely substitutes 
structures for history and an objectification of the subject for a subject-object unity or 
identity will be pursued in a highly specific way in the course of this chapter. What 
we want to consider is how these problems have an impact upon a theorization of 
ideology and at what other ways of conceptualizing the imagination and inner 
experience might be available to us in which a critique of the ideological is, by way of 
its reformulation, preserved.
What we must first note is that the theorization of a dialectic of submission 
and control prepared the ground for ways to reveal a dialectic or contradictory 
interrelation of subject and object within ideology. This was to have a profound effect 
upon the way in which radical philosophy would understand ideas and activity. 
Although many theorists were interested in such an analysis, it is the work of the 
philosopher Louis Althusser who is perhaps most closely associated with a particular 
aspect of the popularization of this problem - that of the idea of the unconscious and
2 Althusser, “Lenin before Hegel”, in Lenin and Philosophy, p. 119.
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its relation to the ideological. It is also largely upon this approach to subjectivity and 
structural causality that a renewal of interest has developed more recently in 
Althusser’s work. For example, the continuing ramifications of Foucault’s critique of 
regimes of power and processes of individualization owe much about their influence 
to Althusser’s pivotal understanding of the individual as a subject who is the 
necessary effect of ideology.3 Numerous studies have appeared in recent years that 
engage with an Althusserian critique of ideology -  most importantly perhaps those of 
the psychoanalytic theorist, Slavoj Zizek;4 but also studies of Althusser’s view of the 
role of the subject by Warren Montag, Michele Barrett, Grahame Lock and Antonio 
Negri; 5 of his contribution to Marxist theory by such theorists as Jacques Derrida, 
Gregory Elliott, Alex Callinicos, Etienne Balibar, Stephen Cullenburg, Maria 
Turchetto, Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff, as well as numerous other studies of 
the ‘Althusserian legacy’ in areas as diverse as political economy, Annales 
historiography, post-modernism and accounts of the philosophy of Spinoza and 
Machiavelli. 6 Much of this ‘legacy’ has its basis in Althusser’s highly idiosyncratic 
approach to the problem of the subject’s submission to ideological control. It is this 
issue to which we will seek to give greater substance in this chapter, in order to assess 
its importance for a contemporary theory of ideology.
3 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, eds. H. L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982),
pp. 208-226.
4 Zizek, The Sublime Object o f Ideology, Tarrying with the Negative. See also Zizek, ed., Mapping 
Ideology.
5 Warren Montag, “Beyond Force and Consent: Althusser, Spinoza, Hobbes” , in Postmodern 
Materialism and the Future o f Marxist Theory: Essays in the Althusserian Tradition, eds. A. Callari 
and D. F. Ruccio (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1996), pp. 91-106; “The Emptiness of a 
Distance Taken: Freud, Althusser, Lacan”, pp. 31-38; Grahame Lock, “Subject, Interpellation, and 
Ideology”, Postmodern Materialism and the Future o f Marxist Theory: Essays in the Althusserian 
Tradition, eds. A. Callari and D. F. Ruccio (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1996), pp. 69-90; 
Michele Barrett, “Althusser’s Marx, Althusser’s Lacan”, in The Althusserian Legacy, eds. E. Ann 
Kaplan and Michael Sprinker (London: Verso, 1993), pp. 169-182; Antonio Negri, “Notes on the 
Evolution of the Thought of the Later Althusser” , Postmodern Materialism and the Future o f Marxist 
Theory: Essays in the Althusserian Tradition, eds. A. Callari and D. F. Ruccio (Hanover: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1996), pp. 51-68.
6 Jacques Derrida, Deconstruction and Philosophy, ed. John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987); Elliott, Althusser: the Detour o f Theory, Alex Callinicos, “What is Living and What is 
Dead in the Philosophy of Althusser”, in The Althusserian Legacy, eds. E. Ann Kaplan and Michael 
Sprinker (London: Verso, 1993), pp. 39-50; Etienne Balibar, “Althusser’s Object” , trans. Margaret 
Cohen and Bruce Robbins, Social Text, no. 39 (Summer, 1994): pp. 157-188; Stephen Cullenberg, 
“Althusser and the Decentering of the Marxist Totality”, in Postmodern Materialism and the Future o f 
Marxist Theory: Essays in the Althusserian Tradition, eds. A. Callari and D. F. Ruccio (Hanover: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1996), pp. 120-149; Maria Turchetto, “History of Science and the Science 
of History”, The Althusserian Legacy, eds. E. Ann Kaplan and Michael Sprinker (London: Verso, 
1993), pp. 73-80; Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff, “Althusser’s Liberation of Marxian Theory”, 
The Althusserian Legacy, eds. E. Ann Kaplan and Michael Sprinker (London: Verso, 1993), pp. 59-72;
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Section One: The Theory of the Subject
There is no subject to the process of alienation.
Althusser, Politics and History
The Inner Expression of the Calculating Logic of Capitalist Reality: Althusser and
‘reality’s secret’
Drawn to Plato’s Cratylus and to its argument over whether one can call a 
spade a spade, Althusser sought to unmask the imagined and unconscious aspects of 
objects themselves. Here he perceived a telling gap in materialist analyses where the 
function of objects had been for too long reduced to the objects themselves. In 
Marx’s work, Althusser saw a theorization of the imaginary relationship between 
people and their world, the basis for the ideological effect of relations o f exploitation, 
and concepts which were adequate to their object. 7 Althusser’s project became not 
only a question o f theorizing ideology from the perspective o f Marxism but of 
developing a Marxist philosophy in general, which he believed Lukacs, for example, 
had tried in vain to create . 8
In Marx and Spinoza, Althusser found a profound sense of the dialectic linked 
to Wiederholungszwang - an ‘instinct of repetition ’ 9 - the combination of which made 
possible a radical critique of ideology. For Althusser, the ideological could be known 
in its effects, effects which emerged out of complex combinations of basic elements 
such as the processes of labour and production. Ideology is, in this sense, “an organic 
part” of the social totality . 10 This totality is a fundamental part of ‘reality’s secret’, the 
present and yet not often perceived structure of the ideological through which the 
individual is interpellated as a subject." But if  so much emphasis seems to be placed, 
as it does in Althusser’s work, upon the object and its processes, why should any 
attention be given to the unconsciousness within ideology? Is it the case, as Zizek 
argues, that the idea of a subject of self-consciousness is inextricably tied to that of
Jo-Young Shin, “Remarx: Althusser’s Contribution to a Postmodern (Overdeterminist) Marxism”, 
Rethinking MARXISM, vol. 8, no. 2 (Summer 1995): pp. 112-122.
7 On this last point see Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. Ben Brewster 
(London: Verso, 1979), p. 191.
8 Louis Althusser, The Future Lasts a Long Time and The Facts, ed. Olivier Corpet and Yann Moulier 
Boutang, trans. Richard Veasey (London: Chatto & Windus), p. 360.
9 Ibid., p. 364.
10 Althusser, “Marxism and Humanism”, in For Marx, p. 232.
11 Louis Althusser, “On Content in the Thought of G. W. F. Hegel” (1947), in The Spectre o f Hegel: 
Early Writings, ed. Francois Matheron, trans. G. M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 1997), p. 149.
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the unconscious? 12 We will attempt shortly to unravel why Althusser is so concerned 
with the lived yet imaginary relations that both underscore ideology and indicate its 
structured practices. This will enable us to muse upon what seems like an oddly 
objectivist view of the unconscious and the ideological. Althusser’s emphasis upon 
the role of the imaginary in the construction and reproduction of ideas, in unconscious 
practices and in a generalized psychology of structured control, as we will see, makes 
for an exciting approach to a contemporary analysis of ideology and one which 
requires serious consideration in order to perceive both its problems and its 
innovations for radical theory. This section will deal generally with the theory of the 
subject within Althusser’s approach and will consider three fundamental aspects of 
this theorizing - the role of the imaginary; the concept of interpellation and, lastly, the 
problem of theorizing the materiality of the subject’s existence within ideology.
Theorizing the ‘absent cause*: The Problem of the Imaginary and the Unconscious
If Lukacs is the philosopher of consciousness against ideology, Althusser is 
that of the unconscious within ideology. Ideology, for Althusser, is a dominant and 
dominating aspect of contemporary social formations. 13 Ideology is the general 
structure in which people think and act, consciously but also, more importantly, 
unconsciously. It works best when it works ‘all by itself without recourse to 
repressive enforcement of its intentions, but instead by an unquestioning 
internalization of its means and ends. Thus ideology is not merely unconscious but 
“profoundly unconscious”, Althusser declares. ' 4 This will be a fundamentally 
important point for us to bear in mind for the particular kind of subject or 
subjectlessness (a process without a subject) that Althusser theorizes in relation to the 
ideological.
12 Zizek, The Ticklish Subject, p. 63.
13 The term social formation is used by Althusser to connote the political and social levels of a given 
economic mode of production. Perry Anderson writes that this term is able to provide a theoretical 
space between the standard concept of classical sociology, that of ‘society’, and the Marxist concept of 
mode of production, and is thus able to avoid problems associated with both. See Perry Anderson, 
Arguments with English Marxism (London: Verso, 1980), p. 67. Although Althusser defines a social 
formation in a particular way, as “a totality of instances articulated on the basis of a determinate mode 
of production” , the term is in fact used by Marx to convey a similar sense of the interrelatedness of 
social and economic aspects of particular societies. See Althusser and Balibar, Reading Capital, 
p. 207. The term appears both in Marx’s Grundrisse and the 1859 Preface.
14 Althusser, “Marxism and Humanism”, p. 233.
216 Ideology Critique and A Philosophy of Freedom
The ultimate meaning of ideology, Althusser tells us, is “the meaning o f its 
social function" , 15 At its most basic, ideological practice exists because contradiction 
characterizes capitalist society. Indeed, he contends that there is an 
‘overdetermination’ of complex, contradictory impulses within capitalism which fail 
to be reconciled to each other and which cannot be theoretically reduced to one 
another. Within this conjuncture of forces ideologies emerge to provide imagined 
resolutions to these contradictions but with effects that are real. Ideologies, therefore, 
are not illusions but the real outcome of contradictory existence. 16 They function as 
the unconscious determinations of much human thought and activity. Althusser’s 
focus upon ideology is an attempt to theorize the basis of the internalization of 
particular structured relations and the processes of this inscription. Why Althusser 
feels this sense of structured relations so needs a category of a process without a 
subject is what will examine.
What Althusser seeks to understand with his investigation of the theory of 
ideology is something about the fundamental conditions of human existence under 
capitalism that shape everyday life: For what he wants to know is why it is that the 
individual becomes the necessary effect of the ideological aspect of life. One of these 
conditions that would become for him of particular significance is that of the lived 
experience of people as human agents or bearers of relations, in which the role of the 
unconscious as an ‘absent cause’ is of substantial import. The unconscious, for 
Althusser, is the site of particular structural conditions that are themselves a part of 
the very structure of power within capitalism. It is here that ideology can be located - 
as being built into the structure of the capitalist mode of production and a basic part of 
its reproduction. It is also a part of the internal contradiction of the subject herself 
that lends to the unconscious a particularly efficacious role. Agency, for Althusser is 
signified by the unconscious; it is not a self-determining cohered whole prior to the 
unconscious or even a self-determining subjectivity in relation to the unconscious. 
Althusser’s investigation of the unconscious is of a highly particular kind - he is less 
interested in the function of the unconscious as an aspect of individual psychology 
than he is in it as a part of a field in which objects and problems are defined. 17
15 Louis Althusser, Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy o f the Scientists and Other Essays, ed. 
Gregory Elliott, trans. Ben Brewster, James H. Kavanagh, Thomas E. Lewis, Grahame Lock, Warren 
Montag (London: Verso, 1990), p. 28.
15 Ideologies, Althusser argues, are “bodies of representations existing in institutions and practices: 
they figure in the superstructure, and are rooted in class struggle” . Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, 
p. 155.
1 Dowling writes that certain links already exist between Marxism and other interpretations of 
consciousness, such as psychoanalysis: “the existence of individuals is for psychoanalysis, as it is for 
most of us in everyday life, something that is timelessly and universally true about the world. Only 
Marxism, perhaps, which is committed in advance to proving that the timeless does not exist, that
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Jacqueline Rose has argued that Althusser’s positioning of psychoanalytic theory 
within a theory of ideology ‘displaces’ the concept of the unconscious from the 
centrality it should possess within such a discipline, 18 and yet this might have more to 
do with the way in which he defines the unconscious than it has to do with 
psychoanalytic theory per se. For Althusser, the ideological field is the terrain of 
unconscious determinations, it is the structure in which the subject plays “not the part 
it believes it is playing, but the part which is assigned to it by the mechanism of the 
process” . 19 The subject is then fundamentally ideological, not as a condition or 
foundation of ideology, as Montag points out, 20 but as an unavoidable effect of the 
presence of ideology in everyday life.
Althusser’s position on the objective element of ‘the mechanism of the 
process’ is clear - ideology is lived out as an object of one’s world. It has “very little 
to do with ‘consciousness’ ” .21 Like ideology, the unconscious is a very real and 
objective element of experience.22 We might still be confused here as to what 
Althusser takes ‘consciousness’ to mean but it is nonetheless certain that he intends us 
to view ideology less as the images and concepts by which people comprehend their 
world than as the structures which impose a particular logic upon people in an 
unconscious fashion.23 Interestingly, however, Althusser defines consciousness in 
such a way that it would seem unnecessarily excluded from his consideration: 
Consciousness, he tells us, is the behaviour or attitudes (comportement) of individual- 
subjects.24 It is recognition but not knowledge.25 Ideology might be present in this
everything within history is determined by history, would dream of thinking otherwise.” See William 
C. Dowling, Jameson, Althusser, Marx: An Introduction to the Political Unconscious (London: 
Methuen, 1984), p. 71.
18 Jacqueline Rose, Sexuality in the Field o f Vision (London: Verso, 1986), p. 89.
19 Althusser, Reading Capital, p. 27.
20 Montag, “Beyond Force and Consent” , p. 93.
21 Althusser, “Marxism and Humanism”, p. 233.
22 To what extent the unconscious is linked to ideology and to what extent it expresses an identity with 
ideology is a matter which is fiercely disputed. Warren Montag maintains, for example, that the 
unconscious is not in any sense political -  it neither reflects nor embodies political divisions (class or 
gender, and so on) nor do these divisions reflect the structure of the unconscious. Montag is thus 
critical of a broad range of philosophy, from Reich, the Frankfurt School theorists, to Deleuze and 
Guattari, suggesting some identity between the ideological subject and the unconscious. See Montag, 
“Marxism and Psychoanalysis: The Impossible Encounter” , p. 73.
23 Althusser argues that even given the ambiguous meaning of the ‘consciousness’, ideology has little 
to do with this realm. Rather, ideology “is profoundly unconscious, even when it presents itself in a 
reflected form” . Althusser, “Marxism and Humanism”, p. 233. This ambiguity may refer to the fact 
that there is no precise French translation of the English word ‘consciousness’. The closest word in 
French is conscience which carries with it the connotation of a moral imperative which could explain 
something of Althusser’s hostility to the concept.
24 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes towards an Investigation (Notes 
Towards an Investigation) (January-April 1969)”, in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, p. 170.
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world because of ‘that institution that the spectacle is’ - in this case the world of the 
capitalist spectacle of commodification - but this is not, in itself, as fundamental to the 
existence of ideology as the material structure through which ideology pertains - the 
unconsciousness. For Althusser there is something deeper than the obviousness of the 
system itself and that is what can be detected in the ‘themes’, the ‘myths’ which 
“govern us without our consent”, without our admitting it. This “spontaneously lived 
ideology”, this “horrible blindness”, the “same dust in our eyes, the same earth in our 
mouths”, the “same dawn and the same night”, ‘the same abyss’, is “our 
unconsciousness”. It is from here that ‘everything begins’ . 26
Althusser struggles here to reveal what the relation between the 
unconsciousness and the spectacle is about, save that assumed by his general notion of 
the existence of conflictual conditions as basic to lived experience. What we are 
initially given is a sense of the connection between the necessity of the reproduction 
of particular relations of production, the reproduction of types of submission or 
subjection, and the existence of ideology in relation to the “teeming fish of the 
unconscious” .27 In this it certainly seems, as Grahame Lock has pointed out, that we 
are being offered a number of different theoretical approaches to the ideological -  
most importantly, a type of sociology of knowledge, a general theorization of 
ideologies and a theory of the constitution of the human subject.28 But this 
immediately makes us question how a theory of what it is that is constitutive of 
human experience might also and in effect primarily be a theory of the subjectless 
unconscious. We then surely need to know what it is about the unconscious that 
secures it this place in the reproduction of fear and subservience, whether it contains 
within itself an intrinsic contradiction that Althusser wants to theorize as the logic of 
its ideological guarantee. We obviously then need to consider whether Althusser’s 
particular engagement with psychoanalytic theory assists or hampers the further 
development of a theorization of this connection between the unconsciousness and the 
conflictual processes of conditions of reproduction and transformation; whether, in
25 Ibid., p. 162.
26 Althusser, “The ‘Piccolo Teatro’: Bertolazzi and Brecht: Notes on a Materialist Theatre” , in For 
Marx, p. 150.
27 Althusser, “Freud and Lacan’’(January 1964, corrected February 1969), in Lenin and Philosophy,
p. 182.
28 Lock, “Subject, Interpellation, Ideology”, p. 71. Lock mentions five different approaches. Beyond 
those mentioned above he includes a theory of ideologies and a theory of some particular ideology.
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other words, his encounter with psychoanalysis leads to a view of ideology as 
‘stronghold or paradoxical space’ , 29 or whether indeed it does both?
4Always, already’ a Subject: Althusser, Freud and Lacan
Let us then consider something of the theoretical context of Althusser’s own 
intervention within debates upon the unconscious and the mechanisms of ideology. It 
is certainly the case that a more general interest by radical theorists in the psychology 
of everyday life can be traced, like Althusser’s own interest, to the impact of the work 
of Freud. Freud’s questioning of what it is that constitutes self-knowledge, and 
particularly his focus upon the deeply held but essentially repressed thoughts and 
desires that unconsciously guide much human behaviour, could not help but add to the 
burgeoning theorizations of ideology from the first decades of the twentieth century. 
Modernity itself was inevitably equated with an excess of stimuli, as Moretti notes, 
and this occurrence was often perceived as some kind of threat. 30 And yet, at the same 
time, an acknowledgement of the unconscious could enable new forms of awareness. 
A sense that dreams and reality were not abstract oppositions but the means by which 
each could be further elucidated would necessarily mean rethinking any dismissal of 
ideas understood merely as false consciousness. And at one level at least this is 
precisely what an interest in the unconscious was to elicit -  a questioning of just what 
it was driving the self to the thoughts she found herself thinking. If this matter was 
not one merely of a misperception or false appraisal of experience perhaps it was the 
character of the thoughts themselves whose source might be quite obscure but 
nonetheless real and with decidedly real effects. For such a way of viewing the world 
what was initially required was an understanding of social activity as in some way 
ideogenic or knowledge-based, and this was Freud’s most deceptively provocative 
contribution to social theory. Although a theorist such as Althusser was to replace 
this notion of ideas with that of a structured unconscious, there is very clearly in 
Althusser’s work the Freudian theme of the decisive role of repression and resistance 
leading to the development of what is contained within the unconscious. There is also 
in Freud, as other theorists such as Fromm recognized, a dynamic concept of the
29 Here we refer to Michel Pecheux’s words, if not quite the conceptual meaning of his terms. Michel 
Pecheux, “Ideology: Stronghold or Paradoxical Space?”, trans. Eugene W. Holland, The Minnesota 
Review, no. 23 (Fall, 1984): pp. 154-166.
30 Franco Moretti, The Way o f the World: The Bildungsroman in European Culture (London: Verso, 
1987), p. 6.
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subject31 - which would be held to be significant by Althusser, even if its implications 
for his own theorizations were never fully realized.
From Freud, Althusser was to derive a number of important concepts - the 
eternal, non-transcendent nature of the unconscious (ideology); the ‘object’ of the 
unconscious as ‘effect’ of humanization; the role of ‘displacement’ and 
‘condensation’ as the major mechanisms of dreams (ideology); and that of slips, 
failures, and symptoms as ‘signifiers’ inscribed in the unconscious. Perhaps of 
greatest significance is Althusser’s contention that Freud had discovered the ‘real 
subject’, the individual not based in any ego, consciousness or form of existence but 
who is de-centred, constituted by a structure which has no centre except in an 
imaginary misrecognition of an ego - in other words, in the ideological formations in 
which people recognize themselves. It is, of course, in this misrecognition that the 
ego plays out the pattern of fear and prohibition via a ‘tribunal of the self from which 
one finds it so difficult to escape. Just as importantly, however, we find that from the 
psychoanalytic theorist, Jacques Lacan, Althusser theorizes the importance of 
linguistics, particularly the primacy of the formal structure of language, the signifying 
chain of discourse in which the unconscious and the verbal play a part; of dislocation 
within the unconscious (and particularly in relation to the Saussurian concept of 
decalage); of transition into human existence via what Althusser refers to as a Law of 
Culture, following Lacan’s idea of a Law of Order and a Symbolic Order, in which 
the child becomes aware of both presence and absence that finally allows for 
objectifying language, in the form of ‘I’, ‘you’, and so on; and the transition to that of 
a sexual human child who tests her imaginary phantasms against the symbolic and 
ultimately submits to the Law of human Order. 32 The picture of the constituent 
subject that emerges from these influences is one in which the unconscious or some 
sort of social imaginary becomes subject to concrete conjunctural forms of power and 
control. Althusser’s depiction of the unconscious is then one of understanding the 
mechanisms of power that act by way of the unconscious to instil control, fear and 
subjection. Let us look at this more closely.
The most distinctive theoretical tool which Althusser incorporates into his 
work is that of Lacanian psychoanalysis/ 3 Using Lacan, Althusser argues that from
31 See Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, pp. 89-90.
32 For a theoretical introduction to the work of Lacan see David Macey, Lacan in Contexts (London: 
Verso, 1988); for some of the historical background to his work see Elisabeth Roudinesco, Jacques 
Lacan & Co.: A History o f Psychoanalysis in France, 1925-1985, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman (London: 
Free Association, 1990).
33 The French philosopher and psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s best known work is on the structure of 
the unconscious. Revising Freud, Lacan argues that this structure is primarily linguistic rather than
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the birth of the child onwards there is the repetition of a myth - an image of a reality 
of individuals as subjects which transforms individuals into subjects: “Before its birth, 
the child is therefore always already a subject, appointed as a subject in and by the 
specific familial ideological configuration in which it is ‘expected’ once it has been 
conceived” . 34 Minute by minute it is this image that makes the individual’s world. 
Indeed, from the primary repression (Urverdrängung) Freud theorizes as responsible 
for a splitting of the subject, Lacan puts forward a subject divided in its very 
constitution. In Althusser, there is the uneasy attempt to bring together this inaugural 
division of the subject with the ideological and the unconscious. The imaginary, itself 
having a material existence, appears real and is recognized by the subject as real. But 
the imaginary is not a nothingness - it is not any dreamy, chimeral, insubstantial, 
empty reflection of the real. It is, rather, a particular representation of the real world, 
however illusory, through which identification or interpellation takes place. Thus 
Althusser contends that the reproduction of ideological formations is necessarily 
related to concrete historical processes, but the consolidation of the illusion of the 
epoch has been greatly assisted by the sheer repetition of the images of bourgeois 
ideology, an ideology whose basis is denial and deception. The recognition of the 
imaginary relation of individuals, as subjects, as an apperception of the real conditions 
of existence, Althusser argues, is always already a part of the ideological structure.35 
Thus we are left with the feeling that this always-already aspect of ideology is more 
important to the subject’s subjection than any other aspect of power filtered through 
or arriving in the wake of this primary recognition, in other words, misrecogntion, of 
reality.
Following Lacan and Freud, Althusser argues that the symbolic and imaginary 
moments governing the period in which the child situates herself within a human 
world is “marked and structured in its dialectic by the dialectic of the Symbolic Order
sexual. See, for example, Lacan’s 1955 essay “The Freudian Thing, or The Meaning of a Return to 
Freud in Psychoanalysis” in Ecrits: A Selection, trans. A. Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1977).
34 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” , p. 165.
35 As Gadamer writes, albeit in a different context, of the process of recognition: “Recognition means 
knowing something as that with which we are already acquainted. The unique process by which man 
‘makes himself at home in the world,’ to use a Hegelian phrase, is constituted by the fact that every act 
of recognition of something has already been liberated from our first contingent apprehension of it and 
is then raised into ideality. This is something that we are all familiar with. Recognition always implies 
that we have come to know something more authentically than we were able to do when caught up in 
our first encounter with it. Recognition elicits the permanent from the transient” . Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, The Relevance o f the Beautiful and Other Essays, trans. Nicholas Walker, ed. Robert 
Bemasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 47. In Althusser too we detect this 
sense that recognition implies a more effective knowledge than that elicited within an initial 
experience.
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itself, i.e., by the ‘dialectic of human Order’ ” .36 This order, this law that has been 
“lying in wait for each infant bom since before his birth, and seizes him before his 
first cry” , 37 determines the individual’s subjectivity. What Lacan describes as the 
“mirror-phase” - the period in which the individual identifies as a subject - is the 
beginning of the “discourse of the unconscious” .38 According to Althusser, this 
discourse where human Order and law are the signifiers, “gives us a hold, a 
conceptual hold on the unconscious, which is in each human being the absolute place 
where his particular discourse seek its own place, seeks, misses, and in missing, finds 
its own place, its own anchor to its place, in the imposition, imposture, complicity and 
denegation of its own imaginary fascinations” .39
This misrecognition, this illusion of autonomy, this idea of what individuals 
know to be their subjectivity, is the specular relationship of ideology to the subject. 
Like Berkeley’s child in the illustration from his Dialogues o f Hylas and Philonous, 
the individual does not experience a distorted expression of the real: The child gazing 
into the mirror does not misapprehend when he attempts to capture and embrace his 
own reflected image; he clearly recognizes himself (an ideal, pure self) in the image. 
The child is the image; he experiences a real relation to the real, but this recognition is 
an ideological effect. The child need not laugh at his mistake, the story is about him, 
whether this is because his vision is constituted both in his own eyes and in the object 
of his vision, i.e. himself (as Berkeley argues) or whether it is because he is, as in 
Lacan’s words, inescapably “captive to the lure of spatial identification” .40 Once the 
image has been assumed and the individual is subsumed within a structure of 
misrecognition, the effectiveness of this ideological recognition is assured. And this 
image is always already present: Lacan argues that the Gestalt or the exteriority in 
which the total form of the body is realized is itself already “pregnant with the 
correspondence which unite the I with the stature in which man projects himself, with 
the phantoms which dominate him, or finally, with the automation in which, in an 
ambiguous relation, the world of his fabrication tends to find completion” .41 For 
Althusser, it is the guarantee of ideological control.
36 Althusser, “Freud and Lacan”, p. 194.
37 Ibid., p. 195.
38 Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror-phase as formative of the Function of the I” , New Left Review, no. 51 
(Sept/Oct, 1968): p. 74.
39 Althusser, “Freud and Lacan”, p. 196.
40 Lacan, “The Mirror-phase as formative of the Function of the I” , p. 74.
Ibid., p. 73.41
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Zizek argues that Althusser overlooks the Lacanian dimension of the 
paradoxical object-cause of desire within his more limited account of interpellation. 
Before being trapped in the misrecognition of ideology, Zizek argues, the subject is 
trapped by the Other through a paradoxical object-cause of desire in the midst of it, 
through what is supposed to be hidden in the Other. This ideological fantasy also 
structures reality, for in the opposition between dream and reality, fantasy is on the 
side of reality. Althusser’s thesis, however, would not seem to be in disagreement 
with the idea that ideology, rather than a dream-like construction, is in fact a fantasy 
or illusion which supports reality. Zizek is correct to point out that the function of 
ideology is not to offer an escape from reality but is to give us “the social reality itself 
as an escape from some traumatic, real kernel” .42 And yet how this real kernel is 
conceptualized is the difficult part of any analysis of ideology. For Althusser, the 
unconscious is the playing out of its own imaginary fascinations. But what are these 
fascinations?; And, even before this question is posed, to whom might we assume 
these fascinations belong? Are they the emanations of the individual mind, open to 
the necessity of antagonism but also to the possibilities of creative existence? Or are 
they the product of the organization of real being given in the social power that we are 
told structures every subjective interaction within ideology? Althusser does here 
seem to be directing his analysis to the level of individual subjectivity, and yet a 
subjectivity which is then universalized in the subject as a subject of a social 
formation. There is certainly no sense of the differences which Deleuze and Guattari, 
for example, theorize between individual and group fantasy in, in this case, the death 
instinct.43 More generally there is little sense of potential differences through which 
the ideological might be individually or collectively realized. If Althusser’s 
theorization is deliberately pitched at the level of a primordial sense of a state of the 
unconscious then perhaps it is unreasonable to expect a metaphysics of being, as it 
were, explaining any such variations within what humanity is as a part of the 
ideological. But this sort of ontological/ontical distinction does not really hold for the 
treatment Althusser gives to the unconscious and the ideological. However abstracted 
these concepts appear in his work, the unconscious and the ideological are decidedly 
mediated constructions. Zizek has pointed out that before deciding upon the idea of 
the subject as the ideological Althusser toyed with the notion of different modalities
42 See Zizek, The Sublime Object o f Ideology, p. 45.
43 See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert 
Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), pp. 62- 
63. See also Luce Irigaray, “The Poverty of Psychoanalysis” , in The Irigaray Reader, ed. Margaret 
Whitford, trans. David Macey and Margaret Whitford (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
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of subjectivity; 44 but ultimately we seem to be repeatedly presented with an abstract 
subject of subjection as the given of all being, what we will argue is a closed circle of 
subjectivity and ideology.45
For Lacan, the individual moves from an experience of the imaginary into a 
symbolic order of social structures. The child proceeds through an Oedipal phase 
thereby being transformed into a human man or woman.46 An unconscious discourse, 
itself structured like a language, facilitates this transformation. The unconscious is 
the site of ideological signifiers which structure the language of every “conscripted 
candidate to humanity” .47 As Bürgin writes of this sort of transition, “the illusion of a 
centred and stable autonomy may now be shed in acceptance of the lived facts of 
contradiction, dialectic, intersubjectivity, the unending process of becoming” .48 The 
child becomes part of a human, adult world, part of a “Symbolic Order”, the order of 
objectifying language. Althusser seems to be arguing that in this world ideology is 
the structure in which the subject can contemplate her own image and have this 
imaginary distortion of the ideological representation of the real world returned, the
44 Zizek, The Ticklish Subject, p. 145. The four modalities Zizek isolates as being temporaily 
considered by Althusser are the ideological subject, the subject in art, the subject of the Unconscious, 
and the subject of science.
45 Despite Zizek’s argument above concerning separate modalities temporarily given by Althusser to 
the ideological before he reverted to the idea of the subject as the ideological, we do find in Althusser’s 
work attempts to create separate categories in which the ideological is, at the very least, held at a 
remove. In “A Letter on Art in Reply to Andre Daspre”, in Lenin and Philosophy, Althusser presents 
an argument for the ‘peculiarity’ of art, a peculiarity that ‘makes us see’ that aspect which alludes to 
reality. Ibid., p. 222. According to Pauline Johnson, this view that Althusser has of art suggests that 
art “undermines a conception of the natural and self-explanatory character of ideology”. Johnson 
considers that art arrives at this “enlightening capacity” “through internal gaps or absences within the 
work” ; we see the ideological instance as an effect on an external determinant. Apart from mentioning 
the example Althusser himself uses of the paintings of Cremonini, Johnson does not really elaborate 
sufficiently for us to be able to assess this claim. Pauline Johnson, Marxist Aesthetics: The 
Foundations within Everyday Life for an Emancipated Consciousness (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1984), p. 125. The idea of gaps continues to engage Althusserian or former Althusserian 
theorists. We find this idea used by Jacques Ranciere in his work La mesentente to connote a type of 
ambiguity between the formal claims of freedom and democracy and the everyday reality of oppression 
and exploitation. Jacques Ranciere, La mesentente (Paris: Galilee, 1995). As Zizek argues, there are a 
number of ways to read this ‘gap’ -  in the ‘symptomatic’ way Ranciere presents or in a more 
subversive way as that of an appearance that evinces an effectivity of its own. Zizek, The Ticklish 
Subject, p. 195.
46 Much interesting feminist criticism has been written on this issue. See, for example, Elizabeth 
Grosz, Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction (London: Routledge, 1990) and Michele Barrett, 
Women’s Oppression Today: Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis (London: New Left Books, 1980). 
For an analysis of the question of whether within his thesis Lacan develops a theory of history, see 
Teresa Brennan, “History after Lacan”, Economy and Society, vol. 19, no. 3 (August 1990): pp. 277- 
313.
47 Althusser, “Freud and Lacan”, p. 198.
48 Victor Bürgin, The End o f Art Theory: Criticism and Postmodernity (London: Macmillan, 1986), 
pp. 17-18.
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“mirror on mirror mirrored” 49 in which the self is unavoidably entrapped. It is in this 
sense that the structure of ideology is doubly or perhaps triply speculary. 50 Lacan 
views the subject as an uncomfortable threesome -  the subject, the imaginary and the 
symbolic other that marks the lack which the subject occupies in its relation to the 
imaginary. So too in Althusser do we see the theorization of the difficult conjunction 
between the imaginary, the symbolic and the real.
Leaving aside for a moment the issue of why we are ‘conscripted’ candidates 
to humanity rather than participants within it, Althusser’s concept of ideology, seen as 
a set of representations in which both real and imaginary relations are realized, is able 
to offer a radical critique of the operation and reproduction of social relations. This is 
because the ideological is viewed as that social reality in which repression and control 
dominate the structure through which the system is organized. This reality is the 
reality of class society is transformed into a fragmented and mythologized reality that 
possesses its real, symbolic and imaginary moments. Does this then imply that the 
unifying power of the unconscious is such that the end result of subjection can always 
be assured? Althusser invites us to see the presence of structured relationships within 
the development of subjectivity, and theorizes from this the necessary place of an 
ideological imaginary distance at the centre of these relations. Ideology exists here 
because the symbolic order in which humanity finds its conceptual recognition is one 
that has been structured by a reality of the smooth illusion of individual autonomy, 
wholeness and independence. Such illusion can no doubt exist, and yet there would 
seem to be in these abstractions, which Althusser presents, an overwhelming 
completedness and separateness in the oppositions constructed. As Sartre was to 
point out, there is at the base of this “a very Cartesian attitude: on the one side there is 
the concept, on the other, imagination” and the concept here is atemporal and
49 W. B. Yeats, “The Statues,” in Selected Poetry (London: Macmillan, 1967).
50 This idea is expressed in Edelman’s analogy of the functioning of juridical ideology - it assumes 
that “a little like Descartes’ God giving an ideological shove will get the machine going. We ask of a 
clock only that it tell the time, and we ask of justice only that it be just. It is sufficient to the law to say 
that man has a power, that this power protects his interests, and that his free will is a will that wills his 
interest in order to ‘start’ juridical ideology” . Individuals are in this sense permitted the concrete 
practice of being a subject in law: “Since you are a subject in law, you are capable of acquiring and 
selling (yourself)” . The State gives coherence to this process whereby a relation in law is a relation 
between subjects. It is in this sense that Edelman refers to the doubly speculary structure of ideology: 
“The subjection of the subject in law to the subject permits it both to legitimate its power outside itself 
and to operate the return to power”. It is in order to perpetuate its own illusion that legal ideology 
operates within this doubly speculary structure. As Edelman argues: “On the one hand, the subject in 
law exists in the name of the law, that is, the law gives him his power. Better, law gives right the 
power to give itself a power. On the other hand, the power law has given right returns to law. The 
power of right is none other than the power of subjects in law. The subject recognises itself in the 
subjects. The power, ownership, recognises itself in the power, the State.” See Bernard Edelman, 
Ownership o f the Image: Elements for a Marxist Theory of Law, trans. Elizabeth Kingdom (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 33.
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therefore unable to be modified.51 The unconscious is presented as a form of complete 
subjection, a finished ideological realm of externally imposed control, not simply as 
having its own defined delimitations within the imaginary, symbolic and real 
moments in which it exists.
Given this general process of the structuring of the unconscious, which would 
seem to await us all, what does Althusser argue in relation to the specificity of the 
development of an imaginary perception of the self? Is there any return of the 
repressed here that is able to interrupt or contend with the ‘dialectic of human order’ 
we have earlier considered? Let us consider an example of Althusser’s early 
treatment of the imaginary to see whether we can find further and perhaps more 
interrupted or self-disturbing dimensions to this problematic construction of the 
unconscious.
Fear and the Imaginary
The idea of the interplay of the real and the imaginary had appeared in a 
variety of forms from some of Althusser’s earliest writings. In an article written in 
1946, “The International of Decent Feelings”, Althusser critically examines an 
awareness of the modem condition of fear, particularly as it is expressed through the 
works of Malraux, Camus, Koestler and Gabriel Marcel. In the works of these writers 
Althusser detects “an ideology seeking to define itself’52 - a humane protest against 
destiny, but a protest which conceals more than it is able to denounce. Its basic 
premise is that there exists a sense of a human destiny which encompasses an 
awareness that humanity is threatened. Althusser argues that what is put forward is a 
kind of ‘proletariat of terror’ which experiences an equality of suffering and, 
ultimately, death. For Althusser, no such equality can exist - not because fear is not 
an essential part of the human condition but because it can only ever possess an 
equality of ‘tomorrow’. The proletariat has no horizon, no destiny before it, it knows 
only that its “tomorrow will be a today”.53
What is interesting in this critique of generalized intimidation for our 
consideration of ideology and a psychology of control is not so much Althusser’s 
depiction of the ‘actual presence’ of conditions of life for the proletariat, which makes
51 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Replies to Structuralism: An Interview with Jean-Paul Sartre” , trans. Robert 
D’Amico, Telos, no. 9 (Fall, 1971), p. 114.
32 Althusser, “The International of Decent Feelings”, in The Spectre o f Hegel: Early Writings, p. 22. 
For a review article of this work see Gregory Elliott, “Fateful Rendezvous: The Young Althusser” , 
Radical Philosophy, no. 78 (July/August 1997), pp. 36-40.
53 Althusser, “The International of Decent Feelings”, p. 25.
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the mere fear of their future possibility decidedly less fearful, but that he sees in the 
content of fear the workings of an imaginary sense of self. The “true object of my 
fear is myself imagined as suffering pain at some point in the future; that is, not 
another, but I  myself, and not a real, but an imaginary F \54 The person who is afraid 
is “a prisoner without a prison and without bars”, argues Althusser, fear makes one 
one’s own prisoner, threats standing guard within one’s soul; whereas the objective 
condition of being imprisoned means that “real bars can be smashed”. If fear is 
“captivity without the possibility of flight”, then it is upon a sense of the destiny that 
awaits the individual that ideology is able to work. There is something sombrely 
silent about the power of such a fear capable of preparing the subject for the complete 
acceptance of the mass of merciless judgements it is about to receive -  ultimately, 
from itself. But is such identification so complete?; does it not also contain moments 
of disidentification? By raising the issue of fear is there not something not-yet 
determined in this which we might take from Althusser’s analysis?
Althusser realizes that Hegel’s contention that destiny is the consciousness of 
oneself as an enemy underscores the paradox which is fear - it implies that reason has 
no control over it, but that then means that it offers little resistance to the reason 
which examines i t 55 We dwell in a void where fear is an abstraction, a myth “but a 
myth that exists” , 56 a “confusing myth” . 57 We live within the confines of a diffuse, 
apocalyptic panic - there can, according to Althusser, be nothing dialectical about this; 
apprehension is a collective expectation, an advent which does not unite humanity by 
truth or reality. Althusser sees the suggestion of a human condition on this basis as 
implying a “human fatherland”, with all the fascistic overtones which this might 
mean; ‘brotherhood’ can only be found in the truth not in fear or words. 58 By contrast, 
in servitude Althusser sees the basis of a dialectical process through which freedom 
might be attained. A lack of freedom is a reality, whereas a generalized sense of fear 
is an imaginary construct, an ideology. 59 It functions as an ideology because ‘myths 
of fear’ tear people from the reality of their existence. It matters little, Althusser 
considers, whether this is a conscious or an unconscious process but that it is a “vast
54 Ibid.
35 Ibid., p. 24.
56 Ibid., p. 27.
57 Ibid., p. 30.
58 Ibid., p. 27. 
Ibid., p. 28.59
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operation”.60 And yet, as we have been arguing in this thesis, understanding ideology 
as a type of voluntary servitude, whatever else it might be, matters greatly.
Throughout Althusser’s examination of the imaginary there is a consistent 
emphasis upon the materiality of the processes of imagined experience. We can sense 
this in the directness of his perception of what were, in 1946, undoubtedly clouded 
understandings of political tendencies. The bomb, as Althusser sanguinely reminds 
us, is the product of human labour. That it is a perversion of human labour and that 
“humanity trembles before what it has itself wrought” is a telling example of the way 
in which workers are enslaved by their own labour.61 If in the end the outcome of fear 
is to make people feel that they can never reconcile themselves with their destiny 
because their labour and very being enslaves and destroys them, then one’s sense of 
oneself in the world has already been abstracted from that of an active, creating 
humanity. Such a situation would surely make us want to ask where any division 
within the subject against herself coalesces with a voluntary and an involuntary 
servitude. Does Althusser furnish us with any such scrutiny of the subject? Does he 
‘de-naturalize’ the subject as Montag, for example, contends?62 We mentioned earlier 
that in bringing our attention to the issue of fear we are struck by a sense of the not- 
yet determined that fear or hope necessarily entail and yet we repeatedlv find a 
disconcertingly determined world as the basis of Althusser’s analysis. Let us consider 
this more closely.
Ideology’s Captives
In this early piece mentioned above we can see many of the interests in the 
problem of ideology which Althusser would proceed to develop. The decisive role of 
an ideology of fear provides Althusser with the basis for theorizing the problem of 
imagined experience, and yet, at the same time, the acceptance of control. In this 
sense he is able to convey something of the artificiality of the category of the 
enslaved, just as Marx had highlighted this in relation to all those who are unable to 
grasp their own freedom - most specifically, those who enter into relations of 
commodity exchange. Relations that depend upon the abstraction of their categories 
are no less real for their abstractedness. In Althusser’s later work, this abstraction of 
the enslaved worker becomes that more generally of the subject - the subject subjected 
to ideology and enslaved by its dictates. In doing so a subjective dynamic is lost from
60 Ibid., p. 31.
61 Ibid.
62 Montag, “Marxism and Psychoanalysis: The Impossible Encounter” , p. 71.
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Althusser’s work; the hapless subject of ideology can only contend with the structures 
of ideology, structures more fearful and powerful than the subject can withstand. The 
prison bars of repressive and ideological apparatuses are too numerous, too fortified 
and sadly too unrecognized for what they are, to smash. Instead, there is a resignation 
to the recognition of what these forces are ideologically, and to the limitations of what 
the subject’s relation to them can mean.
There are numerous instances in Althusser’s later writings in which he 
distinguishes the conjuncture of forces facing the dominated and the dominating of 
ideology. Althusser refers to the “number of realities” (emphasizing that they are also 
“precisely realities for Marx”) - the “cold, hunger and the night” for the worker, as 
opposed to the different circumstances of the ideologically dominating.63 Althusser 
explains that there are people who believe themselves to be the ‘absolute masters’ of 
ideology living its real relation but invested in an imaginary relation - these are the 
people who are able to make use of ideology.64 Even though Althusser assures us 
that: “Just as a people that exploits another cannot be free, so a class that uses an 
ideology is its captive too”,65 and that ideology is “active on the ruling class itself and 
contributes to its moulding”, it is here that a difficult tension arises in his work. He is 
well aware of the general problem of the “pitiless demarcation of class”, as he refers 
to it, “slicing up the world with a single blade”,66 as well as its particular difficulty in 
relation to a structural view of ideology. Nonetheless, he forces his structuralist 
theorization of ideology to occasionally take account of any differences within the 
issue of who it is who uses ideology, and who it is who gets to play the victim of its 
use. At another level, of course, his point is that ideology itself is the active exploiter, 
not a ‘master’ or ‘class’ external to it, and that the process of the unconscious means 
that we are all subjected to its dictates. But why the real within the processes of 
ideological interpellation imposes a unity with the subject of the unconscious is not 
made clear. Perhaps we can see some rectification of this difficulty in Althusser’s 
account of the workings of a ‘deliberate unconsciousness’.
‘Deliberate unconsciousness’
In his 1962 review of “The ‘Piccolo Teatro’: Bertolazzi and Brecht”, an essay 
which is unfortunately little considered by commentators, Althusser takes up many of
63 Althusser, “Contradiction and Overdetermination: Notes for an Investigation” , in For Marx, p. 115.
64 Ibid., p. 234.
65 Ibid., p. 235.
66 Ibid., p. 22.
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the themes that his earlier critique of Malraux, Camus and others had outlined.67 Here 
we are presented with Althusser’s particular way of theorizing the complexity of the 
relation between dominated and dominant in a distilled and extremely interesting 
form. It is indeed this theorization that can provide us with a basis for how we might 
make best use of Althusser’s critique of ideology. Using Brecht’s Mother Courage as 
his example, Althusser writes that “in the struggle the hero belonged to the opponent 
as much as the opponent did to the hero” - the opponent was “the hero’s double, his 
reflection, his opposite, his night, his temptation, his own unconscious turned against 
him” . 68 Within this contained dynamic of subjectively mediated fear and control we 
see a clear sense of the necessity of self-imposed restrictions emerging apparently 
unavoidably from the basic context of the subject’s existence. The subject’s 
experiences are inextricably linked to her ‘always-already’ situatedness, one premised 
on a basic division between the imaginary and the real. This is a fundamental way in 
which Althusser theorizes the process of ideology and the involvement of the subject 
within the unconscious dictates of ideology.
In this review, the Hegelian theme of one’s destiny being a consciousness of 
oneself as of an enemy, again appears. Here, Althusser uses it to convey the idea of 
the spectator who seems to live the play by identifying with the only consciousness 
offered her. One’s relation to the ‘spontaneous ideology’ in which one lives is in 
itself abstract - it is abstract “with respect to the consciousness of self - for this 
abstract is the true concrete”. The materiality of the ideological is as much in “a 
foreign consciousness as a veneer on a real condition” (an identification with 
borrowed myths) as it is in a consciousness “impatient for truth” .69 Althusser feels it 
is important to state that there is no dialectic of consciousness, “lest we somehow 
begin to believe that ideological consciousness can contain within itself an escape 
from itself’. No dialectic of consciousness can exist that can reach reality itself “by 
virtue of its own contradictions”. But need we be restricted to a view of an 
ideological consciousness as if this consciousness is the entirety of consciousness? 
Althusser wants to replace any idea of an Hegelian phenomenology with what he 
terms “an unresolved alterity”, and in this he might be well advised. The inevitable 
schematism of Hegel’s reduction of life to continuous concepts would be usefully 
challenged by a sense of ‘alterity’ if we actually knew what Althusser had in mind 
with this idea. He is insistent that consciousness does not accede to the real through
67 Althusser, “The ‘Piccolo Teatro’, pp. 129 - 151. One exception to those theorists mentioned who 
tend to ignore this work is Michael Sprinker. See his work Imaginary Relations, especially chap. 10.
68 Althusser, “The ‘Piccolo Teatro’”, p. 147.
69 Ibid., p. 139.
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its own development - what is needed, he argues, is “the radical discovery of what is 
other than itself \ 70 Perhaps it is this sense that we can employ -  a consciousness 
‘other than itself that would seem to allow for some understanding of consciousness, 
the unconscious and some type of process beyond both of these.
We can interpret Althusser as suggesting here the possibility of an ideological 
‘self-recognition’ or, at the very least, the desire for such a state. But the mirror 
society looks into for self-recognition is “precisely the mirror it must break if it is to 
know itself’. 71 As ideology is, Althusser considers, tragically the world of “myths and 
drugs” (morals, politics and religion) he thus implies that the shattering of the glass is 
no easy task. At the same time, he claims that ideology “is always in essence the site 
of competition and a struggle in which the sound and fury of humanity’s political and 
social struggles is faintly or sharply echoed” . 72 The problem is, however, that 
ideological self-recognition can just as likely result in a deepening of its myths 
without ever escaping from them. When this “infinite mirror” is placed at the centre 
of the action an “illusion-wrapped, naive consciousness” is the most predictable 
outcome. This is indeed why he theorizes the necessity of forms of displacement, a 
deferring of the centre, so that, placed to one side, in greater proximity to the real, the 
mirror might come “to a sudden end as a heap of splinters on the floor” . 73 Nina, 
Bertolazzi’s central character in his play, El Nost Milan, rejects the world of illusions 
which her father has tried desperately to maintain for her; through her trauma she is 
able to dispatch, what Althusser refers to as, a state of “deliberate unconsciousness” . 74 
In this Althusser sees the necessary confrontation of a world without illusions with the 
‘wretched illusions’ of the self. Some sort of dynamic is theorized within these 
processes of the ideological; Althusser is able to look forward to the advent of a ‘new 
spectator’, “an actor who starts where the performance ends” .75
This insight into the processes of the unconscious as capable of a type of 
‘deliberate unconsciousness’ allows us to reflect fruitfully upon the relation between 
ideology and subjectivity. The impact of an ideology of control is not only to be 
found in the already structured pattern of imposition beyond the knowledge or ability 
of the subject; there is, rather, something forgetive in the subject’s relation to her own 
subjection. The subject can actively participate in her unconscious remembering and
70 Ibid., p. 143.
71 Ibid., p. 144.
72 Ibid., p. 149, n. 6.
73 Ibid., p. 150.
74 Ibid., p. 134.
75 Ibid., p. 151.
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forgetting as much as she can embellish the truth of her subjection. This sense of an 
‘otherness’ arrived at through a confrontation with the self opens new territory for us 
in a critique of the ideological. Little has ever been made of this particular way of 
theorizing the unconscious in Althusser, perhaps because it sits awkwardly with his 
other more straightforward accounts of the problems of the internalization of fear and 
control. We need then to consider whether Althusser believes that humanity can 
grasp this otherness and be in any sense reconciled to what it creates and creates 
anew, and thus whether it can befriend a destiny other than that of the fearful slave. 
What Althusser ultimately seeks out, as we shall see, is what we might understand 
him to theorize as a state of an ‘objectively false consciousness’ which is attributed to 
any capitalist society dependent upon making people unaware of the necessity of its 
illusions. 76 As Marx referred to the true secret history of Rome as that of private 
property, Althusser finds its contemporary ideological equivalent in the role of the 
subject. Capitalist society requires a construction of the subject in which imaginary 
resolutions to contradictions are assumed not primarily as drapery to conceal some 
other truth but as a basic part of its everyday reproduction. The imaginary is also the 
reality of ideology. The role of the subject would then in this sense seem to be vital
76 Paul Hirst puts forward a very different but nonetheless interesting argument in relation to this: Hirst 
argues that, despite his critical understanding of a concept of false consciousness in Marx’s writing on 
ideology, Althusser himself reproduces a notion of ideology as false representation, as 
meconnaissance, in accounting for ideology’s effect. Hirst’s specific criticism is directed towards 
Althusser’s argument that the ideological effect is the misrecognition or ignorance of a very particular 
reality - that of the relations of the reproduction of the relations of production. By indicating the 
existence of a reality against which the effects of falsity may be judged, Althusser is, for Hirst, placing 
the status of representation in direct contrast with the ‘lived relation’ it represents. Such a separation of 
representation and the imaginary cannot be sustained. Hirst poses a number of pertinent questions to 
Althusser’s conception of ideology - specifically, that of “How are the forms in the ‘imaginary’ relation 
generated?” and “What is the reason why a particular set of means of representation dominate so as to 
create the particular spectacles of the ‘imaginary’?” The first question entails a general questioning of 
what Hirst sees as Althusser’s inscription of a functional necessity to the effects of the ‘imaginary’. 
Hirst sees the forms of the imaginary as having the status of significations, “representations which are 
reducible neither to a represented which is beyond them, nor to an origin in a subject, but which are 
effects of the action of means of representation” . The second question is a questioning of why there 
should be a single dominant spectacle, and, hence interpellation in the recognition structure. Hirst 
claims that Althusser’s theory has no real answer to such a question. It is merely at the level of 
supposition that the recognition structure can be said to exist and be recognized. As such, Althusser’s 
theory reintroduces the problems of the subject-object structure of knowledge found in classical 
philosophy. It both presupposes the subject and takes the object of recognition as a given, thereby 
reducing the forms of the imaginary to a functionalism. If, for Hirst, there is no essential unity to the 
ideological, and no necessity to the effects of the imaginary, does his critique decentre or displace the 
subject in a hierarchy of signifying practices, or does it do away with the human subject altogether? 
Hirst specifically argues against the presence of any attributes of subjectivity in a theory of a system of 
signifying practices. Any account of an interpellation relation of the subject will conceive ideology in 
terms of a structure of “empiricism - idealism” - the idealism of the essence and the empiricism of the 
subject. For Hirst, there is no necessary homogeneity, no principle of unity, or governing categories 
such as the ideological. It is on this basis that he rejects any general theory of the ‘ideological 
instance’. See Paul Hirst, On Law and Ideology: Language, Discourse and Society (London: 
Macmillan, 1979), pp. 60-65, passim.
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for Althusser’s understanding of ideology. It is to this area of analysis that we will 
now turn.
The Interpellation of the Subject: Ideology as a Puppet in Turkish Attire77
Althusser recognizes that something about the structure of ideology itself 
might be important for a theorization of the existence of particular ideologies 
emerging at any given time. There appears to him to be elements of the way in which 
subjectivity is constructed that can provide the necessary mechanism for a central 
function of ideology - its unconscious persistence. “Ideology is eternal, exactly like 
the unconscious”, Althusser states in Lenin and Philosophy, 78 What is eternal about 
ideology can only be understood by constructing a theory of ideology in general. The 
argument contained within this apophthegm confronts us as frankly tautological: 
Ideology is eternal and therefore one needs to construct a theory of ideology in 
general; one needs to suppress the temporal form of the functioning of ideology and 
concentrate upon a general theory because ideology is eternal. 79 Althusser argues that 
what can be discovered by a general theory of ideology is, however, the structure of 
ideology itself - or more precisely the “duplicate mirror-structure” . 80 This he deems 
vital to an understanding of the significance of ideology to contemporary life. The 
structure of ideology is that which ensures that individuals are interpellated as 
subjects; it ensures “their subjection to the Subject”; and it entails “the mutual 
recognition of subjects and Subject, the subjects’ recognition of each other, and 
finally the subject’s recognition of himself’ .81 We are left with concluding that
77 Walter Benjamin provides an allegory which is appropriate to this: The story is told, he writes, “of 
an automaton constructed in such a way that it could play a winning game of chess, answering each 
move of an opponent with a countermove. A puppet in Turkish attire and with a hookah in its mouth 
sat before a chessboard placed on a large table. A system of mirrors created the illusion that this table 
was transparent from all sides. Actually, a little hunchback who was an expert chess player sat inside 
and guided the puppet’s hand by means of strings” . Benjamin, Illuminations, p. 253.
78 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” , p. 152.
79 Ibid., p. 164.
80 Philosophy conceived as mirror structures is pervasive in social theory. Arguing that the image 
which “holds traditional philosophy capitive is that of the mind as a great mirror”, Richard Rorty notes 
that without this notion of the mind as mirror, “the notion of knowledge as accuracy of representation 
would not have suggested itself’ and that, without this notion of knowledge, “ the strategy common to 
Descartes and Kant - getting more accurate representations by inspecting, repairing, and polishing the 
mirror, so to speak - would not have made sense” . Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 12. The idea of knowledge as accuracy of 
representation can of course be interpreted, as does Debord, as containing “all the weaknesses of the 
Western philosophical project which undertook to comprehend activity in terms of categories of seeing; 
furthermore, it is based on the incessant spread of the precise technical rationality which grew out of 
this thought. The spectacle does not realize philosophy, it philosophizes reality. The concrete life of 
everyone has been degraded into a speculative universe” . Debord, Society o f the Spectacle, par. 19.
81 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” , p. 168.
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ideology works like the automaton constructed so as to always win; the subject seems 
to recognize its opponent as a puppet only, never guessing that it is an expert player, 
the little hunchback, who is manipulating the strings. But why is the subject in this 
position of having its every move ‘always already’ met with a better countermove? It 
is not immediately apparent what is determinant within this process, and perhaps this 
is Althusser’s point, but we are left with the sense that ideology is both a process of 
recognition which constitutes subjectivity and that ideology presumes an already 
constituted subject through which the process of recognition can take hold. Quite 
what this means for the place of ideology in relation to subjectivity in Althusser’s 
theorization remains unclear. Althusser seems to shift between delimiting the 
structure of ideology according to its function and eternalizing its function in 
accordance with its structure.
In arguing that the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology, 
Althusser explains that “the category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology 
insofar as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of ‘constituting’ concrete 
individuals as subjects. ” 82 Ideology can only be understood, therefore, in its 
functioning in whatever material forms of existence such functioning takes. 83 The 
recognition that, in the most elementary sense, each and every individual is a subject 
and acts out practical rituals within everyday life which “gives us the ‘consciousness’ 
of our incessant (eternal) practice of ideological recognition”,8* is the necessary basis 
from which Althusser can theorize the eternal nature of ideology in general. It is also 
the basis of his theorizing the distinction he makes between science and ideology, 
which becomes for him an important part of the theorization of the critique of 
ideology. In arguing that this everyday ideological recognition gives only a 
consciousness, Althusser is distinguishing consciousness and recognition from a 
‘scientific’ knowledge of the way in which such recognition occurs. It is of course 
this knowledge, this facility for a ‘scientific’ analysis that Althusser is attempting to
82 Ibid., p. 160.
83 In order to understand this, Althusser briefly introduces his readers to the problematic subject of the 
place of both the author and reader in the functioning of ideology. Althusser’s position appears to be 
that both the author who writes the lines (of critical work, as for example, Althusser’s) and the reader 
who reads them are themselves subjects - “that the author and the reader of these lines both live 
‘spontaneously’ or ‘naturally’ in ideology in the sense in which I have said that ‘man is an ideological 
animal by nature’” . Ibid., p. 160. The category of the subject is, for the author and reader, a primary 
‘obviousness’ but this ‘obviousness’ is an ideological effect, what Althusser refers to as “the 
elementary ideological effect.” Ibid., p. 161. Althusser supposes that, in accepting that the category of 
the subject is an obviousness, what is taking place is the operation of an ideological recognition 
function - “you and I are always already subjects, and as such constantly practice the rituals of 
ideological recognition, which guarantee for us that we are indeed concrete, individual, distinguishable 
and (naturally) irreplaceable subjects” . Ibid., pp. 161-162.
Ibid., p. 162.84
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reach - to find, from a place within ideology, a discourse which tries to break with 
ideology and which can ultimately become a ‘scientific’ (subjectless) discourse on 
ideology. The problems with this theoretical/metatheoretical regression seem 
manifold, not least of which is the problem that a ‘scientific’ understanding justifies 
itself in its distance from ideology, which itself is known by its ‘non-scientific’ 
character.85
Ideology is seen by Althusser to ‘act’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ 
individuals as subjects. 86 Ideology achieves this by a process of ‘interpellation’, by a 
‘hailing’ of individuals who recognize that they are being hailed as subjects. 87 
Althusser’s well-known example is that of the individual in the street who thinks that 
a passing policeman’s utterances must be specifically directed towards himself. The 
process of interpellation works because the individual has already internalized a sense 
of guilt in the presence of functionaries of repressive apparatuses, in this ease the 
police. 88 When the policeman shouts “Hey you”, the passing individual recognizes 
himself in the ‘hailing’ regardless of whether or not the commands are being directed 
at him. The recognition of the imaginary relation of individuals as subjects as an 
apperception of the real conditions of existence, he argues, is always already a part of 
the ideological structure. 89 Althusser’s example is telling, and even perhaps too 
telling - the representation of a repressive apparatus will never fail to strike those it 
‘recruits’ as the subject of its repression: But surely other relations between the 
psychological and ‘the real’ are more complex than this; are there not points of 
attachment in the unconscious which are more fragile and more contradictory than 
those involved in Althusser’s readily identifiable example?
85 Ibid., pp. 162, 163.
86 Ibid., p. 163.
87 The “subjective destitution” to which Althusser’s “traumatic” theoretical kernel, as Zizek calls it, is 
addressed, is conceptually fixed, in this structure of representation. Zizek, The Sublime Object o f 
Ideology, pp. 2, 1.
88 This use is very similar to Marcuse’s use of Freud’s ideas. In Marcuse’s own use of Freud, for 
example, he makes mention of Freud’s early emphasis upon “a pre-existing sense of guilt, which seems 
to be ‘lurking’ in the individual, ready and waiting to ‘assimilate’ an accusation made against him” . 
See Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation (London: Sphere Books, 1969), p. 68. The work of 
Freud’s to which Marcuse refers is “Psychoanalysis and the Ascertaining of Truth in Courts of Law” , 
in Collected Papers, (London: Hogarth, 1948-50), vol. II, p. 23.
89 Gadamer argues in relation to recognition that it “means knowing something as that with which we 
are already acquainted. The unique process by which man ‘makes himself at home in the world,’ to use 
a Hegelian phrase, is constituted by the fact that every act of recognition of something has already been 
liberated from our first contingent apprehension of it and is then raised into ideality. This is something 
that we are all familiar with. Recognition always implies that we have come to know something more 
authentically than we were able to do when caught up in our first encounter with it. Recognition elicits 
the permanent from the transient” . See Gadamer, The Relevance o f the Beautiful, p. 47.
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The unconscious is, for Althusser, as we have mentioned, the site of 
ideological signifiers which structure the language of every “involuntary” candidate to 
humanity.90 In a somewhat more prosaic manner Roland Barthes refers to the subject 
as being ‘glued’ to ideological discourse and proceeds to explain this relationship 
between the individual and ideology in terms of the way in which the subject 
“experiences its [ideology’s] coalescence, its analogical security, its naturalness, its 
‘truth’ ” .91 This ‘truth’, this ‘lure’ that ideology has for the historical subject, is, for 
Althusser, that which has always-already interpellated individuals as subjects.92 Is 
there not here a process of ‘interweaving’, as Montag mentions, 93 that connects the 
subject of the unconscious and the subject interpellated by ideology? For if what we 
want to understand is the ‘cop inside our head’ it is surely the strange division 
between obviousness and the unfamiliar, between the natural and the decidedly 
unnatural that we need to consider. This division would indeed explain much better 
the gap between reality and the imagination that Althusser first alerts us to. And this 
fracturing or aporia is, of course, much more substantially the territory of the 
ideological.
For Althusser, all ideology is centred - individuals are interpellated into 
subiects in what we have seen is argued to be a ‘double mirror-connexion’. A mirror 
structure ensures the functioning of all ideology. At the centre is the Subject (the 
Subject being a unique, absolute “other Subject”, i.e. God) that interpellates around it 
individuals into subjects “such that it subjects the subjects to the Subject” .94 In the 
example developed by Althusser, the individual is a subject who recognizes God and 
who therefore recognizes herself in ‘Him’; this double mirror-connexion thus 
provides (following this example) the guarantee of the individual’s salvation.95 The 
condition of the subjection of many to the power of something or someone endowed 
with greater power96 is taken by Althusser to be an eternal condition. A battered,
90 Althusser, “Freud and Lacan”, p. 198. As Bürgin writes of this sort of transition, “the illusion of a 
centred and stable autonomy may now be shed in acceptance of the lived facts of contradiction, 
dialectic, intersubjectivity, the unending process of becoming”. The child becomes part of an human, 
adult world, part of a “ Symbolic Order”, the order of objectifying language. Bürgin, The End o f Art 
Theory, pp. 17-18.
91 Roland Barthes, The Rustle o f Language, trans R. Howard, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 348.
92 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”, p. 164.
93 Montag, “Marxism and Psychoanalysis: The Impossible Encounter”, p. 73.
94 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”, p. 168.
95 Althusser’s view of beliefs as material actions inserted into practices is seen as merely a slight 
adjustment to what is taken as Pascal’s ‘formula ‘of “Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you 
will believe”. Ibid., p. 158.
96 Or as Althusser refers to it, extending his religious metaphors, - “he shall submit freely to the 
commandments of the Subject” . Ibid., p. 169.
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tinny, mirrored image continues as the recognizable and yet comfortless habit of all 
humanity. Temporalized to this society (i.e., capitalism) these interpellations are 
harmful images thrust before the minds of its subjects, capturing capitalism’s likeness. 
Once mirrored, its laws become idols before the subject’s gaze. Whether this 
imagined reality is looked upon with equanimity or an anguished complicity, it 
remains a gaze of recognition where the images seem to belong to the eyes of the 
observer.
Althusser’s basic argument is that ideology operates by a process of 
interpellating individuals as subjects.97 It ensures the subjection of subjects to the 
Subject by the process of subjects recognizing not only their own and each other’s 
place as subjects but also their place in relation to the Subject. Ideology is therefore 
able to provide “the absolute guarantee that everything really is so, and that on 
condition that the subjects recognize what they are and behave accordingly everything 
will be all right: Amen - ‘So be z? ” ’.98 Ideology thus presumably operates by a 
recognition of the prevailing conditions through which individuals live. What these 
conditions actually are remains obscured in Althusser’s analysis. Subjects “work by 
themselves in the vast majority of cases” ,99 and this process or event of recognition is 
always ensured by subjection to the Subject. The individual “must be obedient to 
God, to their conscience, to the priest, to de Gaulle, to the boss [...] etc. , ” . 100 Why 
they must show such obedience is not made apparent by Althusser. Is the remorseless 
Juggernaut of father-figures the result of some basic human need? Is it because 
conditions are imposed externally and against the wishes of subjects? Is the fact that 
subjects “work by themselves” a result of this process or part of its cause? Is this a 
voluntary or an involuntary servitude, or is it both?
Althusser seems to suggest that what appears as a natural process and as being 
obvious is, in fact, a particular representation or set of representations which are 
socially constructed and which, in producing a reality, also produce “the phantastic
97 It is this area of the construction of a set of representations constituting a reality, that a theory 
incorporating elements of psychoanalysis - of how the subject becomes positioned within a process in 
which a particular reality is recognized - can illuminate Lacan’s Freudian theory of formation of the T  
through a mirror-phase of unconscious signifiers and Althusser’s theory (incorporating Lacanian 
psychoanalysis) of the interpellation of the individual as subject. Both attempt to provide an 
explanatory understanding of this process by which a small biological creature is transformed into a 
social individual, or, as Althusser rather more explicitly expresses it, in which the child is “required, 
each by himself in solitude and against death, to take the long forced march which makes mammiferous 
larvae into human children, masculine or feminine subjects". See Althusser, “Freud and Lacan”, 
p. 190.
98 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” , p. 169.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
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form of a relation between things” . 101 Despite his railing against the concept of 
fetishism in Marx’s work, his own theorization of ideology sounds suspiciously 
redolent of just that - the mystified form of social relations as relations between 
things, i.e., fetishism. For Althusser, of course, the emphasis is much more upon 
representations than fetishized forms. Whilst the idea that there is an essence that 
constitutes our individuality may be presented as an obvious and common-sense view, 
if the whole process of the development of individualization is seen as a social 
construction, then a critical view would consider that it is the product of 
representations (for example, God, the priest, de Gaulle, the boss, etc.) rather than a 
pre-given essence that constitutes subjectivity and hence a reality for individuals. The 
seemingly obvious, common-sense view of the world, a manifest image of what it is 
to be a subject, is the fundamental and stubbornly persistent myth reproduced 
specifically within various forms of ideology. The reproduction of such ideology is 
not a natural process but occurs for particular reasons and has particular effects.
The problem posed by Althusser attempts to provide an explanation for the 
operation of ideology within the structure of social reality. If the whole idea of 
‘essence’ is dispensed with then how have images been reproduced and recognized by 
individuals? Of fundamental importance to Althusser’s argument is his concept of 
structural relations within a social totality. It is the relations among elements of the 
‘superstructure’ (including ideological practice) that must be considered. But an 
emphasis upon relations hardly makes clear what is distinctive here in Althusser’s 
approach. In a general sense his depiction of the ‘phantastic form’ of socially 
constructed representations seems little different from Marx’s analysis of the 
mystified form of crucial social relations under capitalism, most particularly, money 
and legal relations. Whilst Althusser concerns himself mainly with legal relations, 
such relations are significant within a complex structure of relations generally within 
capitalist social formations precisely because they present a mystified reality. We can 
perhaps consider this more closely by analyzing a specific example which Althusser 
gives of the eternal nature of ideology as manifest in the subject.
Ideology as a Necessary Form of Human Societies
In his collection of essays, For Marx, Althusser refers to the existence of a 
conditional necessity for humanism as an ideology. 102 The idea of the necessity of 
ideology, which we viewed in Lukacs’s work, is, then, one which also appears in the
101 Marx, Capital, vol I, p. 75.
102 Althusser, “Marxism and Humanism”, p. 231.
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writings of Louis Althusser. Humanism is the bourgeois ideology par excellence for 
Althusser, partly because it forms the basis of all other existing ideological forms - 
legal, ethical, religious, philosophical, and so on - placing at its core the idea of a 
definite pre-existing essence of humanity in freedom and reason. 103 Even radical 
critiques of the political practice of this humanism are themselves caught in the 
unrelenting vice of theoretical humanism because such critiques argue that the subject 
has merely to re-grasp its own essence, an essence since alienated in property, religion 
and the State, in order to become “total man, true man” . 104 As we have seen, 
according to Althusser, ideology as a system of representations has “nothing to do 
with consciousness”; these representations are “usually images and occasionally 
concepts, but it is above all as structures that they impose on the vast majority of men, 
not via their ‘consciousness’ ” . 105
The conditional necessity humanism has as an ideology is evidenced in the 
social function it has for capitalism and also, more generally, as an organic part of 
human societies per se. It is because of the mystificatory role of this ideology that 
humanism is so pivotal as an ideology for capitalism. It is also the historical role it
103 Balibar argues that humanism is the target of Althusser’s critique because humanism is “the 
necessary combination of humanism and economism” . Balibar, “Althusser’s Object”, p. 165.
104 Althusser, “Marxism and Humanism”, p. 226. It is not that the humanism of theories of ‘man’ is 
misguided, it is rather the theoretical role that their categories play. Althusser in fact describes such 
theories in terms of their part “in this great humanist tradition” . The humanist tradition has conferred 
much status and dignity to people in their struggles against feudalism, the church, and ideologists. But 
not only is there a probable link between a humanist ideology and the rise of the bourgeoisie (“Man as 
a free subject, free man as a subject of his actions and his thoughts, is first of all man free to possess, to 
sell and to buy, the subject of law”) but from the philosophy of ‘man’ come the categories of the right 
of ‘man’ to know, from whence are derived its theories of knowledge, and that of the right of ‘man’ to 
act, out of which has formed the economic, moral and political subject. Althusser, Essays in Self- 
Criticism, p. 198. The second criticism that Althusser makes regarding humanism is specifically with 
regard to the philosophical basis of its categories of thought. The empiricist and transcendental subject 
is reproduced from a system of categories that places human essence in an abstract theoretical realm. 
Althusser argues that when individuals are accentuated and the abstract condition of their knowledge 
and action is taken as the basis of a philosophical understanding of the world, real history is ignored. 
In response to his critics who have interpreted his resulting philosophical anti-humanism as amounting 
to the deprecation of human beings, Althusser stresses the necessity of an obligation to respond to 
human misery and suffering by analysing the mechanisms of exploitation that give rise to such 
suffering. What enables one to grasp, theoretically, the nature of this exploitation is the relation 
between the production relation and the infrastructure. Althusser argues that this is also Marx’s 
opposition to humanism. Marx, Althusser considers, shows that the production relation is not a relation 
between individual people or one of inter-subjectivity or psychological essence; it is rather a “double 
relation”, “a relation between groups of men concerning the relation between those groups of men and 
things, the means of production”. Social relations involve human beings, but they also involve things. 
In an economic sense, those things mean the means of production and thus, the relations of distribution. 
It is in this sense that Marx considers people as the supports or bearers of a relation, strictly because 
they are parties to a relation and function in this relation process. Althusser maintains that: “It is not at 
all because he reduces men in their concrete life to simple bearers of functions: he considers them as 
such in this respect because the capitalist production relation reduces them to this simple function 
within the infrastructure, in production, that is, in exploitation” . Althusser, ibid., pp. 201,202.
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has played and that has helped form it in the particularities of the ways it has emerged 
which lends it this centrality to capitalist social relations. Paul Ricoeur’s particular 
interpretation of this is that Althusser must resort to this term, ‘conditional necessity’ 
because if Marxism is a politics it “must take something from the ideological sphere 
in order to accomplish something practically” . 106 And yet, as we will see, no such 
acknowledgement of the place of the ideological for anything ‘practical’ emerges in 
Althusser’s own writings: Indeed, Althusser is at pains to emphasize the distinction 
between an ideological and a theoretically sound approach to practices and social life. 
This is perhaps why Althusser highlights, in the way he does, the example of 
humanism as evidence of the ideological.
For the purpose of theoretical enquiry, Althusser (following Engels’ schema) 
reduces any given society to its economic activity, its political organization and its 
ideological forms. 107 As a fundamental part of any social formation, ideologies - as 
systems of representation - are basic to the survival of human societies: “Human 
societies secrete ideology as the very element and atmosphere indispensable to their 
historical respiration and life. ” 108 Althusser’s general point is to consider this function 
of ideology for class society and specifically modem capitalist society, but the more 
he rnuses upon this general social function of ideology the more dispersed become his 
claims for ideology. 109 He thus argues, “it is clear that ideology (as a system o f mass 
representations) is indispensable in any society if  men are to be formed, transformed 
and equipped to respond to the demands o f their conditions o f existence” . 110 At times,
105 Althusser, “Marxism and Humanism”, p. 233.
106 See Paul Ricoeur, “Althusser’s Theory of Ideology”, in Althusser: A Critical Reader, ed. Gregory 
Elliott (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 51.
107 Andre Glucksmann’s criticism of Althusser’s tripartite schema here is telling, albeit somewhat 
patronising: “The basis of the whole tripartite Althusserian architecture thus arises fully armed from the 
simple but somewhat forced use of a dictionary. It ‘happens’ that everything is production. It 
‘happens’ that every production is divided into three. This conceptual empiricism is never questioned 
in the Althusserian reflection” . See Andre Glucksmann, “A Ventriloquist Structuralism”, in Western 
Marxism: A Critical Reader, ed. New Left Review (London: NLB, 1977), p. 71.
108 Althusser, “Marxism and Humanism”, p. 232.
109 Schmidt argues that Althusser’s theorization indeed begins on this general level and is thus a 
mistaken interpretation of Marx’s specific examination of capitalist society. And yet neither claim 
made by Schmidt is entirely the case. As well as theorising the specific processes of capitalism, Marx 
generalizes his view of many subjective relations - particularly those concerning the problem of 
servility to that of all societies in which conditions of unfreedom exist. More importantly, for our 
present discussion, Althusser extrapolates his general theory from specific assumptions regarding class 
society and, in particular, capitalist, class society. See Alfred Schmidt, History and Structure: An 
Essay on Hegelian-Marxist and Structuralist Theories o f History, trans. Jeffrey Herf (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), passim.
110 Althusser, “Marxism and Humanism”, p. 235. This use of the concept of ideology is also that 
referred to as “organic ideology” by Regis Debray, a one-time student of Althusser, in his Critique of 
Political Reason, trans. David Macey (London: New Left Books, 1983). Debray argues that such 
ideology gives the world the necessary meaning and cohesion it needs to survive. Debray, ibid., p. 35.
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Althusser suggests something even more general in the process of ideology - its 
obviousness, its ability to give rise to feelings and actions of recognition 
(connaissance and (re)- connaissance) and to impose without appearing to do so. All 
these processes seem to indicate what St. Paul saw in the ‘L o g o s that in ideology 
“we ‘live, move and have our being’ ” . 111 Like Lukäcs’s view of the ideology of the 
relentless insinuation of reification into every aspect of life, Althusser maintains that 
“ideology slides into all human activity”. Indeed, he argues that ideology is 
“identical” with the ‘lived’ experience of human existence itself. 112
Ideology as the very breath of human life - is this the idea which Althusser 
intends to convey? Ideology (in the singular) refers to the persistence of ideas in 
shaping people’s sense of reality. It is in this sense that Althusser proceeds to argue 
the notion of the continuing necessity of ideology in any society. This may be 
contrasted with his insistence upon the necessity of overcoming particular ‘bourgeois 
ideologies’ whose function it is to consolidate existing structures within capitalist 
society. Nothing would appear particularly strange about this idea if ideology were 
consistently considered a mere part of the conditions of human existence, but, as we 
have seen, this is not really what Althusser always presents us with. 113 But perhaps 
more importantly we are left in the same dilemma that Lukäcs’s theorization of 
ideology entailed - if the existence of ideology is so all-pervasive that it fails to be 
perceived, or, in Althusser’s words, that it is identical with the experience of human 
existence itself, then there would seem to be a fundamental difficulty in suggesting 
how this situation might be changed or even any point in theorizing it at all. The 
problem is not simply one of detecting a tendency towards an overly functionalist 
interpretation of the ideological, which has been done in numerous different ways 
already by a number of commentators. 114 What we are more interested in here is
111 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” , p. 161.
112 Althusser, “A Letter on Art in Reply to Andre Daspre” , p. 204.
113 Thus, ideology simply as forms of the relation between people and their world could easily be, as in 
Althusser’s own example, in a classless society, “the relay whereby, and the element in which, the 
relation between men and their conditions of existence is lived to the profit of all men” . Althusser, 
“Marxism and Humanism”, p. 236. But is the ideological distinction between a class and a classless 
society merely that in a class society the relay is run to the profit of the ruling class? Much of the rest 
of Althusser’s theory of ideology, dependent as it is upon the distinction between bourgeois ideology 
and Marxist theory, would tend to suggest otherwise. An assertion that ideology is a fundamental part 
of any society simply because it is a human society rather than because it is a society which can be 
distinguished from another on the basis of its general form, i.e. a capitalist or a socialist society, seems 
a strange position for a theorist such as Althusser to have, concerned as he is to establish what he 
considers to be the ‘scientific’ - i.e. the non-ideological - basis of Marxist theory.
114 See, for example, Richard Johnson, “Histories of Culture/Theories of Ideology” , in Ideology and 
Cultural Production, ed. Michele Barrett et. al., (London: Croom Helm, 1979); and Simon Clarke et 
al., One-Dimensional Marxism: Althusser and the Politics o f Culture (London: Allison and Busby, 
1980).
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understanding why Althusser’s attempt to theorize the existence of ideology as 
material so excludes a dynamic or dialectic in which this materiality takes place.
It is important to consider that it is precisely because Althusser situates the 
production of ideological forms as corresponding to the form of the social 
organization of production of a given society that he finds it inconceivable to theorize 
a mode of production, including any new mode of production, implying as it must for 
him determinate forces of production and relations of production, without its 
corresponding ideological forms. These forms might undergo considerable 
modification, shifts in function, or even the disappearance of some of their existing 
manifestations, to be replaced by completely new forms; but to imagine a world 
without ideology altogether, a world replaced by science, he argues, is merely 
‘utopian’ . " 5 This is because whatever adaptations are required will not be left to 
chance but will be “assumed, dominated and controlled” . 116 We might here want to 
acknowledge with Althusser the seemingly enormous capacity a system such as 
capitalism has to adapt and adjust to changing realities and to present these changes as
115 Althusser argues that this ‘utopian dream’ of a world where ideology disappears without trace is the 
principle behind a number of ideological notions: the idea that ethics could be replaced by science; that 
science could take the place of religion; or that art could become everyday life. Such notions are surely 
ideological in the context of a capitalist mode of production where the production of ‘scientific’ 
corrections to religious or ethical beliefs can be just as subject to the controls and interests of those who 
most benefit from their ideological function in relation to commodified society: But where does this 
leave the idea of socialism as the fundamental dissolution of the rationale of profit for a minority? 
Surely, for socialism, art as everyday life is not utopian whimsy but can represent the realization of the 
production of things that have value without being commodities whose value is derived merely from 
their ability to be exchanged. Much of Andre Breton’s writings on and commitment to surrealism 
convey a sense of the potential liberation of the mind realizable with the ending of human exploitation, 
an exploitation he sees as clearly emerging as a result of the wage system. Breton is aware of the 
decisiveness of the social conditions under which creative activity takes place, conditions which, under 
capitalism, are destructive of so much of the realm of human necessity and the emancipation of the 
spirit. These conditions are directly related to specific needs of the system. The authoritarian control 
of people, for example, results in numerous controls on expression, including artistic expression. More 
fundamentally, Breton sees present society as producing contradictions within reality itself, 
contradictions between interior and exterior reality, dreams and reality, the fantastic and reality, and 
conformism and nonconformism. Only a social revolution is able to prepare the conditions for the 
resolution of these seemingly contradictory states, to produce a surreality, “fixing attention neither on 
the real nor on the imaginary, but on, so to speak, the other side o f the real". Andre Breton, What is 
Surrealism?: Selected Writings, ed. Franklin Rosemont (New York: Monad, 1978), p. 135. Such a 
view of social change, related as it is to basic conditions of human existence, and seen as potentially 
able to unleash new ways of conceptualising and practising aspects of human expression, is hardly 
‘utopian’ in any disparaging sense. Indeed in Althusser’s own examination of the art of the Italian 
painter Leonardo Cremonini he explains how Cremonini is able to depict the relation between people 
and things such that his work is an example of a radical anti-humanism. Whilst stressing the “direct 
and inevitable ideological effect” of the relation between a work of art and ideology, Althusser also 
makes it clear that certain works of art can be profoundly ‘materialist’. Whilst we might be left 
wondering what Althusser’s judgement of such things really means, such utterances stand in some 
contrast if not contradiction to his earlier comments. Althusser, “A Letter on Art in Reply to Andre 
Daspre”, pp. 209-220.
116 Althusser, “Marxism and Humanism”, p. 235.
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ideological necessities - but this does not mean that we need agree with him that 
ideology constitutes the means by which the formation and transformation of people 
occurs in response to the demands of their conditions of existence. The idea of the 
eternal nature of ideology expresses the problem of a certain essentialism seeping into 
Althusser’s work. Althusser’s notion of everlasting ideology begins to sound like the 
empty beating of a once romantic pulse quickening in response to the scepticism of 
the times. 117 The persistence of ideology is every bit “worse than a slow inherited 
complaint” . 118 Much of this tendency towards reifying the function of ideology, as 
Althusser does, stems from an inability to see that whilst the conditions of existence 
are certainly formed and transformed for people, so too do people form and transform 
these conditions themselves. Althusser’s theoretical emphasis upon the structural is 
unable to see this aspect of the interrelationship. Where Lukäcs had attempted to 
theorize each moment as history, the present as well as the future as moments of the 
objectification of the subject, Althusser suspends history and focuses upon the 
object. 119
117 It is difficult, for example, to theorize a crisis of ideology when one’s view of the State - the high 
temple of ideologies, for Althusser - is that of a deeply controlling monolith impinging fatally upon 
every aspect of people’s lives.
118 While warning a student away from the study of law Goethe’s Mephistopheles complains of the 
eternal malady of the inheritance of laws and rights. Goethe, Faust, Part One, iii, p. 96.
119 A range of different problems is apparent here in Althusser’s analysis - the nature of ideology as a 
system of representations; the place of ideological representations as situated in objective structures 
and the unconscious rather than in the region of the consciousness; the social function of these 
representations; the distinction between ideology and scientific theory; the necessity of ideology for the 
reproduction of human societies; the role of ideology in relation to class. How might one approach 
these problems? Is, for example, Althusser’s revision of the conditional necessity of ideology merely a 
political ruse to avoid the obvious problem of accounting for the continuation of bourgeois ideology in 
what Althusser otherwise considers, at an economic level, to be an example of a socialist society - 
namely, the then Soviet Union? Of course such a distinction between economic and political or 
ideological types of society is itself a strange position for a Marxist theorist to hold, let alone one who 
is so demonstrably aware of the myriad subtleties of philosophical idealism and the inadequacies of 
classical political economy, the two great theoretical purveyors of the notion of a division between the 
economic and the political. Strange too for a theorist for whom, rhetorically at least, the 
base/superstructure model was a clearly inadequate model of society. Some amount of yielding to 
French Communist Party (PCF) politics seems likely and yet a simple espousal of a fundamentally 
problematic theoretical position flies in the face of much of Althusser’s genuine criticism of party lines, 
and seems, in particular, in tension with much of his own theoretical work on ideology. As a corollary 
to this, the Party’s own distance from Althusser’s theoretical positions is evidenced in its refusal to 
publish under its own imprint either For Marx or Reading Capital. Both works were instead published 
by the leftist, Francois Maspero. In his pro-Maoist article “Sur la Revolution Culturelle” , Althusser 
argues for this separation between “external forms of socialism”, economic and political, and their 
ideological content in order to claim that China has undertaken a “third revolution” - a mass ideological 
revolution which will provide it with an ideological superstructure corresponding to its socialist State. 
See “Sur la Revolution Culturelle” , Cahiers Marxistes-Leninistes, no. 14 (1966): pp. 5, 7-8, quoted in 
Elliott, Althusser: The Detour o f Theory, p. 194. In this context it is also useful to consider Sudhir 
Hazareesingh’s argument that much of the dispute between Roger Garaudy and Althusser during the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, for example, “was fraught with careerist undertones”, with each theorist 
attempting to preserve their respective territory of influence within the party. The party itself was to
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The tension that remains within his depiction of the conditional necessity of 
ideology should not be ignored. Extending Rousseau’s theorization of the obstacles 
and forces of humanity’s ‘manner of existence’, Althusser views human alienation as 
a “state of war”, and the relations in which people are trapped as indicative of a “fatal 
contradiction” . 120 But even here we cannot find a clear sense of how Althusser 
theorizes a path out of this “paradox of total alienation” -  for it is at the same time a 
“flight forward in ideology” and this makes of it a substantially captured reality. 121 
Althusser indeed understands Rousseau’s view of the social contract to be a total 
alienation because it offers the individual the opportunity to give everything and 
receive nothing in exchange, an ‘exchange’ or contract in which the reality of 
ideology is set. The ‘end of the forest’ might well mean, as Rousseau felt, the loss of 
any refuge for human liberty and the beginning of all alienation, but, for Althusser, 
this only means, as he sanguinely notes, that as “we are now in reality, and can only 
turn round and round in it (ideology-economy-ideology, etc.), there is no further flight 
possible in reality itself’ . 122 To think otherwise, Althusser concludes, is “a dream, a 
pious wish” . 123 This reality in which we endlessly turn is a difficult one for we cannot 
even say of it that it is the product of humanity’s own activity: Rather, it is a process 
in relations -  relations of production and other political and ideological relations. 124 
There is much that is frustratingly structure-bound in this and yet something radical 
nonetheless. “To change the world”, Althusser tells us, “is not to explore the 
moon” . 125 We need to change this world, this reality, and in order to do so it is this 
world we must be able to interpret. The problem with this is of course the objectivist 
sense of this world that is put forward, not only as a basis for interpretation but as a 
vehicle for change. Here the problems of Althusser’s over-indulgence in the 
‘necessity of history’ as a form of its subjectless law strike us as overwhelming 
limitations to a fuller sense of the existence of the ideological.
arbitrate on this dispute in 1966, resulting in what Hazareesingh refers to as an “uncharacteristic 
fudge”, of mildly rebuking both theorists. For more on this dispute and other matters relating to 
Althusser’s party affiliation see Sudhir Hazareesingh, Intellectuals and the French Communist Party: 
Disillusion and Decline (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), pp. 99-100.
120 Althusser, Politics and History, pp. 119, 121.
121 Ibid., pp. 140, 159.
122 Ibid., pp. 122, 159.
123 Ibid., p. 158.
124 Ibid., p. 186.
125 Ibid.
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Ideology as Cultural Object
The challenge presented in an Althusserian critique of ideology is contained 
within the intention to question the role of the subject and to view the individual not 
in terms of ‘essences’ but in terms of a social construction constituted through 
representations or the effect of given practices. In this context of the intention to, in 
some senses, ‘decentre the subject’, ideology can be seen as a set of representations 
through which a type of recognition takes hold and has its effect only after, to put it in 
Nietzschean terms, it has found a language which the individual understands. 
Althusser’s theory of ideology is, then, an attempt to move away from a more 
simplistic ‘ideology = false consciousness’ thesis by giving attention to those 
structures he sees as most represented in ideology. The representation of images and 
practices of these structures is seen in terms of a fundamentally political relationship 
between an imaginary and a material existence. Ideology is a material practice and 
not just an illusory dream construction. Here we see Althusser’s subversion of the 
idea of a unified, self-knowing and autonomous subject. It is in this context that a 
theory of the subject specifically directed towards a critique of humanist assumptions 
is generated. Althusser’s critique of the notion of individual autonomy is an attempt 
to put forward a thesis which is radically sociological and political. By incorporating 
Lacanian concepts of psychoanalysis into a Marxist thesis that derives the operation 
of social reality/illusion from an analysis of production relations, Althusser is able to 
construct a theory of ideology which attempts to account for an interpretation of 
meaning beyond that which is necessarily apparent or manifest within the context of a 
particular socio-economic structure. 126 Thus we have a general theorization of some 
relation between ideology and the unconscious in terms of a type of unity between the 
unconscious and the interpellated subject.
From Althusser’s Freudian and Lacanian theorizations we are struck most 
forcefully by his sense of the vulnerability of people to compulsions beyond their 
control and recognition. For Althusser, people are at best the ‘never forgetful 
witnesses’, more often the ‘victims’ of their struggle for life. 127 What they struggle 
with are as much external constraints and structures of repression as it is an imagined
126 Whether Althusser’s critique lends itself to being applied within any specific context is more open 
to dispute. Jameson argues that the Althusserian critique of humanism presents a way in which the 
historical emergence of categories of bourgeois individualism and their “constitution or virtual 
construction as a mirage which is also evidently in some fashion an objective reality” can be 
understood. Jameson, The Political Unconscious, p. 153. Terry Eagleton’s use of Althusser’s schema 
in his work, Criticism and Ideology: A Study in Marxist Literary Theory (London: New Left Books, 
1976) is one well-known example of the application of ideology critique to the study of literary texts.
127 Althusser, “Freud and Lacan”, p. 189.
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construct of their lived experience of disempowerment - the two often blended 
together as an amorphous, ideological whole. Where particular contact points exist, 
between the unconscious and the subject of ideology, is never revealed. Only in his 
much later years, and then merely fleetingly, 128 did Althusser begin to become more 
circumspect in his belief that the unconscious works as an ideology. Overall, his 
interest in the structured materiality of the object of power and hence of its ability to 
disempower, was a consistent theme of most of his writings. The major issue to have 
emerged with this psychoanalytic engagement is that it provided him with a 
mechanism for the function of ideology. Althusser develops the idea of unconscious 
recognition, or a “circuit of recognitions”, as Barrett refers to it, 129 to explain how 
ideology makes of people ‘always already’ subjects who recognize as obvious a 
process in which ideology constitutes subjectivity. That this process can be regarded 
as both imaginary and at the same time real is the innovative aspect Althusser brings 
to a theorization of the ideological.
A tension in Althusser’s approach, however, still emerges. If ideologies are 
the “perceived-accepted-suffered cultural objects” , 130 which act functionally upon 
people, it is somewhat unlikely that this process occurs in an exclusively unconscious, 
objective, unknowing fashion except in the most formal, abstract sense ot the function 
of broad, systemic operations of capitalism itself. Suggesting, as Althusser does, that 
this happens “via a process that escapes them” seems merely disingenuous. How such 
a structure of the unconscious is “imposed involuntarily” 131 is difficult to fathom 
without regard to subjective forces, or, at the very least, to an historical sense of the 
consciousness which confronts the changing realities of capitalism. It would seem 
just as important to acknowledge the role of something more akin to a ‘voluntary 
servitude’ which exists in some relation to a spectrum of unconscious thoughts, from 
the structured to the decidedly unstructured.
Althusser’s concern is patently with the level of ‘everyday life’, in the sense of 
the way in which people live their relation to each other and to their conditions of 
existence, and yet this everyday level of lived relations is quite obviously as much 
comprised of conscious and indeed unconscious subjective understandings as it is
128 By the time of the writing of his autobiography this formulation was being seriously questioned. 
Here Althusser writes that “ the proposition that ‘the unconscious works like ideology’ [...] cannot 
really be sustained in these terms, though in itself it is not wrong”. Althusser, The Future Lasts a Long 
Time, p. 364.
129 Barrett, “Althusser’s Marx, Althusser’s Lacan”, p. 173.
130 Althusser, “Marxismand Humanism”, p. 233.
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with the most general level of functions of the system. As we will see, Althusser’s 
hostility to the subjective level and over-reliance upon what is of moment within the 
processes of the object, is partly to be understood in terms of his perceived need to 
attack what he finds to be the ‘contamination’ of theory by “the idealist problematic” 
with its emphasis upon consciousness, conceptual understanding and subjective 
representation, and upon the assumption of rationality. The criticism of a more 
generalized historicism, particularly in its relativist and empiricist variants, might well 
have been needed, but whether the urgency with which Althusser approaches his 
overturning of theorizations of the subjective within ideology is warranted, is very 
much open to question. 132 Althusser veers beyond the ‘dethroning’ of the ‘bourgeois’ 
subject that Montag sees with his work, leaving us with little about the subject other 
than her institutional settings and pre-ordained ideological practices. 133 It might be 
argued that Althusser constructs this critique in order to make apparent one of his 
fundamental theses on ideology - that ideology has a material existence. ’34 What is 
not clearly defended is why he need do this by making quite so insignificant the place 
of subjectivity - by seeing it largely as a function of ideological repression. Russell 
Jacoby talks of a type of fear of the unstructured that marks the works of structuralist 
Marxists, 135 and certainly this unwillingness to consider the ‘unstructured’ spares 
Althusser the difficulty of dealing with much that is unpredictable and uneasy within 
social relations. Shifting an analysis to the realm of the unconscious would seem to 
open one’s understanding of the ideological to the less comfortable but very much 
more realistic world of darkly undisclosed relationships and unclear borders: But, 
somewhat strangely, it is not this world of dimly recognized undercurrents which 
Althusser seeks. In the unconscious Althusser finds, not unlike Freud, the concrete 
and the complete. The site of ideological repression and its ramifications are very 
clear for the theorist to read; the unconscious is that which wrests the subject to the 
‘father’ or authority figure in a contortion of unrecognized obeisance. Nothing is left 
particularly open or appealingly shadowy in this account. We are left with a 
somewhat limited sense of subjectivity in relation to ideology: But is there something 
useful that Althusser is trying to emphasize about the structured basis of all social
131 This term is used by Althusser’s translator and compiler of the glossary to For Marx, Ben Brewster, 
in his explanation of the terms consciousness and ideology, to which Althusser gives his consent. 
Althusser, For Marx, p. 250.
132 Althusser is aware, at least in criticism of Lenin, that the term ‘objectivism’ is “too easily a pendant 
of the term subjectivism for it not to be immediately suspect” but this suspicion seems not to be taken 
far enough in relation to his tendencies. Althusser, “Lenin before Hegel”, p. 114.
133 Montag, “Marxism and Psychoanalysis: The Impossible Encounter”, p. 71.
134 See, for example, Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” , pp. 155-159.
133 Russell Jacoby, “What is Conformist Marxism?” , Telos, no. 45 (Fall 1980): p. 43.
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relations from which we might better understand the way in which ideology operates? 
We will now turn to an examination o f how Althusser theorizes structures in order to 
understand this emphasis we find in his work and to consider what, if  any, relevance it 
has to a contemporary theory o f ideology.
Section Two: The Theorization of Structures
The proof of the pudding is in the eating! So what! We are interested in the 
mechanism that ensures that it really is a pudding we are eating and not a poached 
baby elephant, though we think we are eating our daily pudding!
Althusser, Reading Capital
The Effectivity of Structure on its Elements
Althusser’s view o f subjectivity, as we have seen, cannot be understood 
without seeing its relation to a theorization of structures. We have already indicated 
that his work is concerned to present a general theory of ideology from which the 
mechanism of ideology itself might be known. In order to assess this emphasis on 
structures we need to delve more deeply into this aspect of his writing. In this second 
section o f this chapter we will analyse the place of structures in relation to Althusser’s 
particular theorization of subjectivity and ideology. We want to know whether he 
indeed argues that, because o f ideology, individuals exist in the absence of an 
historical consciousness. Does Althusser attribute this to the particular ideological 
structures of capitalist society, or does he view the atrophy of the consciousness as 
somehow a part o f the limitlessness of the ideological unconscious? We have already 
seen that he views subjectivity within capitalism as a damaged, if  not forsaken, entity. 
It is for this reason that he so unsentimentally dispenses with a subject/object 
problematic that, in whatever way, suggests the relation between an historical 
continuity and a subjective transcendence. But need any dialectic between subject 
and object be dismissed in this fashion? We cannot ignore the fact that Althusser has 
also outlined the case for the existence of ideology in terms of what is “unbearable for 
individuals”, as Balibar refers to it. 136 To answer these various questions we need to 
consider Althusser’s fascinated hostility to the burden of structures. This section of
136 Etienne Balibar, “Structural Causality, Overdetermination, and Antagonism”, in Postmodern 
Materialism and the Future o f Marxist Theory: Essays in the Althusserian Tradition, eds. A. Callari 
and D. F. Ruccio (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1996), p. 117.
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the chapter will proceed to a discussion of these issues by first considering why this 
theorist of ideology feels the need to outline a theory of ideology in general in which 
no particular diachronic impulse is assumed - why, in other words, this theory of 
ideology in general is a theory of structures made significant by their form rather than 
any historical content. This examination will be followed by an analysis of 
Althusser’s view of structural form and the processes by which the structural is 
structured. We will conclude by assessing the impact that this view of structures has 
upon a theorization of ideology in Althusser’s work.
Ideology in General
In his essay, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”, Althusser outlines 
a general theory of ideology. 137 This general theory is distinguished from a theory of 
particular ideologies (religious, ethical, legal, political) on the basis of the contention 
that ideology in general has no history. Althusser argues that as one of the elements 
on which theories of ideologies depend is a theory of ideology in general, it must be 
on the basis of a general theory that an understanding of the operation of social 
formations proceeds. The level of the general, Althusser seems to be suggesting, is 
that which primary theoretical concepts can grasp and of which they can give account. 
What a general theory is able to give account of are the supposedly invariant elements 
which characterize any given mode of production in which the ideological is 
necessary.
What, then, is meant by the claim that ideology in general ‘has no history’? 
Althusser wishes to isolate the general function of ideology in giving meaning and 
cohesion to the thoughts and actions of people within given conditions from the 
particular function of ideologies of class or capitalist domination. Specific ideologies, 
emerging in relation to a mode of production and the existence of class antagonisms, 
do have histories; but ideology in general, which is a reality beyond mere historical 
changes and fluctuations, is a non-historical reality. 1,8 In order to determine this, it 
would seem that what Althusser takes the historical to be is as fixed as, and 
considerably more finite than, the ‘non-historical’. Unsurprisingly, such a view is 
considered by numerous commentators to render history, if not obliterated, then 
relegated to a limited and subordinate role (subordinate to a view of the internal 
functioning of structures). Steven B. Smith claims that this theorization makes history
137 The curious tentativeness of the subtitle, “Notes towards an Investigation”, should not be read as 
anything more than an unfortunate promise of further work which was, however, never to arrive.
138 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” , p. 151.
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resemble “nothing so much as the perpetual reshuffling of a fixed pack” . 139 Alfred 
Schmidt reasons that such an interpretation of history must devalue from the outset 
questions which concern the content of historical experience. 140 We can acknowledge 
that it is the form of ideological subjection and domination that is all important for 
Althusser in order to arrive at an understanding of any particular ideology of 
capitalism: 141 But might it not be, as Derrida argues, that Althusser was “subtracting 
some things from history too quickly” 142 - or indeed that the historical within ideology 
could not be so separated from its general form, and that understanding the generality 
of ideology inevitably means understanding the structural’s relation to historical 
consciousness and subjectivity?
Althusser’s use of Spinoza’s idea of the “absent cause” 143 is, as Jameson 
argues, behind its “canonically worded” formula, a precise attempt to resist “the 
fashionable conclusion that because history is a text, the ‘referent’ does not exist” . 144 
Jameson’s claim is that “history is not a text, not a narrative, master or otherwise, but 
that, as an absent cause, it is inaccessible to us except in textual form, and [...] our 
approach to it and to the Real itself necessarily passes through its prior textualization, 
its narrativization in the political unconscious. ” 145 The point being made is one that is
139 Steven B. Smith, Reading Althusser: An Essay on Structural Marxism (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1984), p. 180.
140 Schmidt, History and Structure, p. 5.
141 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” , p. 128. A close reading of Althusser’s 
idea is important here, for, as Jameson writes: “The sweeping negativity of the Althusserian formula is 
misleading insofar as it can readily be assimilated to the polemic themes of a host of contemporary 
post-structuralism and post-Marxism, for which History, in the bad sense - the reference to a ‘context’ 
or a ‘ground’, an external real world of some kind, the reference, in other words, to the much maligned 
‘referent’ itself - is simply one more text among others, something found in history manuals and that 
chronological presentation of historical sequences so often called ‘linear history’” . Jameson, The 
Political Unconscious, p. 35.
142 Jacques Derrida, “Politics and Friendship: An Interview with Jacques Derrida”, in The Althusserian 
Legacy, eds. E. Ann Kaplan and Michael Sprinker (London: Verso, 1993), p. 193.
143 This idea of the absent cause was otherwise known as ‘metonymic causality’, a ‘conceptual 
discovery’ made by Jacques-Alain Miller, a student of Althusser’s, whom Althusser somewhat 
facetiously refers to as having “gone off with a girl to the forest of Fontainebleau and was teaching her 
how to produce theoretical concepts”. According to Althusser, upon his return from the forest, Miller 
discovered his ‘conceptual discovery’ reproduced in a number of circulated papers, and accused first 
Rändere and then (following the direction of Ranciere’s accusing finger) Althusser of the theft of his 
concept. Althusser saw this as an unnecessary “to-do” over what were otherwise freely circulating 
concepts. And in his own defence against the charge of theft Althusser explains that he cited Miller in 
a footnote when he borrowed the idea of ‘metonymic causality’, and in any case thereupon changed the 
concept to ‘structural causality’, a concept “which no one else had used and was therefore my 
expression!”. Althusser, The Future Lasts a Long Time, pp. 209, 353. When Althusser uses the idea of 
the structure’s ‘metonymic causality’ in Reading Capital he duly refers to it as an “expression Jacques- 
Alain Miller has introduced to characterize a form of structural causality registered in Freud by Jacques 
Lacan”. Althusser, Reading Capital, p. 188, n. 45.
144 Jameson, The Political Unconscious, p. 35.
145 Ibid.
The Deliberate Unconscious 251
no doubt important to an understanding of Althusser’s thesis. Althusser’s objection to 
the notion of an expressive causality is centred on his idea that history (in general), or 
the real, is not accessible to the understanding in the form of an ultimate truth; history 
is, rather, an absent cause. The construction of ideologies - mythologies, philosophies 
of history - depends on the presence of a notion of the real which is external to these 
philosophies. To immediately dismiss the notion of ideology in general as having no 
history146 as positivist and ahistorical, although perhaps in and of itself correct, would 
in some ways be to misunderstand the Althusserian project. Althusser uses the 
description ‘has no history’ to indicate ideology’s eternal character, that it is 
“omnipresent in its immutable form throughout history (= the history of social 
formations containing social classes) ” . 147 He also uses it to make general comments 
about the form as opposed to the particular content of specific ideologies and 
histories. In both these senses we have considered that somewhat intractable 
problems arise - not least of which being the arbitrary way in which Althusser decides 
to carve the general out of a collection of particulars. However, if we recall the idea 
of displacement which we made mention of in the previous section of the chapter with 
Althusser’s discussion of how society needs to situate itself in relation to the ‘infinite 
mirror’ of ideology, we can see that a similar theoretical construction is being made 
here in relation to history. History, Althusser would seem to be arguing, possesses no 
centre; it is only in its ideological misrecognition that the mirror of history as the 
mirror of illusions is at the centre of the drama of everyday life. Althusser does not 
explain how such history might be usefully deferred or placed to one side so as to 
equip it with a ‘greater proximity to the real’ other than to prise apart a sense of 
‘ideology in general’, but we can nonetheless appreciate the attempt he makes to 
critically examine a sense of history as “the tyranny of the actual” , 148 as Nietzsche 
might refer to it, and to suggest the necessity of some alternative. 149
146 It should be recalled that ideology in this sense is that basis on which the construction of ideologies 
depends.
147 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” , p. 152.
148 Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”, p. 106.
149 In constructing this view of history Althusser wishes to distinguish this part of his theory of 
ideology from that put forward in Marx and Engels’, The German Ideology. Whilst Althusser claims 
that he maintains the terms of The German Ideology (i.e. the general thesis that ‘ideology has no 
history’), he argues that Marx and Engels’ thesis is a purely negative one, indeed, one which is 
positivist and historicist and therefore significantly different from that which Althusser himself 
employs. Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”, p. 151. Althusser concludes that 
The German Ideology does offer an explicit theory of ideology but that it is not a Marxist theory. “As 
for Capital', he says, “although it does contain many hints towards a theory of ideologies (most 
visibly, the ideology of the vulgar economists), it does not contain that theory itself, which depends for 
the most part on a theory of ideology in general”. Ibid., p. 149. One of the well-known passages in 
The German Ideology which seems to make use of this idea is the following - “Morality, religion,
252 Ideology Critique and A Philosophy of Freedom
If we consider the analogy with dreams which Althusser presents for us we 
can see something of the difficulty we face. 150 Althusser criticizes those conceptions 
of dreams where theorists find in them an assemblage of arbitrarily ‘stuck together’ 
images of the imaginary. And if here he was merely criticizing a from of pre­
metaphysics, and all the rest of ideology as well as the forms of consciousness corresponding to these, 
thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development”. Marx 
and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 42. This understanding is, according to Althusser, formulated “in 
a plainly positivist context”. Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”, p. 150. This is 
because ideology is here conceived by Marx as “a pure illusion, a pure dream”, as “phantoms formed in 
the brains of men”. Althusser, ibid.; Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 42. Here in Marx’s 
work, Althusser argues, ideology is an imaginary construction formulated in such a way that all “its 
reality is external to it”. Althusser, ibid., p. 150. The only complete reality is that of the concrete 
history of concrete material individuals materially producing their existence from whose ‘residues’ 
ideology is constituted as a purely imaginary assemblage. The German Ideology posits a notion of 
ideology that has no history on the basis that “its history is outside it, where the only existing history is, 
the history of concrete individuals”. Ibid., p. 151. It is on this basis, therefore, that Althusser argues 
that the thesis that ideology has no history, as found in The German Ideology, is a purely negative 
thesis. Ideology, “the pale, empty and inverted reflection of real history”, has no history, not because 
there is no history in it, but because it has no history “of its own”. Ibid. In The German Ideology, 
Marx and Engels pitch their critique against empiricism - against seeing history as a collection of dead 
facts and a rigid adherence to an assumed objectivity - and against the idealism of “an imagined 
activity of imagined subjects”. It is these ways of seeing, functioning as ideologies and imagined 
explanations, which “have no history, no development”. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 
pp. 12, 43. Against these explanations, Marx develops a critical theory of history'. Althusser correctly 
understands the positivist overtones of an analysis of capital as a naturalistic necessity from which will 
arise a communist subjectivity and yet his own use of the concept of history as a process without a 
subject allows an equally economistic determinism to creep back into his critique of Marx’s presumed 
positivism. It should be noted that only with this concept of ‘history as a process without a subject’ 
does Althusser concede that Marx has an important debt to Hegel, for it was Hegel, according to 
Althusser, who was “the first to conceive history as a ‘process without a subject’”. Althusser, “Preface 
to Capital Volume One”, in Lenin and Philosophy, p. 90. In order to maintain the formulation that 
ideology has no history but so as to distance himself from what is seen as the positivist and historicist 
thesis of The German Ideology, Althusser puts forward the argument that, whilst it is possible to hold 
that ideologies have a history of their own, ideology in general has no history in an absolutely positive 
sense. The sense in which such a thesis is positive is the extent to which the peculiarity of ideology 
pertains to the immutability of its structure and functioning. This is why Althusser refers to ideology’s 
‘non-historical reality’ - an ‘omni-historical’ reality - a reality present throughout history “in the sense 
in which the Communist Manifesto defines history as the history of class struggle, i.e., the history of 
class societies.” Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”, p. 152. Can we not detect 
here Althusser’s redefining of his own terms - ‘non-historical’ reality transmogrifies into the reality of 
class society? The similarity between Althusser’s hypothesis of the immutability of ideology in general 
and Freud’s proposition of the eternity of the unconscious is obvious and is a point acknowledged by 
Althusser in terms of the theoretical usages of “eternal” and, thus, “that which has no history”: And yet 
what is eternal about the unconscious other than an abstract sense of its structure is not made clear. In 
the distorting mirror of ideology an acceptable, liveable reality is constructed - a reality which appears 
in the reflected image and is understood as if always and forever evident. For Althusser, the eternal is 
the omnipresent, the trans-historical and immutable form of ideology throughout history, it does not 
mean transcendent to all (temporal) history but we are faced again with the uncomfortable problem of 
needing to acknowledge the separation between ‘temporal’ history and ideological history if we are to 
accept Althusser’s method.
b0 Althusser draws a parallel between the type of conception of ideology he attributes to The German 
Ideology - that of ideology as illusion - and the theoretical status of dreams given by theorists prior to 
Freud. Here, the dream was taken to be a purely imaginary, empty, null and arbitrary residue of the 
reality of the day. Although Althusser does not elaborate upon this he certainly indicates that dreams 
and the imaginary are empty and vain but are as much a part of a full reality as reality itself.
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Freudian naivety or dismissiveness in relation to the realm of dreams we might be 
inclined to agree: But what he instead seems to argue is that, as with ideology, dreams 
are deliberately and necessarily structured - they are not the ‘bricole’ of spontaneous 
indeterminacy and chance. 151 And yet is this not precisely what the imaginary can 
represent - the accidental randomness of incidental occurrences which we then gather 
in terms of various patterns and formations, justification and rationalization? As with 
his construction of ideology, Althusser applies to the realm of the imaginary an overly 
fixed and pre-determined structure.
At one level it is easy to see that Althusser wants to derive an understanding of 
the central mechanism by which ideology operates - that of the interpellation of 
individuals as subjects. His analysis of this sort of ideology is, in practice however, 
situated quite concretely in the functions of the capitalist State. All of Althusser’s 
examples of the functions of both repressive and ideological apparatuses, and of the 
relation between these apparatuses and the practice of interpellation, are derived from 
the existence and function of a quite specific class society, that of capitalism. Whilst 
Althusser’s general theory is presented as holding true across any given mode of 
production, it is rarely substantiated in these terms. Indeed the terms of reference 
used are those emanating from specifically capitalist relations It can be asked, then, 
what is the point of constructing a general, transhistorical theory when a particular, 
determinate, historical theory is in fact assumed? Again, it is Althusser’s constant 
recourse to theory and metatheory which acts as the primary determinant of the 
projection of his argument. Theory here plays the role of the “conceptual dragons” of 
which Nietzsche speaks, which are brought forth in circumstances where, fragmented 
“and in pieces, dissociated almost mechanically into an inner and outer” and 
“mistrusting any feeling of our own”, we are granted ‘empty being’ rather than a 
sense of the ‘genuine life’ within us. 152 The structure, as we will see more clearly 
below in the next several sub-sections, takes precedence over all other aspects of 
theorizing ideology.
The Structural Form o f Ideology: the Imaginary
In an attempt to explain his central thesis that ideology in general has no 
history Althusser introduces two further theses - the first concerning what is 
represented in the imaginary form of ideology, and the second concerning the material
151 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” , p. 151.
152 Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” , p. 119.
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existence of ideology. 153 The first of Althusser’s theses is that ideology represents the 
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence. 154 This 
thesis poses several hypothetical (and typical) problems for which those interpreting 
the world have sought answers. A common way in which ideas are dismissed as 
being myth or illusion is to isolate particular ideologies from one’s own critical point 
of view and describe them, because they are not believed to be true, as imaginary, as 
not corresponding to reality. 155 Whilst this approach readily signifies that which is 
believed and known to constitute an illusion, i.e. that which does not correspond to 
reality, it must at the same time admit the category of illusion to reality. All that is 
necessary, according to this approach, to lift the veil of illusion, to unmask reality, is 
interpretation. Reality, truth and knowledge constitute the world behind their 
imaginary representation in ideology. Various types of interpretation are suggested 
and believed to be the way to discover the reality lurking behind the ideological veil. 
However, as Althusser argues: “The essential point is that on condition that we 
interpret the imaginary transposition (and inversion) of ideology we arrive at the
153 As would be apparent from the preceding analysis, for Althusser, the first thesis is negative and the 
second, positive.
154 Various theorists using this idea have attempted to explain the meaning of the relation between the 
imaginary and the real. For example, Victor Bürgin refers to the imaginary distortion of the ideological 
representation of the real as an “imagistic irreality” which carries with it signifiers which are both 
illusory and real. Bürgin, The End o f Art Theory, p. 170. Jameson views ideology as a process of 
ideological closure, as the displacement of the reality of capitalist exploitation and oppression. In this 
sense ideology is itself the symptomatic projection of social contradiction. See Jameson, The Political 
Unconscious, p. 83. Adorno’s more disturbingly pessimistic philosophy describes the process of 
ideology as a structural limitation imposed on thought: “Man and the institutions of piety reproduce 
commercially the unconscious will to forget what one has to fear”. See Adorno, The Jargon of 
Authenticity, pp. 153-154. Fearing the brutal reality of the real conditions of existence the human 
consciousness is deceived, not by itself, but by reality. The consciousness is systematically prevented 
from attaining a complete experience of reality. Of this process Dowling claims that, “ it is the very 
essence of systems of domination to hide the truth from those, both oppressors and oppressed, who are 
implicated in them - and yet there remains a drive toward some form of the comprehensibility that 
alone makes existence tolerable. So it is that in the name of comprehensibility the collective mind 
invents systems (religions, philosophies, mythologies) that allow it to attain to some notion of 
coherence.” Dowling, Jameson, pp. 53-54. Such a ‘strategy of containment’, to use Jameson’s term, is 
the means by which the real is suppressed and supplanted by another reality, the ideological reality of 
capitalist order. Caught within the reproduction of imaginary representations of the real, the individual 
is forced, in order to live and function within a capitalist system, to accept this ideology as if it were 
true. But if “the true is a moment of the false” as Debord maintains, then it is this process of 
containment which needs to be understood. Debord, Society o f the Spectacle, par. 9.
135 Althusser enthusiastically endorses Marx’s words that “as in private life one differentiates between 
what a man thinks and says of himself and what he really is and does, so in historical struggles one 
must differentiate still more the phrases and fancies of parties from their real organisation and their real 
interests, their conceptions of themselves from their reality” . Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Bonaparte, in Surveys from Exile: Political Writings, ed. David Fembach (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1981), p. 174 (translation slightly altered). “You must never”, Althusser warns us, “judge 
someone on the basis of his own self-conscious image, but on the basis of the whole process which, 
behind this consciousness, produces it” . Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, pp. 178-179. On this 
point see also Bruce Mazlish, The Meaning o f Karl Marx (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
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conclusion that in ideology ‘men represent their real conditions of existence to 
themselves in an imaginary form’ .” 156
Such an argument, as Althusser proceeds to point out, leaves an essential 
question unanswered: “Why do men ‘need’ this imaginary transposition of their real 
conditions of existence in order to ‘represent themselves’ in their real conditions of 
existence? ” 157 As Althusser sees it, the predominant answer of philosophy in the 
eighteenth century was to suppose that the cause for this imaginary transposition lay 
in the nefariousness of those who wished to exploit and dominate the people. 
According to Althusser, in the early works of Marx another, and yet in some ways 
similar, interpretation is sought. In seeking to understand why a distortion of the 
individual’s real conditions of existence occurred, Marx posits the cause as alienation 
- a material alienation present in the conditions of human existence within societies 
founded on inequality and unfreedom. According to Althusser, both answers to the 
question of why an imaginary transposition of the real conditions of existence occurs - 
in order to represent those real conditions - presuppose that what is to be found behind 
ideology, in other words, what can be interpreted through this imaginary 
representation of the world, is the real world. Thus, Althusser concludes: “All those 
interpretations thus take literally the thesis which they presuppose and on which they 
depend. ” 158 Having pinpointed what he assumes is a problem of interpretation how 
does he propose that it might be overcome? Althusser stresses the need to realize that 
it is not the real conditions of human existence which individuals “represent to 
themselves” in ideology, but rather their relation to those conditions of existence 
which is represented to them in ideology. 159 “It is this relation which is at the centre 
of every ideological, i.e. imaginary, representation of the real world. It is this relation 
that contains the ‘cause’ which has to explain the imaginary distortion of the 
ideological representation of the real world. ” 160 Althusser’s thesis is that, rather than 
the real conditions of the real world being what individuals “represent to themselves” 
in ideology, it is the imaginary nature of their relations to their conditions of existence 
which underpins all imaginary distortion perceived (or, if not perceived, then lived 
through) in all ideology.
156 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” , p. 153.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid., p. 154.
159 This is also Maurice Godelier’s position when he writes that “it is not man who deceives himself 
over reality, it is reality which is deceiving him”. See Maurice Godelier, Perspectives in Marxist 
Anthropology, trans. Robert Brain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 170.
160 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” , p. 154.
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To understand this in Althusser’s own materialist terms - to consider that the 
representation of the real conditions of human existence (of social formations 
containing social classes) are formed by the relations of production and from relations 
whose derivation is in the relations of production - is to argue that all ideology 
represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to the relations of production: 
“What is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of the real relations 
which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relations of those 
individuals to the real relations in which they live. ” 161 Rather than the need to 
examine the cause of this distortion of the real relations in ideology, the question 
which emerges is, “why is the representation given to individuals of their (individual) 
relation to the social relations which govern their conditions of existence and their 
collective and individual life necessarily an imaginary relation” ? 162
It is perhaps somewhat telling that Althusser fails to directly answer his own 
question so pertinently posed. What he does present is a further theorization of the 
existence of the structure of ideology as an imaginary relation, to which we will now 
turn. For it is in this theorization of the ideological which Althusser puts forward the 
most interesting, albeit tantalizingly difficult, aspect of this theoretical examination of 
ideology in general. Althusser attempts to account for the materiality of ideology as a 
facet of the structure of social apparatuses and their practices.
The Structural Form o f Ideology: Materiality
In order to answer the question as to why the structural form of ideological 
representation is necessarily an imaginary relation and to examine the nature of this 
imaginary relation, Althusser presents his second thesis that ideology has a material 
existence. This materiality of ideology not only means that the ideas or 
representations constituting ideology have a material, rather than a ‘spiritual’, 
‘metaphysical’ or ‘ideal’, existence, but that these ideas and representations always 
exist within an apparatus and its practices in a material sense. 163 Precisely what form 
the material existence of ideology takes is a subject dealt with only fleetingly by
161 Ibid., p. 155.
162 Ibid. Althusser’s argument is neither that class is directly implicated in every ideological practice, 
nor that a ruling class ideology is unified and always effective. For Althusser, it is the conditions of the 
existence of the practice and experience of class struggle that express the conflicting and changing 
demands of domination. Ideological state apparatuses reproduce and transform the relations of 
production; there is nothing essential about the function of their ideologies. This is a point also made 
by Pecheux in Stating the Obvious, p. 92.
163 Ultimately, Althusser tells us material existence regardless of which modality it is expressed in is 
rooted “in the last instance in’physical’ matter”. Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses”, p. 156.
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Althusser. Whilst the sense in which ideology can be defined in terms of its 
materiality is not the same as the material existence of “a paving-stone or a rifle” , 164 it 
is still a “physical” existence, although one which is said by Althusser to exist in a 
different “modality”.16' Paul Hirst’s comment in this context also seems to reproduce 
a similarly strangely unenlightening obviousness. Hirst writes: “Ideology is not 
illusory [...] it is not falsity, because how can anything which has effects be false? It 
would be like saying that a black pudding or a steamroller is false”. Whilst Hirst’s 
comment is of course perfectly obvious - that something which has effects is not false, 
in some cases these effects might easily be described as false - i.e. not true under 
given circumstances - even though the thing itself giving rise to these effects - i.e. 
ideology, is obviously not false. Falsity here may not be a denial of something’s 
existence but rather a description of its relation to reality. Many theorists, most 
notably perhaps Schopenhauer, have argued that the world can indeed be false in 
relation to the values it lives out. Again, to equate an understanding of the non-falsity 
of ideology with that of the obvious non-falsity of material objects - be they stones, 
rifles, steamrollers or black puddings - is not particularly useful. 166 Inevitably, there 
seems something significant in the abruptness with which Althusser ends this 
discussion, stopped as if unwilling to proceed. Because he declines to further explain 
what he means by this, the actual sense in which ideology can be said to have a 
material existence remains unclear. Knowing that the materiality of ideology is not 
that of a rifle or a stone explains little more than what is in any case self-evident - 
ideology does not generally express itself as a physical object with hard surfaces and a 
definite shape. But surely Althusser could say more. Ideology functions within the 
context of social relations. Abstracted from social relations not even the materiality 
of prison bars and surveillance cameras has any necessary function for capital: One 
might even be drawn to questioning their inherent meaning in the absence of such 
relations and purposes. Thus the materiality of ideology expresses itself in the social 
relations by and through which ideology functions. It is these social relations that 
make ideologies material not their physical existence, whatever their particular 
‘modality’. As Althusser well knows, ideology, like State power, is not suspended in
164 Ibid..
I6;> On this issue of matter existing in different modalities Montag claims that it is this Spinozist 
concept that allows Althusser to posit the material existence of ideology. It is unfortunate, however, 
that Montag provides us with no further basis upon which to assess this claim. Montag, “Spinoza and 
Althusser Against Hermeneutics: Interpretation or Intervention?”, p. 57.
166 See Paul. Q. Hirst, Problems and Advances in the Theory o f Ideology (Cambridge: Communist 
Party Pamphlet, 1976), p. 16.
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mid air: 167 And yet questions of ideology’s mode of physical existence which fail to 
isolate the most significant social relations through which it is realized are as empty as 
ideas of ethereal power relations are fanciful.
Althusser’s argument is that ideology’s imaginary relation to real relations is 
itself endowed with a material existence. This is a useful and necessary starting point 
for understanding ideology. But, again, in what sense are these relations material? If 
it is not merely in the physical existence of relations that their materiality is expressed 
then what is it about an imaginary relation that is material? Part of the confusion in 
dealing with this issue rests in the tendency to abstract the essence of social 
institutions and apparatuses on the basis of ideological relations. Thus, in Althusser’s 
work, there is a certain sense in which he derives State apparatuses from the 
ideologies with which they are more usually associated. Does the idea of ‘practices’ 
overcome this seeming confusion in his work? Althusser constructs a picture of the 
way in which ideology is furnished with a structure and a way of functioning: The 
ideology of ideology recognizes that the ideas of individual human subjects exist in 
their actions and that these actions are inserted into practices. These practices are 
themselves governed by the rituals in which these practices are inscribed and these 
rituals are a part of and are defined by the material existence of an ideological 
apparatus. 168 He therefore proposes that “there is no ideology except by the subject 
and for subjects” . 169 This means that by the functioning of the category of the subject 
there is a place for ideology. The category of the subject - which may function under 
a variety of names (Althusser’s examples are ‘the soul’ in Plato, and God) - “is the 
constitutive category of all ideology, whatever its determination (regional or class) 
and whatever its historical date - since ideology has no history. ” 170 Here Althusser 
seems to abstract out what is already an abstraction within a theoretical understanding 
of ideology. Ideology in general is not merely an abstraction for theoretical purposes 
but is an abstraction of an abstraction, in other words, an abstraction of itself. 
Ideology in general seems largely cut adrift from time, space, social relations, and
167 This is Marx’s phrase in The Eighteenth Brumaire o f Louis Bonaparte, “And yet the state power is 
not suspended in mid air” . See Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire, p. 238 (translation slightly altered).
168 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” , p. 158. Such a construction is undertaken 
in order to reveal the relationship between ideology and the subject, because for Althusser: “It [...] 
appears that the subject acts insofar as he is acted by the following system (set out in the order of its 
real determination): ideology existing in a material ideological apparatus, prescribing material practices 
governed by a material ritual, which practices exist in the material actions of a subject acting in all 
consciousness according to his belief.” Ibid., p. 159.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid., p. 160.
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particularly a basis in subjectivity. 171 Having performed this delicate manipulation 
Althusser is compelled to offer us the Antigone’s law of ideology, “an everlasting 
law, and no man knows at what time it was first put forth” . 172 Ideology is thus, 
eternal.
Structured Totalities, Overdetermination, Structures in Dominance
Althusser’s construction of a general theory is a part of a broad, interrelated 
depiction of a materialist social analysis. For this reason we will consider some of the 
central aspects of this analysis in which he develops new conceptual ideas in order to 
convey his general thesis. Althusser’s basic argument is that ideology functions 
within a structured totality of relations. Just as Marx rejects the notion of the 
transparency of history and, in relation to this, the Hegelian idea of the real as an 
expressive totality whose essence can be understood in terms of its surface 
manifestations, so too does Althusser. Althusser’s critique rejects the notion of the 
social formation as a structure that can be reduced to the sum of its various elements. 
The structure is reducible neither to its idea or essence, nor to a purpose or a directing 
agency. For Althusser, for example, a Marxist totality is a ‘decentred structure in 
dominance’. With this concept Althusser wishes to express, in somewhat different 
theoretical terminology, the idea present in Marx’s work that a totality is constituted 
by elements from which it is never separable because each element is the condition of 
existence of all the others. For Althusser, this leads to his emphasis upon 
determination of the economic level in the last instance. Because an original essence 
cannot be separated out from the overall structure, the structure cannot be said to have 
a centre. Rather, it may have a dominant element or a determination in the last 
instance - an instance which, however, never comes. 173 In this sense it is, for 
Althusser, a ‘decentred’ structure.
Marx’s theory of the relationship between elements within social totalities can 
be clearly distinguished from a conception of an ‘expressive totality’. The appearance 
of complexity cannot be reduced to any essential elements characterizing the whole. 
Marx’s work is the theoretical recognition of this complexity and its irreducible
171 Again, Althusser’s defining and redefining makes for considerable confusion. Non-historical 
reality is also the history of class societies, so the severence Althusser makes between ideology in 
general and particular social relations is not altogether complete.
172 Sophocles, Antigone, trans. R. E. Braun (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), II, 450-457.
177 Althusser writes that: “From the first moment to the last, the lonely hour of the ‘last instance’ never 
comes” . Althusser, “Contradiction and Overdetermination” , p. 113.
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relation to a primary essence. 174 Ideologies, for example, do not simply express the 
essential character of the whole that they purport to grasp. To explain the general 
character of ideology it is first necessary to consider the specific relation ideologies 
have within social totalities. A theory of structural determination would emphasize 
the non-teleological character of the self-production of the structure. The structure is 
not dependent upon an identifiable purpose in order to perpetuate its form. In the 
process of ensuring its reproduction the structure may well produce elements that do 
not give rise to the optimal conditions for its perpetuation. In a more particular sense, 
capital cannot autonomize itself from labour; it therefore is not able to escape this 
potential antagonism. 175 For example, capitalism produces the potential for 
fundamental economic and social antagonisms which may cause repeated disruptions 
to its successful reproduction and indeed may provide the very basis for its demise: 
But this situation cannot be assumed. 176 Collier refers to this possibility in terms of a
174 Collier argues on the question of how political and ideological formations are produced that the 
acknowledgment of the complexity of the relation of these formations should not lead to a teleological 
mode of explanation; if it is that the “state and ideology are not for the most part purpose-built to 
secure the reproduction of capitalist relations”, then the question of how the superstructure functions to 
promote the reproduction of economic class relations needs to be pursued in ways other than those 
relying upon conceptions of “consciousness, teleology, providence 0 1  Joe Reality” . Rather, it is simply 
that “if a hypothetical mode of production had no mechanism that secured this effect, that mode of 
production could not be instantiated.” An answer sought along these lines would therefore not find it 
surprising that the mode of production has mechanisms which do infact support political and 
ideological conditions for their reproduction. Andrew Collier, 'In Defence of Epistemology” , in Issues 
in Marxist Philosophy: Epistemology, Science, Ideology, vol. Ill, eds. John Mepham and David-Hillel 
Ruben (Sussex: Harvester, 1979), p. 91.
175 See, for example, Marx’s analysis of simple reproduction in volume one of Capital in which he 
states: “The maintenance and reproduction of the working-class is, and ever must be, a necessary 
condition to the reproduction of capital” . Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 537. Marx also explains how the 
apparent purpose of capitalists in producing surplus value also has the effect of reproducing the 
structural conditions for the perpetuation of capitalism. The object of the capitalist is both to produce a 
commodity and to ensure that the value of the commodity is greater than the value of the commodities 
used in its production, i.e. the means of production and labour-power. The aim of the capitalist is, 
therefore, “to produce not only a use-value, but a commodity also; not only value, but at the same time 
surplus-value.” In order to achieve this result, the capitalist may be required to employ new means of 
production, change pools of workers, and make adjustments to other changes in the social relations of 
production.
176 Other limitations to the effectiveness of the structure may be found in its inability to determine all 
laws governing the elements of the social totality. Not only is there the obvious fact that every society 
“exists under the constraints of geological and biological laws which it didn’t constitute”, as Collier 
expresses it (in other words, it depends on a nature external to the structure’s elements) but these 
elements may not be constituted by the structure. The structure may carry with it limitations applicable 
to its elements but, again, this process is not a teleological one; the imperfections to which Collier 
refers may not be produced in any systematic way. This, however, does not indicate any necessary 
randomness to the overall reproduction of the conditions for the perpetuation of the system’s structures, 
nor should it be assumed that because there is no single, essential principle guiding the reproduction of 
social structures it follows that there instead must be an endless multiplicity of purposes or guiding 
strategies on the part of an endless number of individuals. Collier argues that structural determinism 
attempts to avoid both holistic and atomistic explanations of the functioning of social systems, and is, 
therefore, directly opposed to voluntarist, idealist or teleological ways of explaining historical change. 
Collier, “In Defence of Epistemology”, p. 91.
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potential for the structure to have “irremediably imperfect mechanisms” for securing 
its own reproduction. 177 The other side of these unsystematic, imperfect mechanisms 
is, of course, the activity of people which takes place in and against structures.
In order to explain the particular way in which structures function, Althusser 
develops two other concepts, ‘overdetermination’ and ‘structures in dominance’. The 
first is a concept borrowed from Freud to explain contradictions in practices within a 
social formation as a whole which react back on each practice and contradiction itself. 
The overdetermination of a contradiction is an expression of its uneven development. 
‘Structures in dominance’ refers to the idea that, within any given totality, the 
elements of which it is comprised are asymmetrically related. One element will be 
dominant over others. It is the economic base that determines which will be dominant 
in any particular social formation, which will then be, in other words, a structure in 
dominance. Such a structure is not fixed because it is subject to the overdetermination 
of the contradictions present. Althusser considers that he is solving the thorny 
problem of the Marxist theory of the economy being determinant in the last 
instance. 178 But not only is the problem left unresolved by Althusser - for him, the last 
instance never actually arrives as we have mentioned - the task he sets himself is in 
anv case based on a misunderstanding of the intention behind Marx’s metaphor of 
different determinations and mediations between social relations under capitalism. 
Althusser instead searches desperately for firm theoretical evidence of the 
autonomous position of a ‘superstructure’ in relation to a ‘base’.
'The necessity of the obscure field of the invisible’
It is here perhaps more than in any other aspect of his work that Althusser’s 
tendency towards abstraction is apparent. Subjectivity is abstracted into a process of 
the production of a product, the subject. Althusser constructs a determinism of the 
subject which becomes as abstracted as any notion of the individual possessing free 
will. What he fails to theorize is subjectivity as a product and at the same time as 
productive. Social labour is produced but it also produces. This dynamic is absent 
from Althusser’s view of subjectivity. It is not surprising that his theorizing in 
relation to this is sometimes seen as having prepared the ground for a variety of post-
177 Ibid., p. 90.
178 This is presumably why Roy Bhaskar argues that Althusser’s anti-humanism is an attempt to plot a 
reality whose dialectic “stands for the complexity, preformation and overdetermination of wholes”. 
Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy (London: 
Verso, 1989), p. 124. It is, he argues, a critical realism, a philosophy whose task it is “to analyse 
concepts which can only be used syncategorematically, that is, under some particular description, in 
science” . Ibid p. 48.
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structuralist and post-modernist theorists who see as central to contemporary society 
the overwhelming presence of relations of power and control. 179 We need to assess 
how successfully Althusser manages to outline an understanding of ideology as a 
material force and to then consider in what ways this enables and/or prevents him 
from theorizing a liberation from ideology. We will do this in the following section.
Section Three: The Theorization of a Liberation from
Ideology
The expression ‘dominant ideology’ has no meaning if it is not set against another 
expression: the dominated ideology.
Althusser, Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy o f the Scientists
179 It is not difficult to see how such a view can lend itself to a politics of pessimism. It is however in 
some of Althusser’s post-structuralist followers that this pessimism reaches greater heights. Although 
not in any sense complete in its comfort of melancholy, Paul Hirst’s work of his On Law and Ideology 
phase is an interesting example of the reversals found in attempts to remove the category of the subject 
altogether from a critical understanding of the specificity of social relations. That Hirst’s work is also a 
questioning of the role of the reproduction of the relations of production is also of course significant. 
Hirst distances himself from Althusser’s critique of bourgeois humanism on the basis that Althusser 
retains a notion of the subject as a condition for the functioning of that process through which 
individuals are interpellated. Hirst argues that the process whereby individuals inevitably proceed to 
their ideological outcome as constituted subjects presupposes that individuals are already receptive to 
the process of their becoming subjects. The effectiveness of this process requires the presence of 
something essentially human in the concrete individual for the yet-to-be subject to become a subject. 
Althusser’s notion of ideology imposing a condition in which subjects are ‘always already’ subjects for 
the function of the reality in which individuals express a lived relation to their conditions of existence, 
does not, for Hirst, overcome the problem of how a cognition of this reality is represented to them; 
“unless we fill the child’s cradle with anthropological assumptions (i.e. we invest the child with the 
capacity for cognition that is necessary for recognition)” . For Hirst, Althusser remains “committed to 
the presence of attributes of subjectivity in the subject-to-be” . Althusser supposes the subject prior to 
ideology. This problem is, for Hirst, the Cartesian problem of circularity of the cogito. “Just as 
Descartes’ T  must ever recede before a rigorous scepticism and yet, within the terms of the 
problematic, ever remain, so the ‘individual’, who is prior to ideology and whose pre-ideological 
attributes of subjectivity are necessary to its becoming a subject, cannot be erased in Althusser’s text 
and must reappear in it” . This, according to Hirst, allows space for specific theorisations and 
questionings of particular institutions, practices and discourses. Hirst, On Law and Ideology, pp. 67, 
65, 59-60. Hirst’s expressed aim in his critique of Althusser is to identify the idealist trappings of an 
otherwise anti-humanist theory of social relations; but the price to be paid for his more rigorous and 
thorough-going denial of the role of human subjectivity is great indeed. The dispersal of the self into a 
set of signifying practices results in the impoverishment of the critique of those conditions in which the 
subject is dissolved. Incredulity in the face of the notion of “the punctual simplicity of the classical 
subject” , as Derrida expresses it, may help force the confrontation between social criticism and the 
comforting suppositions of a philosophical tradition grown tried, but unless this critique is grounded in 
an analysis of those conditions which give rise to and help sustain abstract concepts, the advances made 
are more imagined than real. Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 227.
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The Transfiguration o f the Existing Order
In this final section of the chapter we will attempt to assess the theorization of 
radical transformation involved in Althusser’s critique of ideology. In a rather strange 
sense, Althusser’s critique indicates at least two divergent directions in which such a 
theorization is positioned. At one level, we have an extensive examination of the 
relatively autonomous articulating economic mechanisms through which the 
ideological insinuates itself - this examination suggests that we must face the cold, 
hard, adamantine materiality of ideology’s structural insinuation. At another level, we 
are told that the place of unconscious proclivities and destinies of the individual 
subject is paramount to ideology’s successful functioning, suggesting that humanity is 
bom to suffer the future that ideology will ensure it lives out. Both aspects of the 
ideological underscore the power of ideology to function according to a pre­
determined notion of the basic purpose of its functioning - it is assumed, a priori, that 
ideology exists to oppress, dominate, confuse and control. We need, then, to consider 
whether Althusser’s theorization allows for any degree of subversive potential within 
the ideological or whether his emphasis upon the self-sufficient, autochthonous logic 
of ideology, a logic which cannot help but draw attention to the inadequate experience 
of the autotelic and freely creating, makes of ideology a closure without end.
The section will be divided into three major sub-sections. The first will assess 
Althusser’s theorization of the subject in terms of its relation to a transfomiative 
theory of ideology. The second will consider Althusser’s most distinctive attempt to 
provide a theoretical basis for a demystification of the ideological - that of the 
development of the concept of critique. It will also consider, briefly, the specific 
science/ideology distinction that Althusser argues is necessary to retain for a science 
of history which is able to do battle with ‘idealist’ tendencies (defined largely as 
problems of epistemology and empiricism). Althusser’s premise here is that no 
assumption should be made of knowledge as a relation between a knowing subject 
and an object. Such assumptions inevitably lead, so Althusser argues, to a distinction 
between tmth and falsity, the very sort of problem which an understanding of 
ideology needs most to avoid. When we look instead at the product of ideology, the 
constitution of subjectivity, it is apparent that ideological discourses presuppose the 
subject as an origin and/or goal of knowledge, he argues. It is this ideological effect 
that must be countered with a ‘scientific’ knowledge effect.
As a way of moving beyond the problems which we have already mentioned 
in the previous two sections of the chapter with both Althusser’s theorization of 
subjectivity and that of structural materiality, we will look lastly at how Althusser’s 
emphasis on critique, at the very least in a negative sense, allows for the rejection of a
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notion of ideological identification with a fixed, externally driven content: That is, 
that the context of the individual’s source of activities and beliefs grounded in one’s 
position within social relations is not simply that given in the empirically given or 
verifiable. This critique allows us to pose the question of the role of identification 
with imagined images. Whilst Althusser’s largely negative critique leaves little room 
for a theorization of the imaginary in terms of wishful images of yet to be fulfilled 
moments, it is this very area which we can explore theoretically once a sense of the 
imaginary within processes of subjectivity and identification are posed and once a 
substantial questioning of what constitutes the given within the construction and 
experience of realities is made. We will take up these issues in more detail later in the 
thesis. In this section of the chapter we will be largely concerned with considering 
what aspects of Althusser’s theorization can allow for a liberatory theorization as the 
way to best oppose ideological practices.
Subjectivity and a Transformation of the Ideological
Humanity as an ‘empty nothing ’
We mentioned in the first section of the chapter that in Althusser’s 
development of a theory of ideology what he might earlier have recognized as the 
abstraction of the enslaved worker becomes that more generally of the subject - the 
subject subjected to ideology and enslaved by its dictates. We conjectured that in 
doing so a subjective dynamic is lost from Althusser’s work; the ill-fated subject of 
ideology is controlled by the structures of ideology, structures she cannot fully 
perceive or understand. This process has occurred because of the identity between 
ideology and the imagined, lived experiences of the subject. The subject is foiled by 
her own conditions of existence, sacrificed to the solemn advance of a commodious 
but careless and disregarding State.
Early in the development of this theory, Althusser saw in Hegel the profundity 
of one whose thoughts haunt an apostate age. Despite detecting a common 
misunderstanding of the relation between the subjective and objective aspects of “the 
Hegelian negativity”, Althusser felt that Hegel’s ‘romantic nocturne’ themes revealed 
a truth about the nothingness of humanity. Hegel saw in humanity a “sick animal who 
neither dies nor recovers, but stubbornly insists on living on in a nature terrified of 
him”. This humanity, “a triumphant error who makes his aberration the law of the 
world”, is “a Night”, an “empty nothing” . 180 Despite Althusser’s later, more strident,
180 Althusser, “Man, That Night” (1947), in The Spectre o f Hegel, p. 170.
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disavowal of Hegel, this view of the individual as the “human void”, as nothingness, 
would persist throughout his work.
It is no doubt the case that systems which rest upon basic injustices and a lack 
of freedom impose a certain nothingness upon the individual as the only way to 
participate in its unfairness: But to argue that humanity has become the void with 
which the objects of capitalism bedazzle it, is to accord this condition too much 
reason and control. For out of this nothingness nothing will surely come, in this 
society or in any other. Althusser at one time uses the phrase the “void of a 
detachment” and Negri certainly interprets this as meaning an extremity that reveals 
the site of “the greatest of possibilities, the site of power” . 181 And yet if people will 
fulfil their destiny as the endless night of empty nothingness how are we to 
understand their actions, including any self-perception of humanity’s destiny? And 
yet must we conclude that this is the level to which people have been reduced? 
Equally, is this really the way in which the system operates? Does capitalism actually 
need people to exist in such a state of empty nothingness in order to function at a level 
it finds reasonable or conducive to its smooth continuation? If it can be assured of 
such a guarantee then why would ideology be needed as a part of this process?
We surely must understand ideology to mean the imposition of a certain 
narrowing of the field of possibilities to present a nuanced view of conflicting realities 
- but unless ideology is seen as the complete extent of all thought and action then this 
cannot mean that these conflicting realities have themselves ceased to exist. Nor can 
we simply assume that the imposition of constraints is always successful and 
inevitably results in some pre-determined outcome. For Althusser, of course, 
ideology is a hollow and yet sufficient mimicry of reality that its identity cannot 
possibly be perceived. Not only is ideology coterminous with all reality in this view 
but it is also considered to share the same boundaries as the problem of domination, 
which is only within itself a product of overdetermination. 182 The subject and 
domination are the two perfectly coextensive sides of ideology. All of this tends to 
result in too neat and undifferentiated a picture of the relation between subject and 
ideology. Just as there are different functions and contents of ideology, so too is the 
subject’s relation to ideology a tinctured and differentiated set of processes. Where 
Althusser mentions the existence of a ‘dominated ideology’ in relation to a dominant
181 Negri, “The Later Althusser”, p. 65, citing Louis Althusser, “Conversation avec le P. Breton” , 1985, 
IMEC Archive.
182 Macherey expresses an example of this problem in his theorization on the problem of representation 
with his claim that the reality which ‘realistic art’ imitates “coincides with the ideology of a society or 
an age”. Pierre Macherey, “The Problem of Reflection”, Sub-stance, no. 15 (1976): p. 12.
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ideology we are not really convinced that he is introducing any level of differentiation 
within the ideological. 183 For not only does this sense of a ‘dominated ideology rest 
uneasily with most of Althusser’s theorization of the ideological and its generality but 
we are never really given any view of what this presumably very different and 
resistant type o f ‘ideology’ actually comprises.
Whilst Althusser allows for social individuals to be active within history, this 
state is circumscribed by the fact that to be active within history means for him to be 
an agent of particular social practices and thus to be a subject of these practices. This 
materialist rendering of the place of individuals within history is useful to the extent 
that it captures the constraints that circumstances might impose upon the activities of 
individuals and does so in a way which emphasizes the unevenness of what Althusser 
sees as overdetermined contradictions within any given ‘social formation’. The 
problem with it, however, is that Althusser’s category of the subject or the ‘subject- 
form’ is theorized in such a way as to claim that the subject’s own disunity is not 
capable of being grasped by the subject herself. The subject remains a ‘night’, a 
‘void’, unto herself. In the workings of her unconscious she has stepped decisively 
beyond the state of a conflictual unity which she struggles to discover; the subject has 
become her own total subjection. Althusser’s one-time co-author, Etienne Balibar, 
has more recently defended Althusser’s structuralism against those detractors who 
have seen a destruction or disqualification of the subject in Althusser’s theorizing: 
Balibar argues that none of the great structuralist philosophers was satisfied with 
disqualifying the subject; that they each undertook instead “to move the subject from 
a constituting function to a constituted position”. This, Balibar argues, is eminently 
the case with regard to Althusser. 184 And yet this is precisely the problem: Althusser’s 
necessary critique of a one-sided idealism is replaced with an equally one-sided 
materialism. 185 And in so doing there is, as Mladen Dolar argues, something very 
abrupt and sudden in the transition from the individual to the ideological subject of
183 Althusser, Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists, pp. 260-261.
184 Balibar, “Althusser’s Object”, p. 169.
183 Even if we take Althusser’s materialism to be something akin to Macherey’s rather positive take on 
it -  materialism “is not a doctrine, not a theory, not a body of knowledge, but rather a manner of 
intervention [...] a way of moving through, not ‘reality’ which is not an object of philosophy, but the 
philosophical field itself grasped in the concrete complexity of its internal conflicts” we are no closer to 
a more dynamic sense of the individual’s passage through conscious and unconscious reality. See 
Pierre Macherey, “In a Materialist Way” , in Philosophy in France Today, ed. A. Montefiore 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 137. Althusser’s view of materialism is very much 
concerned with his understanding of a science of history -  “the word materialism registers both the 
initial rupture with the idealism of philosophies of history and the installation of scientificity with 
respect to history” . Althusser, “Lenin and Philosophy”, in Lenin and Philosophy, p. 44.
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Althusser’s theorizing. 186 Althusser is certainly redressing a perceived imbalance and 
his emphasis upon the process of the constituted subject is a fundamentally important 
aspect in accounting for the relation between ideology and subjectivity but it is an 
aspect only. We need to shift this analysis onwards to an appreciation of the relation 
between the constituted and the constituting subject. Does Althusser in any sense 
achieve this? Let us consider a specific philosophical working out of this problem in 
Althusser’s theorization of the subject.
Alienation versus surplus value
It is clear from Althusser’s earliest writings that he regards the concept of 
alienation as irretrievably bound to the Hegelian notion of ‘the end of history’. 
Althusser rightly points out in his extensive “Letter to Jean Lacroix” that Marx never 
spoke of ‘the end of history’ but it is according to Hegel the idea that alienation is the 
existence, in externality, of absolute self-consciousness. On this basis Althusser 
claims that alienation has nothing to do with history as the product of human activity, 
of the realization of people through their labour and struggles. 187 Alienation, for 
Althusser, can mean nothing other than the externality of the self-consciousness of an 
absolute subject whose goal is to go forth from this externality and reappropriaie, in 
the intemality of absolute consciousness, one’s own alienated substance. History 
cannot be the alienation of humanity because it is the product of humanity, “the 
theatre of his highest activities”, “what he lives on, what he lives in, what he lives by 
and for” . 188 We can detect here the assumption of a divide between the realm of 
activity and the realm of consciousness, where the latter and its relation to alienation 
are dismissed as irrelevant to the former. To Marx, Althusser will attribute a view of 
alienation that emphasizes only the deprivation an individual encounters by other 
people of what the individual actually produces; it is what, at a given moment, “is 
wrested from the man who produces it” . 189 In this way alienation is that which results 
in one’s real capacities being “diverted from their proper end [detournees]”. We 
might want to agree with Althusser if what is meant by ‘what an individual produces’ 
is understood in broad terms - in the sense of what one creates - but Althusser hastens 
to inform his reader that alienation “is an economic concept”, it is a “description of 
surplus value” “of that part of what men concretely produce which is taken from 
them”. Here we detect an Engelsian emphasis upon the determination of history via
186 Mladen Dolar, “Beyond Interpellation” , Qui Parle, vol. 6, no. 2 (Spring/Summer, 1993): p. 76.
187 Althusser, “Letter to Jean Lacroix (1949-1950)”, in The Spectre o f Hegel, p. 207.
188 Ibid., p. 208.
189 Ibid., p. 209.
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‘the production and reproduction of real life’, ‘real life’ being for Engels little more 
than economic necessity. 190 There is, Althusser insists “nothing metaphysical” about 
this process. The possibilities which the individual is denied do not indicate an 
abstract essence “but that which the men living in a given period could actually 
become, if society gave back to them what it took from them” . 191 We are left with the 
picture of a benighted proletariat, unable to fulfil its ‘concrete historical existence’, 
unable to freely make or express its will, condemned to live out its dark night of 
necessity.
Althusser’s story is seductively simple, more simple even than that which 
Lukacs puts forward: For an ‘authentic tension’ to be restored to the proletariat their 
thieves will need to be eliminated, only then will the proletarian be able to “go 
straight to the heart of the real problems of his life”, only then, Althusser continues, 
will “men discover inside themselves a host of needs smothered by capitalism, the 
need for music, for snow, for the sea, for culture, invention, history, and who knows 
what else!” . 192 Althusser recognizes in terms so close to Marx that people are 
‘limited, asphyxiated and crushed’ by the world in which they exist, but what he 
seems unable to countenance is that this world is as well, at least to some degree, a 
world of their making. Instead he views the subject as trapped within a circularity of 
subjection, a domination which is able simultaneously to suggest the freedom of the 
individual as initiator and author of her own actions and the freedom in submitting to 
an external authority. 193 This is the unambiguously dominating ‘ambiguity’ of the 
term ‘subject’ . 194 Althusser captures an essential part of the problem of the 
‘ambiguity’ of ideological concepts but ignores as much as he isolates as important. 
Subjects do not ‘work by themselves’ only because they are forced by their subjection 
to do so. It is not simply a question of whether Althusser is implying something 
‘automatic’ about this process; it is more that the process of subjection cannot assume 
a constant act of subjection because the actions of people are not predictable or 
directly explicable as they appear when viewed from the perspective of the 
dominating power. In all acts of cognition there is the possibility of the exercise of 
power and self-reliance; whether this possibility is realized, crushed or forsaken will
190 See, for example, Friedrich Engels, Anti-Diihring: Herr Eugen Diihring’s Revolution in Science 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), Part III, II. Here Engels sets out what he sees as the 
fundamental “final cause of all social changes” -  “the economics of each particular epoch”. Ibid., 
p. 323. The problem is not of course in giving a central place to economics but in doing so to the 
exclusion of other human interests, motivations and concerns.
191 Althusser, “Letter to Jean Lacroix”, p. 209.
192 Ibid., p. 210.
193 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”, p. 169.
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depend upon the range of circumstances in which the individual is situated. In 
defending Althusser’s omission of the concept of consent, Montag, for example, 
claims that Althusser (like Machiavelli) chooses instead to “view the emergence of 
the capitalist state from the point of view of the people, that is, its victims” . 195 And 
yet this focus upon ‘the people’ as the ‘victims’ of the state, rather than as its 
constructors and the perpetrators of its power, or, more insightfully, as each and also 
both to varying degrees, is the very problem of Althusser’s work. 196 Pecheux attempts 
valiantly to rescue Althusser’s construction by claiming that Althusser’s theses on 
ideological reproduction constitute a valuable resource provided that they are also 
conceived “as spaces of multiform resistance where the unexpected continually 
appears” . 197 The unexpected, however, never seems to arise. 198 Althusser is not able 
to step beyond an investigation of force and consent because he sees both the act of 
authority and the acceptance of submission as the result of external domination. He 
recognizes that the power of the state is not “the conflict-free realization of the 
ideology of the ruling class” 199 and yet the effects of this conflict, or any other, are 
never theorized as a part of the ideological itself. We will consider in the next chapter 
Marx’s rather more radical depiction of a dialectic of slave behaviour.
What is clear in Althusser’s approach to the issue of alienation is that it is used 
as a somewhat strained counterposition to the idea of surplus value or economic 
necessity which is then made to seem more necessary than it really is. The point of 
this criticism is not that Althusser is wrong to emphasize the importance of economic 
dictates but that his counterposing of surplus value to alienation sets out a false 
dichotomy and a tiresomely false one at that. There is no reason why Marx’s more 
rounded appreciation of the extensiveness of the estrangement one experiences in an 
unfree life needs be narrowed by Althusser to the meagre sparseness of a focus upon 
economics. The place of economic necessity as the extraction of surplus value is 
made no more significant by amputating other social relations from it in this manner.
195 Montag, “Beyond Force and Consent” , p. 97.
196 It is not that Althusser does not see that social individuals are active in history -  he certainly 
concedes this -  it is that he views individuals as active only to the degree that they are agents of the 
processes of production and reproduction. People are not, he argues, free and constitutive subjects. 
History in this sense, according to Althusser, does not have a subject but rather a motor -  class 
struggle. Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, pp. 95, 99.
197 Pecheux, “Ideology: Stronghold or Paradoxical Space?” , p. 161.
198 This is despite Althusser’s understanding that the truth of ideological history is neither in its source 
nor its goal but in what we would expect to be the more open, undecided existence of what he calls the 
“nodal constitution of ideological meanings, themes and objects, against the deceptive backcloth of 
their problematic, itself evolving against the backcloth of an ‘anchylose’ and unstable ideological 
world, itself in the sway of real history” . Althusser, “On the Young Marx: Theoretical Questions”, in 
For Marx, p. 70.
199 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” , p. 172.
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Althusser’s principal reason for doing so is, as has already been mentioned, to attack 
what he sees as an idealist assumption of the existence of a prior essence to which the 
individual, delivered from alienation, could presumably return. We have explained 
previously the category mistakes Althusser makes with this assumption. The 
materiality of ideology is as much in its alienating effects as it is in its structural 
constraints. We need only add here that the consequence of such a manoeuvre on 
Althusser’s part is that the role he decides the individual needs play in terms of an 
effective historical consciousness is diminished to the point of insignificance in 
comparison with the vital and commanding role which structures are given to play as 
they strut upon this otherwise eerily empty stage.200
At the same time, Althusser’s critique of the idea of alienation points to the 
reality that people are not directly and fully their own life.201 This quite Nietzschean 
conclusion must also entail a thorough rejection of this state. For while Althusser 
argues that the reason for humanity’s degradation escapes it and indeed that people 
bow down before their domination as a “blind and capricious destiny”, he believes 
that the unavoidably abstract nature of this domination “marks it out for death” .202 It 
might die of its own pre-destined accord, Althusser seems to suggest, but its opponent 
in life, the product of its own necessity, is the universality of a ‘soulless 
wretchedness’, an “impersonal anarchy”. The “monstrous perversion” of humanity’s 
own uncomprehended gestures is also the creation of a suffering mass, “all in the 
same wretched situation” .203 It is not difficult to see where Althusser’s theorization 
will lead - the mass governed by inhuman, human forces will need to be led out of this 
perversion of human forces “whose ruse consists in appearing inhuman, material (in 
the mechanistic sense), and natural”. This naturalness needs to be ‘unmasked’ .204 
Although Althusser’s logic would seem to rest in the direction of a theorization of the 
Leninist party, his real vehicle of awakening is that of a particular type of critical 
knowledge.205
200 The whole idea of the social understood as relations of individuals with particular wishes, personal 
interests Althusser claims is an unfounded Hegelian notion of a ‘world of needs’. Instead Althusser 
claims that both his own and Marx’s concern is with the anatomy of this world and with the dialectic of 
the mutations of this anatomy. Althusser, “Contradiction and Overdetermination”, pp. 109-110.
2ul Althusser, “Letter to Jean Lacroix”, p. 210.
202 Althusser, “On Content in the Thought of G. W. F. Hegel” , p. 136.
203 Ibid., pp. 136, 137, 136.
204 Ibid., p. 139.
205 Paul Patton might be correct in this respect to claim that there has been in the English-speaking 
reception to Althusser’s work an over-emphasis upon issues relating to his epistemological concerns 
and only a secondary appreciation of his philosophical and political aims, which differs from 
Althusser’s own appraisal and that of French readers more generally. At the same time Althusser’s 
theory of theoretical practice which turns upon the epistemological problem of the demarcation of
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As we will shortly see, Althusser’s conception of knowledge does place a 
category of the subject as an instance of a type of critical insight within knowledge, 
suggesting that as well as the subject as economic category there is also another type 
of almost transcendental subject - the subject which exists as part of the knowledge 
effect and is able to recognize the ideological. There is here, as Balibar writes, a 
general “cancelling of the functions of consciousness in favor of those of the 
concept” , 206 which in effect means that Althusser has extricated himself from the 
problem of speculating upon the psychological aspect of the subject of knowledge. 
One might add that this aspect of the subject could also be fruitfully opened up to an 
analysis of the unconscious, as could a theorization be undertaken which attempts also 
to relate these two types of subject in Althusser’s work. And further to this, the same 
complexity of levels of practices assumed of structures could be granted to 
subjectivity so that the range of contradictions, of levels of thought and unconscious 
desires within individuals, could also be theorized. We will attempt something of 
such an analysis in the final chapter of the thesis. We will look now at the role that 
critique plays in Althusser’s theorization of ideology in order to assess whether it is 
here that a liberatory theory is most developed in his work.
Critique as Demystification of the Ideological
Acquiring ‘knowledge o f one’s knowledge before knowing’: The Problem of Critique
Self-consciousness, for Althusser, is the path of illusions towards the 
deception that is ideological reality. It is the problem of acquiring ‘knowledge of 
one’s knowledge before knowing’ .207 Its practices can always contradict its
science is fundamental to the materialism he espouses and to the critique of ideology he develops. See 
Paul Patton, “Althusser’s Epistemology: the Limits of the Theory of Theoretical Practice”, Radical 
Philosophy, no. 19 (Spring 1978): p. 8. Althusser, as we know, has dismissed as illusory any 
problematic that suggests the possibility of grasping a subject of history - this indeed is for him what 
ideology erroneously assumes. Instead, Althusser considers that what must be understood are what he 
takes to be the real determinations of the historical process - largely the significance of an economic 
‘base’ and its ideological superstructure. As we have seen, the structure that Althusser theorizes is not 
any simple dialectic of essence and phenomena but entails an articulated, complex unity of 
overdetermined levels and elements. It is by situating these aspects of the historical process that the 
development of a knowledge of ideology can proceed. The only presupposition which Althusser can 
allow is that of the structural conditions of the production process - Marx, he conjectures, has opted for 
a dialectic of production over a dialectic of consciousness and thus philosophy must set out upon this 
implicitly anti-humanist basis.
206 Balibar, “Althusser’s Object” , p. 169.
207 Althusser, “On Content in the Thought of G. W. F. Hegel” , p. 53. Althusser uses this expression to 
explain Hegel’s critique of Kant’s negative critique and also more generally to highlight the problem of 
reflection upon knowledge.
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representations. Something else is required to step outside and know particular 
ideological beliefs. This something is a particular form of knowledge that is deemed 
capable of offering a critique of ideology. Knowledge has its own criteria and 
guarantees, its own ability to validate its product. For Althusser, then, theoretical 
practice can claim an adequacy to the real on the assumption that it explains the real 
on the basis of its own theories: Science, unlike ideology, does not rely upon 
experience or the acknowledgement of the seemingly obvious or upon what it merely 
recognizes to be true. Indeed, for Althusser, science need not rely upon a knowing 
subject of experience at all because science has its own criteria - theory.
We saw in the previous two sections of the chapter that Althusser goes to 
some lengths to explain the complexity of both reality and our conceptualization of it: 
Reality is brittle and fragmented but not so riven with antagonisms that it cannot be 
critically represented in a system of ‘scientific’ theoretical knowledge, which has as 
its ‘foundation’ the undoing of the ideological of reality. As we will see with 
Althusser’s theorization of knowledge, a direct relation is made between 
distinguishing the real from a knowledge of the real and an understanding of ideology: 
The idea of a circle is not a circle, the concept of a dog cannot bark, Althusser informs 
us.908 if ideology is taken to be a particular form of reality, a mystified and yet real 
experience of reality, suggesting as it does in Althusser’s theorizing that it is not the 
subject who deceives herself but reality which deceives her, 204 then presumably it can 
only be that which exists outside ideology that can demonstrate a distinction between 
the real and a knowledge of the real. For the whole problem with consciousness, for 
Althusser, is that it indulges in the ideological distinction between essence and 
appearance and has thus deceived itself from the start. Let us first consider an 
example of critique which Althusser puts forward as fundamental to an understanding 
of subjectivity in relation to ideology.
The Conceptual Distinction between Science and Ideology
Although some of Althusser’s more adventurous theses on ideology deal with 
an analysis of the experience of the individual as a subject within a capitalism whose 
symbolic meaning is given in mystificatory terms, it is also an analysis of the function 
of ideology as a “knowledge effect” in relation to scientific theory that predominates 
in his works For Marx and Reading Capital. In the latter work, Althusser explains 
that an important difference between science and ideology is that ideology is both
208 For these Spinozean-inspired examples see Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, p. 192.
209 Godelier, Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology, p. 170.
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“theoretically closed and politically supple and adaptable”.210 Ideology merely 
reflects changes in prevailing interests without altering its ideological form.211 It is an 
empty, windswept, mirror reflection of the spying gaze of the State, a reflection which 
bends and refracts with the State’s changing interests. Ideology is ideological because 
of this imaginary reality at its centre - the illusory reality of the subject. Its function is 
none other than reproducing this imagined reality. What then is science? Althusser’s 
use of the term slips and slides between various other concepts depending upon the 
use to which it is being put: Thus ‘the theoretical’, ‘theoretical practice’, ‘practice’, 
‘knowledge’, ‘connaissance’, and ‘Generalities 111’, are all variously interrelated to 
science. Whilst it is true that Althusser uses ‘science’ in one generally accepted 
sense, as somewhat akin to the meaning of ‘theory’, it is also the case that science 
takes on a highly specialized meaning for his analysis of the validity of his ‘historical 
materialism’.
Here Althusser construes science in methodological terms as distinct from 
non-science on the basis of the predominance within ideology of the ‘practico-social’ 
over the theoretical and over knowledge. Ideological conceptions of knowledge are 
dominated by the problem of the criteria by which knowledge can be judged. The 
identification of thought with the real object, where knowledge is simply the rational 
subject’s unmediated perception and understanding of the object, is what Althusser 
refers to as, “the latent dogmatic empiricism of Cartesian idealism”. Against this 
Cartesian idealism, Althusser presents a reading of Spinoza, and more particularly of 
Marx, in terms of the way in which both philosophers may be interpreted as 
presenting arguments against the dominant problematic of classical philosophy. In 
wanting to find foundations, the so-called ‘Archimedean point’, of objective 
knowledge, classical philosophy has had to reduce the conditions of knowledge to 
universal, ahistorical and unproblematic assumptions about the individual subject. The 
dominant emphasis within both empiricist and rationalist theories of knowledge has, 
therefore, been upon the functioning of the senses and their role in the accurate 
apprehension of any given object of knowledge. The theoretical problematic 
underlying this conception of knowledge is the assumption that a fundamental 
distinction between a given object and a given subject arises from the process of 
abstraction, and that, on this basis - on the assumption that knowledge abstracted by 
the subject from the real object must be objective knowledge - rational, scientific,
210 Althusser, Reading Capital, p. 142.
211 Terry Lovell argues in relation to this that because Althusser is unable to explain how theoretical or 
systematic ideologies differ from scientific theories his theory of ideology is reduced to a form of 
conventionalist relativism. See Terry Lovell, Pictures o f Reality: aesthetics, politics, pleasure 
(London: British Film Institute, 1980), pp. 36, 41-42.
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objective knowledge may be distinguished from false or pseudo-knowledge. 
Althusser describes this conception of knowledge with the generic term, empiricism. 
This empiricist conception of knowledge he sees as the “secular transcription” of “the 
darkness of the religious phantasm of epiphanic transparency, and its privileged 
model of anchorage: the Logos and its Scriptures.” The empiricist conception of 
knowledge is, according to Althusser, based on the operation of abstraction by the 
subject. “To know is to abstract from the real object its essence, the possession of 
which by the subject is then called knowledge.” This empiricist abstraction is based 
not simply on any abstraction of the essence of the given object but on the real 
abstraction of the essence of a given real object, thereby furnishing the subject with 
real knowledge, the real essence of the object. The objective conditions of knowledge 
are thus guaranteed - reflection upon and apperception of the real is the basis for 
rational, scientific knowledge. Althusser therefore rejects epistemology in favour of 
‘theoretical practice’. Real ‘theoretical practice’ produces knowledge.212 A supreme 
voyeur of epistemologies, Althusser casts his indiscreet eye over every theory of 
knowledge and declares all to be seeking a crude guarantee of truth, the tell-tale sign 
of a vulgar bourgeois philandering.2 n
212 Althusser, “On the Materialist Dialectic: On the Unevenness of Origins”, in For Marx, p. 175. 
Althusser (acknowledging Hegel) argues that “philosophy always arrives post festum. It is always late. 
It is always postponed (dijpree).” See Louis Althusser, Politics and History: Montesquieu, Hegel and 
Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1972), p. 167. This is not simply philosophy’s 
grey in grey painted against the outlines of life’s golden tree grown old; it is also a recognition of the 
distance between philosophy and material history. Whilst the falling of the dusk may cause the owl of 
Minerva to take wing, it is also the distance of time which is needed for a philosophy to develop. If 
then philosophy can be said to arrive late and perhaps more vividly or familiarly against the condition 
of the idea of the closing of an epoch, it also has a tendency to persist. A creature of the night, 
philosophy is invited to the farewell party but always arrives late and is then the last to leave.
213 Epistemic questions are questions concerning the validity and the truth of a knowledge of what is 
real. The aim of epistemology has been to question and to find scientific guarantees for such 
knowledge; to find a theory which corresponds to the object of knowledge, a ‘privileged access’ to the 
real. Althusser’s criticism of empiricist epistemology specifically challenges the notion of a separation 
between theory and practice where such a severance entails the idea of different theoretical 
assumptions governing each; it is quite possible to maintain a distinction between thought and reality, 
theory and practice, and to do so in a materialist sense, acknowledging the primacy of being over 
thought, and, at the same time, to consider the unity of theoretical production and political practice 
within the historical context of class struggle. If the production of ideas does indeed change in 
character in proportion to changes in material production then, at the very least, an historical 
materialist interpretation of political ideas can situate ideological production within the context of 
political practice. Althusser and Balibar argue that the foundation of Western philosophy is posited on 
an ideological solution - a solution arrived at prior to any posing of the problem, and one whose 
political and other ‘interests’ are foreign to the reality of knowledge but which nonetheless appears to 
constitute a theory of knowledge. In its theory of knowledge, idealist philosophy is posited on a 
problematic of human nature which claims that there is a universal essence of ‘man’ and that this 
essence is the attribute of each and every individual who is its real subject. Such a conception of 
human nature necessarily implies both an empiricism of the subject and an idealism of the essence. 
The empiricism of the subject is indicated by the positing of the essence of individuals as a universal 
absolute given, where this essence implies the existence of concrete subjects. The idealism of the
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The whole notion of science is constituted in terms of the way in which it may 
be distinguished from that which is defined as non-science - ideology, error, illusion, 
ignorance, and so on. A simple contrast between science and ideology in general, 
where ideology is reduced to error and error called ideology, merely stands as to 
defend the humanist premise of the free and rational subject with a more or less 
sophisticated account of individual or collective rationality. If history is seen not as a 
series of often unrelated acts but rather as being comprised of material processes in 
which human actions take place within the bounds of discernible determinations 
(processes without a subject), then neither must the production of knowledge be seen 
as the unproblematical result of observation or rationalist induction or deduction.
What lies behind Althusser’s describing as empiricist this particular theory of 
knowledge characterizing the dominant, ‘bourgeois’ conception of knowledge? 214 As
essence emerges with the transference of a generalized notion of human essence to each and every 
empirical individual. It is on this “type-structure”, Althusser argues, that the (pre-Marxist) idealist and 
materialist ‘theory of knowledge’ has been based. For Althusser, a broad range of philosophies fall 
into this category of a “tenacious empiricism”. Descartes’ transcendent empiricism, Kant’s and 
Husserl’s transcendental empiricism, and Hegel’s objective-idealist variation, all put forward an 
epistemology, purporting to offer solutions to the ‘problem of knowledge’, which takes the legal, 
ideological notion of the subject and presents it as the principle philosophical category. The category 
of the Subject becomes the origin, essence and cause determining that which is external to it - the 
‘Object’. As Althusser writes, for “Marxist philosophy there can be no Subject as an Absolute Centre, 
as a Radical Origin, as a Unique Cause.” The historical materialist conception of history posits the role 
of individuals as agent in history under conditions of determination of various forms of the relations of 
production and reproduction. The classical idealist conception of history takes the individual 
(humanity) to be the Subject and goal of history. Althusser, Reading Capital, pp. 13-69, passim, 
especially pp. 52-53.
214 An empiricist theory of knowledge is distinguished from an empirically informed theory of 
historical materialism on the basis of its claim that a science is constructed upon theory-neutral 
experience or perceptions. The ontological basis of empiricism is one in which reality is understood 
through a particular process of sense-perception and experience - namely, that a reality may be known 
which is independent of both theory and consciousness. The method used to evoke the real posits a 
knowing subject whose relationship to its object, knowledge, is unproblematical. The production of 
knowledge proceeds exclusively on the basis of the observation of a given object through the sensory 
experience of a given subject. Hence the notion of subject and object exist prior to the process of 
knowledge. Althusser argues: “The whole empiricist process of knowledge lies in fact in an operation 
of the subject called abstraction. To know is to abstract from the real object its essence, the possession 
of which by the subject is then called knowledge.” In this abstraction of an essence from the real 
object, the conception of knowledge of the real object is absorbed within the real object to be known. 
In other words, what constitutes knowledge is “completely inscribed in the structure of the real object” . 
Knowledge is therefore present in the real object to be known, prior to the object being known. “This 
investment of knowledge, conceived as a real part of the real object, in the real structure of the real 
object, is what constitutes the specific problematic of the empiricist conception of knowledge.” It is the 
consequences arising from the use of this empiricist conception of knowledge which Althusser 
specifically addresses. One such consequence of empiricism indicated by Althusser is what he 
describes as “the play on words on which this conception is based and which involves the concept 
‘real’” . For this empiricist conception, knowledge is knowledge only in terms of its relationship to the 
real - knowledge is invested in the real through the distinction between the real object and the operation 
of knowledge. From this conception has come the play on words such as ‘real’, ‘concrete’ and 
‘positive’ in which a whole undercurrent of ideology operates. For example, the designation of the 
subjects of history as ‘real, concrete men’, as pervades so much empiricist philosophy, is formulated by
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mentioned, Althusser uses the term empiricism in a broad, generic sense.215 For 
example, in arguing for the inclusion of Hegel’s thought in this category, Althusser 
states that even if the “sensualist empiricism of the eighteenth century” “did not 
always realize knowledge in its real object” but rather “thinks knowledge as the 
product of a history, it realizes knowledge in the reality of a history which is merely 
the development of what it originally contained. ” 216 As Ted Benton notes, for 
Althusser, “empiricism appears to be a very broad tradition indeed”. It covers all 
those theories of knowledge that invest a knowledge conceived as a part of the real 
object in the real structure of that real object, where as a consequence such theory 
“entails a denial of the productive, transformative character of the ‘knowledge 
process’ ” .217
Althusser’s critique of the empiricist theory of knowledge immediately 
introduces the problematic question, which Benton notes, that “given that there is a 
radical separation between knowledge and its external object, how do we ‘know’ that 
the internal object really is the knowledge of (really corresponds to) the external 
object? ” 218 Althusser’s answer to this is to view the criteria of validity of a theoretical 
practice as internal to that practice, as an aim to achieve a correspondence between a 
theory and its object. Without such an intention philosophy must inevitably abandon 
any commitment to objectivity. 214 For Althusser, “all philosophy consists of drawing
the individualist, humanist theory from which it departs. This conception of the supposedly ‘objective’ 
conditions of knowledge is none other than an epistemology (a supposedly ‘scientific’ theory of 
knowledge) based on the juridical category of the subject. Althusser criticises the empiricist 
conception of knowledge in its failure to acknowledge the role of ideological interpretation and 
prejudice in its claim to a scientific foundation to knowledge. Such a conception of knowledge is 
ahistorical. Althusser, Reading Capital, pp. 38-39.
213 Gillian Rose, for example, sees this notion of science as a Geltungslogik of the Marburg type, and 
criticizes Althusser for defining epistemology so broadly that real distinctions (between, for example, 
Kantian epistemology of the transcendental method and Hegel’s rejection of this critical method) are 
lost. It seems likely, Rose argues, “that what Althusser understands by ‘epistemology’ is not Hegel’s 
speculative experience, but Kojeve’s anthropological reading of Hegel, or Sartre’s decisionistic and 
moralistic appropriation of Nietzsche’s thought, which was also based on a rejection of Kantian 
epistemology” . Rose’s lack of sympathy for such indeterminancy is itself put forward on the basis of a 
rereading of Hegel, and specifically Hegel’s critique of Kant, which she argues has been largely 
misunderstood by most theorists who, like Althusser, use a sociological metacritique as the basis of 
their method. Gillian Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology (London: Athlone, 1981), p. 37. Certainly in his 
rejection of every traditional epistemology Althusser sweeps together all critical philosophy without 
regard to a number of internal disagreements, and upon this basis suspends a reading of Marx above the 
fray of all hitherto discredited philosophy.
216 Althusser, Reading Capital, p. 35, n. 15.
217 Ted Benton, The Rise and Fall o f Structural Marxism: Althusser and his Influence (London: 
Macmillan, 1984), p. 38.
2,8 Ibid., p. 39.
219 Althusser directs his analysis specifically towards what he considers to be the exploitation of the 
sciences by bourgeois idealist philosophy because it poses the question of guarantees for knowledge in 
a specifically juridical manner. “For the simple question to which the ‘theory of knowledge’ replies is
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a major dividing-line by means of which it repels the ideological notions of the 
philosophies that represent the opposing tendency; the stake in this act of drawing, i.e. 
in philosophical practice, is scientific practice, scientificity”. The dividing line itself 
is merely “the emptiness of a distance taken”, but a distance which leaves its trace in 
the categories, apparatuses and distinction within philosophical practice.220 This 
process is neither static, nor one which has a fixed purpose. For this reason Althusser 
argues that even the terms that designate the scientific and the ideological “have to be 
re-thought again and again” .221
still a question of law, posed in terms of the validity of knowledge.” The dominant claim on which the 
bourgeois conception of the world is based is that of a set of oppositions through which, not only the 
validity of knowledge but its structure, production and distortion or illusion, may be understood. The 
simple antimonies of truth and falsehood or truth and error, fact and value, knowledge and belief, or 
knowledge and ignorance, and science and ideology, set the bounds of human understanding. The 
philosophical attainment of neutral truths and facts of knowledge and science, or scientific knowledge, 
presents itself in terms of various forms of ‘objectivism’. But it is the very objectivism - the attempt to 
create knowledge of facts as ‘things-in-themselves’, or as innate principles of reason - which ignores 
the specificity of its presumed object. This dominant idealist and rationalist philosophy instead merely 
stipulates as scientific certain ‘givens’, certain ‘facts’, presented in the form of a problem which is 
resolved by locating these ‘givens’ within the privileged realm of one side of a set of oppositions - truth 
over falsehood, fact over value, object over subject, science over ideology. On this basis Althusser 
considers it necessary to abandon completely a theory of epistemology because it will always involve 
the search for scientific guarantees of knowledge which will inevitably be posed in a juridical form. 
See Althusser, “Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists” (1967), in Philosophy 
and the Spontaneous Philosophy o f the Scientists and Other Essays, especially Lecture III, pp. 119-144, 
passim. Likewise with the rise of legal ideology the category of the subject becomes constitutive of all 
ideology. Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” , p. 160. And this is why, Benton 
argues, the classical epistemological guarantees of either experience (providing a solid basis of 
knowledge from which judgments may be made) or “the clear light of reason” must be dispensed with 
by Althusser. In this sense Benton argues that in attempting to avoid the errors of empiricism Althusser 
“over-reacts” . Benton, The Rise and Fall o f Structural Marxism, pp. 50, 39.
220 Althusser, “Lenin and Philosophy”, pp. 61-62, 62. Althusser argues that emptiness is the emptiness 
of a presence. Althusser, Reading Capital, p. 23.
221 Althusser, “Lenin and Philosophy”, p. 62. For Althusser, the dividing line between science and 
ideology is also (somewhat confusingly, given his insistence that ideology is not a set of false ideas) a 
political dividing line between true and false ideas, as in principle, “true ideas always serve the people; 
false ideas always serve the enemies of the people”. Althusser’s general point, however, begins with 
the claim that those who control the production of ideology are those most likely to gain from its 
promotion, particularly where its promotion prevents the correspondence to objective reality in the 
sciences from being fully realized. For example, terms such as ‘humanism’, and the expression that it 
is ‘men who make history’, have been exploited by bourgeois ideology to such an extent that they have 
become the “tranquilisers and poisons” of struggle at the level of theory. Althusser argues that the 
classical Marxist tradition has tended towards a refusal to say that Marxism is a humanism: “Why? 
Because practically, i.e. in the facts, the word Humanism is exploited by an ideology which uses it to 
fight, i.e. to kill, another, true, word, and one vital to the proletariat: the class struggle.” A similar 
refusal with the Marxist tradition occurs with the expression that it is men and women who make 
history: “Why? Because practically, i.e. in the facts, this expression is exploited by bourgeois ideology 
which uses it to fight, i.e. to kill, true expression, one vital for the proletariat: it is the masses who make 
history” . In a very important sense the realities of antagonism are represented by ideas whose concepts 
and categories are the instruments of knowledge. In a situation of political, ideological and 
philosophical struggle these concepts are fought over; they can be directly exploited or they can 
become a site of ambiguity still to be fought over and employed “in a decisive but undecided battle” . 
Philosophy fights “against lying words, against ambiguous words; for correct words. It fights over
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The problem is, however, that for Althusser the form of ideology in general 
follows some pre-given objective law of societal development and it is from this a 
priori form that he abstracts a general theory of ideology and non-science rather than 
viewing this form as the outcome of changing historical forces. A theoretically 
uncontaminated science that attains its purity on the basis of its distance from 
ideology can only ever give an external view of the relation between appearance and 
reality. Althusser effectively severs theory from metatheory by casting the validation 
of his concepts purely within the bounds of an ‘historical materialist’ science 
(theoretical practice). This theoretical practice is not situated in any concrete 
historical sense; it is not a practice of basic contestation but of theoretical regression. 
Granted that arguments put forward on the basis of the idea of totality will almost 
always bring into question the relation between universality and particularity and 
therefore the place of categories in relation to objects - but, even here, Althusser 
severs the link between universal and particular forms by arguing that elements which 
constitute the whole whilst conditioning the existence of all the other elements will 
tend towards the expression of a dominant element known to us by an ever-pre-given 
structure of dominance and subordination.
Against this sort of theorizing is, of course, Althusser’s reformulation of what 
he formerly saw as a theoretical divide between the epistemological question of
‘shades of opinion’.” Epistemology’s function of drawing a dividing line is, then, for Althusser 
inevitably a class struggle between what is scientific - what is materially and objectively true, and what 
is ideological. But what of the quest for guarantees for such knowledge? In what sense does this 
address the basic issue of how objectivity can be known? Althusser, “ ‘Philosophy as a Revolutionary 
Weapon’: Interview with Maria Antoinietta Macciocchi” , in Lenin and Philosophy, p. 24. Bernstein 
argues that the “dominant temper of our age is fallibilistic” ; but does this then mean that the 
acknowledgement of fallibility necessarily makes obsolete the need for guarantees of experience? 
Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1983), see especially part 1. Descartes could admit that false judgements will 
sometimes be made, but maintained that because of the capacity for free will, an Archimedean point 
could be found from which, with proper observation or mediative reflection, a direct acquisition of 
positive knowledge would follow. A sceptical empiricism, which doubts the possibility of knowing 
what reality is, in effect is a distancing itself from any criteria upon which truth and falsity could be 
defined. The inadequacy of the empiricist concept of knowledge, according to Hindess in his 
Philosophy and Methodology in Social Science, is not, however, due to its ideological chararcter, but is 
because it is logically incoherent, dogmatic and involves an unavoidable ‘play on words’. As has been 
previously mentioned, what Althussser refers to as empiricism’s play on words is a consequence of the 
use of the concept ‘real’, where ‘real’ designates that in which knowledge is invested and through 
which both a distinction and a correlation between the real object and the object of knowledge is 
maintained. But for Althusser it is not simply that the very foundations empiricism seeks are 
themselves illogical or, as Hindess expresses it, “that its arguments do not support its conclusions” ; it is 
that these arguments are in fact (whether stated or not) ultimately based upon the fundamental category 
of juridical ideology, the category of the subject. Barry Hindess, Philosophy and Methodology in 
Social Science (Sussex: Harvester, 1977), pp. 212, 196-228, passim. Thus for Althusser, the 
inadequacy of an empiricist concept of knowledge must ultimately be seen in terms of its ideological 
nature - its circularity, its dogmatism, its incoherency are intimately connected to the ideological nature 
of its claims.
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ideology as opposed to science and the materialist question of ideology as a site of 
‘class struggle’. In Essays in Self-Criticism, Althusser reproaches himself for having 
seen “ideology as the universal element of historical existence”, without going 
further: “I thus left out of account the differences between the regions of ideology, 
and the antagonistic class tendencies that traverse, divide, regroup and confront 
them. ” 222 With this avowal it would seem that Althusser is preparing the ground for 
what Marx suggested with the relation between theory and practice - that as well as 
thought seeking to realize itself, “reality must itself strive towards thought” .223 
Beyond admitting this unavoidably significant problem, however, Althusser does little 
to rectify his theory of ideology in the light of his newly acquired insistence upon the 
importance of the interrelationship of theory and practice. By situating his work 
within the problematic terrain of a theory of science, Althusser is of necessity drawn 
to certain issues of the epistemological status of a theory of knowledge which can 
provide a ‘scientific’ basis for a ‘materialist’ critique of ideology. But a theory of the 
antagonistic tendencies that traverse and divide ideologies requires, as well as an 
understanding of theory, an understanding of the relation between such tendencies as 
practice and their theoretical exposition.
In his autobiography, Althusser refers to his changing view of the “so-called 
epistemology to which I had appeared to pay so much attention” becoming “absurd 
outside the framework of the history of science”, as a period of his development under 
the influence of what he saw as the French materialist tradition of rationalism, most 
particularly evidenced in the work of Georges Canguilhem.224 This correction to a 
former idealism in defining philosophy brought Althusser to an understanding of 
epistemology as a variant of knowledge in which guarantees of truth become the basis 
for knowledge. And yet Althusser considers that: “In the last resort, Truth exists only 
to provide a final guarantee of the established order of things and the moral and 
political relationships between people” .225 In order to arrive at any ‘objective’ 
analysis as to the workings of reality (which may also present mystified appearances) 
it is necessary to have, Althusser argues, a scientific as opposed to a merely 
speculative basis upon which certain conditions may be understood. In this way an
222 Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, p. 82.
223 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique o f Hegel’s Philosophy o f Right. Introduction, in Early 
Writings, intro. Lucio Colletti, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1984), p. 252.
224 Althusser, The Future Lasts a Long Time, p. 184. It is from Canguilhem that Althusser says he 
learnt “the disconcerting historical cunning of the relationship between ideology and science”. See 
Althusser, ibid. Interestingly this materialism has been traced back to Auguste Comte. See Elliott, 
Althusser, pp. 52-53.
223 Althusser, The Future Lasts a Long Time, p. 185.
280 Ideology Critique and A Philosophy of Freedom
understanding of the mechanisms working beneath surface appearances may be 
reached. Without such a separation the tendency to make thought reality will arise.226 
In Althusser’s work, we are confronted with the idea of a ‘science’ in order to theorize 
the causal relations existing between economic and social spheres. According to 
Althusser, such a theory of knowledge seeks an ever increasing approximation of 
objective reality, but is one which also must ultimately rest upon categories internal to 
its theoretical arguments. Jacques Derrida expresses a concern he has with the 
Althusserian conceptualization of ideology in terms of the way in which Althusser 
assumes that the concept of ideology is conventionally definable “as if one could 
obtain a non-ideological, uncontaminated, scientific concept of ideology” .227 This 
problem is a substantial one in Althusser’s work, pervading not only his intervention 
within the ideology-science debate but his general sense of what the absence of 
ideology might suggest.
What might we conclude as to the liberatory aspects of this theory and its 
counterposition to ideology? Althusser seems to assume that ideology will be 
vanquished by such a theoretical exposure, all its cunning reality undone. But surely 
a liberation from ideology requires more than this - a fundamental challenge to all 
those conditions which give rise to ideology in the first place, including those centred 
within the individual psyche. If ideology plays any sort of part at all in obstructing 
people from seeking their own liberation, then it is its relationship to conditions of 
exploitation, domination and self-deception which needs to be uncovered. A 
theoretical practice might well contribute to such an enterprise but does not negate the 
role of insight and intuitive and counter-intuitive understanding for the contradictory 
reality that is ideology to be perceived. We will now turn to an examination of 
whether Althusser’s emphasis on the critique of ideology raises the issue of a rejection 
of a notion of ideological identification with a fixed, externally driven content. We
226 For Hegel, for example, thought was the real. Marx’s aim was to “ridicule and discredit [...] with 
the shadows of reality” all those who, misled by the mystified appearance of reality, are unable to 
understand particular relations of capitalism and to thus differentiate types of realities. Marx and 
Engels, The German Ideology, p. 29. But how can this ‘real’ be known to be the reality of the system? 
In the case of Lukäcs, as we have just seen, an elision between thought and reality is played out in his 
insistence that reality can only be known through the identity of a particular subject and knowledge. 
The proletariat under capitalism, reduced as it is to the status of commodities, is unable to grasp the 
essence of the reifications of capitalist society. This Hegelian identity between subject and object, 
requires the subject to see the object as its creation. From this position of attempting to resolve the 
contradictions of bourgeois philosophy from within the problematic of bourgeois philosophy itself - i.e. 
from the correct use of the category of the subject - Lukäcs sees the participation of the proletariat in 
political struggle in terms of the effectiveness of its consciousness. The proletariat’s only ‘decisive 
weapon’ is its ability to see the social totality as a concrete historical totality, to recognize its reified 
forms and to raise the positive side of the immanent meaning of history to consciousness. Somewhat 
strangely, Althusser attempts something similar with his theorization o f ‘scientific knowledge’.
227 Derrida, “Politics and Friendship: An Interview with Jacques Derrida”, p. 202.
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will finally consider whether this critique allows us to pose the question of the role of 
identification with imagined images.
Subject and Substance: the (desire for a desire’
The Theory o f the Objectified Subjection o f the Subject
We have already considered that the sort of reconciliation which Lukäcs 
theorizes between subject and object is deemed by Althusser to be a type of idealism: 
Althusser eschews the possibility of a subjective consciousness opting instead for a 
critical knowledge capable of offering an alternative to ideology. But where does this 
leave the subject in Althusser’s theorizing - is she of significance only as a victim of 
the object confronting her and by which she is objectified? Or is her capacity for an 
eternal memory of submission, her ‘desire for a desire’ , 228 simply the most important 
part of her place within ideological practices? Is the subject an effect of total 
subjection or does her ideological interpellation imply a more partial but nonetheless 
decisively objectified subjection of the subject?
There are strengths in Althusser’s steadfast focus upon this aspect of the plight 
of humanity, in which the subject seems bound by its circumstances to live and think 
within ideological terms rather than to form these terms themselves in whatever way 
possible. His relentless insistence upon the magnitude of the problem of an 
identification with a victim of the power which confronts the individual makes some 
recognition of it unavoidable. We have already considered that Althusser tends to 
conflate the efficacy of certain ideas with what he takes to be the necessarily illusory 
character of the ideological and the necessarily susceptible make up of the 
unconscious. But are there not elements of this in which we might detect something 
useful about the operative character of ideology? Is it not the case, as Ricouer argues, 
that we think from ideology’s point of view rather than thinking about ideology? 229
We might want to agree with Althusser that the seeming inability of people to 
cast off their chains indicates the very resilience of the function of the chains, if not 
the very steeliness of the chains themselves. But it is precisely because he introduces 
the idea of the social imaginary that we are forced to look beyond the structures of 
oppression and repression - to what it is that these structures are attempting to repress.
228 Althusser, “On Content in the Thought of G. W. F. Hegel” , p. 94.
229 Paul Ricoeur, “Ideology and ideology critique”, in Phenomenology and Marxism, eds., Bernhard 
Waldenfels, Jan M. Broekman and Ante Pazanin, trans. J. Claude Evans, Jr. (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 137.
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We might indeed say that such a type of question should always arise in relation to 
ideology - what is it that ideology exists to repress? Is not what I have argued of a 
contradiction within the ideological always a part of the existence of ideology? A 
valid question posed by numerous theorists since Althusser is whether the social 
imaginary does not in fact contain elements other than merely ideological 
mystification? 230 Martin Jay expresses this well when he writes that “what we are 
looking for when we criticize the distortions of ideology may be present in what we 
are looking at in certain manifestations of ideology itself’.231 Does Althusser’s 
searching quest for an understanding of some of the psychological aspects of the 
ideological in any way allow us to pose questions as to the potentially utopian aspect 
of certain ideologies and to the dialectical nature of ideology itself? We will attempt 
to see whether Althusser’s work in any way holds out this challenge - to examine the 
problem in so stark a fashion as to be forced to contemplate a move beyond its 
acceptance.
An Imaginary Marxism: 2^2 the Theoretical Basis o f Anti-Humanism
In some senses Althusser’s position on the ever-continuing nature of ideology 
is in keeping with his highly abstracted view of social relations within capitalism. 
The inner structure of a social formation gains its meaning, according to his theories, 
not through the activities of the people or classes existing within it but through the 
effects of specific practices parts of the structure have. History is an absent cause in 
which the everyday activities of people are subordinated to the existence of 
structures. 233 The structure of the system is an immense machine, a play without an 
author, against which the subjective activities of individuals are made insignificant. 234 
For Althusser, the objective system is “an authorless theatre”. The spectators of the
230 For example, Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution o f Society, trans. Kathleen Blarney 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1987); Paul Ricoeur, “Ideology and Utopia as Cultural Imagination” , Philosophic 
Exchange, no. 2 (Summer, 1976): pp. 17-28; and Bloch’s idea of utopian images in The Principle of 
Hope.
231 Martin Jay, Force Fields: Between Intellectual History and Cultural Critique (London: Routledge, 
1993), p. 146.
232 In his autobiography, Althusser admits to Raymond Aron’s charge that he had invented an 
imaginary version of Marxism “which was far removed from the real Marx”. See Althusser, The 
Future Lasts a Long Time, p. 221. Aron’s criticism appears in his “Althusser ou la lecture pseudo- 
structuraliste de Marx”, in his D ’une sainte famille ä l ’autre: Essais sur les marxismes imaginaires 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1969).
233 Absences for Althusser are as much a part of the whole of history as are its presences. Indeed, 
absences have a necessary relationship to presences, the invisible is inside the visible, and so on. See 
Althusser, Reading Capital, p. 21. Fredric Jameson also uses the idea of history as an absent cause to 
great effect in his Marxist writings. See, for example, the chapter “On Interpretation: Literature as a 
Socially Symbolic Act”, in his The Political Unconscious.
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system “can, on occasion, be spectators only because they are first of all forced to be 
its actors, caught by the constraints of a script and parts whose authors they cannot 
be” .235 Why does Althusser adopt this position? Althusser’s strict anti-humanism, in 
which all activities of people are seen as negligible in relation to the practice of 
structures, sets out to bend back the stick of existentialism - with its presumed 
wayward emphasis upon the autonomy of individuals and their political activity - in 
the opposite direction. As well as directing his attack towards the existentialism of 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Althusser’s criticism was directed toward a range of Marxist 
humanists.236 Althusser wants to show just what a supposedly ‘voluntarist’ emphasis 
must ignore in order to maintain its humanist stance. Exposing the importance of the 
function of structures becomes for him a relentless crusade against all humanist 
illusion. Any holy, sanctifying confirmation of individual autonomy and realization is 
tom apart in Althusser’s hands. For anyone sceptical of the supposed individualist 
and voluntarist claims of a wide range of social theory both preceding and following 
the publication of Althusser’s somewhat startling theses, the sheer rigour involved in 
his leaving no humanist stone unturned, was no doubt impressive.237 Within his own 
work, then, he could allow no compromise with bourgeois humanism, harbour no 
thought of the workings of the individual psyche which led to the construction of a 
lukewarm, bearable centre of the self; until what had always been a rather contrived 
edifice for his theses began to unravel, resulting in a series of reconsiderations of past 
formulations and corrections to some of the more obvious problems associated with 
them.738 Althusser came to see a mistakenly excessive theoreticism in his early work,
2M Althusser, Reading Capital, p. 163.
235 Ibid., p. 193.
236 In France these included Henri Lefebvre, Roger Garaudy and Maximilien Rubel as well as the 
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty. One of the few Marxist theorists to escape Althusser’s more 
damning criticism is Antonio Gramsci whose theory of the role of the apparatuses of the State 
Althusser thought travelled some distance along the road he himself was taking. For various comments 
on Gramsci see Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, pp. 136, n. 7, 137, 15, 16.
237 Negri, for example, endorses Althusser’s critique of humanism referring to the “orgy of totality, 
rebirth, and plenitude to which we give ourselves over” and for the need for the setting “of clear limits 
and the exclusion of this insipid blubbering from theory” . This could, of course, apply equally to anti­
humanism. But Negri warns “ let us not introduce ulterior, fictional classifications” into this theory: 
Marx’s “so-called humanism” needs to be seen for what it is “the fruit of impatience with theory [...] 
the contradictory residue of the materialist method of separation, of the constitutive method of 
subjectivity”. One therefore needs to be aware that the “path of materialism passes precisely through 
subjectivity” and thus one should not, by avoiding humanism “also seek to avoid the theoretical areas 
of subjectivity” . See Antonio Negri, Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse, trans. Harry 
Cleaver, Michael Ryan, and Maurizio Viano, ed. Jim Fleming (South Hadley, Mass: Bergin & Garvey, 
1984), p. 154.
238 As Robert Resch writes, however, what “is missing from Althusser’s elliptic self-criticism [...] is a 
re-evaluation of his philosophical defense of scientific realism in light of his rejection of theoreticism 
and, even more important, an elaboration of scientific concepts of ideological, scientific, and 
philosophical practices as historical-social activities divested of philosophical connotations of truth and
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a theoreticism which had, he claimed, ignored class antagonism as a theoretical site in 
which ideologies are played out. Admitting such one-sidedness and relocating his 
analysis to a realm wherein the concept of class was then allowed to intervene 
between political practices and the reality of structures in dominance, Althusser 
attempted to give some place to a certain type of practice in relation to a hitherto 
rather lonely theory.239 His admission of the absence from his analysis of antagonistic 
social relations strangely echoes Lukacs’s own excursion into self-criticism with his 
disclosure that, in History and Class Consciousness, “labour as the mediator of the 
metabolic interaction between society and nature, is missing”.240
What can we make of this opposition to humanism in Althusser’s theorizing? 
Derrida has argued that Althusser’s anti-humanism bears the marks of a “fascination- 
repulsion between Marxism and Heideggerianism” and that in all Althusser’s works 
of the 1960s “the shadow of Heidegger is present”.241 Derrida sees Heidegger’s Letter 
on Humanism, its denouncing of humanism as metaphysical and its insistence that 
Marx’s materialism is a philosophy of work and production (as opposed to a 
philosophy of being) as fundamentally influential in the development of Althusser’s 
work. There was, according to Derrida, a legitimacy of the Heideggerian discourse 
'in the air’, and so a pattern was set of “impregnation and avoidance” that was to be of 
greatest impact in the case of Althusser.242 Indeed, for Althusser, he argues, 
“Heidegger is the great unavoidable thinker o f this century”.243 We can certainly 
extrapolate from Heidegger’s critique of the dominance of subjectivism in Western 
philosophy, and his view of the limitations of human will power, to perhaps find 
echoes in Althusser’s own theorizations on the problems of subjectivism. A statement
adequacy” . See Robert Paul Resch, Althusser and the Renewal o f Marxist Social Theory (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992), p. 163.
239 Althusser refers to this mistaken theoreticism as a “rationalist-speculative drama” from which “the 
class struggle was practically absent” . See Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, p. 196.
240 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. xvii. The central place Lukacs gives the fetishism of 
commodities is not the result of the narrowed-down economism that he himself claims it to be. The 
centrality of commodity fetishism to the reification of ideas is here, as it is for Marx, a theorization of 
the most basic antagonism within capitalism - that of the denial of a human identity within relations 
that dominate our lives. Ideas are reified precisely because this reality is masked by the rule of things, 
by the idea that entities that are products of our own making, appear more as alien things, beyond our 
comprehension or control. Thoughts appear like commodities, as objects “outside us”, as Marx puts it 
in Capital. It is because Lukacs sees the impermanence of social relations under capitalism that he is 
able to theorize reification as the product of fundamental antagonism. Lukacs’s concern with fetishism 
and alienation is crucial to his theory of domination. But it is here, as we have seen, that complications 
within his theory arise.
241 Derrida, “Politics and Friendship: An Interview with Jacques Derrida”, p. 190.
242 Ibid., p. 191. Martin Heidegger, “Letter on ‘Humanism’” , trans. Edgar Lohner, in Philosophy of the 
Twentieth Century, eds. William Barrett and Henry Aitken (New York: Random House, 1962).
243 Derrida, “Politics and Friendship: An Interview with Jacques Derrida”, p. 189.
The Deliberate Unconscious 285
of Althusser’s such as that in which he claims it is ‘no longer the eye of a subject 
which sees’ but the ‘field itself which sees itself in the objects it defines’, or that the 
text of history is not a text in which a voice speaks but one in which there are 
inaudible effects of structures, sounds very close to Heidegger’s claims that humans 
do not speak but rather that language speaks us:244 We might even think that despite 
Althusser’s various criticisms of what he sees as Heidegger’s continued 
metaphysics,245 some unstated overlap in their views on the problem of subjectivity 
might indeed exist. But what does this then suggest for Althusser’s critique of 
historicism and the problem of an access to objectivity or a theoretical practice?
If a real dynamic is absent from Althusser’s abstracted view of the structural 
determination of the system this is partly because, like Lukacs, Althusser justifiably 
wishes to criticize the way in which capitalism as a system falsely propounds the 
realization of the individual. In History and Class Consciousness, Lukacs writes that 
“the higher development of individuality is only purchased by a historical process in 
which individuals are sacrificed” .246 In Essays in Self-Criticism, Althusser writes of 
human individuals being reduced to the bearers of anonymous and interchangeable 
functions at the same time that bourgeois ideology declares the omnipotence of the 
individual’s power of freedom and liberty.247 The humanist illusion of the power of 
the individual is an “empty idea”, one which is “weighed down with bourgeois 
ideology” .248 Ideology means that one is unable to objectively acknowledge the 
disappearance of what is, for Althusser, merely the conceit of freedom. In Freudian 
terms, what one is left with is the lowering of self-regarding feelings - there is no
244 Althusser, Reading Capital, pp. 25, 17.
245 See, for example, Althusser, Reading Capital, p. 53. Heidegger himself does indeed see, even in 
the ending of metaphysics (an ending he claims that lasts longer than the previous history of 
metaphysics) an inappropriateness in standing outside metaphysics, and it is perhaps this that Althusser 
has in mind. See Martin Heidegger, The End o f Metaphysics, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1973).
246 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. xviii.
247 Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, pp. 203, 205.
248 Ibid., p. 205. This bourgeois ideology derives specifically from legal relations which abstract from 
the individual a sense of her function as within a legal relation. The individual becomes a simple 
subject of law, capable of owning property, even if the only property which she possesses is that of her 
naked labour power. Similarly, political relations abstract from the social individual, treating 
individuals as the support of political relations, as a free citizen, even if her vote only reinforces her 
servitude. From these relations is abstracted from the individual, not the nature of her real historical 
existence in society, but the concept of her theoretical role as an originating subject, as homo 
ceconomicus, homo rationalis, homo moralis, juridicus and politicus. Where there is, in reality, 
capitalism, and capitalist production relations, distribution relations and exploitation, there emerges 
instead the ideas of ‘man’s’ control of power, his freedom, his liberty, his creative labour. It is not that 
ideas of freedom and creative labour are misplaced, it is just that where a history of powers of the 
economic relation, of the State, of the economic organisation of society and its consciousness fail to
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other reality to test the validity of the object, and therefore an internalization of fear, 
and thus a sense of punishment results. So this might persist where ideology is only 
ever the illusion of freedom, but, according to Althusser, it cannot be anything other. 
It is not difficult to see the content of ideology as becoming overly fixed by such a 
theorization. Not only is ideological content cemented by this insistence but 
meaningful realities which are part of a ‘humanist’ vision are left out. It is not 
possible to tell in advance whether anticipations existing within images of freedom 
and liberty will be realized in relation to expectations or exceed them or whether they 
will be reversed or abandoned. It is important to consider too that even where 
anticipations fail to be realized, resulting in a division between a phenomenal reality 
and its original expectation, that this situation too can create potential for change. We 
might be drawn to explaining Althusser’s inability to see this in terms of some amount 
of yielding to French Communist Party (PCF) politics, and yet a simple espousal of a 
fundamentally problematic theoretical position flies in the face of much of Althusser’s 
genuine criticism of party lines, 249 and at times seems in tension with aspects of his 
own theoretical work on ideology. 250
emerge, an understanding of the material position of the individual is being suppressed. Althusser, 
ibid., pp. 203, 204.
249 As a corollary to this, the Party’s own distance from Althusser’s theoretical positions is evidenced 
in its refusal to publish under its own imprint either For Marx or Reading Capital. Both works were 
instead published by the leftist, Francis Maspero.
250 In political terms Althusser’s criticism of PCF positions can be generally characterized as an 
opposition to both political reformism as a substitute for socialist argument, and the Stalinist 
bureaucratic organization of the party as a substitute for mass political initiative. This sort of 
opposition to party orthodoxy - sometimes referred to as ‘Euro-communism’, is, for Althusser, largely 
an opposition to theoretical contradictions between Marxist ideas and party practice. Much of 
Althusser’s criticism is marked by a detachment from any sustained theoretical engagement with 
political practice. Most usually, Althusser moves from a fleeting mention of current political events or 
forces to theoretical discussions of aspects of Marxist orthodoxy with little attempt to connect the two. 
Questions of party intervention in a range of political struggles are posed almost exclusively from the 
point of view of the ideas of Marx and Lenin, as stated by Althusser. Whilst Althusser can refer to the 
need to conceive the problems of socialism in relation to real experience, his theses on ‘concrete 
utopias’, ‘smashing the state’, and the like, almost always emerge on the basis of a perceived failure by 
the party to engage in thoroughgoing theoretical reflection. For an excellent account of Althusser’s 
relation to both the politics of the PCF and the more general politics of the 1960s and early 1970s see 
Elliott’s Althusser : The Detour o f Theory, especially chap. 4. Althusser’s own descriptions of his 
theoretical variance with PCF positions can be found in “On the Twenty-second Congress of the 
French Communist Party” , New Left Review, no. 104 (1977): pp. 3-22; “What Must Change in the 
Party”, New Left Review, no. 109 (1978): pp. 19-45; “The Crisis of Marxism”, Marxism Today July, 
1978. Althusser’s view of the events of May 1968 and the PCF’s engagement can be found in his 
correspondence with Maria Antonietta Macciocchi, Letters from Inside the Italian Communist Party to 
Louis Althusser (London: New Left Books, 1973). In Althusser’s autobiography, The Future Lasts a 
Long Time, there are numerous comments scattered throughout on the politics of the PCF. See 
Althusser, The Future Lasts a Long Time, especially chap. XVI. One somewhat poignant comment 
made in this work occurs in an extended defence of his continued association with the PCF: Althusser 
writes that against the curious silence from other French leftists, including Trotskyists, “only Helene 
[Plelene Rytman, Althusser’s wife] asked me what the hell I was doing in a Party which had ‘betrayed’
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For Althusser, a critical position against humanism is perhaps most 
importantly a reading of Marx’s Capital - a self-declared ‘symptomatic’ reading but 
one no less directed towards providing evidence in the texts of Marx himself of the 
same commitment to structural determination. 251 The idea which is central to
the working class in ‘68, and she was quite right”. Althusser answers her, in her absence, by explaining 
that only by being in the Party was one able to “judge its actions by its principles” , to get “an extremely 
clear idea of the Party’s practices and of the obvious contradiction between those practices and its 
theoretical and ideological principles”. Althusser, ibid., pp. 235, 236, 237. From late 1980, after the 
tragic events of Althusser’s strangulation of Helene Rytman, he ceased to be a member, thinking of 
himself instead, as he believed Lenin had, as a communist without a party. Ibid., p. 197. For a critical 
view of Althusser’s relationship to Stalinism see Alex Callinicos, Althusser’s Marxism (London: Pluto 
Press, 1978), especially chap. 4, which very effectively relates Althusser’s philosophical positions 
(particularly that of philosophy as the class struggle in theory) to his uneasy relation both to the PCF 
and to Stalinism. Callinicos concludes that Althusser’s position is generally an ambiguous one but one 
also marked by some serious silences or tacit acceptances of PCF politics, particularly that concerning 
the PCF’s lack of involvement in organizing striking workers during May and June, 1968. Jacques 
Rändere, a colleague and former comrade of Althusser’s, has also written in criticism of Althusser’s 
continued association with the Party despite his public disagreements with some of its political 
positions. From a generally Maoist perspective, Rändere argues that there is a fundamental objective 
contradiction in Althusser’s revisionist position. See Jacques Rändere, La Legon d ’Althusser (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1974). See also Ranciere’s essay “On the Theory of Ideology (the Politics of Althusser)”, 
Radical Philosophy, no. 7 (Spring 1974), pp. 2-15. See also Valentino Gerratana’s short article 
“Althusser and Stalinism”, trans. Patrick Camiller, New Left Review, nos. 101-102 in which the author 
argues that Althussei only manages to disentangle himself from the philosophical dilettantism of 
Stalinism by way of certain evasions. In a second article on the topic Gerratana considers the 
relationship between Stalinism and Leninism, a problematic relationship which he argues is left 
unresolved in Althusser’s work.
251 Althusser explains at length how there can be no innocent readings of texts, only symptomatic 
readings which disclose the problematic with which the theorist is engaged. The problematic is the 
theoretical or ideological framework within which the theorist works, and the place from which 
questions as to the presences and absences in the text can be posed. Borrowing from Freud, Althusser 
suggests that a text must be approached from the point of view of a symptomatic reading which can 
make visible what is not immediately obvious in the text. For Althusser, an empiricist reading of a text 
is premised on the assumption that the meaning of any given text is immedately obtainable; that, in 
terms of the way in which a text is to be understood, no intervention takes place between the words on 
the page and the manner in which they may be comprehended. According to Althusser, this “reading at 
sight” involves a particular theory of reading, whose lineage extends back at least as far as Galileo’s 
The Assayer: “ to treat nature or reality as a book, in which, according to Galileo, is spoken the silent 
discourse of a language whose ‘characters are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures’, it was 
necessary to have a certain idea of reading which makes a written discourse the immediate 
transparency of the true, and the real the discourse of a voice” . According to Althusser, what is 
important in a critique of the empiricist reading of texts is an understanding of the importance of the 
history in thought, the theory of history. This understanding can provide an “internal dislocation 
(decalage) in the real” to show the effects of the reading of a text. This can be done only “by 
discovering that the truth of history cannot be read in its manifest discourse, because the text of history 
is not a text in which a voice (the Logos) speaks, but the inaudible and illegible notation of the effects 
of a structure of structures” . What Althusser considers to be the “illegible notation of the effects of a 
structure of structures” refers to a text read within “the mirror myth of knowledge”, a given object 
which it is thought need only be read to be understood. This particular way of reading and 
understanding is based on “the logic of a conception of knowledge in which all the work of knowledge 
is reduced in principle to the recognition of the mere relation of vision; in which the whole nature of its 
object is reduced to the mere condition of a given” . If “we turn the thin sheet of the theory of reading” 
what might be discovered? Althusser argues that “once we have broken those tacit pacts in which the 
men of a still fragile age secured themselves with magical alliances against the precariousness of 
history and the trembling of their own daring [...] a new conception of discourse at last becomes
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Althusser’s anti-humanist position is that of a term found in Capital in which Marx 
refers to people as Träger, as supports of economic relations. Together with the idea 
of mystification - which Marx explains at length with his example of the coat into 
which has disappeared the tailor’s labour - the idea of people as the bearers of 
economic relations is fundamental to Althusser’s particular construction of 
‘structuralism’ .252 On this basis, Althusser argues that Marx rightly started his
possible” This new conception of discourse involves the understanding that what is both visible and 
invisible, both the presences and absences in a text, pose the problem of their combination. Instead of 
reducing “this day in which all cats are no longer grey” to deficiences or virtues of vision, Althusser 
argues for “a necessary invisible connexion between the field of the visible and the field of the 
invisible, a connexion which defines the necessity of the obscure field of the invisible, as a necessary 
effect of the structure of the visible field”. Because non-vision is inside vision, “ it is a form of vision 
and hence has a necessary relationship with vision” . The problem for the classical political economists, 
for example, is with what they see, not with what they do not see - but, unfortunately, they do not see 
what it is that they see. The real problem then is not to be found in mere differences of vision but 
“exists in and is posed by the actual identity of this organic confusion of non-vision in vision”. The 
way in which Althusser considers there to be an organic link between the field of vision and the 
invisible is by relating vision and non-vision to the structural conditions of seeing. Sighting “is the 
relation of immanent reflection between the field of the problematic and its objects its problems” . 
Sighting is, therefore, an act which takes place within a theoretical problematic of a given theoretical 
discipline. “It is literally no longer the eye (the mind’s eye) of a subject which sees what exists in the 
field defined by a theoretical problematic: it is this field itself which sees itself in the objects or 
problems it defines - sighting being merely the necessary reflection of the field on its objects” . The 
field of the problematic not only defines the visible but “structures the invisible as the defined 
excluded, excluded from the field of visibility and defined as excluded by the existence and peculiar 
structure of the field of the problematic; as what forbids and represses the reflection of the field on its 
object”. Thus what might be seen “goes unperceived” and what is not visible is so because it is 
“repressed from the field of the visible” . Again, Althusser stresses that, like the visible, the unvisible is 
not a function of a subject’s sighting; “the invisible is the theoretical problematic’s non-vision of its 
non-objects, the invisible is the darkness, the blinded eye of the theoretical problematic’s self-reflection 
when it scans its non-objects, its non-problems without seeing them, in order not to look at them”. In 
order to see the invisible, “to identify the lacunae in the fullness of this discourse, the blanks in the 
crowded text” , what is required is an informed gaze “produced by a reflection of the ‘change of terrain’ 
on the exercise of vision”. This process of real transformation of the means of production of 
knowledge takes place, not because of a “subject of vision” but because of the position occupied by the 
subject in a new terrain. Althusser, Reading Capital, pp. 16-17, 19-21, 32-34. Presumably it is without 
any such blinded vision that Althusser is able to interpret Capital.
252 According to Althusser, this reading of Marx is vital, “for as long as history fails to provide the 
tailor and the cloth” the theoretical concepts we construct to explain this mystification will need to 
march in borrowed clothes. See Althusser, Reading Capital, p. 51. Such concepts, clothed in terms 
other than what Althusser considers to be strictly Marxist, are not of themselves wrong; rather they are 
confined to a pre-scientific understanding of the social world. Even the anthropology of Hegel’s 
‘sphere of needs’ is not misplaced for its view of subjects as subjects of needs; it is that the space of 
economic phenomena is occupied by the giveness of a set of needs of human subjects whose needs 
define them as economic subjects. To understand the real needs of humans, different concepts are 
needed; concepts which do not obscure an ideology behind the “fore-stage of obviousness”. Because if 
“we do not go a look behind the curtain we shall not see its act of ‘giving’: it disappears into the given 
as all workmanship does into its works” . Real individuals are merely its spectators, its beggars. 
Althusser, ibid., p. 163. As well as reading Marx’s Capital symptomatically one needs to read the 
Theses on Feuerbach as Marx’s renunciation of Feuerbach’s idea of man as the originating essence. 
One would also read the 1857 Introduction to the Grundrisse as an attack upon the eighteenth century 
notion of the isolated individual, abstracted from the historical process. The lonely, solitary hunter and 
fisherman, the individuals of the work of Smith and Ricardo is a notion which “belongs among the 
unimaginative conceits of the eighteenth century Robinsonades” . (Robinsonades are utopias, along the
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theorizing without the idea of the person “in order finally to reach living men”, an end 
point never attained by bourgeois ideology’s theoretical pretensions to a concept of 
people.253 Marx’s “detour” via an account of the relations by which people live does 
not in any way estrange him from living people, it is merely a necessary path of 
abstraction taken in order to understand the abstractions imposed upon people by the 
relations under which they live.254 Althusser argues that it is not Marx ‘the 
theoretician’ who treats individuals as the simple bearers of economic functions, just 
as, as we have previously alluded to, it is not Machiavelli ‘the theoretician’ who is 
responsible for the perfidiousness of rulers. It is rather, the economic and social 
relations of capital which treats people thus. Whilst it is certainly the case that it is 
these relations that reduce the variety and complexity of individuality to that which is 
anonymous and interchangeable, this tells us little if we are not also able to 
acknowledge that these relations are ultimately nothing other than the people who 
comprise them. It is perhaps in this sense that a similarity between Althusser’s view 
of the plight of the bearers of economic relations and Heidegger’s views on 
technology can be drawn. Technology, Heidegger maintains “is in its essence 
something which man cannot master by himself’.255 For Althusser, this ‘anti­
humanism’ is fundamental to his ‘historical materialism’ .256 Wherever Marxist 
theorists have veered from this position and have instead incorporated aspects of “the
lines of Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe). See Marx, Grundrisse, p. 83. For Marx, “this twaddle” ignores the 
fact that the human being “can individuate itself only in the midst of society” . Ibid., p. 84. Thus, in 
capitalism, “Society does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of interrelations, the 
relations within which these individuals stand” . Ibid., p. 265. The difference between people, between 
capitalists and workers, is the social relation. An anti-humanist position is therefore also one of a 
critical distancing from the theoretical project of what Althusser sees as “classical bourgeois ideology 
and bourgeois political economy” . Althusser, “Contradiction and Overdetermination”, p. 124.
253 Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, p. 205. Whilst Althusser finds various instances of this anti­
humanist stance in Marx, in Capital and in the 1857 Introduction, he also chides Marx for a “return to 
the theme of alienation” in parts of Capital. Althusser concludes that the importance of this return is 
minimal, however, because the passages in which the theme of alienation is taken up do not have a 
“theoretical significance” . Althusser concludes that Marx uses the concept of alienation only because 
he has not yet developed an alternative conceptual basis for the realities he is wishing to describe. 
Althusser, ibid., pp., 206-207. Again, Althusser’s argument rests upon an uncompromising positioning 
of abstract relations in opposition to alienation. Whilst some of the shifts that Althusser describes in 
Marx’s work do occur, as has been argued previously, it is probably more useful to see them as parts of 
largely continuous themes in Marx’s analysis rather than as necessarily warring armies in conceptual 
conflict.
254 See Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, p. 202. See also Louis Althusser, “Machiavelli’s Solitude”, 
Economy and Society, vol. 17, no. 4 (November 1988).
253 Martin Heidegger, ‘“ Only God Can Save Us’: Der Spiegel's Interview with Martin Heidegger 
(1966)”, trans. Maria P. Alter and John D. Caputo, in The Heidegger Controversy, ed. Richard Wolin 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 105.
236 Of this ‘theoreticist tendency’ Althusser was later to see in his work he refers to the “accidental by­
product” in which “the young pup called structuralism, slipped between my legs”. Despite this 
admission Althusser claims “we were never structuralists” . Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, p. 125, 
131.
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ridiculous concept of man” , 257 they have fatally compromised their adherence to 
‘historical materialism’, he claims. It is only this theorization of ‘historical 
materialism’, he continues, which can at once expose the obfuscations of humanism 
and provide an adequate theoretical basis for explaining the real political and 
economic relations of capitalism giving rise to the function of the ideology of the 
subject in the first place.258
Striking out against humanism also entails, for Althusser, a thorough and 
wide-ranging critique of empiricism and idealism - both being philosophical forms in 
which the humanist drama of the subject has played itself out. A rejection of the 
philosophical forms of humanism is a rejection of all presumed teleological accounts 
of history. History is a process without a subject and without a final goal. There is no 
essentialist causality - neither that of the realization of the Absolute Idea, as Hegel 
theorizes, nor that of the category of the subject. It seems as though any general 
theory of history that relies upon a sort of evolutionism, in which some speculative 
principle of historical development is taken as the point of its departure, is, for 
Althusser, an unacceptable teleological metaphysics. The whole idea of a human 
essence is a misappropriation of the concept of the individual, imposing upon it a 
spurious continuity across time and place.251 Having deracinated the whole of 
Western philosophy on the basis that its major theories are contaminated with a 
theoretical humanism, Althusser very deliberately terms his own position “theoretical 
anti-humanism” .260 What motivates the bluntness of his position is surely neither any 
sort of opposition to humanity, wrapped with skeins of deceptive theory, nor any 
surreptitious attempt to revive Stalinism, as has sometimes been suggested:261 It is a
257 Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, p. 204.
258 Ibid.
259 Althusser puts forward a theory of the differentiation of time. See, for example, Althusser, Reading 
Capital, pp. 106-110. Whether this concept solves the problem Althusser has set out to address is less 
apparent. This is the criticism made by Pierre Vilar, the Marxist Annales school historian, with regard 
to Althusser’s concept of differential time. See Pierre Vilar, “Marxist History, History in the Making: 
Towards a Dialogue with Althusser”, New Left Review, no. 80 (July/August 1973): pp. 65-106.
260 Althusser, “Marxism and Humanism”, pp. 229-231. See also V. Korac’s article, “The Phenomenon 
of ‘Theoretical Anti-humanism’”, in Praxis, nos. 3-4 (1969).
261 Althusser has been dismissed as a ‘kangaroo spouting Stalinism’, and as “chief of ideological 
police” by E. P. Thompson. E. P. Thompson, The Poverty o f Theory and Other Essays (London: 
Merlin Press, 1981), p. 131. J. G. Merquior lends Althusser a slightly more academic demeanour by 
describing him as the prophet of “talmudic gospel-idolatry”, and a Marxist Comte with a phoney 
scholastic. See J. G. Merquior, The Veil and the Mask: Essays on Culture and Ideology (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 116, 121. Both of these polemical attacks are misguided. As we 
have already mentioned, as Callinicos points out, Althusser’s politics are neither Stalinist nor reformist 
but can perhaps be best described as centrist “in the sense given the term by Lenin, occupying a 
position mid-way between the far left and the mass reformist parties” . See Alex Callinicos, Is There a 
Future for Marxism? (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 79. Thompson’s inveighing against Althusser’s 
supposed ‘Stalinism’ in his essay “The Poverty of Theory or An Orrery of Errors”, misses this point.
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theoretical position taken in opposition to the distortions of other theoretical positions 
- namely those which put forward an uncritical universalism of the subject as the basic 
precept of their theoretical enquiry. But herein lies one of the problems with 
Althusser’s approach - his own porcelain view of the problems of humanism is an 
entirely theoretical approach seemingly untouched by an appreciation of the dynamic 
forces of history. Moreover, it is a theoretically limited position, sui generis. His 
criticism is a theoretical opposition to a theoretical problem - that of the naturalization
For Althusser, structure is not the whale that Thompson describes, opening its jaws and swallowing the 
unhappy individuals of capitalism; nor does Althusser consider humanism to be a hideous monster, 
thereby evicting human agency from history. For Thompson’s argument against Althusser see, The 
Poverty o f Theory and Other Essays, pp. 95, 122. There is, however, something persuasive about 
Thompson’s argument that language structures our ideas - “If we think about women as ‘dolls’ or 
‘pieces’ or ‘chicks’ or whatever, it may be more easy to behave to them in this way”. Thompson, ibid., 
p. 145. But an acknowledgment of this is surely one way to begin the process of subverting the attitude 
that gives rise to that particular construction of language. It follows for Thompson that if we think of 
people as the träger of structures that we will treat them no better, but again this misses the point that 
Althusser is making; he is not mistakenly endorsing a view of people as subjects of bourgeois relations 
as the träger of structures, as subject to and thus merely as objects of the state, he is attributing this to 
specific bourgeois relations. In Reading Capital, the thesis of people as the träger of structures is made 
in relation to Marx’s comments in Capital. A number of different interpretations can be given to 
Althusser’s statements in For Marx and elsewhere that, “It is the masses which make history”, “the 
class struggle is the motor of history”, and the “ ‘subjects’ of history are given human societies” . See 
Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, p. 46; and For Marx, pp. 215, 231. Althusser’s emphasis on the 
effectivity of human subjects in the making of their history can be seen as both the demand that history 
be interpreted as the product of masses, rather than individual action, and that the humanist emphasis 
upon individuals as the subjects of history (a phenomenology of the worker or the peasant or the 
industrialist or the financier) be replaced with an account of the ideological, political and economic 
structures which control and define significant parts of human activity. It is on this basis that one may 
have a theoretical commentary upon the practical experiences of human activity, of struggle and 
contradiction, and importantly upon the fusion of an accumulation of contradictions, a fusion into a 
“ruptural unity”, in which, “disarmed in the very citadel of the State machine” the people, who have 
been so long “kept in leash and respectful by exploitation violence and deceit” , can express their 
opposition. Althusser, For Marx, p. 100. A particular mode of production may not fully explain why 
people are treated as bearers of economic relations or why female people are treated as mindless 
objects, but if it is able to bear some light on these political practices then it is worthwhile that it is 
acknowledged as such. The problem with an exclusive emphasis upon people and classes as only the 
träger of social relations is that it excludes any explanatory power to subjectivity comprising, amongst 
other (ideological) things, conscious deliberation. An abstraction at the level of theory that posits 
people only in terms of their function as supports of social relations cannot explain why an ideology of 
consent operates with effectiveness. Larrain’s comment with regard to a comparison he draws between 
Althusser and Sartre indicates this problem for Marxist theory: “Whereas for Althusser the structures 
are constituitive and subjects are constructed, for Sartre the subject is constructive and the structures 
are constructed. They thus pull apart subject and object, the unity of which Marx tried to safeguard 
precisely by means of the concept of practice” . Jorge Larrain, A Reconstruction o f Historical 
Materialism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 94. The questions which must then be asked of 
Althusser’s theory are, if subjects are constituted, how does this process operate, and if structures are 
constituitive, what is their objective function in relation to the subject? But this is more difficult terrain 
than some commentators have been willing to acknowledge, and no simple solution is to be found in 
Althusser’s work. It is not a simple question of choosing between two abstract systems, of the 
individual as a rational, moral, being, or the individual as the träger of structures. Hence Thompson’s 
parodying of Althusser, in what he sees as a construction of mystifying and misplaced theory, does not 
tend to advance an understanding of this problem other than to restate the rather familiar chasm 
between empiricism and a dialectical materialism.
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and universalism of the subject. And yet, as Althusser himself surely realized, 
ironically the idea of the universal subject is a theoretical problem which emerged as a 
result of the abstraction of the idea of the subject from any basis in concrete political 
practice. 262 Placing such theory on this merciless edge of exclusion only to disregard 
the very point of doing so compromises Althusser’s critique severely.263 The 
indeterminately abstract nature of his theorizing cannot allow any internal relation 
between conceptual and historical analysis. This sort of schematic approach to 
analytical problems often functions only to create further problems. Theory in this 
context becomes self-referential and, not being sustained by any reference to 
historical developments and changes, begins to unravel into an infinite regress of 
metatheories. It is theory with a distinct longing for the loneliness and cloister of its 
own company. It would be foolish to underestimate Althusser’s own awareness of the 
problems associated with the schematic character of his arguments, and yet very little
262 But is it also the case, as Andrew Collier argues, that Althusser’s attack on humanism, in addition to 
a theoretical joust in the name of scientific explanation, is also made politically “in the name of class 
analysis”? Andrew Collier, “Retrieving structural Marxism”, Economy and Society, vol. 17, no. 4 
(November 1988): p. 546. In the sense that Althusser’s explanadum is to be found, not in 
understanding the actions of some pre-given subject (individual or collective), but rather in seeing a 
socially constituted class agent whose capacity as a ‘bearer’ of social relations is in some way (in the 
last instance) determined by the material relations of production, his anti-humanism is unequivocally 
on the side of a type of class analysis. But whether this position, theoretically consistent as it is in 
being devoid of humanistic nostalgia or the metaphysics of individuality, is more than a theoretical 
exploration for the basis of a supposedly ‘scientific theory’, is more questionable. If Althusser’s theory 
is made politically in the name of class analysis, as Collier suggests, then something of the politics of 
the period (both more broadly and more narrowly defined) would presumably have greater impact on 
his work than would seem to be the case. Gregory Elliott argues, for example, that Althusser “took 
almost no part in the controversies of the political and intellectual Cold War” . Althusser’s emphasis is, 
he argues, consistently upon the renewal of Marxist theory, a striving towards a theoretical orthodoxy, 
which if consonant with Maoism is only so in a secondary and indirect way. Elliott, Althusser: The 
Detour o f Theory, p. 324. And even if such an analysis were to have emerged it remains a moot point 
as to whether it might have in any way substantially contributed to resolving the ideological problem 
Althusser sets for himself.
263 Part of the problem seems to rest in the tendency Althusser has to establish ever more definitive 
categories for the highly abstracted terms of his analysis. In a supplementary note to his discussion of 
humanism, for example, he introduces the concept of ‘socialist humanism’ and proceeds to argue that 
its function can be explained both as a “practical, ideological slogan” and as a theoretical concept. 
Althusser, “Marxism and Humanism”, p. 246. This odd division is put forward not as any basis for a 
discussion of what these two different functions would in any real socialist practice mean but 
seemingly solely for the purpose of setting up his argument that ordinary, bourgeois humanism “has no 
theoretical value, but does have value as a practical index”. Ibid., p. 247. Interestingly, Althusser was 
later to refer to the ideology of the PCF as “a self-satisfied socialist humanism” in contrast to his own 
theoretical anti-humanism which was the only “genuine, practical humanism”. See Althusser, The 
Future Lasts a Long Time, pp. 185, 186. For a radically different and theoretically superior approach 
to what is sometimes referred to as the politics of ‘socialism in transition’ see Negri, “Keynes and 
Capitalist Theories of the State Post-1929”, in Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse, which 
Yann Moulier claims is “the first post-socialist Marxism, nearly twenty years before the radical 
questioning of ‘real socialism’ by the Soviet Union itself’. See Yann Moulier, Introduction to Negri, 
The Politics o f Subversion: A Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century, p. 16.
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seems to be done in an attempt to rectify this tendency other than to create ever more 
theoretical correctness.
In “A Letter on Art in Reply to Andre Daspre”, for example, Althusser makes 
this very point of “the very schematic character of my article on Humanism”, and 
notes the “disadvantage that it gives a ‘broad’ idea of ideology without going into the 
analysis of details” .264 And yet his excursion into an analysis of the relation between 
ideology and art hardly addresses this problem with any significant detailing of what 
doggedly remains a highly schematic argument. Indeed, what detailing there is 
offered is a staggeringly inept approach to the relation of art to ideology. Let us look 
briefly at this issue. Althusser sets out to address what he feels could have been 
interpreted as - in his former silence on the question - the view that art and ideology 
are identical. Having informed his reader reasonably enough that the problem of the 
relation between art and ideology “is a very complicated and difficult one”, Althusser 
puts forward a rather simplistic notion that “real art” - which he defines tautologically 
as “authentic art, not works of an average or mediocre level” - should not be ranked 
among the ideologies, “although art does have a quite particular and specific 
relationship with ideology”. Art, as in ‘real art’ is something which alludes to reality, 
it enables one to see “the ideology from which it is bom, in which it bathes”. Its 
relationship to knowledge is one of “difference”. The view of ideology to which it 
alludes “presupposes a retreat, an internal distantiation” from the very same ideology 
from which it is generated. Art does not deal with “a reality peculiar to itself but 
with “a different domain of reality”. The writers Balzac and Solzhenitsyn are thrown 
in at odd places in this theorizing, although nothing of their actual works is 
mentioned. Althusser stresses that the effects of works of art “in no way [...] give us a 
knowledge of them”, an argument he also makes about ideology itself (ideology is not 
“dissipated by a knowledge of it” ) . 265 Althusser concludes this ‘detailing’ with the 
less than robust argument that art makes us see the lived experience of capitalist 
society in a “critical form”. We are able to see this if we know art through a “rigorous 
study of Marxist theory”. To look at art otherwise, to see only its “aesthetic effect”, 
would not enable one to arrive at a knowledge of art but merely an ideology of art.266 
This example, perhaps more than most illustrates the problem with Althusser’s 
analysis. The theoreticism of his argument dictates the entire manner in which the 
problem is formulated and advanced. In the midst of all this Althusser raises some 
critical, pertinent points but the general form of the argument remains extravagantly
264 Althusser, “A Letter on Art”, p. 203.
265 Althusser, “Marxism and Humanism”, p. 230.
266 Althusser, “A Letter on Art”, pp. 203-208, passim.
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detached from any actual analysis of art. Althusser’s propensity towards simplistic, 
subjectivist generalizations is unfortunate (only ‘above average’ art is real art; only 
real art is critical of the lived experience of capitalism; only this critical art avoids 
being ideological art; only a knowledge of this internal distance it has from ideology 
places it outside ideology; it is only outside ideology when perceived from inside the 
ideology it distances itself from, and so on). Such generalizations would not of 
themselves cast his argument into the murky dark of theoreticism: It is his failure to 
relate these theses to any actual analysis of art itself that makes his arguments 
relentlessly abstract. His general thesis, then, that art is not merely ideology but 
expresses a particular relation to ideology, remains an abstract, static, unsubstantiated 
proposition.
Neither art nor anticipated visions of justice, freedom and equality count as 
anything substantially other than ideology for Althusser. In this sense they play the 
part that false consciousness did for other theorists - we are duped by any sense of the 
expectation of freedom held because the consciousness that these words articulate 
offers nothing more than the fraudulent and hypocritical manipulations of our wily 
rulers. By declaring this by fiat, Althusser is unable to actually account for the 
process by which anticipations of images of freedom become types of enslavement. 
And yet the ideological is surely present in this process as itself a process in which the 
progressive dissolution or transformation of revolutionary intent is brought into 
dominance and the still unrealized of the revolutionary impulse shifts between 
anticipation and illusion. What it is that contributes to the process is then also left 
unaddressed by Althusser - the subject has always had her part assigned to her; she 
can do no other than submit to its pre-destined subjugation. The object that the 
subject tries in vain to grasp is too abstracted from the subject to control. Althusser 
describes for us a state of objectively false consciousness in which the acceptance of 
the necessity of illusions is a fixed part of ideology itself. The problem of the 
subject’s submission to ideological control is thus set out by him as a problem of the 
objective world to which the subject must cleave. If we consider again Reich’s 
question as to why it is that the hungry do not steal, Althusser’s answer must 
undoubtedly be that the subject’s objective reality acts as a compelling constraint. 
And yet an examination of the place of the unconscious in this unfailingly human 
drama would seem to suggest something more than the objective limitations placed 
upon the fugitive subject. There is surely something about the subject herself and her 
particular engagement with her world and its realities that also dictates her response to 
pressing hunger. Althusser can enlighten us no further as to the meaning of any such
reasons.
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Conclusion
Althusser’s attempt to understand ideology, both as an aspect of the 
reproduction of power relations within capitalism and as a part of the workings of the 
unconscious, is an ambitiously interesting attempt to account for the systemic 
functioning of power and its relation to subjectivity. If there are difficulties with the 
way in which he brings these aspects of the function of power and subjectivity 
together this is not altogether unrelated to problems in the way in which the structure 
of the system and the structure of the individual are each understood. And yet beyond 
these difficulties what we are offered is an insightful depiction of constitutive tension 
- perhaps even at times contradiction - that marks subjectivity within relations of 
power. The subject acts neither in a purely subjective nor objective sense but against 
the enormous weight of an object that is both real and ideological. Crucially, this 
object is also the subject’s threatened erasure that sets in train a whole oppositional 
dynamic from which the subject can emerge defeated or as the ‘deliberate 
unconscious’ that the conditions of its subjectivized existence provokes. It is this 
sense of a subjective in potential that we want to extend in a theorization of the 
ideological.
As we have set out in the course of the chapter, Althusser at best offers only a 
sort of dynamic; it is not the dialectic of the discontinuity of real and imagined 
processes and it is not the depiction of a structure which is internally split by the 
subjectivities of which it is constituted. With this his analysis is effectively drained of 
any unfinished or anticipatory subjective force, and is left with an unavoidably 
objectivist, specular nightmare from which the subjective would seek a release.267 The 
very fact that the system requires mechanisms which attempt to control what is 
imaginable is not only a case of the excesses of its normal state of internal 
contradiction; this internal contradiction is itself fragmented by antagonism. Ideology 
materializes illusions and this materiality constantly creates and recreates difficulties 
for a system in actually delivering on its ideological promises. It demands that we 
take seriously its claims to equality and freedom and yet this repeatedly subjects it to
267 This tendency is apparent in Zizek’s own conceptualization of ideology where ideology is really 
ideology, is really “holding us”, “only when we do not feel any opposition between it and reality” . 
Zizek, The Sublime Object, p. 49. A monolithic ideology becomes the all-determining controller of our 
everyday experience, a “totality set on effacing the traces of its own impossibility”. Ibid. Here, Zizek 
draws a contrived distinction between a Marxist concept of ideology as the partial gaze overlooking the 
totality, and the Lacanian concept of ideology a totality in the process of effacing its impossibility.
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its own contradictions and failures. The limit of ideology is ideology itself. The 
possibility of scission is inherent in its attempted reconciliation of contradiction. For 
Althusser, this merely means its limit is the very impetus of its own development - an 
impossible, never-ending paradox of ideological interpellation as fundamentally 
constitutive of ideology itself.268 But structure has no such guarantees; neither 
constant constitutive imbalance - its excessive power always its impotence -  nor, at 
the psychoanalytic level, the endless paradox of ‘surplus enjoyment’. The 
subjectivities of structure mean, rather, its openness to possibility and uncertainty.
Subjectivity, for Althusser, is a fixed mechanism ensuring the quiet terror of 
control over the subject by the subject’s own representation to herself of her relation 
to the conditions of existence that she experiences. Even the experience of fear, a 
feeling one would imagine most suggests the interrelation of subject and object, is 
part of a psychology of a determined world. This is an arresting but ultimately 
improbable depiction of ideology. Lived experiences concerning subjectivity are 
dynamic, they involve unfinished contradictions and counterposition. Althusser 
presents a flat plane of disembodied power which almost imperceptibly seeps in and 
engulfs the hapless subject and keeps her in a place from which there can be no 
escape. The human subject is conscripted into ideology’s army, and once there never 
really questions the point of the war, let alone ever actively mutinies. Within his own 
confines of the significance of capitalism, Althusser reifies structures by dismissing 
the power of labour in and against capital.269 This leads to a theoretical suppression of 
the concept of contradiction in his work. Althusser rightly sees the widespread 
insinuation of bourgeois ideology in all forms of social production and criticizes its 
manifestations precisely on the basis of their function within specifically capitalist 
relations of production.270 But it is this static, systemic determination in which 
Althusser is most interested rather than in that of any changing socio-historical 
instances of its existence. This fixity and almost seamless linear evolutionism of 
structuralist critique is what prevents it from being able to theorize contradiction. 
Althusser’s central thesis concerning ideology - that which explains ideology as the 
lived experience of the imaginary representation of the real world - is unable to move
268 For Zizek this is the paradox of surplus enjoyment. See ibid., p. 21.
269 For Althusser, the relationship between ideology and capitalism is expressed in the structural and 
institutional form that ideology takes in given social formations. This is a general relationship whose 
theoretical contours can be assessed in abstract forms. But the institutional form of ideology needs to 
be seen as the historical mode through which and in which the class struggle is experienced within 
ideology.
270 But although the practices which comprise this ideology are seen as historically and socially 
determined this determination is not defined as a movement of social contestation. There is, as it were, 
a fixed determination over which glides historical changes.
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beyond a static depiction of subjectivity. Only where Althusser momentarily sees the 
importance of a state of deliberate unconsciousness are we able to find any shift away 
from this static picture.
An openness to an appreciation of the movement of contradiction within the 
social world entails the identification of the instability that forms of contradiction 
take. Ideologies and the structures of society through which they are most usually 
reinforced, have a precarious, constantly constituted and reconstituted existence 
within a contradictory, crisis-prone social world. 271 The rise and fall of dominant 
ideologies reflecting phases of the rationale for economic strategies in the movement 
of crisis is testimony to this. There cannot be the sort of separation Althusser sees 
between ideology in general and specific ideologies because form, as he himself 
would surely argue, is inherent in content. As we have seen, Althusser constructs a 
theoretically innovative way of understanding what it is he considers underpins the 
variant forms of social, legal and political ideology. His incorporation of 
psychoanalytic themes within his analysis of the workings of ideology is most 
enlightening where it provokes an awareness of the place of the unconscious within 
relations of power: But he is bound to seek vainly for the generic or abstract 
dimension of ideology, or to construct it artificially, because such a separation 
between the generic and the specific is itself artificial and contrived. Seeing ideology 
rather as a moment of often historically bound forms of social contestation means that 
instead of constructing categories of fixity one would understand ideology as part of 
the unpredictability of the movement of social relations: Here the subject is involved 
in her conscious and unconscious worlds. Althusser is not wrong to highlight the 
structures of ideological control - they exist and are real - but as a social relation 
structures exist within the movement of contradiction. They are not fixed or 
autonomous.
Althusser’s ideological subject is disconnected from the concept of 
differentiation and is merely a subject, and by definition, any subject of the State. 
Only where we see her as furnished with a deliberate unconsciousness can we see
271 Ideology, therefore, is never merely, even in the last instance, reducible to economic relations. It is, 
as well as being a part of economic relations, a part of political and cultural relations. Social relations 
in general cannot be separated into autonomous categories of structure and social practice without 
giving rise to a deterministic view of one side of the divide. For Althusser, parts of the structure of 
capital - ideology and the State - function according to pre-determined laws which will almost 
inevitably subordinate social practice to its logic. Not surprisingly, he sees an overwhelming logic of 
capital and the State that is axiomatic for the ideological control of the subjects of capitalism. The 
practices of the State set the agenda which its subjects have no choice other than to largely 
unquestioningly follow because this process tends to work by itself without direct coercion. For an 
analysis explaining why Marx’s theorizing is not reductionist see Gunn, “Marxism and Philosophy: a 
Critique of Critical Realism” , pp. 87-116.
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another view of the subject. More typically his theories achieve a severance between 
an abstraction of the pattern of every social formation and subjectivity. This too, 
although for different reasons, is the end result of Lukacs’s tendency towards an 
abstraction of the process of the self-realization of the proletariat. In both cases their 
otherwise perceptive social theories suggest causal explanations for the function of the 
relation between the development of capitalism and subjectivity which inevitably 
privilege one side of the equation of subject/society. Where Lukacs sees the self- 
realization of the proletariat in the annulment of the social effect of alienation, 
Althusser draws his causal link between apparatuses of the State, functioning as 
relatively autonomous structures, and the subjection of the subject. What emerges 
here is interesting in that both theorists strive to construct a total theory in which they 
feel a materialist conception of history can be established: But the idea of the 
realization of an essence as conditioning the social development of reification, and 
that of State apparatuses and their ideological effect conditioning subjectivity, are 
both, in their own ways, narrowly causalist. Both rest upon a methodological 
privileging of a singular and rigidly defined position from which a critique of 
reification/ideology can take place.272 Realities and meanings are lost in Althusser’s 
reading - chief amongst these is the sense of the dignity of humanity found in a refusal 
to bow before an ideology more demeaning than enlightening, more self-satisfied than 
challenging. Althusser cannot see the existence of different forms of justice, liberty, 
equality and their images - there can be no formal ideals which at the same time 
afford a relative protection against the barbarism that they might equally underscore - 
all forms for Althusser are ideological and suspect. We cannot easily find a basis for 
defining the subject’s relation to the need for undiminished values when all values are 
taken to be the stuff of illusion. And illusion itself need not progress in such a one­
dimensional manner. There are indeed numerous instances where the need for
272 Althusser’s rejection of historicism, as we have already seen, is underpinned by the assumption that 
theoretical practice or class struggle in the realm of theory is the only decisive undoing of ideology. 
Just as monolithic as Althusser’s conception of ideology, Lukacs’s reification can only be fully 
comprehended and thus dissolved through the workings of an idealized proletarian consciousness. 
Such theories are complete within themselves as if their conceptual bases are adequate to all reality. 
Theory in this sense and thus the construal of reality becomes complete only by its own closure. 
Whilst Althusser is surely right to point out the difference between an object and an object of 
knowledge and to realize the importance of Marx’s attempt to move his analysis in the direction of 
concrete totality where the distance between an object and our concept of it is minimized, he is 
mistaken in believing that such totality is the sole province of theory. Althusser’s Reading Capital 
seems to be posited on this basis that his theoretical novelties will fill in the gaps created by absences in 
Marx’s own theorizing. Despite these problems, Althusser’s work, as Callinicos argues, has “enduring 
strengths which make it an indispensable part of any attempt to continue the Marxist tradition”. The 
strengths which Callinicos identifies largely concern Althusser’s critique of Hegelian dialectics, his 
theoretical understanding of the conceptual basis of production relations, and his ability to situate 
Marxism within an anti-empiricist and non-positivist philosophy of science. Callinicos, “What Is 
Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Althusser” , p. 43.
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fabricating illusions by capitalism and its bourgeoisie far outstrip any ability to act 
with heroic vision, and yet even the most cynical and manipulative construction of 
illusion need not always remain the province of its fabricators. Different impulses 
might not only alter the meaning and significance of ideologies over time but might 
indeed be present in such a construction in the first place. Althusser keeps his 
conception of ideology too tightly bound to a set notion of what anticipated ideals 
might be.273
We are left then wondering what we can take from Althusser’s radical 
engagement with theories of the unconscious and a psychology of control. Althusser 
brings to our attention, forcefully and uncompromisingly, the vulnerability of the 
individual in the face of relations of power and exploitation. His work constantly 
highlights the peculiar hollowness of a subjected humanity made all the more piercing 
in the duplicity of its ideological championing as free and equal. Fear of and in the 
self dominates our lives. We may not agree that only subservience to ideological 
control is at the core of human existence but we can still recognize the importance of 
Althusser’s insistence that we tend to experience ideology as a lived reality through a 
complex process of misrecognition and unconscious acknowledgement. This 
emphasis allows us to question what it is that humanity has ceased to reflect upon by 
instead becoming entangled in a mire of repressed and unconscious fears. Althusser 
has much to say about the structural constraints upon the development of conditions 
for transformation, and some of this can surely be heeded, even if a more positive 
vision of emancipatory impulses within everyday existence is ultimately to be argued. 
And if there is something deeply disturbing in Althusser’s portrayal of the objective 
contradictions structuring our present world, it is not merely because this waking 
nightmare is one we would wish would come to an end - there is something in it that
273 For all the sophistication he brings to bear upon his understanding of the structured function of 
ideology, the theoretical account he develops remains entrapped within a capital-logic determinism. 
During the 1980s this one-sided emphasis on structures came to be seen as a theoretical obstacle even 
by some of the various inheritors of the Althusserian tradition - most obviously in the case of the 
Regulation School theorists who found an incompatibility between an emphasis upon eternal structures 
and the resurgence of monetarism in the wake of the crisis of Keynesianism. For critiques of the 
regulation approach see Simon Clarke, “Overaccumulation, Class Struggle and the Regulation 
Approach”, Capital and Class, no. 36 (1988): pp. 59-84 and also Werner Bonefeld’s critique of 
Hirsch’s theory of the State in his “Reformulation of State Theory” , Capital and Class, no. 33 (1987): 
pp. 96-127. The so-called ‘New Times’ were merely appropriated beneath a banner now thoroughly 
expunged of Marxism. What today continues of a tradition of structuralism frequently offers itself as a 
critique of a Marxism it seems to misunderstand. Where it shows ample sensitivity to new and 
changing forms of social reproduction of present-day society, its understanding of the Marxist tradition 
is often one-dimensional and crude. More particularly, it largely fails to move beyond its own form of 
structural determinism by emphasizing new forms of domination and exploitation at the expense of any 
sustained accounts of forms of often razor-sharp antagonism and contradiction which also define the 
contemporary period. Althusser’s self-criticism of his failure to theorize antagonism within and against 
the structures he so painfully observed seems to have fallen on largely muffled ears.
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resonates with where we have managed to come to as we prepare to enter into a new 
millennium without having resolved the most basic problems of conditions of 
degradation for much of humanity. It is here that Althusser’s view of a state of 
deliberate unconscious would seem to have most power. In the next chapter we will 
consider whether Marx’s much earlier writings on this theme of why people have 
become degraded and enslaved help to shed any further light upon the manifestly 
difficult task which Althusser set himself in seeking a reason as to why humanity’s 
degradation appears to escape any cognition of it by the degraded. Let us also recall 
that Althusser recognized most poignantly that “we are hungry for truth” and that this 
means that “we will also be battling the myths that are meant to conceal the truth from 
us” . 274 The battle, as we know, continues.
274 Althusser, “The International of Decent Feelings”, p. 32.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE CRITIQUE OF SOCIAL LIFE: 
IDEOLOGY AS THE INVENTIVE NEED OF THE 
CALCULATING SLAVE
Introduction
On all sides many short and easy paths to freedom are open.
Epicurus
The necessity to subdue necessity
Thus far in the thesis we have seen that there is much to be gained from 
critiques of social life in which the problem of command is addressed, especially 
where this gives us some insight into the seeming imposition of ideology within 
conditions of unfreedom. Ideology is able to disorient and control precisely where 
freedom is absent. And yet is ideology not also present in various struggles for 
freedom? Does ideology itself not entail both the expression of impulses as well as 
their suppression and mystification? In the light of an acknowledgement of the 
importance of a spectacularized commodification of life and a generalized psychology 
of control, what we have so far yet felt unable to adequately theorize is the relation 
within ideology between externalized command and the various internalized or 
subjectively activated points of a susceptibility to ideology’s dictates or seeming 
rationale.
It is in order to address this issue that we will, in this chapter, consider 
ideology as an expression of ‘inventive need’, in which existing and perhaps partially 
determining conditions are realized in relation to a range of subjective, often 
internalized, factors. Rather than assuming that people are the unwitting subjects of 
ideology we will here instead consider their predicament, in relation to ideology, as 
one more akin to that of being ‘calculating slaves’. With this we will open up the 
critique of ideology to a radical philosophy of freedom. Such a philosophy will 
enable us to reconsider the problem of the relation between subject and object in a
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rather different manner than we have thus far encountered in the thesis. We will 
situate our discussion of this issue within an extended analysis of the philosophical 
approach of Karl Marx, whose development of a dialectical understanding of the 
existence of unfreedom allows us to pose the problem of ideology as a type of 
inventive and calculated need.
As we will see, Marx theorizes a range of basic elements which he treats as 
fundamental to individual and social freedom - such as freedom from alienation and 
the imposition of external forms of coercion; the ethical value of self-realization and 
human emancipation; the need for the realization of human creativity, and thus the 
imperative to uphold this need against all those aspects of society - from the spell of 
the commodity and technological rationalization to poverty and degradation - that 
militate against creativity. 1 As Epicurus had noted and Marx was to make much use 
of, we frequently find ourselves living out conditions of necessity, but this necessity 
“is not a necessity”. It is not a necessity because we are able to “subdue necessity” . 2 
Ideology is undoubtedly involved in the need for liberation from exploitation and 
relations of dependence, in claims for self-determination and social justice. All these 
elements are freedoms humanity can strive for against the encroachment of forms of 
control, including ideological control. Indeed, as we have argued throughout this 
thesis, because there is no finally closed determinateness of the possibility of the 
intervention of the subject, freedom can be regarded as a mode of human 
comportment confronted with the real possibility of domination and control.
This freedom, or its lack, exists in a world that has become, seemingly quite 
irrevocably, one of the human creation of humanity, a reality that Marx, perhaps more 
than any other modem philosopher, feels compelled to account for in his theorization 
of social life. There is little of Nietzsche’s half-wavering, half-resigned humanity 
facing the loss of a creator who could forge a world from nothing and write into its 
history a certain apocalypse. Well before, Marx had confronted the alienation of all 
things, both spiritual and material, but did so on the basis of a realization that the era 
of Creation has been surpassed. 3 The human being, in all her fragility and need, is the
1 There is o f course much debate as to the significance of Marx’s treatment of such issues. This has 
been most notably the case in relation to discussion concerning Marx and the question o f ethics. For a 
variety of positions on this see, Allen W. Wood, Karl Marx (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981); 
Norman Geras, “The Controversy about Marx and Justice”, New Left Review, no. 150 (March/April 
1985); and more recently, Norberto Bobbio, In Praise of Meekness: Essays on Ethics and Politics, 
trans. Teresa Chataway (London: Polity, 2000).
2 Epicurus, quoted in Karl Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation”, “Difference Between the Democritean and 
Epicurean Philosophy of Nature”, Collected Works, vol. I, p. 43.
3 With reference to Seneca’s view of the giving of benefits, Marx tells us that “God does not give 
benefits [...] he turns his back on the world”, and, quoting Lucretius, he refers to the Epicurean
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hapless inheritor of this onerous responsibility for fashioning the world. And whilst 
this in no sense severs her completely from yearnings for some master or mastery to 
contend with the disorder, it places her quite definitely, and in many ways more 
directly, in relation to her need for a feeling of dignity, which Marx defines as 
freedom. The time is out of joint, and humanity has thoughtlessly exchanged a former 
reconciliation with its world for the workings of an out of control sorcerer - an 
alienating society of production and exchange.* 4 The feeling of dignity is, as we will 
see in this chapter, part of the potentiality humanity possesses: It has not yet been 
fully realized and many obstacles have arisen preventing the self from grasping this 
freedom. Marx shows us various aspects of the contradictory reality of this need for a 
reintegration of being. This struggle for freedom is the ‘ideal world’ “which always 
wells up out of the real world and flows back into it with ever greater spiritual riches 
and renews its soul” . 5 What we will find is this sense of the striving for self-liberation 
captured in Marx’s dialectic of freedom. In this chapter, then, we will be concerned 
with a critical examination of the ways in which Marx theorizes how we fail to be 
freed from ourselves.
The spirit of critique
We first need, however, to say something about how we will approach the 
material to be considered. We will begin shortly by situating the sort of critique we 
will develop against what is commonly taken to be ‘the Marxist view of ideology’. 
As we mentioned at the outset of the thesis, Marx’s work presents a particularly 
challenging case in the interpretation of ideas largely because of the polemical use and 
abuse to which his work has been put. As Michel Henry, himself the author of an 
exceptionally insightful treatment of Marx’s approach to praxis and the concept of the 
human being, writes of his subject: “No philosopher has had more influence than 
Marx; none has been more misunderstood” . 6 It is indeed hard to think of another 
philosopher whose work has been so overrun by trouble-making intruders. It is of 
course the case that some of Marx’s ideas have been put to highly political use and 
abuse, and yet very much more overtly political philosophers than Marx do not seem 
to have suffered at the hands of their interpreters so: Hegel is not held personally
philosophy o f humanity lifting itself “level with the skies”. Karl Marx, “Notes for the Doctoral
Dissertation”, Collected Works, vol. I, p. 90, and “Doctoral Dissertation”, p. 73.
4 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto o f the Communist Party, trans. Samuel Moore, ed. 
Frederick Engels (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p. 49.
5 Karl Marx, “Debates on Freedom of the Press and Publication o f the Proceedings of the Assembly of 
the Estates”, Collected Works, vol. I, p. 165.
6 Henry, Marx, p. 1.
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responsible for the bunglings of bureaucrats; Heidegger’s sometime enthusiastic 
endorsement of Nazi party programmes is not generally held as the core of his entire 
questioning of the meaning of being. 7 Marx, however, who neither involved himself 
in any form of State governance nor actively participated in any organization with 
abusive outcome or oppressive intent, is frequently associated with, of all things, 
totalitarianism. 8 Marx’s concern to change the world was an engagement in a vision 
of life very much broader than the machinations of the State, from which he felt 
people should assert their freedom rather than, by a cleaving to it, continuing to be 
enslaved. After Machiavelli, Marx is perhaps the philosopher most damned by his 
yearning to expose a world convulsed in the perversion and defilement of the use of
7 One needs to add here that Heidegger’s more generally fascist or right-wing revolutionary political 
attitude is, however, a matter that he himself chose to relate to his deconstruction of being, most 
particularly where he saw the founding of a State or new order as necessitated by the catastrophe of 
being into which the exhaustion of modernity had plunged the individual. That he chose to align 
himself with Nazism was hardly any sort of aberration in this sense but more a choice made upon 
definite political and social lines, lines which accorded with aspects of his philosophical outlook. As 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe argues, contrary to many commentators, “the commitment of 1933 is neither 
an accident nor an error”. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the 
Political, trans. Chris Turner (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 18. The point I am making above in 
the text is simply that Heidegger’s questioning of human essence need not necessarily have resulted in 
his endorsement of Nazism. Likewise, whilst it is certainly necessary to draw a link between Hegel’s 
theorization of ethical life as the realization of free will via the intermediaries of, amongst others, civil 
society and the State, to make Hegel himself responsible for any failure of such a realization would be 
mistaken.
8 Marx’s participation in the League of the Just, which was founded by German refugees in Paris as the 
League of the Banished and later became the League of Communists in 1846, obviously falls outside 
these categories. Marx took an interest in the work of the League of the Just from the spring of 1844 
until his abrupt departure from Paris in January 1845. He participated in various Correspondence 
Committee meetings in Brussels in 1845 and was later elected president of the local reorganized 
branch. The Committee was launched in order to provide an international point of contact for 
emancipation movements. In 1847 Marx and Engels founded the Brussels German Working Men’s 
Society, an open and public organization. Marx was elected vice-president of the newly founded 
Association democratique in Brussels in 1847. After the expulsion of refugees and activists from 
Belgium in 1848, Marx re-established the Communist League in Paris. Over the next five years Marx’s 
participation in the various organizations with which he was associated waxed and waned -  various 
organizations were disbanded and reformed; Marx and his family continued to be pursued by 
authorities in various countries in which they attempted to reside and thus his participation in the 
various Leagues was sporadic. From the early 1850s, while resident in London, Marx devoted himself 
to his writing, only occasionally attending meetings of the London Council of the Communist League. 
During this time he was invited to participate in various meetings and organizations, such as the 
Chartists ‘Labour Parliament’ and the International Emigrant Committee but was preoccupied with 
writing articles for the Daily Tribune in order to survive financially, and had at this time taken a 
decision to decline all participation in any organization whatsoever. Early in the 1860s Marx helped to 
organize a meeting in London to protest against the arrest of Auguste Blanqui by the French police. In 
1864, at the urging of various participants, Marx attended a meeting for international workers at St. 
Martin’s Hall. Although Marx attended merely a spectator, it was here that a decision was made to 
found an international association of working men with the aim of social equality for all workers. 
Marx was active in the organization during 1865 but ill health and work on the manuscript of Capital 
prevented him from direct participation in the following years. He attended meetings where his health 
and other circumstances allowed. In 1871 Marx’s attention turned to the French Republic, with support 
both for the Communards and for refugees from Paris. Marx’s active association with the International 
Working Men’s Association effectively came to an end in the following year.
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power. In Marx’s case, of course, his commitment to the idea that the ability to 
achieve the revolutionizing of life actually rests with individuals themselves, would 
perhaps inevitably have made him a target of distortion and fabrication. 9 We thus find 
it necessary to state that this present evaluation of Marx’s work is embarked upon not 
for the purpose of polemical restatement but in order to capture the spirit of his work, 
a quality frequently lost to overly dogmatic readings. As Kant reminds us, any such 
enterprise to judge a work in relation to its intrinsic spirit will be problematic. This 
spirit is missing not merely and unsurprisingly from what are the ‘coldest’ of 
interpretations of Marx; even those readings more sensitive to the critical essence of 
his work often fail to do justice to the significance of the issues that Marx explores, 
outside the narrow confines of a widely accepted conceptual development. Indeed, 
sometimes from sources most unlikely and from which it should be least expected, we 
are presented with regrettable dismissals of Marx, such as that conveyed to Martin Jay 
by Adorno (and thereafter, not surprisingly, much cited) in which Adorno claims that 
“Marx had wanted to turn the world into a giant workhouse” . 10 We will see that an 
engagement with Marx’s actual writings shows his repeated opposition to the 
reduction of people to the level of animal laborans, and that Marx prompts his reader 
to consider a world that is not primarily defined by the imposition of work. Readings 
of texts that fall grossly outside any possible stated intent of the author we can usually 
deduce as having fallen prey to one or other or both of the common evils of 
misinterpretation - a reluctance to engage with the work in question itself (and thus to 
rely, instead, exclusively upon secondary summations); and that of being swayed by 
particular fashions of opinion and giving voice to a polemic rather than to what is 
found within the given text itself. Even given that more sympathetic interpretations 
have certainly been undertaken, we still face the problem of dealing with a critical 
inheritance that has, as it were, set much of the agenda in advance. Nietzsche 
understood the difficulty with allowing the values that should exercise constraint upon 
the knowledge of the past being those of the demands of life itself." Indeed, he saw 
the ultimate necessity to uphold such demands. To apply these imperatives to a field 
already so intensively furrowed in highly particular directions is no easy task.
Critiques of Marx’s work that aim to capture a fundamental sense of his 
philosophy are not common, although perhaps for this very reason, they are frequently
9 Throughout history, many who have set out similar types of philosophies of self-determination have 
not been treated favourably by those who would prefer to take refuge in the paralysis of the 
continuation of injustice and unfreedom, more often than not resenting anyone who dares point out that 
one’s discontent is within one’s own power to bring to an end.
10 Theodor W. Adorno to Martin Jay. See Jay, Dialectical Imagination, p. 57.
11 Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’’, pp. 72-82, passim.
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of enormous interest in and of themselves. A variety of important philosophical 
projects emerged in the last century in which we can detect the attempt to re-read 
Marx as a way of engaging with the spirit of the work - we will merely note here the 
enormously fruitful and originative works of such theorists as Ernst Bloch, Walter 
Benjamin, Henri Lefebvre, Herbert Marcuse, Agnes Heller, Michel Henry, Kostas 
Alexos, Antonio Negri and Jacques Derrida. 12 Within this broad spectrum no specific 
work on Marx’s approach to ideology has been undertaken, although many of the 
aforementioned works touch upon the general topic. In this chapter, the re-reading of 
Marx I will develop will attempt to bring such an analysis of Marx’s critique of 
ideology into central focus. The most basic step in this direction of a critical 
engagement begins with loosening the constrictions around what it is that constitutes 
Marx’s work. For far too long Marx’s writing has been commonly read in a strangely 
incomplete fashion. No doubt this is due partly to the piecemeal availability of 
editions and translations, and yet this does not of itself explain the tendency towards 
overly narrow studies (both exegetically and theoretically) of the work. The problem 
is not simply that many commentators select a particular text as their point of 
reference (sometimes indeed this can be undertaken to great effect); it is more that 
they tend to present strikingly familiar images, as to the meaning of a particular 
metaphor or argument, as has been adduced by many other commentators, and that 
this is often done so without engaging in any real dialogue with the works in question.
One reason for this narrowing of focus is often lent supposed substance by 
demarcating the value of Marx’s texts according to various stages in his own 
theoretical development. As we have seen, this sort of approach reached its 
apotheosis with Althusser who highhandedly dismissed almost all of Marx’s work 
prior to the writing of the latter’s final major work, Capital. Remarkably, this sort of 
approach of purging Marx of his own work to arrive at ‘the acceptable Marx’ was 
agreed with, acceded to, or left unchallenged by numerous Marxists for whom 
political or philosophical mileage, or in some cases both, were deemed to be had by 
dividing Marx’s work into Hegelian and ‘historical materialist’ phases. It is not, of 
course, at all unreasonable to concentrate upon a theme for which particular works
12 Ernst Bloch, On Karl Marx, trans. John Maxwell (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971); Henri 
Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, trans. J. Sturrock (London: Jonathon Cape, 1974); The Sociology of 
Marx, trans. Norbert Guterman (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972); Herbert Marcuse An Essay on 
Liberation (Boston: Beacon, 1969); Eros and Civilisation', One-Dimensional Man\ Agnes Heller, The 
Theory o f Need in Marx (London: Allison & Busby, 1976); Henry, Marx', Kostas Alexos, Alienation, 
Praxis, and Techne in the Thought of Karl Marx, trans. Ronald Bruzina (Austin, Texas: University of 
Texas Press, 1976); Negri, Marx Beyond Marx', Derrida, Specters o f Marx.
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stand as useful examples. But what we find is that this splitting Marx in half, 13 
between an Hegelian, humanist phase and an historical materialist, anti-Hegelian one, 
although a pervasive interpretation of his work, has not resulted in the sort of 
“meditation on the work of Marx”, as Alexos puts it, which one might have expected 
from so large a number of studies. 14 What we instead find is that differences between 
various works are often treated in an entirely abstracted manner, purely at the level of 
semantics within the text, with little acknowledgement of changing content in 
accordance with the pursuit of different issues and problems. What this has tended to 
leave us with is an attenuation of the spirit of the work rather than very much which 
might be added to our current understanding. It is partly on the basis of assumed 
divides, for example, theoretically impoverished as they are, that many strands of 
post-modernism, for instance, have wholly repudiated the significance of Marx’s 
work. It is simply inadequate to treat Marx’s writing in such a fashion, either in 
defence of his work or as the basis for its criticism or rejection. As Bloch succinctly 
writes, “the mature Marx [...] is the truth of the young Marx” . 15
Any significant body of philosophy should be understood as setting out upon a 
path of enquiry that might well pass through numerous stages in its consideration of 
problems. Rather than dismissing this as authorial authoritarianism or contrived 
progression, or, more patronisingly, as barely comprehended and unselfconscious 
stages, a critical interpretation will seek to participate in the journey undertaken by the 
work considered, at least at the level of acknowledging the purpose of that 
undertaking. 16 Likewise, a critical appraisal of Marx’s theoretical contributions 
demands a consideration of a wide range of questions asked of his works, and a 
consideration that pauses long enough to reflect upon the problems posed, and this 
needs to be attempted by consulting a wide range of his writings. 17 Balibar, for
13 Bloch argues against those who “seek to split Marx in half’. Bloch, The Principle o f Hope, vol. Ill, 
p. 1358. It is worthwhile noting that Bloch’s first important essay on Marx, “Karl Marx, Death and the 
Apocalypse” in his collection, Spirit o f Utopia, in which such sentiments were expressed, was 
published in 1918, well before publications of some of Marx’s early writings were widely available. 
That this ‘spirit of Marx’ was apparent to such theorists at this time says much for the deeply engaged 
understanding they were able to bring to a reading of Marx.
14 Alexos, Alienation, Praxis, and Techne in the Thought o f Karl Marx, p. 5.
15 Bloch, On Karl Marx, p. 15.
16 Anything less than a critical reading, anything less than striving to search beyond the immediate 
appearances of words and phrases to explain the meaning and importance of the ideas for us today, 
degenerates into artificiality and tendentiousness.
17 For example, in his work Specters o f Marx, Jacques Derrida claims in a general endorsement of 
Marx’s ideas that “never in history, has the horizon of the thing whose survival is being celebrated 
(namely, all the old models of the capitalist and liberal world) been as dark, threatening and 
threatened”. For these times one cannot proceed, according to Derrida, “without Marx [...] without the 
memory and the inheritance of Marx”. Derrida, Specters o f Marx, p. 13. On this basis Derrida puts 
forward a provocative argument in relation to the concept of the spectral in Marx’s work. Macherey
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example, having once proclaimed the singular and unequivocal importance of only the 
iate Marx’, is now quite correct in at least referring to the necessity to read the “open 
totality of his [Marx’s] writings” . 18 This is particularly the case in relation to a 
construction of a theory of ideology, as we shall see in this chapter. 19 As we will 
argue in this chapter, what we are given, throughout all of Marx’s work, is an analysis 
of philosophical concepts, perhaps even, as Henry argues, a radical sense of 
ontological concepts. 20 It is this spirit of the work that we will pursue here.
The problem we then obviously confront, as is the case with most significant 
work, is that we develop, within the corpus of work we study, an interpretation of the 
main ideas in relation to many other interpretations. This inevitably raises for us a 
significant degree of interpretation through which we attempt to understand Marx’s 
own meaning. Although this is partly due to the manner in which Marx himself 
analyses various aspects of society, developing, as Maurice Blanchot has pointed out, 
a range of concepts and responses which nonetheless leaves undetermined or 
undecided the questions to which it responds, it is also because there is a tendency by 
his interpreters to then fill in a void they perceive with widely varying senses of
argues that this construction is of a “dematerialized Marx”: And Laclau argues that “Derrida does not 
trace the genealogy of his intervention in the Marxist text. This is regrettable, amongst other things 
because the specificity, originality and potentialities of his intervention do not come sufficiently to 
light”. Pierre Macherey, “Remarx: Derrida’s Marx”, Rethinking MARXISM, vol. 8, no. 4 (Winter 
1995), p. 24; Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) (London: Verso, 1996), pp. 67-68. And yet what is 
interesting in Derrida’s approach is his surprisingly fresh treatment of well-worn phrases and 
commentaries in Marx as viewed in relation to the conceptually multi-faceted idea of spectres.
18 Etienne Balibar, The Philosophy o f Marx, trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 1995), p. 5.
19 It is often argued, for example, that it is Marx’s more developed view of ideology conceptualized 
within the context of the interrelated nature of social relations under capitalism that is the more 
worthwhile basis for the construction of a Marxist theory of ideology. Often this argument is made not 
simply by suggesting that Marx’s early treatment of ideology as a deceptive reality that the ruling class 
manipulates for its purposes of control is at every level erroneous but, rather, that it cannot be sustained 
as a theory of the function of ideology because it merely describes a fragmented, superficial and 
inconsistent surface appearance without in any way explaining the origins and determination of ideas as 
ideological ideas. According to this argument, such an explanation can only be derived from a 
consideration of the conditions which give rise to any potential necessity for ideology in the first place. 
This is seen as a central argument for a Marxist theory of ideology . For example, Larrain, Marxism 
and Ideology, see especially chap. 1. Its greater sophistication and subtlety is presumed because it 
appears to shift the argument concerning the function of ideology for capitalism beyond that of crude 
class interests. Although one need not argue that the proletariat is systematically duped by an 
omnipotent ideological machine run for and by the ruling class in order to acknowledge instances of the 
control of certain ideas by that class which may also benefit from such action or contribute to the 
perpetuation of its power - at the same time - acknowledging instances of the production of ideology by 
the ruling class is not considered to amount to a theory of the production of ideas for a capitalist system 
as a whole. According to this argument, such a theory can only be achieved by an analysis of the 
conditions for the production of ideology, including those conditions which express capitalism’s most 
basic social relations. Such an analysis can be found, however, throughout all the stages of Marx’s 
work and is not exclusively a product of his later writings.
Henry, Marx, p. 13.20
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Marx’s intention. 21 The same concept, or even the form in which it is expressed, is at 
one time interpreted as humanism, messianism or historicism, and at another as 
atheism, anti-humanism or nihilism.22 But further to this we are presented with the 
problem that this interpretation is itself often of a highly charged if not, indeed, quite 
questionable kind. Marx’s work has suffered too much in the hands of the “clerical 
camarilla”, as Brecht felt. 23 As we have seen, both Lukacs and Althusser claim to be 
giving accurate readings of Marx’s relevant texts and yet it will be interesting to 
consider how these readings diverge from a fuller interpretation of Marx’s work. If 
our present study appears overly concerned with the difficulty that understanding 
Marx presents it is at least in part because his work has been fought over in ways 
unlike most other philosophy.24
There is no avoiding the obviousness that this chapter will itself be another 
interpretation of Marx’s work - it could not be otherwise. As some philosophers have 
pointed out, most notably Kant and Heidegger, the interpretation of philosophical 
work is ultimately meant to convey the intention of the author. 25 However sceptically 
we might approach such an intention today, it remains no less valid despite its very 
real difficulties, and indeed is only all the more relevant where we can sense the 
inadequacy of polemical misreadings. But so too is it the case that “the reading must 
find its work and the work its reader”, as Derrida argues. 26 And in these two facets of 
what an interpretation might offer -  the Kantian and the Derridean -  we see no 
necessary contradiction. In the interpretation within this thesis what will be presented 
is a Marx who is not typically quoted and examined. With this we hope to venture 
into the richness and variety to be found in his work. As we have just mentioned, as 
much as there is a point to textual exegesis, there is nothing wholly sacred in the 
project the work provokes that can be preserved in aspic, unchanging and verifiable 
for all time. Marx’s theory was meant as a working theory of the society with which 
he was confronted. Indeed, with a distinctly uncommon detachment, Marx made it 
clear that his theorizations were the product of an unavoidable historicity. As Balibar
21 Maurice Blanchot, “Marx’s Three Voices”, quoted in Derrida, Specters o f Marx, pp. 18-19.
22 Ibid.
23 Brecht conveyed this sentiment to Benjamin on the 28 June, 1938. See Walter Benjamin, 
Understanding Brecht, trans. Anna Bostock (London: New Left Books, 1973), p. 115.
24 As Alexos so succinctly states: “The thought of Karl Marx has, since Marx, become Marxism, a 
method and doctrine, a theory and practice turned into an official system”. Alexos, Alienation, Praxis, 
and Techne in the Thought o f Karl Marx, p. 7.
23 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem o f Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 207.
26 Jacques Derrida, “Philosophers’ Hell: An Interview”, trans. Richard Wolin, in The Heidegger 
Controversy: A Critical Reader, ed. Richard Wolin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 
p. 271.
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puts it, Marx writes “in the conjuncture” - an approach which is incompatible with 
stable conclusions. 27 The instability of the ideas, where this amounts to a creative 
tension between the concepts developed and the context in which we might then 
interpret them, is its strength to speak to us today. 28 One needs to step beyond the idea 
of simply setting the record straight; the point of a critical reading is to regain what is 
of unclaimed value in the works. It is thus in this sense that the house of 
interpretation is “haunted rather than inhabited by the meaning of the original” . 29 At 
the same time, for the very reason that there have been such strictures placed upon 
Marx’s work, and that we exist today in an intellectual climate hardly conducive to 
listening to Marx’s words at all, it is important that some unfamiliar aspects of Marx’s 
own voice are heard.30 The central area that this chapter will have as its focus is, as 
mentioned, Marx’s concern with freedom. In addition, this present interpretation will 
be made on the basis of what is useful for a contemporary understanding of ideology 
within the context of what is central to a Marxist approach - that of theorizing the 
transformative potential of a liberatory politics. There is no other way to critically 
‘read’ Marx.
Theorizing ideology critique as an aspect of Marx’s work
Within the commentary on Marx and the critique of ideology three main 
interpretations have predominated; firstly, that of a type of economic reductionism, 
secondly, one that is unable to find a theorization in Marx of the ideological, and 
lastly, one that puts forward an inversion theory of ideology. As we have already 
considered aspects of these ideas in the first chapter of the thesis, here we will merely 
make mention of them in relation to a theorization of freedom. The first and perhaps 
most common view is one in which ideas are reduced to the status of an 
epiphenomenon of economic necessity, and their absorption is explained in similarly 
reductionist terms. The second view asserts something that seems quite contradictory 
to the first (but in reality is often not) -  namely that Marx fails to present a theory of
27 Balibar, The Philosophy o f Marx, p. 6.
28 This reading is in marked contrast to presumptive views that deny the existence of ‘truth’ in texts. 
Marx does not presuppose ‘truth’ - his work is, in contrast, a critique of those philosophies which do - 
it instead presents a search for a theoretical explanation of the world with which he is faced. His work 
is a refusal to accept the domestication of a presumption either of truth or non-truth.
29 Derrida, Spectres o f Marx, p. 22.
30 Such a fate for Marx’s work has, of course, repeatedly been the case. In 1938, for example, Walter 
Benjamin conveyed to Brecht, upon his reading Capital, a preference for studying Marx when the latter 
was no longer fashionable. See Benjamin, Understanding Brecht. That Marx’s work has moved in and 
out of fashion many times during the past century is perhaps some indication of a significance of the 
work in itself. Needless to say, my own analysis of Marx happily anticipates the times turning 
dialectical once again.
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ideology. The third interpretation, which has perhaps been more common within a 
wide variety of Marxist literature, has been to claim that Marx views ideology as a 
type of disguise or inversion of reality. Somewhat oddly, variants of all three of these 
interpretations are at times blended together into one overarching explanation and 
presented as what Marx intended in his critique of ideology. We can perhaps clarify 
this situation by looking more closely at these tendencies, and addressing the major 
issues involved in this, as a general approach. What we will see is more generally 
missed in such interpretation is the consistent thread that weaves its way through all 
of Marx’s writing and can be traced from the earliest to the final works - that of his 
concern with the realization of freedom. 31 To downplay this avowed commitment to 
liberation is to corrupt Marx’s most fundamental intention. As we will see, freedom 
is, for Marx, a complex interplay between a creative humanity and the world or nature 
in which people exist. It is not a straightforward suggestion of the actuality of reason 
and nor does it marginalize the importance of a practical reason or self-awareness. 
Let us consider a general approach which combines the elements we have mentioned 
above. We will then be in a position to contrast this with the approach I will take to 
Marx’s philosophy. On this basis we will then outline how we will proceed with the 
chapter.
The Marxist view of ideology’ versus Marx’s philosophy of human reality
Let us here briefly construct a view of ideology, ‘the Marxist view of 
ideology’, as it has become known both by proponents and detractors. The view need 
not be attributed to any theorist in particular but can be seen as representative of a 
well worked tendency within Marxism, and, beyond that, as the sort of view which 
elicits considerable hostility to Marxism from theorists of post-structuralism and post-
31 On this general point of the importance of freedom to Marx’s work see Terry Eagleton’s guide to 
Marx in the ‘Great Philosophers’ series, Marx and Freedom (London: Phoenix, 1997). In the area of 
understanding Marx’s ethical vision we should mention that a range of theorists has attempted to 
present the importance of Marx’s theorization of freedom. See, for example, George G. Brenkert, 
Marx’s Ethics o f Freedom (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983); George E. McCarthy, Marx and 
the Ancients: Classical Ethics, Social Justice, and Nineteenth-Century Political Economy (Savage, 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1990); Alan Gilbert, “Marx’s Moral Realism: Eudaimonism and 
Moral Progress”, in Terrence Ball and James Farr, eds., After Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984); Kai Nielsen and Steven Patten, eds., Marx and Morality (Guelf, Ontario: Canadian 
Association for Publishing in Philosophy, 1981); Philip J. Kain, Marx and Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1988); Joseph Margolis, “Praxis and Meaning: Marx’s Species Being and Aristotle’s Political Animal”, 
in George E. McCarthy, ed., Marx and Aristotle: Nineteenth-century German Social Theory and 
Classical Antiquity (Savage, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1990); Tom Rockmore, “Marxian 
Subjectivity, Idealism, and Greek Philosophy”, in George E. McCarthy, ed., Marx and Aristotle; 
Laurence Baronovitch, “Karl Marx and Greek Philosophy: Some Explorations into the Themes of 
Intellectual Accommodation and Moral Hypocrisy”, in George E. McCarthy, ed., Marx and Aristotle; 
Wood, Karl Marx\ Geras, “The Controversy about Marx and Justice”.
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modernism. This constructed view of ideology goes something like this: Capitalism 
gives rise to material contradictions and the system therefore requires a superstructure 
composed, amongst other things, of ideologies that veil these contradictions and that 
present a picture of the workings of the system that ideologies are able to declare to be 
true.32 Ideology, in this view, is understood as false and distorting knowledge and 
consciousness, as ideas which prevent workers from recognizing their true interests 
and which instead present the view from the system as if its needs are representative 
and legitimated. Ideology can then be seen to fulfil a purpose for capitalism - it 
maintains the system as it is by sustaining false consciousness. In this sense, false 
ideas express a basic distance from true consciousness and yet, because the system is 
structured according to classes, ideology - which is one thing for those who control it 
and benefit from it - is something different for those who are supposed to accept it. 33 
At some inevitable stage when the immiseration of the proletariat is at its height this 
beleaguered class will pierce through the veil of deception and then understand the 
materially contradictory relation between capital and labour. When exploitation is 
seen for what it is the proletariat will be liberated from false consciousness and will 
then have attained a scientific understanding of its world. Amen. 34
32 Marx is then generally considered responsible for constructing a diagrammatic view of society in 
which ideology occupies the higher level of a two-tiered model - the ideological superstructure 
hovering over an economic base. Nowhere does Marx suggest such a separation within the social 
system, not even in the much quoted 1859 Preface to A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy 
used to defend this diagrammatic position. Marx’s particular understanding of structures is to be found 
in his identification of a contradiction within the processes of capitalism, often referred to as that 
between the forces and relations of production. In the 1859 Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy, Marx describes the relation between the forces and relations of production and the 
social structure of capitalist society as one characterized by a correspondence, the connections of which 
suggest a particular determinancy: “In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter 
into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate 
to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these 
relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which 
arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness.” Karl Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in Early 
Writings, intro. Lucio Colletti, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1984), p. 425.
33 Marx not only conceptualizes subjectivity within capitalism as fundamentally fragmented but 
opposes all those traditions of thought which have assumed the stability of the concept. Every variant 
of materialism and idealism known to Marx in his time is held up to scrutiny on the basic issues of 
subjectivity and the process of materialization. Crude materialists, such as the economists of Marx’s 
time, who mistake properties inherent in social relations for properties of material things, are equally 
crude idealists, even fetishists, who fail to understand that social relations are materialized in material 
things. Marx, Grundrisse, p. 640. They imagine that gold, for example, is the origin of value. Marx is 
well aware of the absence of any necessary incompatibility between materialism and idealism, an 
awareness frequently lost to philosophy ever since. What is clear is that his emphasis upon dialectics is 
put forward in order to show a constant tension between forces of domination, acceptance, resistance 
and refusal in which, what we might want to designate as the object and subject, interact.
34 It should be mentioned that there are some theorists who argue that the sort of one-dimensionality 
which we have been indicating involves fetishizing the very concepts that Marx indicates are rather the
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Thus is Marx frequently interpreted in relation to his view of ideology. 35 As 
we have already provided a critique of the issues involved in this approach we will 
merely explain here its inappropriateness in relation more specifically to Marx. As 
we have mentioned, at the same time, it is often argued - indeed, perhaps suspiciously 
too often argued - that Marx gives no specific theorization of ideology to which we 
might refer as ‘the Marxist theory of ideology’ . 36 John Torrance, for example, 
explains that because Marx did not define ‘ideology’, “his interpreters have had to 
infer a definition from his uses of the word” . 37 Most recently, Michael Rosen adds his 
voice to what appears as an overly habitual and iterative chorus by declaring that 
“Marx did not have a theory of ideology in the full sense - an empirically well- 
specified account, that is, connecting explanans and explanandum by means of a 
plausible explanatory connection” . 38 Given what we have previously mentioned in
fetishized products of a system of commodity accumulation. Whilst Derek Sayer argues that Marx’s 
account of ideology denotes “an account of the world which is characterised by its overall falsity”, at 
the same time, he recognizes the problems involved in fetishizing the concepts that Marx uses. Derek 
Sayer, Marx ’s Method: Ideology, Science and Critique in ‘Capital ’ (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: 
Humanities, 1979), p. 8; and The Violence o f Abstraction: the analytical foundations o f historical 
materialism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 76. The work of Jakubowski, de Ste Croix, Simon Clarke 
and various contributors to Critical Marxism, for example, all place an emphasis upon the problems 
with fetishizing concepts within the area of a general political economy. All these theorists argue for 
the openness of Marxist categories and for Marx’s view of the processes of capitalism. Jakubowski, 
Ideology and Superstructure in Historical Materialism; Geoffrey de Ste Croix, The class struggle in 
the ancient Greek world: from the archaic age to the Arab conquests (London: Duckworth, 1981); and 
Simon Clarke, Marx, marginalism and modern sociology: from Adam Smith to Max Weber (London: 
Macmillan, 1982).
35 As we have already briefly indicated, the claim is made that, for Marx, ideology is a fixed part of a 
systemic objective structure, for example, a part of a superstructure dominated by an economic base. 
This assertion is made on the assumption that Marx separates the various parts of the social system 
placing particular emphasis upon the determinate role of the base. I argue instead that Marx’s theory of 
capitalism is not one of economic determinism. An analysis of the overwhelming majority of his ideas 
simply will not support an assertion of economic determinism. Marx claims that to regard society as 
any one single subject is wrong. Marx, Grundrisse, p. 94. He stresses the importance of social 
relations to human life, the wide and incomplete range of social relations into which people enter in the 
course of their lives. There is a reciprocity between different types of relations not any sort of mono- 
causal determination. There are moments of processes that, in a given conjuncture, might theoretically 
express greater significance than others: Thus, consumption as “urgency, as need” might appear as a 
logical outcome and therefore a “predominant moment” of production, but Marx insists that, in society, 
the relation of subjects to other individuals can change everything about what is merely the appearance 
of abstract relations. Ibid.
36 Callinicos, for example, argues this in Marxism and Philosophy, p. 128.
37 John Torrance, Karl Marx’s Theory o f Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
p. 191. Although this is, of course, generally the case, it is hard to imagine with such a complex and 
varied corpus of work that Marx produced, how his reader might do otherwise than to infer an 
understanding from his conceptual development: But it is also important to realize that the presence or 
otherwise of particular words relating to ideology is not the most immediate and fruitful place to look 
for an understanding of Marx’s approach.
38 Rosen, On Voluntary Servitude, p. 168. Instead, Rosen argues, Marx was the constructor of five 
different and largely incompatible models of ideology. Ibid. The problem with Rosen’s claim about 
Marx’s ‘models’ of ideology can be detected in his treatment of what he takes to be Marx’s critique of 
capitalism. In his overly terse claim that in Capital Marx views the “capitalist system [...] [as] a quasi-
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relation to assumptions about ‘the Marxist view of ideology’, this claim of the 
absence of a theory of ideology in Marx might appear odd. However, such 
inconsistencies in the interpretation of Marx seem to abound. 39 Does this suggest 
some problem inherent within Marx’s works themselves, or does the difficulty reside 
more with the nature of the interpretations? This issue is, unfortunately, not a 
particularly straightforward one to ascertain, but it is hoped that by making the 
general significance of Marx’s approach to ideology clearer that we might start to be 
able to address this point. My argument in this thesis is that Marx’s work is wholly 
opposed to the sort of empiricist fatalism made in claims such as those from 
commentators who fail to look more broadly at what it is that constitutes the
Hegelian self-reproducing and self-maintaining process” with the “subject that realizes itself in the 
course of this process”, being capital itself, we can see that Rosen has focused upon a fragment and 
reached conclusions from this, thereby distorting the general tendency we see in Marx. Ibid., p. 208. A 
few pages later essentially the same point is made in relation to the Grundrisse which Rosen claims 
“presents an account of capitalist production as a self-unfolding process with capital as its subject”. 
Ibid., p. 213. Unfortunately, this is as much as we are really told about why Marx was interested in 
critically examining capitalism and of what this examination consists. On the basis of such little 
analysis it is difficult indeed to judge what Marx’s treatment of ideology might be. Rosen’s wish for 
the simplicity of an empirical theory, for a neat tallying between what one observes and what is 
understood, for what he equates with systematization as displayed in some cybernetic model, is the 
very sort of doctrine of reflection and empiricist fatalism against which Marx railed with his stipulation 
that “it is essential to educate the educator”. Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in Early Writings, intro. 
Lucio Colletti, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), Thesis 
III, p. 422.
39 An argument is also sometimes made that only particular issues constitute a treatment of the 
ideological in Marx. Callinicos, as we have mentioned, argues that “there is no satisfactory account of 
ideology in Marx”. Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy, p. 128. He claims instead that Marx has both 
an epistemological conception of ideology, based on the model of inversion, and one that emphasizes 
illusions that serve the interests of the ruling class. Ibid., pp. 128-129. Although Callinicos relates 
Marx’s treatment of ideology to antagonism, the aspects of Marx’s approach that he considers 
important - the models of inversion and illusions based on ruling class interest - do little justice to 
Marx’s theorization. This sort of reduction of Marx’s understanding of ideology fails to appreciate the 
antagonistic and multi-dimensional form that is ideology itself. More specifically, Callinicos’ analysis 
focuses upon two different treatments of ideology to be found in Marx’s work, both of which, he 
considers, create problems for a Marxist theory of ideology. These conceptions are identified as 
epistemological and pragmatic. Ibid., pp. 128-129. Marx’s epistemological concept of ideology is 
essentially his thesis of ideology as a misperception of reality, as, in a sense, a false consciousness. For 
Callinicos, Marx’s epistemological conception of ideology is based on a model of inversion which 
postulates the presence of ideas in consciousness as merely the reflection of an inverted reality. Thus 
Callinicos quotes Marx’s passage in The German Ideology. “If in all ideology men and their relations 
appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical 
life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process” to show 
precisely what a model of inversion entails. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 42. This 
conception of false belief or ideology as an inverted reflection, can be distinguished from Marx’s other 
conception of ideology which Callinicos identifies as a pragmatic dimension. This pragmatic 
dimension can be found in Marx and Engels’ famous statement that the “ruling ideas of each age have 
ever been the ideas of its ruling class”. Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, p. 72. 
This statement implies the institutionalization of class power, which need not at all entail the truth or 
falsity of ideologies. For Callinicos, Marx’s only sustained attempt to bring an analysis of these two 
conceptions of ideology together is a failure. This attempt is to be found in Marx’s analysis of 
commodity fetishism. Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy, see the first part of Chapter 6.
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ideological. It is possible to find in Marx repeated theorization of an unavoidable 
openness in historical phenomena, an unfinished, transformable world of thought and 
activity, which mechanistic theories of static quantitativeness are unable to 
appreciate.40 Falling grievously short of this, Marx argues, the empiricists satisfy 
themselves with “a collection of dead facts” .41 The search for a model in order to 
explain ideology qua ideology is pointless.42 As we will consider in this chapter, 
Marx does not present ‘models’ of explanation of ideology. There is nothing in his 
work suggesting the sort of inevitability or schematic depiction in relation to ideology 
conveyed in the ‘Marxist theory of ideology’ outlined above. It is a state of 
ideological contestation that Marx wishes to understand.43 Such an investigation is 
never going to yield an empirical theory or a singular model - whatever these might 
be.
It is certainly the case that in The German Ideology Marx’s description of 
ideology functioning as the distorted reflection of reality tends to suggest that subjects 
of ideology can only be the passive recipients of this inverted thought.44 In this work,
40 The more particular issues involved in some of these claims sit oddly, if not incredulously, with 
what we will find in Marx’s texts. Without pre-empting our discussion of this work to come in the 
chapter, let it be made clear that Marx criticizes all mechanistic theories and models which purport to 
explain the actions of people according to their circumstances on the basis of direct reflection. In 
Marx’s view, people are as made by circumstances as they themselves make circumstances. There is a 
reciprocity between the subjective and the objective. Marx argues that ideas can be weapons but 
thought and being, although distinct, express a unity with one another. Marx, Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 351.
41 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 43.
42 Those commentators who have devoted considerable energy to the task of seeking an empirical, 
positivist theory of ideology in Marx are bound to be disappointed. Rosen’s argument for a ‘model’ of 
ideology thus seems a rather dubious one and one which enlightens us no further as to Marx’s 
conceptualization of ideology.
43 Terry Eagleton acknowledges where Marx situates ideology within the dynamic of contestation. 
Eagleton understands Marx’s treatment of, for example, ‘Bonapartism’ in The Eighteenth Brumaire o f 
Louis Bonaparte, as a contradictory “space of a continual struggle”. Terry Eagleton, Walter Benjamin, 
or Towards a revolutionary criticism (London: New Left Books, 1981), p. 162. By way of contrast, 
Eagleton’s critique of The German Ideology is that it reduces ideology to the idea of falsehood; even its 
terminology of ‘reflexes’ and ‘echoes’ “smacks strongly of mechanical materialism”. See Eagleton, 
Ideology: An Introduction, p. 73.
44 The relation of this depiction of ideology to Marx’s understanding of consciousness is somewhat 
more ambiguous in that it is not always clear from Marx’s work precisely what mechanisms are 
involved in the translation of reflections of reality into consciousness. In a work such as Capital, for 
example, the mechanisms involved in this process are more straightforward and thus readily apparent. 
Within exploitative production relations the division between the classes on the basis of power over 
material production leads to a division of the production of a consciousness of one’s position within the 
production process. Marx locates the basis of this division of both material and intellectual production 
in the generation of particular requirements of the process of productive labour. As has been just 
considered, for Marx, the production process entails the direct relationship between exploiter and 
exploited. The development of the concrete form of ideology is a fundamental part of the production of 
surplus value. It is at this level that the mystification process of consciousness integral to the fetishism 
of commodities takes place.
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the metaphor of ideology as reality in a camera obscura is mentioned thus: “If in all 
ideology men and their relations appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this 
phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of 
objects on the retina does from their physical life-process” . 45 Marx explains the 
importance of viewing ideology in this way against the idealism of “descending] 
from heaven to earth”, that is, setting out from the ideas people have “in order to 
arrive at men in the flesh”. Rather, one should begin “setting out from real, active 
men, and on the basis of their real life-process demonstrating the development of the 
ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the 
brains of men are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is 
empirically verifiable and bound to material premises.” Here, Marx presents the 
formation of ideology as characterized by a process of inversion - the inversion of 
reality as much as the inversion of a picture or ‘projection’ of reality. 46 Ideology is 
both a reflex of reality and an inverted mental construction from which forms of 
consciousness develop. 47 Marx’s examination of the part ideas play in allowing
4s Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 42. It should of course be remembered that Marx and 
Engels abandoned work on this manuscript, declaring that they would sooner leave it to the “gnawing 
criticism of the mice”. Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 22. In 
an interesting article on “The Theory of Ideology in Capital’ John Mepham argues that the sheer 
number of metaphors used in The German Ideology to describe ideology is symptomatic of Marx’s 
failure to come to terms with the philosophical basis of a materialist theory of ideology. John Mepham, 
“The Theory of Ideology in Capital', in Issues in Marxist Philosophy, ed. John Mepham and David- 
Hillel Ruben, vol. Ill, Ideology, Epistemology, Science (Brighton: Harvester, 1979), p. 144. Mepham 
attributes the use by Marx of a variety of metaphors to Marx’s own dissatisfaction with a theoretical 
tendency towards positivism from which Marx was attempting to develop a critical distance. However, 
the idea of phantoms can lend itself to interpretations which suggest that “the victim [of ideology] 
simply overlooks or is distracted from ‘empirically verifiable facts’ that would otherwise be obvious 
and clear.” Ibid. Mepham concludes from what he sees as Marx’s typical construction of ideology in 
The German Ideology that the camera obscura model cannot account for forms of thought that are 
“natural self-understood modes of thought”. Ibid., p. 168. Mepham considers that the philosophical 
basis of this metaphor involves a representation of the relation between reality and ideas that suggests 
distortion arising out of a simple correspondence between ideas and reality. The process of inversion 
means that reality and ideas are inverted in a simple relation to each other such that ideas can be 
derived from reality one at a time. This gives rise to the fallacious notion of a clear separation between 
distorted and non-distorted reality. Ibid., p. 146. What each of these critiques has in common, then, is 
a dissatisfaction with Marx’s conceptualization of ideology as a false or distorted set of ideas.
46 Marx refers in the Grundrisse to an “inverted projection” {Lichtbild) of reality. Marx, Grundrisse, 
p. 249.
47 This idea is expressed in relation to Marx’s argument for the material determination of 
consciousness; consciousness is determined by “real living individuals themselves, and consciousness 
is considered solely as their consciousness.” Marx’s well-known argument summarizing this view, as 
we have just considered, is that: “It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines 
consciousness”. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 42. The determination of consciousness is 
seen to be dependent upon material conditions, rather than merely the product of abstracted thinking, of 
thoughts in their “fantastic isolation”. Ibid., p. 43. But is it also the case that the notion of ideology as 
phantoms in the brain or sublimates of material forces inevitably suggests a simple separation between 
what is real and material and what is ideological? In a sense, Marx’s camera obscura metaphor 
presents the ideological in unproblematic terms of illusion set against the backdrop of reality.
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people to structure views of their social world certainly deals with the problem of 
mistaken perception in terms of illusion and faulty or limited understanding; his rare 
use of concepts such as reality appearing in camera obscura, and ideas as a ‘reflex’, 
certainly seems to suggest this particular sense of ideology as distorted reality. 48 It 
does not deal, however, with building block metaphors nor with the idea of separate 
and mono-causal realms of ideas and material realities. 49 Even the idea of ideology as 
illusory and limited understanding is neither the only sense in which ideas are 
theorized, nor is it in any way the most important of Marx’s insights into the nature of 
ideology. It is of course possible to find quotations in Marx’s work to suggest aspects 
of some of these ideas, and where such ideas form a significant part of Marx’s general 
theorization of ideology they should of course be treated seriously: 50 But to construct a
48 Andrew Collier sets out a number of problems associated with Marx’s use of ideology as false 
reality. Collier argues that this more common understanding of ideology in Marx and Engels is 
“almost equivalent to idealism”, in the sense that this interpretation of ideology is that of misplaced or 
incorrect thought as derived only from thought, as opposed to what would be a materialist depiction of 
thought; that is “thought which is aware of its origins in practical interaction with nature”. Andrew 
Collier, Scientific Realism and Socialist Thought (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), 
p. 27. One of the consequences of such a formulation of ideology is that ideology understood as false 
ideas can be nothing other than ideology, and thus will be explained in terms of largely undifferentiated 
class interests. Such a conception of ideology obviously does not allow for the possibility that 
ideological thought in the sense of thought that serves the perpetuation of class division might also be 
the basis of objective knowledge (in the sense of thought which does not serve class interests). The 
distinction, for Collier, is not that primarily between science and ideology but that between “different 
kinds of relation between a practice and its environment”. Ibid., p. 28. Such a distinction is readily 
apparent in Collier’s example that a brewery will simultaneously bring into existence beer, surplus 
value and the ideology of the wage form, but are all practices as recognizable as distinct forms which 
are either material or ideological? How might different kinds of relation between a practice and its 
environment manifest themselves? Collier’s answer to such a question is approached in his claim that 
these are not alternative kinds of relation - that “every practice is related to its environment in an 
ideological way, only some in a scientific way”. Ibid. Such different kinds of relation will generate 
different questions as to the social conditions or epistemic relations of a practice’s existence. In this 
sense it follows from Collier’s analysis that if ideological relations must be related to their social 
conditions of existence ideology cannot be that which is simply false.
49 Marx criticizes what he sees as the “dualism which recurs in many forms”, between “life and ideas, 
between soul and body”, in a letter to Annenkov. Marx to Annenkov, December 28, 1846, Collected 
Works, vol. XXXVIII, pp. 95-106.
50 One common criticism of Marx’s camera obscura metaphor is encapsulated in Walter Benjamin’s 
objection to what he sees as Marx’s view of ideology within base/superstructure relations. Benjamin 
considers that Marx creates problems for his analysis in the very shift he makes beyond establishing a 
causal relation between superstructure and base. By arguing that ideologies of the superstructure 
reflect the relations in a false and distorted manner, Benjamin believes that Marx must be suggesting 
this direction within this view of ideologies. It is not that Benjamin is advocating a return to simple 
reflexive causality: “The question is, namely, if the base somehow determines the superstructure in the 
material of thought and experience, but this determination is not one of simple reflection, how is it then 
to be characterized, leaving aside the question of the cause for its emergence? As its expression. The 
superstructure is the expression of the base”. Walter Benjamin, Passagen-Werk, p. 495, quoted in 
Margaret Cohen, Profane Illumination: Walter Benjamin and the Paris o f Surrealist Revolution 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 239. Benjamin’s analysis is interesting not for its 
discussion of a base/superstructure typology, which, as we have seen, bears little relation to Marx’s 
intention, but for its indication of Marx’s understanding of contradiction within ideology. If ideology 
here is not a reflection of the objective world but is its expression it can suggest the contradictory
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theory from scattered references as if they amount to a critique of ideology would be 
to distort the tendency we find in Marx’s work. 51 Of much more significance is his 
understanding of capitalist society as a society whose reality is one in which 
contradictions and antagonisms arise and are frequently incorporated into the way in 
which the system works. As we argued in the first chapter of the thesis, ideology is 
not a fixed part of any social formation. It is this understanding of ideology that is 
distinctive in Marx and is more generally theorized than other ways in which he
mediation of subject and object as we have already considered. The world of capital is, for Marx, 
already a topsy-turvy, enchanted world - this does not make it any less a real world. Ideology is an 
expression of this contradictory real world, it is not its distorted reflection.
51 Here it is perhaps worthwhile to deal with the issue of the etymology of Marx’s use of the relevant 
terms involving ideology. It is unwise, if not indeed fatuous, to make too much or too little from the 
particular terminology Marx’s employs. This is a generalized problem in Marx’s work, extending well 
beyond the apparent superficial ambiguity of the term ‘ideology’. Far too much is made, for example, 
of the different words Marx uses for ‘alienation’ and perhaps too little interpretation is given to his use 
of the word ‘production’. A savage injustice is often done to the essence of the work by an insistence 
upon a harping narrowness of interpretation of particular words. It is also relevant that any translated 
and edited work is bound to suffer to some degree from the interpretations of its translators and editors, 
most particularly when such people have their own philosophical and political bias to incorporate 
within their interpretation of the original text. It is unfortunately the case that with many of the 
interpretations of Marx the vehicle threatens to overwhelm the spirit of the work. For example, Marx 
uses a variety of German words to convey the concept of alienation: Entfremdung - meaning alienation 
or estrangement, Entäusserung - meaning alienation, renunciation or extemalization, Entwertung - 
meaning devaluation, Entwirklichung - meaning a loss of reality, Veräusserung - as in alienation 
through selling and Lebensentäusserung - meaning the alienation of life. According to Cassell’s 
German Dictionary, the sense in which Entäusserung is used is that as in the renunciation, parting 
with, or alienation of property, whereas Entfremdung is more the estrangement or alienation of a person 
from something. In the Grundrisse, Marx uses Entäusserung when he refers to the alienation of labour 
because the objective conditions of labour is an objectivity created by itself as alien property. Marx, 
Grundrisse, p. 515. Marx emphasizes that the loss of the property of oneself “signifies the alienation of 
the man as much as of the property itself’. Karl Marx, “Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements o f 
Political Economy”, in Early Writings, p. 267. Whilst Marx uses Vergegenständlichung when he is 
specifically referring to objectification, both this term and that of extemalization are frequently stated 
as a part of the process of alienation. Numerous studies ponder the import of the use of one word 
rather than another, and, although one cannot fault the scholarly intent of such studies, it seems that 
many miss the essential point. By way of contrast, Tom Bottomore explains in his translation of the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts that he translates both Entäusserung and Entfremdung as 
alienation (or sometimes ‘estrangement’) “since Marx indicates no systematic distinction between 
them”. T. B. Bottomore, “Translator’s Note” to the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in Erich 
Fromm, Marx’s Concept o f Man (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1973), p. 89. There are, of course, 
differences in the precise meanings of the different words but that Marx alternates various words within 
different paragraphs or different works is perhaps not cause for such earnest speculation. His meaning 
of the term alienation is generally clear - that he uses different terms to refer to this might well be for 
stylistic reasons. In contrast, as I have mentioned previously, an often grievously narrow meaning is 
given to Marx’s use of the word production. It should be mentioned that Marx not only uses the term 
reification as a category in relation to alienation but also as one distinct from it. Reification 
(Versachlichung) is often mentioned in terms of it being generated out of alienation. See Marx, 
Grundrisse, p. 160.
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understands certain ideas operating as misperception, illusion, or class motivated 
attempts at truth-claims. 52
It can certainly be said that different ideas and approaches to these issues 
intermingle and coalesce in Marx’s work in what often seems to be a rather elliptical, 
although not unordered fashion. This does create difficulties with any exercise in 
textual exegesis. Again, it can be stated that such a way of theorizing calls for an 
analysis that places at its centre a thematic focus which can help make apparent the 
relationship between concepts and their uses. It is not that Marx develops ad hoc 
models that bear little relation to each other and provide scant insight into his 
particular concern. Rather, he is concerned with unravelling the contents of the 
unfinished reality with which he is faced, clinging neither to the merely given nor to 
fixed conceptual certainties. Undoubtedly, the absence of a self-defined theorization 
of ideology might create some potential difficulties, but this claim needs to be more 
thoroughly established. It might also be the case that it provides extensive scope for a
52 Much has been made of this view of the inversion of reality. Indeed, it has commonly been taken to 
represent the way in which Marx conceptualizes ideology. Partly because it has been exhaustively 
covered by various commentators but more because it is a limited aspect of the theorization of ideology 
in Marx, we will not pursue a more detailed analysis of it in this thesis. A number of problems with 
this idea of ideology as distorted reality can be briefly summarized here. The camera obscura 
metaphor of ideology seems less than adequate for an understanding of ideology as a site of conflict 
and contradiction. This is because the limitations to ideology are not merely to be found in external 
factors acting upon ideology, such as forms of resistance or ruling interests and needs; there are also 
internal limitations to the effectiveness of ideology which need to be theorized from the perspective of 
the object and result of antagonistic relations. At a theoretical level, it represents an abstract negation 
of the interrelationship of dialectical tendencies. In a more specific sense, this negation denies 
contradictory unities. It suggests instead that reality is a straightforward unitary whole dominated by 
some particularity that the ideological inverts. This interpretation of ideology often represents an 
artificial separation between economic and political levels of reality in which the economic supposedly 
reigns at any and every given moment. Such a separation is fundamentally at odds with Marx’s 
otherwise dialectical understanding of social processes, as too is it incompatible with his insistence 
upon the contradictory unity of such things as economics and politics. Marx refers repeatedly to the 
“crude tearing-apart” of connections and relations to which theorists such as John Stuart Mill and 
Adam Smith succumbed. He also claims that a singular focus upon one particular characteristic, such 
as that of production, tended to “extinguish all historic differences under general human laws”. Marx, 
Grundrisse, p. 87. Marx’s analysis of ideology as distorted reality (mentioned in various forms, such 
as, a reflex of the real world, as in a ''camera obscura', ‘echoes of the real life processes of people’, 
‘mere phantoms formed in peoples’ brains’, and so on) suggests a mere aspect of what can be a part of 
the process of the operation of the ideological. This cannot be sustained, however, as a central part of a 
conception of ideology in general. The reason for this is that Marx’s analysis of the relation between 
the actions of agents and the conditions in which they act presents an historical view of the totality of 
relations, including both their material and seemingly phenomenal forms, in order to express the 
dynamic of practice within a given context. In contrast with this, a view of ideology as distorted reality 
supposes the independence of a real object or reality against a dependent illusion, a false, distorted 
representation or epiphenomenon. Ideology can, of course, at times operate as distortion, as 
misperception and illusion. All of these outcomes are possibilities of the operation of ideas within 
particular social contexts. But in order to theorize at a general level why ideology takes on a social 
form it is necessary to see within its form the antagonistic forces of which it is composed. Ideology 
according to the camera obscura metaphor presents merely one abstracted function of what is an 
otherwise mediated process.
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more wide-ranging and theoretically interesting analysis of Marx’s understanding of 
ideas. McCamey captures something of this sense when, in relation to Marx’s 
treatment of ideology, he states that we “are given a set of clues and left to discover 
the pattern for ourselves” .53
What we will see is that when one merely extrapolates from a series of narrow 
assertions as to what constitutes a theorization of ideology -  particularly when this 
involves an overly exclusive emphasis upon a particular text - a miscomprehension of 
Marx’s project tends to arise. 54 An overly narrow focus upon passing references in 
Marx’s work to the term ‘ideology’ is also partly to blame.55 But I would contend it is
53 Joe McCamey, The Real World of Ideology (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1980), p. 1.
54 For Terry Lovell, the theory of commodity fetishism allows Marx to define ideologies as those 
theories that take the appearances of social relations under capitalism at face value. Ideology can thus 
be distinguished from “adequate knowledge”. Lovell, Pictures of Reality, p. 24. On the basis of this 
interpretation, Lovell suggests that the problem of ideology for Marx is, therefore, one of class 
interests; a naturalizing of capitalist social relations in the interests of the bourgeoisie, against which 
the proletariat must develop adequate knowledge of the reality of these relations in order to overthrow 
capitalism itself, ibid., pp. 24-25. We argue instead that Marx views all social relations within unfree 
societies as potentially antagonistic. Ideology is a social relation in this sense. It is not the case, for 
Marx, that ideology is simply the illusions believed in by hapless workers that are in reality merely the 
interests of a ruling class. Ideology represents the battle-ground of ideas and practices generated by the 
struggle between freedom and control. The issue of interests, reality and illusion is a much more 
complex interplay than both Callinicos’ and Lovell’s interpretations allow.
55 Whilst the word ‘ideology’ is used only occasionally by Marx (the word ‘ideologist’ appears slightly 
more often but is still used sparingly) and often with an accompanying epithet such as ‘Hegelian’ or 
‘political’ or one that is implied such as in specific instances of German philosophy, it should be noted 
that so too does Marx rarely use the term ‘capitalism’. Indeed, in Capital it appears only once and in 
the Grundrisse not at all. Marx instead refers to ‘capitalist production’ or more usually to capitalist 
processes. But this does not mean that he is not in fact inferring capitalism as a general mode by which 
people live their lives - he very obviously is. In volume II of Capital the word ‘capitalism’ appears on 
p. 199. Here Marx is questioning calculations of the accumulation of capital which he argues must in 
general terms be based upon the further accumulation of capital rather than pure pleasure: “For 
capitalism is already essentially abolished once we assume that it is enjoyment that is the driving 
motive and not enrichment itself’. So too with the term ideology are general ideas and their 
consequences often inferred. More frequently, Marx uses the expression ‘ideological’ to describe those 
aspects of thought and activity of which he develops a critique, which may take a specific character, as 
in the ‘ideological method’ of the political economists, or be used to describe concepts and forms in a 
more general sense. At times there are particular reasons for specific terminology - when Marx refers 
to the processes of capitalist production he is often indicating the importance of seeing capitalism in 
motion; likewise, when Marx refers to ‘ideological forms’, he is indicating the various forms which 
contested values take in capitalist society. See Marx, Preface to A Contribution to a Critique of 
Political Economy. But the term ideology is also sometimes used as a form of shorthand to describe a 
range of ideas and activities - religious, metaphysical, philosophical, political, and so on. In The 
German Ideology, for example, Marx criticizes Kant as an ideologist because his philosophical ideas 
have unacknowledged ‘material interests’ as their basis. This philosophy is, for Marx, an unacceptable 
separation of material interests from their theoretical expression, resulting in purely ideological 
determinations and moral postulates. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 99. This sense of 
ideology appears to have much in common with Heinrich Heine’s understanding which refers to 
ideology in its relation to the world of German speculative ideas. Heine, a friend of Marx during 
Marx’s time in Paris from 1843 to early 1845, criticized that German ‘ideology’ which in its 
speculative philosophy had become detached from practical life. Marx was well aware of Heine’s 
work and was later to collaborate with him. See, for example, S. Prawer, Karl Marx and World
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overwhelmingly the result of ignoring the theme of the problem of freedom and 
unfreedom in Marx’s writing. 56 By analyzing this problem and by situating his 
critique of ideology within such a problematic, a far more integrated theorization of 
the ideological is able to emerge. 57 In this chapter we will then focus upon the issue of 
a dialectic of freedom in order to more fully assess Marx’s critique of ideology.
The aim of this reconsideration is to set out the various ideas Marx puts 
forward in relation to ideology critique and in so doing present a wholly different 
aspiration in Marx, one which has generally failed to be considered by many 
commentators. My approach is fundamentally different from the dominant 
interpretation of Marx’s understanding of ideology, which claims that Marx highlights 
mechanisms through which ideas become illusions, whether manipulated or believed 
in, which then enter into a part of the ‘superstructure’ of society.58 Various more
Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 15. Prawer draws links between Marx’s work 
and, for example, Heinrich Heine’s Pictures o f Travel. See Heinrich Heine, Reisebilder (Pictures o f 
travel), trans. R. D. Gillman (London: Scribners, 1907). Where Marx writes of ideology as deceptive 
knowledge it is not knowledge that systematically deceives a class and interferes with motives but 
more a particular recognition of reality which can be explained on the basis of the way in which that 
reality works. Marx’s construction of a complex structure of theoretical analysis in order to appreciate 
the particularity and generality of capital, is undertaken on the basis of appropriating the concrete in 
order to reproduce in theory that very structure in which the accumulation of capital dominates. See 
Marx’s ‘Introduction’ to the Grundrisse, passim. As we have been indicating, describing this structure 
or any of its aspects as ‘false’ would be pointless for Marx’s purpose. Moreover, much of what Marx 
writes of in relation to ideology could never coincide with false consciousness as simply a belief in the 
justification of exploitation - otherwise there would be no basis for people to ‘fight it out’, and indeed 
no basis for the continuation of false ideas in the first place. Again, it is because Marx’s primary 
emphasis is upon process and contradiction that a fixed view of the falseness of ideas is of little 
relevance to his general analysis of capitalism.
56 It is worth stating, against the systematizers, that even theoretically useful differentiations, such as 
those between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’, are only hazy approximations of relations that we seek to 
understand. Marx claims to use abstractions because it brings out “the common element and thus saves 
repetition”. Marx, Grundrisse, p. 85.
37 When Antonio Gramsci writes of Marx’s work as giving rise to a conception of the world that its 
founder had never expounded as an esprit de Systeme, he claims he does so in order to “reconstruct the 
process of intellectual development of the thinker” with accuracy and honesty. Gramsci, Selections 
from the Prison Notebooks, pp. 383, 382. The same could not really be said of many of the more 
contemporary commentators who take up this theme of a lack of systematization in Marx’s work, and 
the presumed problem therein, particularly as it applies to his approach to ideology.
38 Grahame Lock argues that two different conceptions of ideology emerge in the writings of Marx. 
These can be briefly summarized as, firstly, ideology identified with false consciousness, based on a 
theory of alienation, and, secondly, ideology as identified with social consciousness, which is itself the 
product of a determinate set of social relations, or the mode of production of material life. Both 
conceptions also raise problems, in Lock’s opinion, due to the idea of consciousness on which they are 
both based, but the second can at least provide a materialist basis for a theory of ideology. Grahame 
Lock, The State and I: Hypotheses on Juridical and Technocratic Humanism (Leiden: Leiden 
University Press, 1981), pp. 59, 60. Lock’s argument is that any conception of ideology which 
supposes the expression of a particular set of interests against which the real reality, the real truth, can 
be contrasted, has, as its basis, an epistemological position in which a guarantee is thought to be 
provided for a knowledge of the correct abstraction of the essence of the real. Lock considers that “it 
was precisely the rise to dominance of the ‘problem of knowledge’ which brought with it the need for a
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recent attempts to account for the whole or aspects of Marx’s critique of ideology 
have been put forward, for example, by Ricoeur, Derrida and Balibar. 59 My approach 
is also significantly different from some of these more recent examinations. 60 I will
new, more adequate theory of false belief, of untruth, of error, of illusion, etc. and of their causes.” 
Ibid., p. 26. Thus the concept of ideology came to be equated with an explicit attempt to explain the 
falsity or truth of ideas in terms of their origin in the essence of reality. The specific notion of ideology 
that emerged from this was that of the object, ideology, as representing an imaginary relationship of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence. This is an idea derived from Althusser’s work, 
“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”. Lock argues that from the Enlightenment onwards some 
notion of an imaginary transposition of the real conditions of existence has been resorted to in order to 
provide an explanation for aspects of these real conditions. An example emerging in the eighteenth 
century he claims can be found in the intricate arrangement of ‘Sublime Lies’ forged by priests and 
despots to procure and maintain their domination. In the belief that they were obeying God, people 
under despotic eighteenth century rule were in fact obeying the priests and despots. Contemporary 
conspiracy theories follow a similar logic; a set of beliefs is held together by its ability to seemingly 
quite logically slay its opposition. All the more solid is its own position if questions asked as to its 
necessary coherence are answered in advance by its ability to distort reality. Both are based upon a 
theory of knowledge which suggests that truth and fact may be arrived at only where illusion, or the 
manipulation and distortion of the truth, can be excluded. Lock, The State and I, p. 27. This 
conception of ideology cannot be sustained, according to Lock, as it is unable to understand ideology as 
a lived relation of everyday human experience under capitalism.
59 Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, especially chaps. 2-6; Derrida, Specters of Marx', Balibar, 
The Philosophy of Marx, especially chap. 3. In addition, Michael Sprinker has suggested that Paul de 
Man was at work on the theory of ideology in Marx’s work at the time of de Man’s death in December 
1983, a work which was to complement several of his late essays on aesthetic theory. Sprinker, 
Imaginary Relations, p. 239.
60 I have already briefly mentioned in the Introduction to the thesis Paul Ricoeur’s analysis of the 
relation between ideology and utopia and the demarcation he theorizes in relation to this. Ricoeur’s 
analysis of Marx starts out on the basis of seeing in Marx a fundamental distinction between ideology 
and reality. Because Marx defines reality in terms of praxis, Ricoeur argues, ideology is necessarily 
defined by its opposition to praxis. Ricoeur’s argument is derived largely from his reading of The 
German Ideology, and it is only really to this text (and indeed very selective parts of it) that such a 
reading applies. The predominant way in which Marx views ideology, as this chapter shows, is not that 
of some opposition to reality or praxis but is as a dialectical part of reality, of which there are both 
active and more contemplative moments. In his work Specters of Marx, Jacques Derrida argues that in 
Marx’s critical analysis is a suggestion of a supposed dividing line between the simulacrum and actual 
reality or “living effectivity”. Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. 47. Derrida also points out Marx’s 
treatment of the ‘phantomatic’ as the ideological and the idea of invisibility and ghostliness in his 
understanding of the commodity as an ideological form. Ibid., pp. 148-149. The central issue for 
Marx, according to Derrida, is that these expressions of the ideological are presented as a problem of 
autonomizing a representation, in forgetting the genesis as well as the real grounding of the spectral. 
Ibid., p. 171. Here Derrida indicates two interesting points of analysis -  one is in what he sees as 
Marx’s understanding of the relative autonomy of exchange-value, the ideologem, or the fetish; the 
other is in suggesting that there is more to humanity than its presentation in terms of a Hauptgespenst, 
an arch-ghost in relation to a capital ghost. Ibid., pp. 174-175. For Derrida’s persistence of spectres, 
we instead want to consider the role of the imagination within the ideological. Derrida, as we briefly 
mentioned earlier in the thesis, sees the spectral within ideology as suggesting the incorporation of an 
autonomized spirit, as “objectivizing expulsion of interior idea or thought”. Ibid., p. 126. As we 
stated, the emphasis within this thesis is more upon the interrelationship of subject and object. Etienne 
Balibar’s essay on “Ideology or Fetishism: Power and Subjection”, in his work The Philosophy of 
Marx, also focuses upon The German Ideology and specifically upon the relation between production 
and domination. Balibar detects several different developments in Marx’s theorization of ideology, 
focusing initially upon the idea of a constitutive gap that he claims Marx sees between consciousness 
and reality, and then by considering the concept of fetishism. Balibar argues that Marx’s problematic 
of ideology reveals two different issues -  one of the power of ideas understood as a real power 
grounded in the forces and circumstances and one of the abstraction of philosophy. Balibar claims that
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instead attempt to show that Marx views ideology as a manifestation of contradiction 
in which a range of dissentient impulses exists. Here we will consider the substance 
of Marx’s dialectic of freedom. Such a re-evaluation is necessary not only on the 
basis of the truncated and incomplete readings mentioned above (which have often 
resulted, not surprisingly, in partial and limited understandings of Marx’s ideas on 
ideology) but because this thesis attempts to challenge some of the accepted 
orthodoxies that have built up within Marxism and various Marxist interpretations of 
Marx. Any argument to be made today as to the relevance of Marx’s theorization of 
ideology will obviously need to return to Marx as its starting point. It is therefore 
essential to consider what is developed in Marx’s writing, the consistencies and 
inconsistencies, in order to understand why it is that Marx believes that a life of 
external necessity is unfree, and what place ideology has in a culture of unfreedom. 
Of course this could be taken as an invitation to consider every aspect of Marx’s 
thought, as not only is there no self-contained or loudly proclaimed singular 
theorization of ideology in Marx but almost any idea raised within his work could be 
thought of as bearing some relation to the concept of ideology.61 It will be important, 
then, to be selective in terms of the extent of material considered whilst not 
compromising on approaching his ideas as an ‘open totality’. This selectivity is 
determined by the central reason for Marx’s endeavour itself - that of theorizing the 
liberatory impetus of a troubled humanity.
Marx’s understanding of ideology emerges out of his analysis of social 
relations. His explanation of the way in which these relations develop in unequal, 
and, more specifically, capitalist societies, concerns the complex relation certain ideas 
have to particular social and psychological needs.62 Ideology is not simply a matter of 
predisposition or functional necessity. In what way it operates, how effective it is, 
and whether it creates difficulties in its wake, are all matters subject to the historical 
interplay between people and their social circumstances. When Marx concerns
these senses enable Marx to view ideology primarily in terms of domination, its dominating form that 
of a false or ‘Active’ universality. Balibar raises some interesting issues particularly in relation to 
Marx’s understanding of fetishism and the symbolic but ultimately conveys a sense of ideology in 
Marx that is bound by a certain objectivity. We will show a different dynamic at work in Marx’s 
treatment of the ideological.
61 At another level there are many comments made, perhaps less directly concerned with the subject of 
ideology, which are nonetheless highly relevant to the substantive issues around the subject of 
ideology, dealing with the relation between material relations and consciousness, and with the 
processes of the transformation of present historical forms and conditions.
62 Marx writes that there is something quite curious about such social relations particularly when they 
exist as ‘reflex-categories’. For example, as we have already mentioned earlier in another context, 
Marx tells us, “one man is king only because other men stand in the relation of subjects to him. They, 
on the contrary, imagine that they are subjects because he is king”. Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 63, n. 1. 
The important point, however, is to detect the nature of the social relations involved.
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himself with alienation he is examining something about ideology; when he criticizes 
commodification he is indicating aspects of the ideological within social life; 63 when 
he rejects the realm of labour in favour of the realm of freedom he is criticizing the 
ideological - not merely because justifications for all of these conditions exist but also 
because within these conditions Marx detects contradictory impulses which constitute 
the ideological. 64 Stating that ideology is a part of the historical life of social relations 
may not, of course, be enough. Ideologies can persist beyond their seeming 
usefulness for particular social conditions, presenting potentially fruitful 
contradictions within the ideological itself. In building a picture of Marx’s work on 
ideology we hope to provide a deeper theoretical context for an understanding of the 
two major themes we have highlighted in the two previous chapters of this central part 
of the thesis - the commodity spectacle and a psychology of control. We will address 
these issues by examining the dialectic of freedom that Marx presents in terms of the 
problem of theorizing an inner and outer life. The sort of open re-reading we are 
proposing will be evidenced in the investigation of Marx’s various analyses of 
alienation -  an alienation of self in egoistic need, in commodified life and in suffering 
- that we will present later in the chapter. In each of these we will look at how 
successful Marx is in conveying the issue that is of greatest concern to an 
understanding of an alienation of the self -  that of how the ideological operates here 
as a contradictory reality. Such a reading will be in stark contrast with the limited sort 
of analysis that emerges out of the ‘Marxist theory of ideology’ approach. For this re­
reading of Marx we are presenting we are able to seek inspiration from those 
theorizations that have also sought an openness of analysis, or highlighted what has 
been referred to as the “unknown dimension” of Marxism. 65
63 It can be noted that Zizek contends Marx did not refer to the domain of commodity fetishism with 
the term ideology because it falls into the category of a ‘spontaneous’ ideology that is at the basis of 
social reality itself. This domain, Zizek argues, designates “a series of presuppositions that determine 
the structure of the very ‘real’ economic practice o f market exchange” and for this reason it is 
questionable as to whether it is appropriate to use, in relation to it, the term ideology. Zizek, “The 
Spectre o f Ideology”, pp. 9, 15. We would need to point out firstly that Marx’s actual use of the term 
ideology is extremely limited and yet we can still understand him to mean the ideological within a wide 
variety o f alienating practices, and secondly it is precisely where the real is represented as it is 
(although in the case o f commodity fetishism involving a basic reification of its meaning and function) 
that we can detect the ideological. What is important here are the antagonistic relations subtending the 
fetishization of commodities, rather than what Zizek sees as the spontaneously ideological aspect of 
reality itself.
64 As we have just argued, Marx sees in the commodity form the basis for much contemporary 
alienation but the concept is not therefore reduced to the status of the structure of wage-labour and 
nothing more.
65 See especially, Karl E. Klare, “The Critique of Everyday Life, the New Left, and the Unrecognisable 
Marxism”, in The Unknown Dimension: European Marxism since Lenin, eds., Dick Howard and Karl 
E. Klare (New York: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 3-33.
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The chapter will be structured into three sections. The first section will 
introduce the theme that this thesis takes to be central to Marx’s work -  the problem 
of unfreedom. Here we will look at the particular form Marx theorizes as integral to 
an unffee society -  that of estrangement. With this Marx sees a fundamental 
alienation of the self generated out of conditions of egoistic need. In relation to this 
we will consider what it is that he takes to be the fundamental problem of subjectivity 
- that humanity has become a slave to appetites that foster the perpetuation of an 
unjust system rather than being moved by an impulse towards self-realization. We 
will highlight the relation Marx draws between what he terms ‘the calculating slave’ 
and the role played by the ideological as ‘inventive need’, and will consider here, in 
particular, the processes of the ‘forced acceptance’ of a system of alienation and the 
complicated operations of forms of self-alienation. With this analysis we will begin 
to see what it is that gives rise to Marx’s critique of ideology. In the second section 
we will consider in a more particular sense how Marx views ideology as a form of 
contradiction by analyzing the particular method Marx employs to unravel the 
problem of antagonism within a dominant social form -  that of the commodity. Here, 
we will interpret the problem of the commodity form in Marx’s work as a 
philosophical problem. Marx views the commodity in terms of inner and outer 
structurings of social life. What becomes commodified is human creativity itself. 
Wage-labour and money entail the dominant forms of a life given over to the rationale 
of the commodity. As we will see, Marx explores not only the external characteristics 
of this money form but much in relation to an inner psychology of money as well. 
What we will want to consider is why Marx focuses so much of his attention upon the 
objective necessity of this commodity world. The third section of the chapter will 
reflect upon an extremely interesting form of alienation -  that of types of suffering in 
which the ideological can manifest as illusion or self-conscious knowledge. We will 
thus approach the issue of spirituality from the point of view of a type of dialectical 
analysis. We will examine Marx’s critique of ideology as a form of antagonism by 
focusing, in particular, on the significance of spirituality as an interrelationship of 
estrangement and self-knowledge. We need to consider here what sort of theorization 
of liberation Marx offers, and how this might help us to critically assess the place of 
ideology within such an approach. This, it is hoped, will allow us to identify various 
themes for a renewal of the critique of ideology. These three sections will together 
canvas the problem of theorizing the contradictory unity of the relation between an 
inner and outer life, and will hopefully assist us in situating ideology as an ontological 
problem. In egoistic need, the commodification of life, and in suffering, Marx brings 
together a complex analysis if the problem of contemporary ideology. We will come 
to see that Marx views the ideological as a type of fear -  a fear of the possibility of 
being which we all possess. We will conclude the chapter by summarizing the ways
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in which Marx’s approach to the critique of ideology can enable us to think more 
critically about ideology today.
Section One: Ideology and the Calculating Slave - 
Marx’s Critique of Unfreedom
The extension of products and needs makes man become, subjectively, the inventive 
and ever-calculating slave of inhuman, exquisitely cunning, unnatural, and imaginary 
appetites.
Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
Capitalism produces a poverty which is conscious of its spiritual and physical 
poverty.
Marx, The Holy Family
Contradiction as the Motive Force of Becoming
In this section of the chapter we will begin by explaining the importance of the 
concept of freedom to Marx’s critique of social life. From this analysis we hope to 
then show how this concentration upon freedom and the problem of unfreedom 
structures Marx’s approach to the critique o f ideology. We will introduce two 
concepts that allow us to pursue this analysis and further our understanding of the 
contemporary problem of ideology. The first concerns the problem of estrangement, 
which Marx views in a highly particular way as a complex of processes involving 
both confusion and familiarity. This leads us to the other fundamental concept in 
Marx’s critique of ideology - that of the calculating slave. The subject of ideology, as 
Marx sees it, is a subject involved in the dialectical reality o f the existence of 
unfreedom, in other words, in tendencies towards freedom within a realm of 
unfreedom. The influence o f Fichte on Marx’s theorization o f freedom and the idea 
of becoming has been well noted , 66 and it is clear that this sense o f the importance of a
66 See, for example, Auguste Comu, Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels: leur vie et leur oeuvre (Paris: 
Presses universitaires de France, 1955-1970), 4 vols.. See especially vol. I, Les annees d ’enfance et de 
jeunesse, la gauche hegelienne, 1818/1820-1844 (1955). Marx himself rails against censorship laws 
that have the effect o f rejecting the “intellectual heroes o f morality, such as Kant, Fichte and Spinoza”. 
Karl Marx, “Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction”, Collected Works, vol. I, p. 199.
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contradiction between freedom and unfreedom is central to Marx’s theorization of 
humanity’s transformative potential in acting within the world.
This contradiction within unfreedom is the basis of Marx’s understanding of a 
particular type of subjectivity that has come to characterize the modem age of 
unfreedom. Here Marx suggests the significance of something akin to ‘the obscurity 
of being’, as in the Blochian sense67 - that, as individuals, we are constantly caught 
within the restrictions and possibilities through which we struggle to define ourselves 
and that this often results in an inability to come to terms with a sense of 
incompletedness. Paraphrasing Democritus, Marx tells us that human beings like to 
create for themselves manifestations, and often illusions, of their own perplexity. 68 
For Marx, as we will see, this open potential is often transformed into something quite 
limited and restricted. Repeatedly, humanity has been prepared to settle for very 
much less than it is capable of determining; the individual has surrendered her 
creative power “like Esau his birthright for a mess of pottage” . 69 The condition or 
conditional event through which all of this occurs is, for Marx, an alienation of the 
self. We will consider how Marx theorizes this process as consisting of conditions in 
which one ‘necessarily impoverishes’ oneself by way of egoistic need. This, as we 
will show, constitutes a vast and significant realm of the ideological. What we will 
then want to reflect upon is whether the presence of ideology reveals to us a 
dialectical tension -  we express our humanity both in ways determined by the 
conditions of our existence and in terms of calculated and constructed needs. We will 
proceed to a fuller analysis of this ‘inventive need’ in Section Two of the chapter. Let 
us begin by examining the problem, for Marx, of freedom and unfreedom.
Freedom and the Freedom of Egoism
The central sustaining theme of Marx’s work is the goal of freedom. 
“Freedom”, Marx argues, “the feeling of man’s dignity, will have to be awakened 
again” in order to transform society into a democratic community of people. 70 Marx’s 
Epicurean and more particularly Aristotelian ethics are evident here in the value he 
places upon the self-determining nature of the necessity of freedom and happiness
67 Bloch, Literary Essays, p. 189.
68 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation”, p. 42.
69 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 307.
70 Marx to Ruge, May, 1843, p. 201 (translation slightly altered).
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(eudaimonia) . 71 Indeed Marx is first drawn to study Epicurus because he considers 
the Hellenic scholar sets out a philosophy of life that opposes fear. Epicurus asserts 
the value of absolute freedom of the mind, particularly in relation to the ability people 
have to carve “out their own passage”; it is a “freedom of the mind and its freedom 
from determination”, Marx states in one of the notebooks for his dissertation. 72 And 
yet contemporary life is only all the more steeped in the very confusion Epicurus had 
advised against. Our present confusion is particularly difficult to theorize precisely 
because we have tended to replace a concern for our own passage into freedom with 
calculations bred of an enslavement. “Since in fear, and specifically in an inner fear 
that cannot be extinguished, man is determined as an animal, we do not care at all 
how an animal is kept in restraint” .73 We are the difficulty of a natural humanity cast 
into conditions that we are ill prepared for, thereby turning our natural selves into 
something quite foreign.
In the absence of freedom the world has witnessed the development of 
conditions of egoism, a transformation of the self into a state of ‘thingness’, and 
needless suffering. At its worst, an unfree world is one in which the individual is “a 
degraded, enslaved, abandoned, and wretched creature” . 74 Marx distinguishes this 
unnecessary suffering from suffering that is a confirmation of human reality, a 
suffering which, “humanly conceived, is an enjoyment of the self’ . 75 To be sensuous 
is to suffer and to suffer passionately because suffering in this sense arises due to the 
fact that people are subjected to the actions of others. 76 The other type of suffering, an 
unneeded, worthless suffering, is one that emerges out of unfree societies and 
specifically from alienated beings within such societies.
Already here we see a view of human virtues that allows for the different 
dimensions of their expression. We will see this most clearly in Marx’s analysis of 
spirituality. In his commitment to well-being Marx does not relegate all suffering to 
the realm of necessity, an existence to be decisively left behind once freedom has 
been obtained. What Marx appears more concerned with is in seeing the significance
71 For an account of the influence of the ancients on Marx see, McCarthy, Marx and the Ancients', and 
George E. McCarthy, ed., Marx and Aristotle: Nineteenth-Century German Social Theory and 
Classical Antiquity (Savage, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1990).
72 Marx, “Notes for the Doctoral Dissertation”, p. 81, n. 27; Marx, “Notebooks on Epicurean 
Philosophy”, Collected Works, vol. I, p. 448.
73 Karl Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation”, “Fragment from the Appendix, ‘Critique of Plutarch’s Polemic 
Against the Theology of Epicurus’”, Collected Works, vol. I, p. 74.
74 Marx, Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’, p. 251 (translation slightly altered).
75 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 351.
76 Ibid., p. 390.
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of the problem of unfreedom in the present. It is, as Nancy suggests, an Aristotelian 
question of how to pass from poiesis to praxis, from “the activity that produces 
something to the activity through which the agent of the action ‘produces’ or 
‘realizes’ him/herself’ . 77 For Marx, this general lack of freedom has an ancient 
lineage, but in capitalism the victorious march of egoism and commodification have 
reached such widespread intensity that it is to its processes that attention must be 
given. For it is in commodity society’s realm of necessity that he sees the greatest and 
most troubling atrophy of a realm of freedom. It is here also that a very particular 
type of unfreedom emerges -  an unfreedom into which people enter contractually, a 
seemingly voluntary servitude. Is it here then, we will want to consider, that the 
ideological is most difficult to theorize, or is it that the contradictory unity of 
commodified relations is least likely to generate actual disruptions in its own 
ideological realm?
All production, Marx argues, has as its effect the objectification of the 
individual. 78 An objectifying system of law has emerged that allows people to exist 
for the benefit of the law, rather than the law existing for the benefit of people: “the 
supreme relation of man is the legal relation, the relation to laws which apply to him 
not because they are the laws of his own will and nature but because they dominate 
him and breaches of them would be avenged ' . 19 But this system of law takes place on 
the basis of the commodification of all aspects of life and creates needs that are 
commodified needs, egoistic needs. It is on this basis of objectification that the 
concept of alienation is developed in Marx’s work; he explains it as all involuntary 
activity which enslaves. 80 But before we conclude here that this way of theorizing the 
ideological sounds suspiciously Althusserian, let us point out that whilst Marx views 
the basis of alienation as being in itself involuntary he also claims that it is by “man’s 
own deed” that the self is enslaved. 81 In this process where freedom has ebbed, 
emerges the strange reality of the controlled and circumscribed freedoms of 
commodified life. It is this odd, seeming contradiction of the freedoms of an unfree 
world that engages Marx in a quest to fundamentally challenge this reality. This 
difficulty in defining what exactly are the voluntary and involuntary aspects of 
unfreedom we can note as a continuing problem for the critique of ideology. Let us 
try to approach this problem in more depth.
77 Nancy, The Sense o f the World, p. 97.
78 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 226.
79 Marx, On the Jewish Question, p. 239.
80 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 53.
81 Ibid.
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The freedom of egoism is “the passive and merely given result” of such a 
society.82 The actual individual within capitalist society is “acknowledged only in the 
form of the egoistic individual” and in the form of the abstract citizen. 83 Marx 
recognizes in commodity society the development of merely different forms of a 
master/slave relationship. Caliban has a new master which he believes will mean his 
freedom: 84 But just as it matters little for which master one is a foot-licker, so too, in 
the monotonous perpetuation of enslavement in capitalism’s unequal and unjust 
society, Marx sees scant difference in such a society merely declaring itself free. This 
is even and indeed precisely the case where se/^alienation and the alienation of things 
appear at their greatest. The master of external need is “a weakness which will tempt 
the fly onto the lime-twig” . 85 There is a strange form of necessity that Marx detects in 
this situation. It is a necessity to which people are enticed, to which they surrender 
and succumb. We can see here that he prods at the ‘given’ of this ideological unfree 
reality. External need is not mere imposition but is an interactive part of what people 
form of their humanity. It is involuntary and yet also the result of one’s own deeds. 
He does not merely highlight the objective properties of this reality but questions the 
part that individuals play in its construction as such. This is of course necessary to do 
if the issue of the ability to subdue necessity is taken seriously. Despite seeing the 
role of objective existence as vital to the development of a humanity prone to 
temptation, he nonetheless leaves open the relationship between subjective and 
objective in the playing out of need. This way of viewing the problem of unfreedom 
draws him constantly back to what it is about humanity’s existence that brings about 
such a situation. What is this necessity which we have the ability to subdue?
Necessity, Marx theorizes, appears in the world as determinism but that 
determinism “can only be deduced from real possibility". It is a network of 
conditions, reasons, causes by which determinism and possibility are revealed.86 
Capitalism is one such example of this interrelatedness of necessity and possibility. 
Capitalism is a system, Marx writes in a letter to Ruge, “based on the principle of the 
dehumanized world” . 87 It is a fundamental type of alienation. At the same time, Ruge 
is proffered the assurance that the world “has long possessed in dream form 
something of which it need only become conscious in order to possess it in
82 Marx, On the Jewish Question, p. 233.
83 Ibid., p.234.
84 The Tempest, act 2, sc. 2, lines 185-187.
85 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 359.
86 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation”, p. 43.
87 Marx to Ruge, May, 1843, in Early Writings, p. 201.
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actuality” . 88 So as basic as the alienation is it resides within a realm of possibility. 
However we might want to assess the likelihood of any such conscious possession of 
a concrete hope, it is most certainly this dream capable of a revolutionary freedom 
that inspires Marx to consider the significance of a world of self-alienation, 
deprivation, devaluation, greed and seeming delusion. It creates for him a context for 
the tension he sees within ideological existence. In the commodity form he sees 
encapsulated many of the vain strivings of humanity - an alienation of the spirit, an 
alienation through work, and an alienation of those things which humanity produces.
The commodity is a strange form of alienation because it is at the same time 
an external object that arises from the desire to satisfy human need. It is not, 
however, only a form of impersonal structural objectivity and nothing else -  the 
commodity might well appear to people in this form but it is not this form itself. This 
is the basis of Marx’s critique of the commodity form as an ideological form. We 
should mention then that Marx’s theorization of alienation is widely misunderstood in 
this sense as an objectivity in itself, rather than as a fetishized objectivity. Much rests 
on this misunderstanding for what various theorists take Marx’s view of alienation to 
be is some sort of objective entity whose reappropriation by the subject will result in a 
revolutionary consciousness. 89 As we have argued in a previous chapter, this is what 
we find in the work of Lukäcs. What we have already indicated is that Marx starts out 
on the basis of detecting a tension at work through the forms of alienation that are 
expressed ideologically. In Lukäcs’s work consciousness emerges out of the 
objectivity that is alienation. Marx tends not to separate subject and object in this 
fashion. The dream of humanization is just as real as the actuality of dehumanization. 
We will need to understand quite how it is that Marx theorizes the relation of subject 
to object within commodified, alienated forms. It is certainly the case that in these 
forms of alienation he sees the complicated processes of types of accommodation to, 
and struggle with, the conditions one faces. Such conditions are primarily ones of 
fear, a fear of self and a fear of the other. And it is of course to this reality that Marx 
protests.
Marx’s critique of alienation is centred upon a view of the possibility of 
freedom, of the self and the realization of the self as a free being. His critique is thus 
an ontological critique in this sense. Marx speaks stridently, as we have mentioned, 
of the need for a sense of freedom and self-esteem to be re-awakened, and indeed his
88 Marx to Ruge, September, 1843, in Early Writings, p. 209 (translation slightly altered).
89 Even Habermas, whose work is more sensitive to the problems of these categories than many, argues 
this. See his discussion on the philosophy of praxis in his The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity: 
Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 60-82.
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entire corpus of work is premised on this basis.90 If his focus seems too exclusively 
upon that lost freedom of capitalism it is principally because it strikes Marx that its 
alienating sting should no longer surprise, and yet, even with much of its sharpness 
gone, a state of compulsion still catches people unprepared. What Marx maintains is 
that within conditions of commodified control people can never be “real, free human 
beings” . 91 But humanity does not lead a “passive and thoughtless existence”; people 
are in a constant process of thinking about their suffering and reformulating their 
humanity.92 When the assertion is made that “free competition = the ultimate form of 
development [...] and hence of human freedom” we know that what is really meant, 
says Marx, is the impoverishment of “middle-class rule” . 93 This is “life in its most 
soulless form” .94 The problem with such a life is that it has extinguished much of 
one’s sense of self-esteem and freedom.95 In this sense, the particular forms of 
unfreedom, seemingly sunken below capitalism’s horizon, are the continuation of 
other sigillate forms of compulsion and need. It is precisely here that alienation and 
egoistic need coalesce. People who do not feel a sense of freedom are “like a breed of 
slaves or a stud of horses” for their masters.96 In contrast, freedom consists in 
socialized peoples “under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human 
nature” .97 It is “that development of human energy which is an end in itself’ .98 
Freedom can only ever be determined through itself. Thus, without a sense of 
freedom, people will be as much a slave to ideology as to any other master. A 
condition of soulless dehumanization is fertile ground for that aspect of the 
ideological which relies upon a state of dependent control.
What Marx takes the ideological to be is a condition in which there exists the 
workings of one’s “own inner priest” - and importantly an internal priest signifying a 
struggle between pacification and emancipation.99 Is it then within the subject herself 
that need and alienation take form, and what does this suggest of the involuntary and 
the outcome of our own deeds that constitutes the ideological? Can we indeed glean 
from Marx that this ‘internal priest’, the battle-ground of freedom and control and,
90 Marx to Ruge, May, 1843, in Early Writings, p. 201.
91 Ibid., p. 203.
92 Ibid., p. 205.
93 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 652.
94 Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State”, in Early Writings, p. 167.
95 Marx to Ruge, May, 1843, in Early Writings, p. 201. Marx considers that this “sense vanished from 
the world with the Greeks, and with Christianity it took up residence in the blue mists of heaven”. Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Marx, Capital, vol. Ill, p. 820.
98 Ibid.
99 Marx, Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’, p. 252.
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potentially, freedom against control, is fundamental to ideology? In commodity 
society, he tells us, control is imposed and self-imposed in forms different from that 
pertaining in slave societies, and yet the same issue of a lack of freedom exists. A life 
in which people are not freed from “the filth of gain” is, for Marx, quite simply a 
“fully developed slavery and inhumanity” . 100 And yet this lack of freedom is not 
simply the inhumanity it comes to represent. Even the most extreme forms of 
alienation are those in which the individual finds herself engaged in conditions 
oriented against the richness of humanity and yet is not a powerless, eternal captive to 
such dependence. A process of the ‘surrendering’ of one’s creativity has occurred. 101 
This problem, which Marx highlights, enables us to see quite clearly the challenge 
that a state of ideology represents. In Rousseau’s sense Marx tells us that we imagine 
ourselves to be “free even in chains” . 102 And yet it would seem more the case that 
unchained and yet unfree, the individuals of capitalism compromise their sense of 
humanity to the perpetuation of a system whose rewards are transient and few, and 
whose ability to cause suffering seems unlimited. And yet of course fuelling much of 
this process is an open-ended, imprecise and threatening hunger, a sense of empty 
privation and craving, but also a striving against a fulfilment of merely unconscious 
needs and a striving for the mediation of people with their world. 103 For Marx, the 
system produces against its will, as it were, a “poverty which is conscious of its 
spiritual and physical poverty” and a “dehumanisation which is conscious of its 
dehumanisation” . 104 We surrender our freedom knowingly and unknowingly, and yet 
we know that we live out an existence of unfreedom. Is this because of the sort of 
possibility we are or is it because of the sort of alienation we experience? Much of 
the existence of humanity has been marked by a general unfreedom. Marx isolates 
capitalism as a system of the odd alien dualities of freedom - the freedom to realize 
one’s humanity alongside the freedom to realize this as alienated, constant, unsatiated 
need. Marx wants to know whether there is something about the system of capitalism 
more specifically which indicates what has enabled such a situation of both 
dehumanization and potential emancipation? What is it about the world that entails 
this contradictory freedom, and where does the urgent necessity of the system end and 
the obligations of the stifled in its vault begin?
100 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, pp. 133, 137.
101 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 307.
102 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 111.
103 This is what Marx means in his discussion of the realized naturalism of humanity and the realized 
humanism of nature. Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 350.
104 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 44.
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We need then to consider more closely the relation between this alienated, 
unfree life and ideology. Marx first attempts to consider this relation as we have seen 
as a systemic problem. Capitalism, he argues, “creates a world after its own image” . 105 
Its image is one of the veneration of the principle of universal saleability. Under 
capitalism, everything has become a potential commodity with a “marketable 
value” , 106 everything can be transformed into property. Possession has turned into a 
juridical relation, 107 and, once such a relation, it enters into a strange process of 
transformation where the contract by which possession is realized - of free persons 
equal before the law - is also the contractual abdication of human freedom and 
equality. Marx scornfully refers to this realm as “the very Eden of the innate rights of 
man” precisely because what is taken to be human freedom within capitalism is the 
ability to participate in commercial exchange. 108 Exchange “turns into its opposite and 
the laws of private property - liberty, equality, property - property in one’s own 
labour, and free disposition over it - turn into the worker’s propertylessness, and the 
dispossession of his labour” . 109 Freedom to compete is actually “the most complete 
subjugation of individuality under social conditions which assume the form of 
objective powers” . 110 But even more than this freedom becomes the freedom of the 
ego, of the self in her selfishness, of the self separated from the other.
What we need to understand is how Marx believes freedom is able to assume 
the form of objective powers because of a complex interplay between the subject and 
the subject’s social conditions. It is on the basis of such exchange that the capitalist 
form of social life has come to be characterized. Thus Marx wants to take us further 
into the problem of unfreedom as a systemic problem and present us with the illusion 
-  the “necessary illusion” * 111 -  that a system of exchange relies upon. Capitalist 
exchange is a peculiar form of exchange in which both freedom and enslavement are 
ensured. This anomaly of a disconnected, “alien reality” , 112 is the realm of the 
ideological. Let us now look at the nature of what Marx sees as an objective 
condition or necessity of ideological control. The basic problem Marx chooses is that 
of the imposition of a form of command over creativity -  the enslaving world of the
l0;> Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto, p. 47.
106 Marx, The Poverty o f Philosophy, p. 30.
107 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 102.
108 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 172.
109 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 674.
110 Ibid., p. 652.
111 Ibid., p. 509.
112 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 351.
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reduction of the individual to the status of an animal laborans and to relations of 
dependency.
The Stunting of Life through Command
Marx argues that capital is “essentially the command over unpaid labour” . 113 It 
is thus a form of command over social being. It is a type of command whose 
consequences are to be found in much of the oppression, degradation and exploitation 
that characterizes the contemporary world. 114 It is a command capable of transforming 
being. Individuals are subsumed under its social relations. 115 Primary amongst these 
is that of exchange. “Selling”, Marx tells us, “is the practice of alienation” . 116 Within 
this the imposition of work makes “an accumulation of misery a necessary condition” 
forcing the individual to its dictates “more firmly than the wedges of Hephaestus held 
Prometheus to the rock” . 117 This imposition of work runs counter to the “free 
conscious activity” and “free expression” that Marx takes to be the substance of 
human creativity. 118 Creativity should be the authentic expression of one’s 
individuality, it should be one’s life, not the external arbitrary need of forced work, it 
is only capital that has “subjugated historical progress to the service of wealth” . 119 It is 
a system of fragmented and opposing strands of activity and thought. Where it creates 
private interests, competition and monopoly, capitalism also creates cooperation and 
“the antithesis of private interests” . 120 It has contributed to the “hitherto most 
developed social [...] relations” : 121 And yet in the midst of such development the 
standpoint which marks the capitalist epoch is that of the “isolated individual” . 122 We 
are aware that this flagrant antithesis between isolation and dependence gives form to
113 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 500.
114 Ibid., p. 715.
115 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 158.
116 Marx, On the Jewish Question, p. 241.
117 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 604 (translation slightly altered). The Lawrence and Wishart edition states 
that it was the wedges of the Roman god of fire, Vulcan, rather than the Greek god, Hephaestus, 
holding Prometheus to the rock.
118 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p.328; Marx, “Excerpts from James Mill’s 
Elements o f Political Economy”, p. 278.
119 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 590.
120 Ibid., p. 159.
121 Ibid., p. 84. It is perhaps with this in mind that Camus claims of Marx that: “The most eloquent 
eulogy of capitalism was made by its greatest enemy”. Albert Camus, The Rebel (New York: Vintage, 
1958), p. 192. Describing Marx’s statements as a eulogy of capitalism does, however, seriously miss 
the point. Marx acknowledges the achievements of people acting often in opposition to the dictates of 
the system, not the functions of the system itself.
122 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 84.
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ideological control, and yet, is it not often suggested that Marx sees something worthy 
in the development of these same social relations capable of such a restless clash of 
values? Marx’s adjudication leaves little room for settling uncondemned the question 
of capitalism’s forms of development. Capitalism’s particular forms of ‘development’ 
are, indeed, never left unquestioned. Just because “we are further ahead than the 
ancients in mechanics”, Marx jibes, does not mean that we should “be able to make an 
epic too” . 123 Indeed, Marx points out that capitalism is often “hostile to certain 
branches of spiritual production, for example, art and poetry” : 124 And if not hostile to 
such creativity then the profit system will merely grant it recognition to the extent that 
it fulfils “a ‘useful’ function for wealth” . 125 The wants of a grasping, money-bloated 
system and the needs of an active humanity are always indicative of such disparity 
and underlying disharmony.
It is of little surprise that Marx sees the realm of actual freedom as existing 
beyond and outside the world of material production and the functions of the creation 
of profit. The freedom of the social being is outside command. This actual freedom 
“begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundance 
considerations ceases” . 126 Far from trumpeting the ideals of ‘industrial man’ and of 
work, as various commentators claim, Marx argues that labour “has lost all semblance 
of self-activity and only sustains [...] life by stunting it” . 127 Any activity that does not 
engage people at this level of self-activity, freely chosen and participated in, is a form 
of alienation. Labour “cannot become play, as Fourier would like”, Marx states. 128 
Labour is the alienated person. 129 It is only because the conditions of a life of 
alienated labour “seem accidental” that people imagine they are freer than before, 
when in reality they are less free. 130 This state of diminishing freedom Marx sees as a 
fundamental characteristic of capitalism. Life is stunted by command and so too, it 
would seem, the individuals engaged in such a life. We can still see here in Marx’s 
analysis only the given existence of the individual caught in this apparently unnatural
123 Karl Marx, Theories o f Surplus-Value, trans. Emile Bums, ed. S. Ryazanskaya (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1975), Part I, p. 285.
124 Ibid. Marx’s phrase ‘spiritual production’ should not be read in a technicist sense. The German 
word for produce and production (as in works o f art, etc.,) - her\>orbringen - is the same word for create 
(as in bring forth).
125 Ibid., p .288.
126 Marx, Capital, vol. Ill, p. 820.
127 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 96. Again, for Marx, it was Hegel who saw labour as 
some kind of self-confirming essence of humanity; Marx instead sees labour as the person’s coming to 
be for herself within alienation. Marx, Economic and Philosophiccd Manuscripts, p. 386.
128 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 712.
129 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 386.
130 Ibid., p. 87.
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state. Why the individual becomes an adherent to the circumstances of her control 
remains unclear. What Marx does suggest is the openness of conditions to which the 
individual has become attached. At the same time that command solidifies life in this 
seemingly restive state of withheld freedom, a belief in freedom can be more than 
delusion. Imagination is not merely the stuff of illusion; it is also the hope for 
something beyond the reality that capitalism offers. The dream possessed in actuality 
is both freedom and the consciousness of freedom. This freedom, Marx suggests, 
must start out upon the basis of the end of subjugated, stunted labour, creativity and 
life.
The problem is not only that capitalism has created a world of greed and 
competition based upon the enslavement and dehumanization of the individual. 131 It is 
also that it is a system in which “various forms of social connectedness confront the 
individual as a mere means towards [...] private purposes, as external necessity” . 132 In 
such a world, human bonds are replaced by bonds of dependency, a dependency felt 
not as inner need but as external necessity. “My life is necessarily grounded outside 
itself if it is not my own creation” . 133 The difficulty involved in such a situation is that 
what is self-mediated “contradicts all the palpable evidence of practical life” . 134 This 
condition is too the ideological. It is the “alien which inevitably appears as something 
real” . 135 We have seen that the problem of the contradiction of freedom is one Marx 
attributes to forms of command effectively beyond individual volition or control. 
Capitalism’s development of labour for the purpose of the creation of wealth leads to 
forms of compulsion. The dehumanization that results is capitalist freedom. The 
problem with the ‘stunting of life’ is that it creates conditions of dependency and turns 
connectedness into necessity instead of a free sense of being. One’s consciousness is 
transformed through estrangement. 136 The problem with this is also that such a 
development appears seemingly accidental. Marx implies that what appears as the 
situation in which people are engaged is one not so much that deceives as involves the 
individual in a pathetic reality, an ideological reality. People come to accept a 
freedom that, as we have mentioned, merely “imagines itself to be free” . 137 What then 
is the basis of this relation between the imagination and ideology? With ideology the 
subject becomes an object, a particular lived experience of objectification. But again
131 See, for example, Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 43.
132 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 84.
133 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 356.
134 Ibid.
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we are left to question what of this process is the rueful attraction the individual 
experiences when faced with her own dehumanization? What is the viscosity of the 
surface of such a life to which the grasping will inevitably fall prey? Ideology, Marx 
tells us, is a form of embellishment - an embellishment of reality well versed in its 
own contradictions. These relations of command are predatory relations upon the 
human spirit. Let us look more closely at an example of this embellishment of reality 
to begin to see more clearly where it is that Marx locates the ideological.
The Relation between Embellishment, Enslavement and the ‘Capacity to consume ’
The “embellishment of exploitation” takes a variety of forms under different 
types of society. 138 In the case of the system of capitalism, without a profit-centred 
ruthlessness, capital accumulation could not conceivably continue to exist into the 
future. This feature might be presented in its nakedness as egotistical, self­
interestedness, but also - and this is particularly relevant to the period in which Marx 
was writing - it might be indicative of a system of selfishness with an inward 
conviction of its own general benefit to humanity. Within such times even spiritual 
creativity can be presented as a natural player of the game of supply and demand. 
“Human individuality, human morality, have become both articles of commerce”, 
Marx opines. 139 What then, we are led to ask, is it that the individual is grasping 
within her own enslavement? For what the product of her labour is, she is not. 140 The 
derivation of needs in capitalist society is to be found in “the capacity to consume” . 141 
Consumption “beckons” with an “aim-determining need”, which produces a certain 
inclination towards the consumption of objects. Consumption constantly reproduces 
need. In this it is able to enslave. It is only where the individual is free from such 
need that one lives and creates freely. 142 On this basis, ideology intervenes between 
contrived want and the rich variety of human need and possibility that characterizes 
the wealth of individuals.
We have previously argued that ideology exists to reconcile the subject to 
whatever tensions or conditions occur at any given time - times that allow for the 
idealism of a contrived harmonization, or the open deception of times less favourable 
to illusion, to sentimentality or cynicism. For Marx, we find that ideology is a part of
138 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 434.
139 Marx, “Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy”, p. 264.
140 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 324.
141 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 92.
142 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 329.
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an unaccepted condition of enslavement whether or not it is brazenly presented as 
such. 143 What is significant for him is the element of recognition that functions in a 
variety of ways in order to make of a compromised freedom a sense that this is itself 
freedom. “Selfish need” and “private interest” are reproduced as “unconscious 
natural necessity” . 144 And yet ideology is also a part of a structure that operates on the 
basis of contradiction. It is always an uneasy mixture, a confusion of subjective and 
objective contradictions. It is a system of the belief in mutual exchange, and of an 
ultimate general interest. It emerges by way of hiding the content of the struggles 
with its own limitations as much as it exists in forms of cynical deceit. It is the 
generation of perpetual desire, and it is the inability to deliver; it is the striving for a 
world beyond alienation at the same time as it is one of greed and crass 
commercialization. “In the modem world”, Marx tells us, “each person is at the same 
time a member of slave society and of the public commonweal” . 145 Capitalism is 
constantly marked by contradictions. Indeed, Marx states quite straightforwardly that 
capital “itself is the contradiction” : 146 And within contradiction rests the barrier to its 
own untrammelled development. 147 When Marx uses the term contradiction let us 
note that it is meant in specific and explicable ways. 148 All the basic processes of 
capitalism operate as multi-dimensional determinations, many of which are unities of 
different determinations which make a transition from one form to another on the 
basis of opposing and dissolving tensions and constant and often unpredictable 
historical limitations. 149 Contradictions are forced “to embrace” impossibilities
143 Marx witnessed developments within societies undergoing enormous changes. In all of this he 
detects a general state of flux but is repeatedly moved to comment upon particular changes most 
notably when these changes reveal the inadequacy of preconceived assumptions. For example, in 
criticism of Hegel’s view of an ethical State based upon private property and the common will Marx 
asks: “What sort of a state is it that cannot even tolerate the idealism of its own civil law?” Marx, 
“Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine o f the State”, p. 170.
144 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 133.
145 Ibid., p. 137.
146 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 543. This is because while it constantly tries to suspend necessary labour 
time, surplus labour time “exists only in antithesis with necessary labour time, so that capital posits 
necessary labour time as a necessary condition of its reproduction and realization”. Ibid.
147 Ibid., p. 541.
148 Perhaps in the assumed obviousness of what he is stating Marx risks losing the subtlety of what he 
intends. Certainly his use of the concept of ‘contradiction’ is poorly understood. For example, 
Torrance states apropos Jorge Larrain’s definition of ideology as contradiction that Marx’s concept of 
contradiction is “confused”. See Torrance, Karl Marx’s Theory o f Ideas, p. 191. And yet Torrance 
unfortunately does not provide close study of an example of Marx’s conceptual use of ‘contradiction’, 
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149 Marx’s efforts to theorize these processes are enormous, like those too of Hegel and Spinoza. 
Marx’s debt to Hegel, for example, in his use of the concept of contradiction, which drives itself 
towards its own dissolution, is clearly apparent, as too is his use of Spinoza’s thesis that ‘determination 
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brought together with the universal exchange of all things. 150 Thus, opposing tensions 
of objective and subjective desire can exist in a state where ideological freedom reigns 
as ambage and equivocation. We can perhaps see this more clearly by considering an 
example of Marx’s understanding of contradiction. Here we will see that these 
predatory relations Marx indicates involve the playing out of a fundamental paradox 
within the reality of everyday existence -  that between freedom and unfreedom; that, 
as we will later see, of a compromised freedom.
The *Apparently mysterious’ is the *Prosaically real’
Marx argues that it is an ideological contradiction, “this perverted appearance, 
this prosaically real, and by no means imaginary mystification” that is characteristic 
of all social forms positing exchange-value. 151 At the same time, this process is 
‘apparently mysterious’ . 152 If the notion of the individual as free and autonomous is 
fundamentally important for the abstract human labour necessary within modem 
capitalism, the ideology subtending this, that of a generalized human equality, is 
significant in a number of ways. An assumption of equality is in actuality that 
construction of ideology that becomes materialized precisely in the very inequality 
and unequal distribution of value that characterizes capitalist accumulation. This is 
the transparency of ideology’s mystifying process. The idea of the value of the 
individual thus appears ambiguous because what is of value in the individual for 
capitalism carries considerable significance, i.e., the individual is a source of potential 
labour ability enabling the extraction of surplus value. At the same time, this value is 
merely the value that every worker possesses, the entirely interchangeable value of 
having the capacity to produce surplus value. Ideological constructions of this 
ambiguity tend to suggest that it is a condition of endless paradox from which the 
individual can never escape: Such an argument ignores, however, the very 
consequences of the paradoxical situation that gives rise to ambiguity in the first 
place. What is ambiguous is not a part of the natural condition of being human, nor 
necessarily that of personal, psychological inadequacies to the task of adjusting to 
modem industrialized society; this ambiguity of the individual is the internalized 
outcome of the contradictions of an unfree system, in this case, capitalism. The need 
for one being satisfied by another is something peculiar to humans - ‘elephants do not 
produce for tigers’ . 153 Alienation is such a strange form of social process that its
150 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 379.
151 Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 49.
152 Marx, Theories o f Surplus Value, vol. I, p. 390.
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appearance as an objective interrelation, which arises from the mutual influence of 
conscious individuals, is neither entirely a part of their consciousness nor completely 
subsumed by it. “Their own collisions with one another produce an alien social power 
standing above them, produce their mutual interaction as a process and power 
independent of them” . 154
Why these contradictions should exert such an influence on humanity is still 
not clear to us at this stage within Marx’s analysis. What we want to consider is what 
such states of ambiguity mean for the construction of relations between people, in 
particular the I-We relation, which appears on one level open for us to create and on 
another forcefully conditioned by circumstances. Ambiguity itself can certainly be 
the expression of the discrepancies that the system produces, discrepancies which are 
never completely mystified in the consciousness, whose material reality is inequality, 
dependence and a lack of freedom. It might well be the case, then, that the 
contemporary reproduction of this ideology is unable to escape engendering a certain 
cynicism with regard to the ideas of fairness, equality and autonomy: But this does not 
mean that the material relation upon which these ideas are based is fundamentally 
altered. As we have thus far seen, Marx attributes much about the situation the 
modem individual finds herself in to aspects of the external construction of social life, 
and most particularly to that of an unffee social existence via the unfolding of 
commodification.
Given Marx’s analysis of capitalist relations as being characteristically 
ambiguous and mystifying, what does this suggest about the role of ideology in the 
reproduction of the various forms in which relations are expressed? One of Marx’s 
central points is that the “actual” process of capitalist production gives rise to new 
formations and in these new social forms internal connections are increasingly lost -  
so much so that “production relations are rendered independent of one another, and 
the component values become ossified into forms independent of one another” . 155 
These forms become obscured by seemingly individual, separate, accidental 
functions. The forms in which production relations appear at an immediate level are 
not those forms that their connectedness reveals. 156 At an ideological level there are 
mystifying processes that occur as a result of the loss of the real connections between 
people and aspects of their social life.
134 Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 196-197.
155 Marx, Capital, vol. Ill, p. 828.
156 Ibid.
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These forms of appearances are, however, no mere illusion. Marx explicitly 
refers to the necessity of these appearances under capitalism. This emphasis upon 
mechanisms of mystification would seem at one level to suggest a certain 
functionalism in Marx’s account: If the form of relations between capital and labour is 
itself mystified, then, whilst capitalism remains, so too will its ideologies. It is not 
difficult to see that at a further level of abstraction this functionalism could easily blur 
into a fetishization of mystification, where mystified consciousness is the necessary 
outcome of the process of mystification itself. But is a delineation of the mechanisms 
by which the production process produces mystified ideas necessarily functionalist? 
Marx’s argument is that it is necessary that social relations between people manifest 
themselves as relations between things because a capitalist commodity producing 
society requires the distribution of social labour. The exchange of commodities is in 
fact the exchange of peoples’ labour but this exchange occurs on the basis of the 
exchange of commodities as equivalents, in this sense masking the real form of the 
value of labour. Marx explains that a given social relation of production “appears as 
something existing apart from individual human beings, and the distinctive relations 
into which they enter in the course of production appear as the specific properties of a 
thing” . 157 This is what is ‘a prosaically real and by no means an imaginary 
mystification’, as was mentioned earlier. Marx’s understanding of the reality of these 
ideological forms within commodification is the essential point to consider here. 
These forms are not mere fantasies or simple illusions; they are most definitely forms 
of reality. The ‘twisting and inversion of phenomena’ is real and not just an imagined 
construct, he tells us in the Grundrisse. 158 They are precisely an ideological reality. 
Again, in Capital, Marx refers to “the relations connecting the labour of one 
individual with that of the rest” as appearing “not as direct social relations between 
individuals at work, but as what they really are material relations between persons and 
social relations between things” . 159 Whilst capitalism rests upon a number of 
necessary illusions, its contradictions mean that it reveals realities within its relations 
as much as it might attempt to then confuse these realities. What Marx stresses then is 
the apparently mysterious process of reality of which ideological forms are a part; he 
does not suggest that this process is a simple illusion or mere deception. Unfreedom 
is fundamentally connected to this state of apparent reality -  a prosaic reality of 
inevitable contradiction. Let us look more closely at this issue of the prosaic reality of 
ideological reality.
137 Marx, A Contribution to the Critique o f Political Economy, p. 49.
158 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 831.
159 Marx, Capital, vol. 1, p. 73.
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‘The apparent satisfaction of need’
One of the problems Marx focuses upon is the peculiar outcome in capitalist 
society that it is capital which is “independent and has individuality, while the living 
person is dependent and has no individuality” . 160 Indeed capitalist society is marked 
by the consistent realization of an individualism which is merely external and 
material, 161 a separation imposed through external, arbitrary need. 162 People are no 
longer integrated within the community of the society; rather it is only in what they 
possess that their “characteristic of being human assumes its significance”. The 
principle of bourgeois society - the ability to enjoy, which partly depends on chance, 
determines the individual merely externally. 163 Human individuality and human 
morality have become “articles of commerce” . 164 The separation of the self from the 
other appears as one’s true existence. The self becomes a servant of her own 
creations. 165 In a world in which this system “has left remaining no other nexus 
between man and man than naked self-interest” , 166 this creation of dependence and its 
seeming effect of suppressing the ability for the individual to control and determine 
her own life, forms much of the basis for the existence of ideology within capitalist 
society. Capitalist reality has developed in this way: Thus, the fact that it appears as 
such is not the result of illusion or false perception but is its constitution as an 
appearance of objectivity. This Marx considers as an historical process in which the 
conditions for its development in this manner are actually posited. Illusion about the 
way the system operates exists but this is more likely to take the form of, what Marx 
refers to as, “necessary illusion”: Thus, when the system of exchange is taken to be 
independent from capital such an appearance is a necessary illusion. 167 Exchange, as 
Marx elaborates, is inextricably linked to capital. But because labour is so easily and 
so mistakenly separated from the conditions of its existence, commodity production 
and exchange appear to those who look at the system in its superficiality to be 
separate and independent realms. At a surface level, labour seems to disappear into 
the product it makes once this product becomes a commodity. For example, despite 
the fact that human labour is accumulated in a coat “it does not let this fact show
160 Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto, p. 65.
161 Marx, Critique o f Hegel’s ‘Philosophy o f Right’, p. 250.
162 Marx, “Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements o f Political Economy'”, p. 278.
163 Ibid., p. 269
164 Ibid., p. 264.
165 Ibid., p. 266.
166 Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto, p, 44.
167 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 509. Marx also writes of the historical necessity of inversions such as that 
between alienation of labour and the development of capital. See, ibid., p. 831.
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through”.168 From “the taste o f wheat it is not possible to tell who produced it”.169 But 
the reality is that the worker produces, not for herself, but for capital.170 Because the 
work is wage-labour it appears as paid labour; “here the money-relation conceals the 
unrequited labour of the wage-labourer”.171
In this fetishism of commodities rests much everyday confirmation of the 
dependence of human individuals: Their labour is valued according to profits that 
their products make for someone else, and what people generally see in a product is 
its value determined by its price, not the labour involved in its construction. This, for 
Marx, is their unfreedom. Ideology, in this context, exists both in the abstractions of 
this condition of dependence and in the condition of alienated labour, exchange value 
and competition marking capitalism itself because it is in this condition of capitalism 
that people experience an aspect of the reality of subjection. Marx’s early borrowings 
from Charles de Brasses’ 1760 work, On the Cult o f the Fetish Gods o f  Ancient Egypt 
and Africa, and from Hegel’s comments on the ‘fetiches’ of the African world, in the 
introduction to his Philosophy o f History, introduce us to the idea that the 
contemporary world might too have its enchanted things - its fetishes - around which 
other social relations might be organized or subsumed: “The savages of Cuba 
regarded gold as a fetish of the Spaniards. They celebrated a feast in its honour, sang 
in a circle around it and then threw it in the sea”, writes Marx, and then asks: “If the 
Cuban savages had been present at the sitting of the Rhine Province Assembly, would 
they not have regarded wood as the Rhinelanders’ fetish?”172 Whereas Hegel 
considered the power of people in relation to their ‘fetishes’, for Marx the power of 
the modem fetish was quite the reverse, it was in the fetishes’ control over people. 
For de Brasses, this fe tisso \ this enchanted, divine thing, will be honoured when it 
lives up to the promise attributed to it. Nonetheless, some “prevent themselves from 
ever seeing their fetish on account o f either reverence or fear”.173 For Marx, however,
168 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 58.
169 Marx, A Contribution to the Critique o f Political Economy, p. 28.
170 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 477.
171 Ibid., p. 505.
172 Karl Marx, “Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood”, Collected Works, vol. I, pp. 224-263.
173 Marx quotes various excerpts from Charles de Brasses’ 1760 work On the Cult o f the Fetish Gods 
o f Ancient Egypt and Africa, in a treatise he prepared but never completed on “Hegel’s Hatred of 
Religious and Christian Art”. Marx read the German translation of de Brasses by Pistorius. Passages 
in which these excerpts appear are in the Marx Engels Gesamtausgabe (Berlin, 1976), 4/1, pp. 321-329. 
Various articles written in 1842 by Marx for Rheinische Zeitung use de Brasses ideas of fetishism. 
Charles de Brasses, Du culte des dieux fetiches, c ’est-ä-dire des objets terrestres et materiels, anim ou 
inanimes, contenant leparallele de I ’ancienne religion de VEgypte avec la religion actuelle de Nigritie, 
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this fear or reverence emerged for the fetish because people see the fetish rather than 
the rest of reality.
It is also the case that this fetish has become a part of people themselves rather 
than something decisively externalized, such as that of the fetish of the Spaniards 
from the perspective of the Cubans. Modem people, it seems, have ceased to be 
willing to throw their fetish in the sea when they have finished with it. Hegel saw the 
individual’s relation to the fetish as a peculiarly African inability for consciousness to 
have attained “to the realization of any substantial objective existence” - for which 
Hegel meant God or Law. 174 For Hegel, the fetish - derived from the word feitizo, 
meaning a type of magic - cannot assume mastery over the individual: It has a kind of 
objective independence but “the human individuality remains master of the image it 
has adopted”. Thus: “If any mischance occurs which the Fetich has not averted, if 
rain is suspended, if there is a failure in the crops, they bind and beat or destroy the 
Fetich and so get rid of it, making another immediately, and thus holding it in their 
own power” . 175 When Marx proceeds to talk of fetishism in relation to the 
commodity, another element is clearly introduced: The process of fetishism is a 
mysterious process. It is not immediately apparent from what occurs, or what is real, 
exactly what the reality of the process entails. Hidden within the commodity is its 
fetishized form, neither beaten nor bound and certainly not destroyed.
This type of fetishized reality is, however, merely one important aspect of 
one’s experience of subjection within a commodity society. Most people are subject 
to the fetishizing tendencies of commodities and to the privations of alienated and 
exploited labour. Most are subject to “the same human self-alienation” , 176 however 
differently they experience this condition. Even those who exploit directly or 
indirectly are bearers of the movement of capital. 177 Can we then say that people are 
‘bearers’ of commodity relations to the extent to which they assume the roles assigned 
to them? 178 The experience of subjection Marx recognizes as more fundamental than
174 G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy o f History, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956), p. 93.
175 Ibid., p. 94.
176 Marx, The Holy Family, p. 43.
177 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 151.
178 According to Marx, people are bearers of particular relations within economic systems. This means 
that the capitalist production relation reduces the capitalist as much as the worker to a simple function 
within the production process. The production relation does not discriminate between capitalist and 
capitalist or worker and worker; all are treated by the capitalist production relation as bearers of 
economic functions. This point is stressed repeatedly in Marx’s Capital. In the first volume of 
Capital, for example, Marx refers to people as the conscious representatives or bearers of particular 
relations within capitalism. Individuals are “dealt with only in so far as they are the personifications of 
economic categories, embodiments of particular class-relations and class-interests”, as he explains in 
the Preface. Marx, Capital, vol I, p. 21. The representatives of capitalism, for example, are the
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this. What we can find in Marx is an important sense of the individual’s instantiation 
in the process of contradiction which then bears upon and directs a life lived in 
unfreedom. “In a sort of way, it is with man as with commodities”, Marx explains. 
“Since he comes into the world neither with a looking glass in his hand, nor a Fichtian 
philosopher, to whom “I am I” is sufficient, man first sees and recognises himself in 
other men” . 179 Should this necessarily express itself as a problem? Marx seems to 
equate mutual recognition with a certain distancing the individual feels from her own 
self-knowledge. The self is distanced from herself in community, or perhaps here 
commences the struggle to clamber towards self-knowledge. In this state the potential 
for recognition through empathy, envy, equality, objectification or subjection begins. 
At the same time the experience of subjection gives rise to “a mass of antithetical 
forms” , 180 an “antinomy” , 181 an “unavoidable antagonism” , 182 in which Marx sees the 
potential for change. 183 This experience “contains the conditions for going beyond
conscious bearers of the circulation of money as capital rather than necessarily being people whose 
psychological characteristics compel them to control others. Ibid., p. 151. So too does Althusser stress 
this point when he says that both capitalist and worker “must submit to the law of a production relation, 
which is a relation of exploitation, therefore an antagonistic class relation”. Althusser, Essays in Self- 
Criticism, p. 202. Marx’s description of the structure of the movement of capital places clear emphasis 
upon the actions and processes of which the capitalist is representative, rather than that of the 
individual motivations of the capitalist; “it is only in so far as the appropriation of ever more and more 
wealth in the abstract becomes the sole motive of his operations, that he functions as a capitalist, that is, 
as capital personified and endowed with consciousness and a will”. Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 151. 
Individuals are bearers of economic relations not in the sense that they have no active part within these 
relations, but as social beings within particular societies, their actions can be understood in relation to 
these relations. Marx’s point is that it is precisely because they are parties to these relations, precisely 
because they enter into contracts, according to their distribution among classes, that they are held 
within these relations, and it is because they are held within these relations that they are therefore a 
party to them. Ibid. This also sounds much like the point emphasized in Althusser’s arguments on 
individuals as the bearers of economic relations. But as we have seen, Althusser’s particular use of this 
idea is substantially altered from that of Marx. See, for example, Althusser, “Is it Simple to be a 
Marxist in Philosophy?”, in Essays in Self-Criticism, especially pp. 200-207.
179 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 59, n. 1. Marx considers that “Peter only establishes his own identity as a 
man by first comparing himself to Paul as being of like kind. And thereby Paul, just as he stands in his 
Pauline personality, becomes to Peter the type of the genus homo”. Ibid.
180 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 159.
181 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 225.
182 Ibid., p. 313.
183 One consequence Marx sees in the fact that the same conditions that separate workers from the 
means of production and subsistence and mystify the nature of labour (in other words those conditions 
which provide the basis for capitalist exploitation) are those conditions that indicate the advance of the 
working classes through their collective mobilization. For example, the wage contract appears to the 
worker as a reality determined primarily as a result of his or her relation of dependence upon those in 
control of labour; but in circumstances where workers are able to confront the power of capital with the 
collective power of withdrawing their labour, the dependent nature of their relation to capital rapidly 
unravels. Another consequence to be found in the processes of fetishization and alienation is in the 
process of the obscuring of the real nature of the exploitative social relations of capitalism. This 
obscuring of social relations indicates a complex process whereby consciousness and material 
conditions are intertwined in the ideas that develop to explain and justify particular conditions. Marx’s 
theoretical understanding of this process is in his depiction of a structure that explains the various
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it” i84 w hat it is to be human within the experience of unfreedom is then a controlling 
and yet an ultimately undecided and fractured series of events.
What Marx makes clear is that an unfree system can only ever provide an 
‘apparent satisfaction of need’.185 This appearance of satisfaction involves the 
participation of the subject, and, indeed, could not proceed without it, but the allure of 
seeming satisfaction can never be fully realized in satiated desire. The apparent 
satisfaction of need is no more than a “crude barbarism of need”. Its true manner is 
indeed “self-stupefaction”.186 Again, we see that Marx’s analysis of the interrelation 
between subject and object primarily involves positing the potential dynamic that this 
dialectical form constitutes. What this means for the subject’s reconciliation with 
herself seems to involve an engagement with the future and the ever decreasing 
distance that antinomic relations within and between subject and object can manifest 
as. Is there anything more that Marx reveals of the subject’s contradictory passage to 
self-knowledge? We are told that the tendency towards comparison also gives rise to 
its potential “beauty and greatness” in its “spontaneous interconnection” of 
individuals.187 This bond is an “historic product”, a product of individuals.188 It is 
indeed this ‘practical-critical activity’189 that the materialism of Marx’s time had 
ignored.190 Even the existence of antagonism, however, is no guarantee of the 
rejection of fetishization and dependence.
elements of the social relations involved at the level of appearances and at the level of what is not 
immediately visible.
184 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 161.
185 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 363.
186 Ibid.
187 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 161.
188 Ibid., p. 162.
189 Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, Thesis I, p. 422.
190 See, for example, The Holy Family, in which Marx criticizes the materialism of the eighteenth 
century for its mechanistic and wholly external explanation of phenomena. Whilst Marx speaks of the 
importance of the material forces of life in determining consciousness, consciousness is an historical 
product and as such is a product of active human intentions. In addition, Sayer’s argument that claims 
for primacy need at least to be sufficiently nuanced in order to do justice to Marx’s intentions, is 
worthwhile making in this context. See Sayer, The Violence o f Abstraction, p. 9. Marx’s view is 
directly counterposed to the materialism he sought to criticize. This materialism held that people were 
merely passive products of their circumstances and fated to ever remain so, rather than as the practical 
agents of social transformation. Consciousness is a part of this process. It is not counterposed to 
activity; activity is itself a conscious process. Objective reality is not “a thing given direct from all 
eternity, remaining ever the same”, it is an historical product of human activity. Marx, Preface to A 
Contribution to the Critique o f Political Economy, p. 425. At the same time, conscious activity is not 
merely subjective experience. Marx’s criticism of idealism centres on this point. The nature of the 
practice of the transformation of historical conditions Marx conceives in a very particular way: “The 
coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived 
and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice”. This statement is from Marx’s third point of
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We have seen how Marx understands a state of unfreedom and how he 
conceptualizes the place of the individual within external and yet then very 
internalized conditions of the lack of freedom. Let us prefigure our later discussion of 
spirituality as the contradiction of the ideological, and conclude our examination of 
the subject of ideology as a ‘calculating slave’ by first considering more specifically 
what it is Marx theorizes of the problem of ideological estrangement.
‘Finding oneself in someone else’s house’: The Problem of Ideological
Estrangement
What we have so far considered in Marx’s understanding of ideology as 
alienated life is that a world in which the free development of individuality cannot 
ensue is a world in which forms of psychological, seemingly unconscious, or 
mystified control will emerge. In this part of the chapter we will consider in more 
detail how this process is theorized. It is not that the individual begins to feel at home 
in her own alienated self. In Marx’s startlingly provocative phrase, the individual 
finds herself, “in someone else’s house” . 191 This is where ideology resides, in a place 
both familiar and alien, a place in which the battle for the expression of life is always 
present. One can make oneself at home, or leave. This is the choice that Marx 
outlines for humanity. The sort of dehumanization fundamental to unfree societies is 
the basis, as we have seen, upon which Marx theorizes that the economic enslavement 
of capitalism that has been able to develop. Its hold is as tenuous and tenacious as its 
ideological grip, which Marx sets out to comprehend in order to undermine.
What then might this signify if the effect of the ideological does not mean that 
one feels at home in one’s alienated humanity but rather that one finds oneself in a 
place that had not been anticipated and yet which appears, superficially at least, to 
display all the hallmarks of familiarity and naturalness? Its familiarity leads to a 
besetting, ingrained irresistible habit, a habit to which one easily becomes 
accustomed, not because ‘someone else’s house’ is the same as our own but because 
we domesticate its difference and acclimatize to any residual desuetude. This, we can
criticism against Feuerbach. Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, Thesis III, p. 422. What Marx means here 
by ‘revolutionary practice’ is somewhat open to conjecture. Marx himself emphasizes a number of 
points: That capitalism, as an anarchic system, constantly revolutionizes itself; change occurs in 
relation to the structures of the capitalist mode itself. Marx argues that it is not only the constant 
revolutionizing of production but also the “uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions” which 
distinguishes the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. See Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto, 
p. 45. These structures in fact play a decisive role in the determination of the transformation of 
historical conditions and are a part of the constant changes and processes of human existence.
191 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 366.
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deduce, is a disconcerting place to be. Such an understanding enables us to break out 
of a view of the ideological as the necessity of an unrecognized and unrecognizable 
oppression -  the sort of approach we have encountered in the particular theorizations 
of ideology we considered in the previous two chapters. But despite an acute 
sensitivity to the psychological ramifications of egoistic individualism, we will need 
to look closely at whether Marx deals adequately with the variety of areas of psychic 
liberation humanity is best able to pursue.
The concept of humanity, of what it is to be human and its radical incipience, 
is vital to Marx’s critique of unfreedom because he sees in a humanity engaged in 
actively comprehending itself, values worthy of human struggle. In humanity resides 
an aspect of the materiality of ideas. Battles within and against ideas take place 
ultimately in an embodied state. Ideologies are variable, active and interactive, as 
well as being the product of activity. People can look upon themselves and pursue 
activities as “universal and free” beings. 192 Without this freedom people are not only 
estranged from others but are estranged from themselves. 193 As we have seen, Marx 
sees this ancient struggle against dehumanization of immense and increasing 
significance, particularly within the alienation, reification and blanketed 
commodification of capitalism. This struggle is not universal, as such, but is a part of 
all internally divided and opposed societies. Humanity is realized in concrete social 
relations through any ideological battle in which it might become engaged. 194
A striving for freedom inevitably has a context. For as much as humanity is 
capable of freedom and, indeed, of anything for that matter, a materiality of time and 
place and circumstance intervenes in this process. People are able to create a mirror 
in which is reflected the realization of their individuality in its uniqueness, the 
enjoyment of their creativity, the satisfaction of an awareness of human need and of 
its mediation by society, and the confirmation of existence in thought and love: But 
how people define their being is also determined by those guiding images inviting
192 Ibid., p. 327.
193 Ibid., p.328.
194 In works such as the Grundrisse and Capital it is clear that Marx views the condition of people 
within society dialectically, from its abstraction to a concretion in particular societies. He does not 
argue that conditions pass from one particularity to another but that they are a part of separate 
concretions and particularities. Nor does Marx suppose any historical determination of the passage 
from one concretion to another. In any given, concrete particularity humanity occupies a condition 
realized in the transition of a concrete to an abstract relation and from an actual to a potential state. 
Ideas and their relation to humanity do not occupy a gestaltist abstraction of the determination of 
human beings and nature: Nor do they emerge as a part of any Cartesian determination of humanity as 
the determination of mind. Marx’s ‘Sixth Thesis’ on Feuerbach states clearly that the idea of the 
isolated individual is an abstraction - humanity is instead an ensemble of social relations. Marx, Theses 
on Feuerbach, Thesis VI, p. 423.
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imitation with which particular societies are associated. Capitalist society, for Marx, 
is one of widespread alienation. It is, as later theorists will come to characterize it, a 
society whose guiding image is the unheroic ‘employee’; Spartacus, the modem 
individual is not. 195 This is not to suggest that alienation is capable of reducing all 
virtues to the level of selfish defect. The non-egotistical hovers even where the 
practice of self-centredness prevails. Even in bourgeois terms, ideals are promoted 
that arouse dissatisfaction with the given. As we will see in more detail shortly, Marx 
focuses upon the citoyen in his various discussions of the French Revolution for this 
very reason. These ideals structure the idea of a possible humanity as much as does 
the practice of commodification. Nonetheless, Marx argues, consciousness is 
transformed through estrangement. 196 Spontaneous and free activity is reduced to a 
means when people devalue and are themselves devalued. When one’s life is no 
longer one’s own creation then existence is necessarily grounded outside itself. 197
This “devaluation of the human world” 198 would seem to be both a generalized 
and a highly personalized experience of estrangement. People are not only alienated 
from their world but are estranged from their spiritual selves and their own bodies. 199 
In such a situation the circumstances one is able to freely choose seem, not so 
surprisingly, more constrained. We have already suggested something beyond a 
simple belief in the will as a psychological and technological product; there are 
clearly limits to any impulse and, most particularly, to that of freedom. The will itself 
is often divided, cast in restlessness and ambiguity. It is apparent that Marx does not 
separate the realm of the psychological from the social; the alienation of the spirit 
takes place within social circumstances - circumstances of intense interest. Marx 
explains why the history of activity has presented itself as the ‘open book’ of the 
capacities of people and why these aspects suggest a “psychology present in tangible 
form” . 200 There is obviously a problem with this if it is claimed that the open book is 
somehow more real - but Marx seems to suggest otherwise. He emphasizes how a 
psychology needs to be grasped in its connection with the nature of people and not 
viewed in its “external utilitarian aspect”. A psychology of humanity’s self-estranged
195 Marx often criticizes the German bourgeoisie for asserting its own narrowness and allowing this 
narrowness to be used against it. He claims that the morality and honour o f this class is that of a 
“modest egoism”. Marx, Critique o f Hegel’s ‘Philosophy ofRight ’, pp. 254, 255.
196 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 329.
197 Ibid., p. 356.
198 Ibid., p. 323.
199 Ibid., p. 329.
200 Ibid., p. 354.
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activity has been a closed book even though its contents would reveal “an extended 
wealth of human activity” and, most apparently, the existence of “common need” . 201
The question certainly arises as to whether Marx puts forward an abstract 
method of thought in relation to the concept of humanity. Much dissatisfaction has 
emerged with theories whose certainty in the human self appears to overstep social 
practices. Marx’s work is often seen as totemic in this regard - a humanity capable of 
overturning alienation is viewed as a flippant disregard for the fact that no real barrier 
to dehumanization has been successfully maintained. If his view of humanity is one 
of simple self-confidence in the ability of people to triumph over any depredation of 
reality then it would tend to follow that ideology represents the block to an unfolding 
of reason. Ideology, in this sense, prevents people from reaching their true nature or 
participates in the process by which they are accommodated within their own 
dehumanization. And yet, as we have seen, this is not an understanding of ideology 
we need to take from Marx. Perhaps this is due partly to what Marx sees of value in 
humanity and partly the result of his opposition to empty, ahistorical abstractions 
which put forward generic concepts of humanity.
Marx’s attack upon abstract ideals of humankind and their anthropological 
concepts is best conveyed in his critique of Ludwig Feuerbach. According to Marx, 
there is merely an empty connection made by Feuerbach between the individual and 
the generality that avoids the problem of their relation by omitting society and its core 
of human activity. 202 Humanity in this sense is merely a symbol of an abstract 
conceptualization of experience. There is, for Marx, no unity of the person; rather 
there is an historical and social openness. Not even the ego is so fixed that what it is 
capable of doing is predetermined and thus incapable of renewal. Marx’s problem 
with Feuerbach’s theorization is not that an ethics is absent from his work but that a 
sense of the future is not integrated into this ethics. Indeed where Feuerbach presents 
a fuller picture of the nature of humanity in these terms Marx readily acknowledges 
his genius. Marx considers the theoretical unity offered by Feuerbach’s Philosophie 
der Zukunft (Philosophy o f the Future) and his Wesen des Glaubens (Essence o f 
Faith) to have provided “a philosophical basis for socialism” . 203 We will see later that 
much of Marx’s discussion in Capital of the outcome of humanity within the confines 
of mechanized work is directed towards outlining how a partial individuality based 
upon the dictates of automatic mechanism can be replaced with a developed
201 Ibid.
202 Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, Thesis VI, p. 423.
203 Karl Marx to Ludwig Feuerbach, August 11, 1844, Collected Works, vol. Ill, p. 354.
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individuality occurring vitally within society: But what does Marx mean in his 
elevation of the idea of a socialized humanity? 204
Certainly a socialized humanity is not to be found in any extant generality, 
including that of the worker, but emerges out of the difficult process of the struggle 
for freedom. What this freedom means is also of course a relevant question 
particularly as Marx chooses to contrast it with a realm of necessity. We have already 
seen that Marx’s sense of an emancipated humanity describes more than those 
exploited by labour. It includes all those who suffer degradation and the 
dehumanizing effects of the system. What it is to be human and to possess such 
capacities to challenge dehumanization “is no abstraction inherent in each singular 
individual”; it is, rather, a part of the social relations in which people exist.205 In this 
sense there is no simple individually verifiable human essence to which Marx sees the 
person as capable of returning. Humanity is rather a tendency, a process of society, a 
potential ability to achieve the “release of the richness of human nature”. And this 
realm of freedom, we will stress again, “actually begins only where labour determined 
by necessity and mundane considerations ceases” . 206 A world of deprivation and 
external expediency is not a world worthy of people’s human nature. 207 What much 
twentieth century doubt over humanity and its capabilities relates to is a doubt in the 
possibility of a better future, of any coming Kingdom when captives shall be free, the 
sick healed, and the oppressed released into a prevailing harmony. There is, 
throughout much Marxist work, an assumption of a future human cataclysmic event 
heralding this imagined Kingdom. Critics of the possibility of transformation also 
take this assumption seriously by way of criticizing its likelihood. Marx wavers 
between casting humanity in a role of a participant in an event in history and seeing 
its capacity for a state of transformed consciousness in the present, a consciousness 
which relies upon some sense of the future.
Transformation is both inside and outside humanity. If humanity fails to know 
its capacity for transformation then it will remain a slave to that which it does not 
recognize. But the recognition of enslavement is hardly straightforward. This is 
partly because the ideological is not simply that which is false. It is the case that even 
the more laudatory principles of generality such as that contained within the image of
204 Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, Thesis X, p. 423. 
203 Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, Thesis VI, p. 423.
206 Marx, Capital, vol. Ill, p. 820.
207 Ibid.
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the citoyen can also constitute ideology of the most flexible kind. 208 Marx’s 
Eighteenth Brumaire considers the ideological within the context of historical struggle 
and the transposition of ideas germane to the Second Republic. There is a phantom 
objectivity in ideas, just as there is in money and the commodity more generally. 
Here, Marx presents the theatre of history. Subjective and objective interact. There is 
no Cartesian divide between subjective and objective worlds across which 
consciousness and materiality cannot traverse. Marx considers the historical 
destruction of ideas at the hands of Louis Bonaparte: “liberte, egalite, fratemite [...] all 
has vanished like a phantasmagoria before the spell of a man whom even his enemies 
do not make out to be a sorcerer” .209 The ideas and their enacted practices are Tike a 
phantasmagoria’ and yet they are not merely a disappearing vapour. They are not the 
incense of false consciousness. The dream of revolution contains within it the ideals 
of something beyond that which exists, and it is something in the dream, in this 
embellishment, which remains.
Marx looks closely at how easily ideals can be transformed and incorporated; 
in this case, at the failure of liberal-republican ideals to be realized.210 It is clear in 
Marx’s analysis that there is no easy, straightforward object for the simplicity of a 
unified subject to grasp. These categories are thrown into the contradictory 
interrelation that their materiality entails. 211 The ideological aspect of defeated ideals, 
of longing unmet, is an expression of this contradiction. Marx is careful not to adopt
208 This Marx considers in the case of the French Revolution. The Revolution showed that the terms 
upon which the bourgeoisie might seek emancipation did not correspond entirely with the conditions 
for the emancipation of society more broadly. Poverty and dehumanization continued to exist for 
working people despite revolution and revolutionary ideas. Ideas are a part of material reality; 
materiality is a part of ideas. There is no counterposition involved in Marx’s understanding. Nor is 
this a position arrived at only in his later work. In a letter to his father written in 1837 Marx says that 
he is “seeking the idea in reality itself’. Marx to Heinrich Marx, Berlin, 10 November, 1837, Collected 
Works, \ ol. l,pp. 10-21.
209 Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire, p. 151 (translation slightly altered).
210 And here he finds an odd mixture of the “enthusiastic striving for innovation, yet a more 
fundamental retention of the old routine; a greater appearance of harmony throughout the whole 
society, yet a more profound alienation between its constituent parts”. Ibid., p. 153. Marx is far from 
being mistaken as to how seamless this process of incorporation can appear. But nor is he lulled into a 
defeatist heresy of objectivist automatism by this seeming failure of ideals. The time is driven by 
contradictory demands. Bonaparte “brings the whole bourgeois economy into confusion, violates 
everything that seemed inviolable to the revolution of 1848, makes some tolerant of revolution and 
others desirous of revolution, creates anarchy itself in the name of order”. Ibid., pp. 248-249.
211 For Marx, thought expresses, implicitly and explicitly, mediated connections between phenomena. 
It is these mediated connections that the ideological attempts to conceal. Thought is concrete; it exists 
in relation to something. It is merely scholastic, Marx argues, if it assumes a closed immanence. 
Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, Thesis II. Activity is, therefore, always some part of thought - in the 
realization or potentiality of consciousness. Holding particular ideas and beliefs is not a merely passive 
process but involves active construction and interpretation of thought. This means, of course, that a 
vast array of ideas may make up a given consciousness.
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an attitude of cynical posturing to the ideology of ‘rights’ encapsulated in French 
revolutionary ideals. Nor does he abstract from conditions of political emancipation 
to one’s situation in general. People are able at one and the same time to lead 
imaginary and prosaically real lives. This “double life, a life in heaven and a life on 
earth, not only in [...] mind, in [...] consciousness, but in reality” , 212 enables and 
structures the ideological. Marx considers the distinction between the droits de 
l ’komme and the droits du citoyen in order to show that “the so-called rights of man 
[...] are quite simply the rights of the member of civil society, i.e. of egoistic man, of 
man separated from other men and from the community” . 213 This right of the person 
to freedom is premised not on association between people but on their separation. It 
is indeed the right of separation, “the right of the restricted individual” , 214 the right of 
self-interest. In the rights of the citoyen is the abstract ideal of community, a sphere 
which is degraded to that level where people behave as partial beings, the rights of 
man. It is then the person as bourgeois, as a member of civil society and not as a 
citizen of a community “who is taken as the real and authentic man” , 215 and the idea of 
the person as citizen is seen as merely allegorical. 216 Human emancipation requires 
that individuals ‘resume into themselves’ the substance of the ideal of the abstract 
citizen, of community.217 Marx’s critique of the ideology of rights is, then, as much an 
examination of the problems of proclamations of bourgeois rights as it is a positive 
emphasis upon abstract ideals. His critique does not treat the ideology of rights as a 
form of false consciousness but as an antagonistic form in which various 
contradictory tensions are played out. But do we have any better sense of how and 
why the individual takes on the consequences of these contradictions?
We have already considered that, for Marx, a part of the materiality of human 
consciousness is formed from the experience of suffering - a suffering in which the 
full potential of the self and the aporia of the human condition is realized. Marx 
describes the joy to be found in this knowing of the self, and various aspects of his 
work are directed towards the belief that this pathlessness can be an inner strength 
through which one’s communion with society might be affirmed. We will see later 
that this understanding of suffering places Marx at a considerable distance from the 
orthodox Christian and Judaic understanding of human suffering as a condition 
derived from human fault or sin that requires some external judgement in order for it
212 Marx, On the Jewish Question, p. 220.
213 Ibid., p. 229.
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid., p. 231.
216 Ibid., p. 234.
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to be overcome. One might suggest that Marx’s understanding of suffering is closer 
to that held by some of the early Christian mystics; for example, Tauler, the 
fourteenth century Dominican mystic, who viewed inner, personal suffering as a mark 
of holiness because it invites self-contemplation. 218 What we need above all, Marx 
tells us, is “confession”: “To obtain forgiveness for its sins mankind needs only to 
declare them for what they are” . 219 More broadly, in his criticism of religion, Marx 
considers that a view of suffering as an externally imposed sense of sin acts merely as 
an affirmation of the given order of society - an order in which unnecessary terror, 
pain and confusion mark the lives of many people. The other sort of needless 
suffering, on which his work focuses, comprises historical instances of anguish and 
terror to which humanity is best situated in a stance of opposition.
From this we might theorize that through self-knowledge one is best able to 
understand and intervene in the process of the various impulses by which humanity is 
driven. One need not be a passive recipient of one’s experience. People are the 
initiators of their experience, and, for this reason, ideology need not have the 
seemingly solid power it assumes.220 Human agency in this sense is inevitably
217 Ibid.
218 “Just as the hart is hunted by hounds, so men who are beginners in the spiritual life are pursued by 
temptations as soon as they turn away from the world [...] Before, the soul was barely conscious of 
temptation; now, however, it is aware of being hunted [...] Have you understood how God leads the 
soul along wondrous paths, and how He reveals Himself in His works? [...] He has led the Beloved 
along wondrous and awesome paths into that innermost abyss which is He Himself’. Johannes Tauler, 
Sermons, trans. Maria Shrady (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), Sermon 11.
219 Marx to Ruge, September 1843, Early Writings, p. 209.
220 In the Grundrisse, Marx argues that under those social conditions which assume the form of 
objective powers a type of individual freedom reigns - that of free competition - but this is nothing 
other than “the most complete suspension of all individual freedom”, the “most complete subjugation 
of individuality”. Marx, Grundrisse, p. 652. Here he talks of the necessity people have for “creative 
activity” and an emotional relation to one’s activity rather than the ‘subjective poverty’ that capitalism 
entails. Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 614, 613, 453. In various works, Marx emphasizes the idea of the 
existence of a range of constraints upon the extemporised or intended outcome of activity. This has 
given rise to considerable dispute as to how the process of the determination of history by actions and 
structures might actually take place. For example, one of the well known passages from Marx’s work, 
The Eighteenth Brumaire o f Louis Bonaparte, is commonly interpreted as suggesting the subjection of 
human agency to determinants beyond the mere choice, will, or, at times, even the comprehension of 
real, living people. “Men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under 
circumstances they themselves have chosen, but under the given and inherited circumstances with 
which they are directly confronted”. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire, p. 146. For it is the “tradition of 
the dead generations [which] weighs like a nightmare on the minds of the living”. Ibid. These 
differences in emphasis are not evidence of wholesale conceptual changes but merely shifting 
examinations of the same central problem. In accordance with a narrowness of interpretation often 
given to the meaning of concepts and categories used by Marx is a limited construal and definition of 
terms. Thus Marx’s use of the term Wesen is usually construed as essence, nature or beings or a being: 
But for Marx what is essential is meant in the sense of whatever is, in the here and now, of the reality 
that human beings face. See, for example, Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 343. In 
the glossary accompanying Marx’s Early Writings under the entry for ‘Essence, nature of man’ the 
somewhat curious claim is made that “Marx regularly exploits the fact that the word [Wesen] carries
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interwoven into the complex interplay of ‘circumstances’ in which people may find 
themselves situated. These circumstances might indeed present people with situations 
not previously comprehended, actively sought and pursued, or those which 
necessarily exist under some degree of their control.221 One need not live in a state of 
constant and unresponsive unconsciousness, of an unrooted unawareness of the self, 
subject to instability, doubt and division and the disturbing daydream of unreality and 
illusion. One need not be in a perpetual state of fleeing without strength, of 
deficiency and a lack of fulfilment. Opposition to enslavement and its ideologies 
constitutes the constant hope Marx has in humanity. Spartacus is obviously Marx’s 
hero for this very reason.222 Marx argues that value can come through a humanity in
[...] diverse meanings, and in doing so enters territory where the translator cannot follow”. See Ibid., 
p. 430. Unfortunately this attitude has prepared the ground for more often than not a narrowness of 
interpretation of terms and an unwillingness to allow the spirit of the meaning to take precedence over 
technical definitions. This sense of being is, then, what the processes of history create of the human 
being. Marx is opposed to an abstract otherwordliness - one needs to find redemption in what is, not in 
an empty previous existence or a beyond. “To comprehend what is, is the task of philosophy” says 
Hegel. “Hie Rhodas, hie saltus!” an inner demand to comprehend leads to a reconciliation with 
actuality. This phrase is Hegel’s variant (Here is the rose, dance thou here!) upon the Latin phrase used 
in one of Aesop’s fables. Hegel’s phrase appears in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. 
Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 11.
221 Whilst these two views of the relationship between structure and agency have, perhaps not 
surprisingly, resulted in conflicting interpretations of the capacity of people to make history, the most 
useful response to this conflict seems not to substitute a perceived ambiguity with a misleading 
derogation of either human agency or structures but to explain the relation of structures and agency in 
terms of those conditions which can be specified. In this way, instead of seeing unbridgeable chasms 
within Marx’s early and later works, as many commentators tend to do, it can be argued that it is of 
greater use to plot shifts in terms of the development of Marx’s theoretical position. The shift as 
outlined above, suggesting Marx’s greater emphasis in some of his work upon relations determining the 
social conditions under which people experience the system in which they live, can be interpreted as 
part of the development of Marx’s analysis towards an investigation of particular circumstances 
peculiar to capitalist economies. An analysis of these circumstances does not necessarily give rise to 
an emphasis upon either structural or subjective determinants but allows for an examination of the 
specificity of their interaction. Marx sets out a range of concepts in order to explain aspects of the 
system precisely so as to give systematic meaning to structural and subjective determinants. For it is 
only in their relation to generally specifiable particularities of capitalist systems that structural and 
subjective determinants acquire their significance. Thus it would seem inappropriate to argue that in a 
work such as Capital, where Marx is concerned to develop theories explaining identifiable tendencies 
and where the description of such tendencies results in emphases upon structural determinants, that this 
is a dismissal of the significance of human agency. Whilst Marx refers repeatedly to people as agents 
of particular economic and social relations this is not to suggest their passivity in relation to the 
dynamic force of structures, or to deny their activity any intentionality or deliberation; it is, rather, to 
explain the complexity of the interrelated conditions in which the historically concrete interplay of 
class activity and structural conditions may take place.
222 In Fromm’s Marx’s Concept of Man, a manuscript entitled “Confession” written by Marx’s 
daughter Laura is reproduced which is the written document of a game called ‘Confessions’ Marx 
played with his young children. In the game Marx was asked about a variety of his favourite things; for 
example, Marx’s favourite poets were Shakespeare, Aeschylus, and Goethe; his favourite heroes, 
Spartacus and Kepler; his idea of happiness, to fight; his idea of misery, submission; and his most hated 
quality, servility. See ibid., p. 257. Kolakowski also refers to these answers to Marx’s daughters’ 
‘questionnaire’. See Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, vol I, The Founders, p. 412; and Francis 
Wheen’s biography of Marx, Karl Marx has a full reproduction of Marx’s answers. Francis Wheen, 
Karl Marx (London: Forth Estate, 2000), pp. 387-388.
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mediation with itself and its world, but this is not put forward as any inevitable 
process.223 For Marx, nature and one’s nature can be brought together but this does not 
prevent him from wondering why a grasp on freedom seems so historically shaky and 
unclear. Marx’s emphasis is upon the social relationships into which people enter that 
are frequently tom asunder; it is the human consciousness which is riven with desires, 
with struggles in and against ideologies. In criticism of Proudhon, Marx explains that 
one’s consciousness is played out within the context of one’s social circumstances - 
“human being A is not a slave, he is a slave in and through society” .224 Marx criticizes 
more generally the notion of any “presupposed perennial subject” 225 and views an 
inability to see otherwise as “the barbarism of mindless objectivity” . 226
In his discussion of slavery in The Philosophy o f History, Hegel argues that 
the essential principle of slavery is that the enslaved “has not yet attained a 
consciousness of his freedom, and consequently sinks down to a mere Thing - an 
object of no value”. Life, says Hegel, “has a value only when it has something 
valuable as its object” . 227 Marx takes much to be of consequence in the reduction of 
people to the level of things and also argues that a consciousness of one’s freedom has 
to be grasped for humanity to shift beyond a realm of need and external necessity. 
Only then can the richness of humanness be realized. The refusal of slavery, the 
finding of a solution to this particular riddle of history, outlines to Marx the
221 The open-ended nature of Marx’s conceptualization of humanity and human capabilities is clear. 
There is no essence of humanity in the sense of a universal absolute. What is real for Marx in the 
capacities of humanity is something potential and yet always realizable. There are tendencies within 
the real but the real itself, as in a realized freedom, does not yet exist. Very little of this openness, if 
indeed any at all, is captured in the more typical debates surrounding the issue of Marx’s view of 
humanity and its relation to ideology. This is most particularly the case with the interminable 
structure/agency tussle that has dominated much contemporary Marxist theorising. Marx has no time 
for any variety of pre-ordained teleological argumentation that insists upon positing a fixed, settled 
notion of either structure or agency, or both. Often in Marx’s work there is a clear emphasis upon the 
subjective element of human agency in the determination of historical change. In The Holy Family, for 
example, Marx and Engels contend that: ‘'History does nothing, it ‘possesses no immense wealth,’ it 
‘wages no battles.’ It is man, real, living man, that does all that, that possesses and fights; ‘history’ is 
not a person apart, using man as a means for its own particular aims; history is nothing but the activity 
of man pursuing his aims”. Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 110. Human agency is in this sense 
the fundamental determinant of economic and social history; history is that which is formed by the 
active pursuits of dynamic human beings. It should be noted that Marx is here, at one level, setting his 
analysis against those idealist philosophies that posit a certain passivity in relation to the individual’s 
capacity to engage with the non-human forces of history which accounts for some of this emphasis 
upon ‘real, living man’ for the development of his social ontology at this period. There are other 
passages in Marx’s writings that consider in greater detail this idea of human agency and the pursuit of 
aims and include, in this consideration, more of the context in which activity within capitalism takes 
place.
224 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 265.
225 Ibid., p. 323.
226 Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State”, p. 175.
227 Hegel, The Philosophy o f History, p. 96.
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possibility of freedom. This does not mean that the possibility of a shattering of the 
potential of this freedom exists also - but this is rarely touched upon by Marx.
It is undoubtedly in many ways more difficult today to feel assured that history 
will yield any such dialectical potential but so too is it difficult to maintain that only 
acceptance and conformism are now a necessarily ordained outcome. For Marx, there 
is obviously an unfinished solution, there is unrealized potential in the struggle for 
freedom. To what extent there is an adequate theorization of the delusion of 
consciousness beyond the power of mythology, fetishization and the product of 
abstraction is not easy to immediately assess. Marx was writing at a time before the 
mass engorgement on commodities was to lay bare the question of a drunken and yet 
unslaken thirst: And yet his interest in the internal quality of experience is obvious, an 
unconscious of symbols and images which is not simply naked and never simply 
recognized. What is more apparent is that if ideology is not a basic matter of identity, 
where that which is suppressed makes adequate one’s subjective identity to a false 
object, then we are still left with the problem of the devaluation of the self into the 
objects of an alienated existence. This is obviously Marx’s central preoccupation, the 
attempt to, at the very least, outline history’s riddle. Ideology is not limited to the 
products of the mind nor is it simply a part of the objective existence of capitalism. It 
is for this reason that humanity and its capacity for freedom is at the core of Marx’s 
approach to ideology. The human psyche bears within itself the potential for 
liberation or enslavement. The desire to remain unconscious is great - ideology can 
play the part of both an internal and external form of constraint against the struggle 
for freedom and yet so too is it inevitably bound up with the very terms of this 
struggle.
What we have here is primarily a critique of the conditions of humanity that 
result in dehumanization, but we can also detect some attempt at an analysis of the 
susceptibility of humanity itself, faced with the processes of its degradation. The 
problem that Marx pursues is that, in capitalist society, the process of 
commodification is the contractual reduction of human potential to the level of a 
commodity. It is the level of the egocentric, the level of the use of one person by 
another, which detaches people from their relation to themselves and others. There is 
in this kind of enslavement a different sort of authority exercised in the control of 
commodity production over the producers than that which exists in the control of 
slaves and serfs as such. 228 In capitalism it is an authority that relies upon a particular 
sort of compliance in which an internalization of contractual equality is paramount.
228 Marx, Capital, vol. Ill, p. 881.
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This internalization takes an ideological form. Marx’s objection to this is his 
objection to any society based upon subjugation and mere necessity. Marx argues 
unequivocally for a society without masters and slaves. In capitalism the glaring 
opposition between freedom and necessity attempts to take a more subliminal form: 
Under these conditions the abstract purpose of ideology is to mythologize reality.
What it is to be human can in these circumstances be utterly transformed. The 
‘rights of man’ can emerge as another form of egotism rather than as the bearer of 
social freedom. Marx looks at the most significant aspects of the system of 
exploitative profit to judge where in his own world humanity resides. The inhumanity 
of “a world of hucksters, in which everyone gets his advantage” 229 is the world of 
capitalism. There is no assurance in a real become rational and a rational real, in 
which Hegel believed. For Marx, this is not only an abstract, baroque resolution to a 
continuing problem230 but is suggestive of the wrong question being asked. “If I 
negate powdered wigs, I am still left with unpowdered wigs” he baldly states. 231 
History and its “vale of tears” 232 continues to exist whether ideology persists or 
unravels. Humanism can only be that which positively originates in itself, not an 
abstraction or flight from what is real. 233 People are suffering, conditioned and limited 
beings as much as they are active beings with dispositions, capacities and vital 
powers.234 The solution to the riddle of history exists but it is not to be found in 
simply believing that all things could be as they ought to be. What exists is the power 
of redemption; people can only redeem themselves through “the total redemption of 
humanity” .235
The issue of redemption returns us to many of the problems Marx detects 
within an unfree existence. Principal amongst these is the significance of slave-type 
behaviour within the dictates of commodity life. It was not merely in parlour game 
banter that Marx expressed the quality he most hated in people, that of servility; his 
opposition to servility pervades all his work. The existence of slave behaviour poses 
the problem of how people become steeped in a servile attitude and how they might 
break out of it. It is to this idea that we must turn our attention more closely to 
understand why it is Marx sees the subject as begirt by an objectivity of both
229 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 441.
230 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 397.
231 Ibid., p.245.
232 Ibid., p. 244.
233 Ibid., p. 395.
234 Ibid., p. 389.
235 Marx, Critique o f Hegel’s ‘Philosophy o f Right’, p. 256.
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constraint and possibility. We will now consider what I take to be one of the most 
decisive elements of Marx’s critique of ideology and unfreedom that emerges out of 
his analysis of estrangement -  the notion of the ‘calculating slave’.
The Calculating Slave
One of the most important aspects of Marx’s work is his emphasis upon 
relations as social, human relations. 236 People are both “the actors and authors of their 
own history” . 237 If people are the authors of their own history then criticism needs to 
take a “detour” via the crossroads of this human drama in order to let go of what 
immediately confronts it as evidence of eternal principles.238 The fact that people 
make their world is vital to Marx’s understanding of emancipation. Emancipation of 
society is conceived very broadly by Marx. Marx talks of the “formation of a class 
with radical chains” as a part of the sphere that has a “universal character” which 
“does not lay claim to any particular injustice because there is no special injustice, but 
rather injustice in general”, an injustice which is being levelled against it. 239 Where he 
refers to ‘emancipation of workers’ Marx acknowledges that this is a narrow, concrete 
form. He uses this form “not because it is only a question of their emancipation” but 
because in their emancipation is contained ‘human emancipation’ . 240 This is because 
commodity production attempts to produce most people, not only workers, as 
‘dehumanised beings’. The “loss of the self’ under capitalism becomes the 
“discordant reality” most face. This ‘punishment’ is an “estrange[ment] from one’s 
spiritual essence”, from a fulfilled life. 241
For many, life is made worthless, misshapen, barbarous, dull and slave-like 
within the unfreedom of existence.242 Whilst we have needs that go unfulfilled, 
capitalism attempts to institute universal envy - “the hidden form in which greed 
reasserts itself and satisfies itself’ :243 Imaginary needs arise in the midst of privation.
236 The basic premise of Marx’s approach can be summarized in the argument that history is made by 
people engaged in a ‘totality’ of social relations which develop according to changing circumstances. 
One of Marx’s statements of this can be found in Marx and Engels’ summary of the their conception of 
history in The German Ideology, pp. 61-62.
237 Marx, The Poverty o f Philosophy, p. 98.
238 Ibid.
239 Marx, Critique o f Hegel’s Philosophy o f Right’, p. 256. The Livingstone and Benton translation 
uses the words ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ for ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’. I have translated this passage to convey 
more accurately Marx’s sentiment.
240 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 333.
241 Ibid., pp. 327, 343, 329.
242 Ibid., p. 325.
243 Ibid., p. 346.
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Where one simply has, the less one is, the less one is able to give expression to one’s 
life because this type of having is not being, it is a form of estranged life. 244 The sense 
of having, the simplest of estrangements, is capable of colonizing all our senses. We 
lose ourselves in objects because these objects have become inhuman to us but also 
because we have failed to perceive our being in relation to social objects and 
ourselves as social beings. Marx recognizes this crucial need for a “human reality”, 
and in a note to his discussion of this issue says that in “practice I can only relate 
myself to a thing in a human way if the thing is related in a human way to man” . 245 
This of course raises the whole problem of objective existence - the existence in 
which the enslaved calculates her movements and counter-movements - but does not 
in any sense provide us with a way out of its difficulties. Marx’s tendency is to return 
us to a dialectics of the subject’s situatedness. Thus he assures us that this imposed 
view of consumption, possession and having is a one-sided depiction which denies a 
confirmation of human reality. Need and enjoyment are not merely egoistic 
practices.246 “Humanized nature” constantly stands in opposition to estrangement - but 
capitalism’s rationale is destructive of ‘human social significance’ .247 People 
experience what is their greatest wealth - other people - as need.248 In the place of this 
real wealth, money emerges as the common source of wealth for most people. At the 
same time, we are unable to avoid “the madness of self-conceit” .249 It is within these 
conditions of need that Marx theorizes the characteristic form of capitalistic 
enslavement. Within the products and needs of the system, people have become 
‘inventive and ever-calculating slaves’. Let us reflect upon this succinct and very 
perceptive summary of the human condition of unfreedom. Humanity is enslaved by 
a system of need and, in particular, to its “inhuman, exquisitely cunning, unnatural 
and imaginary appetites”. That we see woven in humanity a network of needs derived 
from the system itself seems relatively straightforward. What Marx tells us, however, 
is that humanity is not simply a slave to these needs but is a ‘calculating slave’ . 250 
What is it that the individual gauges and evaluates? What is this, at least partly, 
independent process of calculation of which the individual is capable? Let us
244 Ibid., p. 361.
245 Ibid., pp. 352, 352, n. 7.
246 Ibid., pp. 351,352.
247 Ibid., pp. 353, 356.
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid., p. 383.
250 Ibid., p. 359.
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consider an example. In this example we hope to understand more fully the type of 
dialectical tension in which Marx situates the ideological. 251
Having a Certain ‘Faith in the thing Ideology as Compromise
As well as creating contradictions, participation in the system of capitalism 
demands a type of compromise - one which Marx sees as the basis for open 
tendencies and active processes. This participation may involve a certain “faith in the 
thing” 252 that underscores the compromise that is made. We have just considered that, 
in his discussion of the French Revolution, Marx views the unfolding of differing, 
competing contents and ideals. The abstract, ideal construct of the equal citizen 
struggles for recognition against the egotistic, profit based rationale of the ‘rights of 
man’, rights which, for Marx, were “nothing more than the rights of the member of 
civil society, that is, of egotistic man, separated from his fellow men and from the 
community”. Liberation in this sense is not liberation from the cravings set in place 
by property “but only obtains the freedom of property”; people are “not emancipated 
from the egotism of commerce, but obtain [...] freedom for commerce” . 253 Freedom in 
this sense becomes defined by the prevailing conditions in which human expression 
takes place. But by choosing a commodity reality are people preferring this reality to 
any other, or resigning to a weak compromise with the dominant rationale of the 
world in which they live? In The Holy Family, Marx refers to the realm of 
compromised freedom as the “apparently accomplished independence of the 
individual”, a realm which fosters the illusion of the limitless motility of the alienated 
elements of one’s life as personal freedom.254 This ‘uncurbed movement’ is certainly 
the absence of general formal restrictions but it is also the basis of enslavement and 
dehumanization. “What a colossal deception”, Marx is moved to write, “to have to 
recognize and sanction under the aegis of human rights, the modem bourgeois society,
251 For an interpretation of aspects of the philosophical context of Marx’s dialectical approach see 
James Daly, “Marx and Justice”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 8, no. 3 (October 
2000), pp. 351-370.
252 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 160.
253 Marx, On the Jewish Question, p. 233 (translation slightly altered).
2 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 137 (translation slightly altered). The Holy Family sets out 
Marx’s critique of the Berlin Hegelians, the Bauers, who argued, contra Marx and Proudhon, that ideas 
singly and exclusively make history. In their attack on Marx in the General Gazette for Literature, the 
Bauer family maintained that criticism alone was the fundamental means by which society could 
change. Marx’s reply to this was to outline the problems involved with an exclusive emphasis upon 
ideas which would necessarily result in believing that they are independent from all other aspects of 
society. Lurking behind this belief in the independence of ideas, Marx saw a religious supematuralism 
provoking him to derisively refer to the Bauers’ as ‘the Holy Family’. For Marx, ideas may represent 
interests that then enable particular interests to prevail.
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the society of industry and of general competition, of private interest, freely pursuing 
their goals”.
This world of capitalist freedom is a world of “alienated natural and spiritual 
individuality” that annuls the “expressions of life” .255 Calling such a world that of the 
rights of people is no simple deception, however, because it is as much a world of 
self-deception as it is the bland reality of the way in which the system works -  a 
“night in which all cats are grey” .256 However, it is only a world of self-deception to 
the extent to which the loss of one’s ‘natural and spiritual individuality’ goes 
unnoticed, or indeed is felt necessary and important in the first place. What Marx 
repeatedly wants to show is that because ideology occurs as a process of self- 
deception and alienation it is also part of a process expressing something more. In the 
abstract, idealized image of the citizen is the struggle for social freedom, a social 
freedom which can be realized “only when man recognises and organises his forces 
propres [her own powers] as social powers, and so no longer separates social power 
from himself’ .257 This separation, Marx argues, is nothing fixed or necessary to 
humanity as a self-sustaining entity. There is another type of freedom that is clearly 
Marx’s fundamental starting point from which follows his critique of egotism and the 
shabby, unsatisfying compromise of the ‘rights of man’ and the freedom to compete. 
Something much more than ideology as illusion is theorized here by Marx. Ideology 
is obviously that which is constructed out of the conditions of power and freedom 
within society but it is also then something which is able to be reconstructed by those 
subjected to its processes.
Of greatest concern to Marx in his analysis of ideology is to understand how 
life under an unjust system constantly demands a type of acceptance (even if 
reluctantly given) from those who participate in it. It is not that it is such a puzzle as 
to why, at a general level, the system is able to maintain itself; Marx is well aware of 
the mechanisms which allow this. Nor does Marx say that, were it not for ideology, 
there could not be any sort of compliance given to the system. As we have seen, this 
is the sort of contrived conundrum that leads many an interpreter of Marx to claim as 
its solution the idea of false consciousness. According to this view, false 
consciousness emerges on the basis that the tricksters are able to fool the hapless into 
a compliance with a system that fails to serve the interests of the fooled. This is not 
generally the way in which Marx perceives the operations of ideology. People may 
indeed participate within the general modus operandi of the system because aspects of
235 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 144 (translation slightly altered).
236 Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire, p. 172.
237 Marx, On the Jewish Question, p. 234 (translation slightly altered).
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their interests and aspirations are in fact addressed. Marx does not see a simple, 
stagnant, dreamless state of helpless genuflection in the face of deception. Instead, he 
perceives a complex web of compelling forces, most difficult amongst which and 
most interesting to an account of ideology, is that of the acceptance of reified 
relations, that strange “faith in the thing”, which Marx searchingly questions. 258
This sort of acceptance is expressed in numerous different forms. Marx 
considers everything from the wage contract to concepts of individuality in terms of 
how they reveal certain requirements of the system, or certain requirements of people 
in order that they might participate within the system of commodity exchange. The 
subject of ideology is an individual of cunning and imaginative desires. And yet 
because the system of capitalist accumulation exists by force, 259 this ‘acceptance’ is of 
a particular kind. It is not completely freely given but is extracted as the price to be 
paid for the limited reward the system offers. There exist needs that act upon 
individuals with “compulsive force”. One must submit to this force “from egoistic 
need, from necessity” .260 We sense here that Marx views some type of ‘necessity’ as 
basic to one’s human existence. A self-consciousness that has alienated itself takes on 
“the form of a slave” . 261 And whilst we might again see that he intends us to 
understand this necessity in terms of a relation between determinism and possibility, 
and even as a relation between one’s own deeds and external force, what remains 
unclear is more what it is about being human that Marx believes engenders this 
necessity.
We can certainly see more definitely that Marx’s concern with ideology is not 
simply one of viewing the ideological as that which is accepted by those whose 
interests it least serves: All those commentators who attempt to build models of 
rational behaviour and functionalist explanations of belief system in order to explain 
their interpretation of Marx’s understanding of ideology have missed this essential 
point. For Marx, people have a ‘faith in the thing’ only as a reified relation, a relation 
which does address their input and their interests but which addresses it as their 
participation in a system of buying and selling -  a system of ultimate unfreedom. At 
times, this might mean that it takes into account their aspirations for a less overt 
egotism. Abstract ideals of the rights of a common humanity have existed alongside
258 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 160.
259 The system exists as a unity “brought about by force”. Marx, Grundrisse, p. 150. Labour is, 
according to Marx, “external forced labour”. See, for example, ibid., p. 611. According to Marx, “in 
essence it always remains forced labour - no matter how much it may seem to result from free 
contractual agreement”. Marx, Capital, vol. Ill, p. 819.
260 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 269.
261 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 165.
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the selfish impulse of the system in a variety of forms: But what Marx recognizes in 
these at times conflicting, at times reconciled, forces is the openness of ideology and 
the historical nature of its forms.
In the final section of the chapter we will consider in greater depth an example 
that goes some way to examining the issue of why humanity should pit itself against 
ideology - this will be taken from Marx’s analysis of estrangement and spiritual 
yearning. That this example is drawn from an area of Marx’s analysis that has been 
overwhelmingly associated with what is taken to be an aspect of Marx’s 
conceptualization of ideology as false consciousness merely adds to its interest. We 
will see that, far from the issue of spirituality representing a typical example of 
ideology as false consciousness in Marx’s work, it represents one of the best examples 
of the contradictory emancipatory impulse that Marx detects in humanity, which, as 
we have argued throughout this thesis, is more what ideology should be seen to mean. 
A failure to theorize the ideological in this fashion results in a complete 
miscomprehension of Marx’s position on spirituality. We first will explore more 
closely what it is Marx takes to be necessity within a life lived under conditions of 
unfreedom, and will explore this in the following section of the thesis. This will 
provide us with a fuller context for the discussion of emancipatory impulses just 
mentioned. Let us then summarize what we have thus far encountered in Marx’s 
critique of unfreedom.
The Actual and the Comprehended of Becoming:
Marx’s General Approach to Ideology Critique
It will be useful at this stage to review the general way in which we have 
approached the concept of ideology in Marx’s work. Marx is concerned with the 
problems of an alienated life, with the consequences of externalized need and the 
devaluation of relations between people in societies lacking fundamental freedom. 
The task that Marx sets himself in his critique is to develop a theorization that helps 
realize a ‘humanized nature and a naturalized humanity’ . 262 What is it, Marx wishes to 
know, that interferes with this potentiality of free existence? It is in answering this 
question that Marx considers the ideological. There are various aspects of the 
objective world that Marx sees as impinging upon the individual, some of which we 
will consider in further detail shortly: But Marx also repeatedly reminds us that the 
individual brings into being aspects of an alien objective world by allowing these 
aspects to govern the individual “over against himself’. Once she does this the
262 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 350.
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individual and her inner world become poorer, and the less they belong to her as an 
individual. 263 The ‘actual and the comprehended of becoming’ , 264 which Marx sees in 
all human relations, does not allow for mechanistic theories and their closed, fixed, 
isolated premises. What Marx does not present us with is a functionalist view of 
ideology in relation to capitalism.
Marx sees the ideological in many aspects of unffee life. It is for this reason 
that the search by various commentators for a single ‘model’ to explain ideology is 
inadequate and inappropriate. Marx sees a basic reciprocity in the relation between 
subject and object with all the complexity and uncertainty that this necessarily 
involves. Marx does not view ideology as any form of ‘false consciousness’. 
Ideology is instead the reality of antagonistic and contradictory impulses. Various 
approaches to the ‘riddle of the world’ exist but these are not to be known in the 
isolation of an historical proof “drawn from what already exists” ; 265 they are to be 
found in the genuine resolution of all contrived conflict between people, between 
people and their world, existence and being, objectification and self-affirmation, 
between freedom and necessity. 266 The central concept that persists throughout all of 
Marx’s writing is that of the invention of need within the alienation of unffee life. 
Ideology is a form taken within alienated existence in which the clash of ideas, values 
and realities are realized. For Marx, alienation is the imposition of an external 
necessity that generally detracts from what is of human value. 267 Alienation in this 
sense is not the outcome of a process of estrangement of some abstracted essence of 
the human person. 268 It is rather a condition in which individuality is or cannot be 
freely realized. 269 Whether or not the concept of alienation in Marx is, as Roger 
Garaudy argues, non-Hegelian and non-Feuerbachian, it is certainly an “historical and 
militant” conception of alienation. 270 It is a view of estrangement that involves a sense 
of both recognition and confusion, and it is this that allows it to be situated as an 
ideological problem.
263 Ibid., p. 324.
264 Marx refers to the movement of history as “the actual” and “the comprehended and known 
movement of its becoming”. See Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 348.
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
267 Marx criticizes all those theories in which such hollow, abstract, separation is fixed. He then 
develops an alternative theory in which the “inexhaustible, vital, sensuous” activity of people is 
allowed to roam freely. Ibid., p. 396.
268 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, pp. 97-98.
269 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 154.
270 Roger Garaudy, Marxism in the Twentieth Century, trans. Rene Hague (London: Collins, 1970), 
p. 77.
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Three central issues, which we will see Marx deliberately confronts, impinge 
decisively upon his treatment of ideology. The first is that Marx views a social 
existence in which people are unable to freely express their creativity as a life that is 
unfree. In this existence resides the strange forms of estrangement and self­
estrangement we have just reviewed. The second and perhaps most interesting aspect 
of what Marx sees within processes of the forced acceptance of a system of self- 
alienation via the predominant modes of life which people lead, is the role of the 
subject of this drama. Marx views humanity in this context as a ‘calculating slave’ - a 
type of subjectivity which has emerged in relation to the needs of the system. This 
has constituted an important area of focus for our examination of Marx’s theorization 
of ideology in this chapter. We have considered what it is about the ‘calculating 
slave’ Marx finds so decisive for the processes of ideology, and, in particular, the 
ways in which he theorizes a dynamic of the ideological. In the final section of the 
chapter we will consider a specific example of Marx’s presentation of ideology as a 
form of contradictory emancipatory impulse, and, in this, will attempt to establish the 
ways in which Marx combines a critique of the conditions of social life with an 
analysis of the place of the subject. We will then consider what it is Marx feels is 
conditioned by a structure of needs by which unfree societies operate. The third issue 
of relevance is that he takes capitalist reality to be a reified reality whose processes 
are open and incomplete. Ideology is a part of this reality and an aspect of the reason 
why people have a certain “faith in the thing” .271 Understanding the workings of this 
complex process of reified relations is then paramount amongst Marx’s concerns. 
These reified relations Marx views as the outcome of the basic contradictions inherent 
within unffee societies. It is out of these contradictions that inventive need arises. 
This is the area of focus that we need to take seriously in Marx’s work, and will 
proceed to discuss in the next section of this chapter.
This need, as we will see, derives not only from the level of particular 
structural antinomies of a system such as capitalism but also from the complex 
interplay between the system and those people who live out its realities. Upon this 
basis, needs are invented and reinvented. Marx sees bound up within ideology the 
contested field of consciousness, activity, knowledge and participation. In this he also 
detects the problems of fear, alienation and the habit of servility: But these problems 
are not simply abstract conditions, they are a part of the antagonistic tensions of 
unequal societies. As such, they are potential forces of “hostile reciprocal 
opposition” 272 whose outcome cannot simply be presumed. In this generalized tension
271 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 160.
212 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 341.
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within the “alienation of life” (Lebensentäusserung) , 273 Marx sees a vast unfinished 
realm of human relations. He thus understands ideology within the context of the 
absence of, and struggle for, freedom. A life of external necessity is unffee. Labour, 
commodification and objectification turn human capacities and creativity into alien 
products. Capitalist reality is a reified reality. It is the necessary result of the fact that 
its “point of departure is not the free social individual” . 274 The world to which Marx’s 
analysis is directed is the world of capitalism, its fetishism of commodities, its 
alienation of labour and its institutionalization of unequal power relations. It is a 
world of injustice that is both borne and resisted. Marx repeatedly points out the 
futility involved in enduring an unnecessary suffering. This is indeed why capitalism 
has need for ideology - as an attempt to distract those who suffer from the nature of 
their suffering within the struggle for meaning that is basic to human existence.
Marx is one of the first theorists of ideology to recognize its changeable and 
ruthlessly pragmatic character. He does much more, however, than provide an 
historical basis to the concept of ideology. Ideology in his work is not simply the 
fallacious reconciliation with what exists, it is also a part of the complex process of 
everyday mystification. An alienation of life occurs under capitalism because people 
become estranged from the conditions of their work, what they produce, and the 
manner in which what they produce is exchanged. This alienated life assumes its own 
power, thus taking on an ideological relation to people who fail to recognize or cease 
to live out the reality in which they are themselves the producers of their lives. There 
is, for Marx, an ideological process of the fetishization of reality. As distinctive as 
this contribution to an understanding of the ideological in the contemporary world is, 
this is far from all that Marx does. The significance of Marx’s insight is also bound 
up in his appreciation of unffee relations as antagonistic relations. It is for this reason 
that he is able to view fetishism as a process of fetishization and defetishization. 275 
From this understanding one is able to introduce into his critique of ideology a sense 
of antagonistic openness. The ideological within an alienated life is also a part of the 
struggle between freedom and oppression. This allows us to give theoretical 
recognition to the richness and complexity of ideologies, to the often bold and 
cunning inventiveness of many of its changing ideas, and to the sense of future and 
past that exists within its present.
273 Ibid., p. 351.
274 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 197.
273 For a further examination of the idea of fetishization see John Holloway, “From Scream of Refusal 
to Scream of Power: The Centrality of Work”, in Open Marxism: Emancipating Marx, vol. Ill, eds., 
Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn, John Holloway and Kosmas Psychopedis (London: Pluto, 1995), 
pp. 155-181.
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Thus far then we have a considerable sense of the tension that is, for Marx, the 
ideological. The seifs own deeds contribute to her enslavement and this lack of 
freedom is itself the product of egoistic need. But the process of need is a complex 
working out of force, compulsions, unconscious desire, substitution and illusion. 
Through all of this complexity is woven the possibility of self. Before we can fully 
assess this entanglement as a part of the ideological as contradiction we first need to 
come to terms with Marx’s particular focus on the social form of an unfree world -  on 
the contradictions of social life as encapsulated within the commodity form. We will 
now consider Marx’s analysis of this form.
Section Two: Ideology as Inventive Need:
The Contradictions of Social Life and the Commodity Form
Our relations in society have to some extent already begun to be established before 
we are in a position to determine them.
Marx, ‘Reflections of a Young Man on the Choice of a Profession’
Every limit appears as a barrier to be overcome.
Marx, Grundrisse
Contradictions of Unfreedom
Section Two of the chapter will look at a range of contradictions of social life 
that Marx highlights throughout his various writings. We will focus in general terms 
upon what Marx sees as the fundamental constituent of capitalist unfreedom -  the 
commodity form, looking then at particular instances of this in two examples -  those 
of money and wage labour. We will attempt to understand why Marx employs the 
concept of the commodity in order to theorize the widespread problem of unfreedom, 
but importantly also the potential for freedom. We will thus view the commodity 
form as a philosophical problem. In the first section of the chapter we reflected upon 
this issue of commodification to the extent to which it provided us with a context for 
Marx’s critique of unfreedom. We saw that Marx conceptualized inner and outer 
compulsions involved in the commodification of life, choosing as his focus for an 
explanation of unfreedom the often mysterious or less obvious forms of external 
compulsion. There is, for Marx, something necessary within the impoverishment 
from which humanity suffers. In this section of the chapter we want to explore this
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tendency in Marx more closely and consider the nature of the necessity so theorized. 
This examination will enable us to pose the issue of ‘inventive need’ within the 
process of the realization of objective conditions.
Marx theorizes contradictions within the commodity form as fundamental to 
the lack of freedom people experience within modem social life. On the basis of an 
understanding of the social and psychological impact of these contradictions we will 
theorize how ideology emerges in Marx’s writing as a form of inventive need. We 
will see that Marx is particularly interested in why human creativity and the need for a 
sense of being in the world are transformed by processes that seem to exist beyond the 
control of the individual. What is it, Marx wants to know, about the system of 
capitalism that has so compromised the value of the freedom of self-realization within 
community, and yet which has also so decisively tethered it to this devalued freedom? 
Is there something within the objectivity of the system that can militate against a 
hunger for freedom, or can we find within the objective itself the assertion of forms of 
inventive need? What then is the nature of this objectivity that so concerns Marx? Is 
it that certain aspects of a system of competitive greed stifle creativity and in the 
process stupefy, if not very nearly deaden, human potentiality. Do we indeed sense 
that the processes of commodification overwhelm the possibility of the self as a part 
of egoistic need that we have just considered in the last section? Is it here that we 
encounter alienation in its most involuntary form, and, if so, what does this then mean 
for our analysis of the ideological? We will begin our analysis of this by considering 
why Marx chooses to focus his attention upon capitalism as a system, the commodity 
form as its most basic instance of unfreedom, and the example within this of money as 
a philosophical problem.
The Significance of the Commodity Form
If Marx sees the ideological in the social form of an antagonistic system, why 
is it that his main focus is upon the system of capitalism? Marx views capitalism as 
the dominant economic system characterizing all the world economies. In all forms 
of society, he argues, a specific kind of production will predominate over the rest. 276 
In the present epoch, capital “is the all-dominating economic power of bourgeois 
society” . 277 It is a global system of wage labour in which the processes of production
276 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 106.
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for profit are a central part.278 It is a system based on the commodity form. This 
globalized commodity society creates particular needs that are not primarily 
motivated by the significance of people as human beings but by the needs of the 
commodity and the money-based structure of capitalism itself. Marx sees the 
establishment of an “alien power” within individuals that exists to find satisfaction for 
selfish needs but in doing so assumes nothing other than their complete existence. 
The relentless pull of neediness grows within the individual in relation to the increase 
in the power of alien structures such as money and commodities. 279 Given that this is 
the case, and we have already considered some of its consequences in relation to the 
problem of freedom in the previous section of the chapter, what more is Marx 
attempting to convey in his critique of capitalism? Here we want to understand that 
what Marx feels is lost from this development of neediness is the ability to 
comprehend the self-mediated being [Durchsichselbstein] of humanity, since such 
being contradicts so much palpable evidence of everyday life:280 But first we will 
return to Marx’s general critique of capitalism in order to situate this discussion.
Marx’s assertion that capitalism operates throughout the world as a system 
provides a significant insight into the nature of capitalism of the mid-nineteenth 
century. The global nature of capitalism has been a feature throughout its history.281 
Marx repeatedly refers to the “world market” as a presupposition for capitalism as a 
system. 282 The tendency to create the world market, he writes, “is directly given in the 
concept of capital itself’ .283 The process of capital accumulation exists within a global 
form, its tendency towards generalization occurring merely with more or less ruthless 
thoroughness. This is a general tendency, to which there are exceptions, but which 
nonetheless exists as a dominant form. It is a tendency to which Marx is wholly 
opposed. Whilst, within capitalism, the cultivation of a breadth and depth of qualities 
in the social being has occurred, this is because people have created these qualities for 
themselves, often against the rationale of profit, competitiveness and the 
commodification so basic to capitalism.
278 Marx points out that wage labour “always consists of paid and unpaid labour”. Marx, The Poverty 
o f Philosophy, p. 574.
279 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 358.
280 Ibid., p. 356.
281 A fact, we might add, which some contemporary theorists seem to have only recently grasped. As a 
counter to these see, Fernand Braudel, Civilization and capitalism, 15th to 18th century, trans. Sian 
Reynolds (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1981-1984).
282 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 227.
283 Ibid., p. 408.
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Marx’s attitude to the notion of ‘progress’ is not that most typically presented 
by commentators who wish either to credit or discredit him with the view that he was 
an unabashed supporter of so-called ‘progress’ .284 Marx writes of former and, within 
his time, in some cases still existing communities (such as those to be found in some 
parts of nineteenth century India) based upon possession in common, as societies 
where the worker and the work done remain closely united, “like the snail with its 
shell”. Such societies were able to support poets and spiritual teachers without 
commodifying their creativity.285 It is, by contrast, modem capitalist society that has 
severed this tie between people and their daily lives. This so-called ‘progress’ has 
drowned former values “in the icy water of egotistical calculation” . 286 When Marx 
refers scathingly to this as ‘civilization’ he is careful to explain exactly what is meant: 
He states that capitalism compels other societies “to introduce what it calls civilisation 
into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves” . 287 Marx questions the whole 
basis of capitalism, describing it as “merciless Vandalism” 288 and its creation of a free 
labouring poor as “that artificial product of modem society” , 289 and sees specific 
instances of capitalism’s ‘progress’, such as the destruction of land and animals for 
agricultural uses, as “reckless terrorism” . 290 Marx devotes considerable space in 
Capital to an analysis of capitalism’s ‘progress’, as in the “brute force” of the colonial 
system. With “the globe for a theatre” , 291 capitalism performed atrocities of 
enslavement and murder for the sake of a new market: The “extirpation” and 
“enslavement” of native Americans, the “conquest and looting of the East Indies”, the 
“plunder at will” of the Hindus, “the turning of Africa into a warren for the
284 Habermas, for example, is by no means alone in claiming (without any evidence, it should be 
stated) that Marx heralded the arrival of forms of ‘progress’ as evidence of some unfolding of a 
revolutionary consciousness. Habermas argues: “Science and technology, [have] for Marx an 
unambiguous potential for emancipation”. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 
p. 66. This is simply not the way in which Marx views social categories such as technology or 
‘science’. For Marx, there certainly is an open potential within all social categories which might or 
might not result in a consciousness of them. Overall, however, one would have to say that Marx’s 
concern about technology, for example, to which he devotes a considerable portion of the first volume 
of Capital, is that it results in a fetishization and ideological confusion about humanity’s relation to the 
machine whose outcome in relation to emancipation is far from clear or predictable.
285 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 339, 338.
286 Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto, p. 44.
287 Ibid., p. 47.
288 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 714.
289 Ibid., p. 711.
290 Ibid., p. 685. Marx’s own experience of a lengthy stay in the Ahr Valley in Germany prompted him 
to write to Engels that the region had fortunately been spared the infection of a modem transport 
system. Marx to Engels, 17 August, 1877, quoted in Maximilien Rubel and Margaret Manale, Marx 
Without Myth: a chronological study of his life and work (Oxford : Blackwell, 1975), p. 306.
291 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 703.
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commercial hunting of black-skins” , 292 the “violent rounding-up of the people in 
Egypt, Etruria, India etc. for forced construction and compulsory public works” - all 
in the name of progress. In doing so, capitalism was ensuring the “whole earth for its 
market” .293 The global character of capitalism inevitably meant the “entanglement of 
all peoples in the net of the world-market” .294
The universalization of market relations is the everyday practice of 
alienation.295 Its everydayness seeps into our conscious and unconscious lives. For 
Marx, capitalist societies are based upon antagonistic relations, which become 
relations of exploitation due to the nature of production. 296 The social relations of 
production result in the objectification of the relation of people to the productive 
process. Capitalism produces two major categories of individual relation to 
production - that of owner and then seller of one’s own ability to perform labour and 
that of buyer of the labour capacity of other people. 297 The labour performed under
292 Ibid., pp. 703, 704.
293 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 528, 539.
294 Marx, Capital, vol. I, pp. 714-715.
295 It seems that because Marx describes universalizing tendencies within capitalism that by a strange 
process of transference he is then charged with having a so-called ‘universalizing’ theory of ideology. 
Larrain’s recent work on Ideology and Cultural Identity, for example, makes the claim that Marx’s 
theory of ideology is “universalistic”. Jorge Larrain, Ideology and Cultural Identity: Modernity and the 
Third World Presence (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), p. 1. Larrain continues that Marx’s theory tends to 
conceive of history as “universal, unilineal, teleological progress”. Ibid., p. 7. Marx, of course, does 
nothing of the kind, but because he criticizes capitalism’s tendency to universalize, to present history as 
unilinear and directed towards a known end, and to reify a notion of progress, various commentators 
seem to then confuse this distinction between Marx’s view of history and his critique of capitalist 
processes.
296 In contrast to Cohen, Clarke, as previously mentioned, theorizes the relation between the forces and 
relations of production explicitly against theories which view production in a technical sense as a 
process of the production of products by labour, and thus the forces and relations of production as 
technical relations of production. Such a conception of production results in a technicist view of the 
correspondence between the forces and relations of production rather than viewing this relation as a 
relation of contradiction. Any separation of the forces and relations of production in this way not only 
results in the “abolition of the dialectical relation between the two” but “dictates that the primacy of 
production takes the form of an economistic, or a technicist, reductionism”. Simon Clarke, “The State 
Debate”, in The State Debate, ed. Simon Clarke (New York: St. Martin’s, 1991), p. 80. Clarke develops 
instead a view of production which sees within the process of production itself the contradictory nature 
of the capitalist mode of production. Such a view is opposed to any simple positing of the necessary 
primacy of production but rather sees that production is a process which is both material and social. 
Ibid., p. 77.
297 Marx’s understanding of production is that it is a fundamentally social process. Without this 
understanding of production he believes that theorists will tend to reproduce the form of appearance of 
bourgeois relations of production, the ‘trinity formula’, which he criticizes. Marx’s trinity formula is 
set out in the third volume of Capital where the trinity of capital, property and labour holds, according 
to Marx, “all the secrets of the social production process”. The trinity of land - rent, capital - interest, 
and labour - wages, or the price of labour, is understood by vulgar economics in a merely superficial 
manner: “Vulgar economy actually does no more than interpret, systematise and defend in doctrinaire 
fashion the conceptions of the agents of bourgeois production who are entrapped in bourgeois 
production relations.” Marx’s central point is that capital in the form of interest, private property in the
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capitalist relations of production is distinctive in the particular form of value ascribed 
to the products produced by labour. In the capitalist mode of production, labour 
ability has value to the capitalist beyond that of the time and energy expended on the 
production of products. Whilst the worker is partially compensated for labour 
performed by receiving a wage, under capitalism, the surplus created by the 
production of products beyond the value of a wage is appropriated by those owning or 
controlling the means by which production occurs. This surplus value appears in the 
objectified form of something with a use-value and not as the time and energy 
expended by workers as labour. Once objects with a use-value are put into 
circulation, they become commodities and are exchanged with other commodities. 
This process generalizes the workers’ surplus labour into exchange value that, when 
obscured by the pricing mechanisms of relations of distribution, completes the 
mystification of the original labour ability expended. Marx refers to this process as 
the fetishization of commodities, and the material separation of workers from the 
products of their labour as alienation. 298 As we have seen, however, this is only one 
sense in which Marx uses the concept of alienation. 299
form of rent, and wage labour are historically specific social forms which correspond to the particular 
economic formation of society, of capitalism. This seemingly simple point is explained by Marx in 
relation to the specific character of the production process under capitalism. Capital is a definite social 
relation which manifests itself as a thing. The capital-land-labour trinity within the capitalist formation 
of society appears as a set of relations the parts of which are superficially understood as emerging in 
some natural connection with each other from the technical structure of material production. But, Marx 
argues, “all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly 
coincided”. The trinity, which outwardly appears as a set of prima facie “absurd and perfect 
contradictions”, is in fact a set of “three impossible combinations”. The forms these relations take in 
actuality are not simply those by which they appear; land which has no value has a use-value, and rent 
has exchange value - in other words “two incommensurable magnitudes are supposed to stand in a 
given ratio to one another”; the form capital - interest presents itself with “its occult quality of making 
value unequal to itself’; and labour - wages, or the price of labour, is an expression which “prima facie 
contradicts the conception of value as well of as price”. It is in their conception of value that ‘the 
bourgeois and the vulgar economist’ fails to understand the connections between these forms of 
production relations, and thus fails to recognize the actual nature of these relations. It is the form of 
appearance of relations, a trinity of apparent relations, which is then eternized. See Marx, Capital, vol. 
Ill, pp. 814-818.
298 This understanding of the fundamental processes of capitalism is best conveyed in Marx’s lengthy 
critique of the capitalist mode in the three volumes of Capital. It will be obvious that I take fetishism 
and alienation to be different processes, although both are part of the ideological form of capitalist 
social relations. These processes are neither subsumed within nor counterposed to each other. Many 
commentators again seem to miss the point by making much of the differences between them. John 
Mepham’s critique of Roman Rosdolsky’s The Making of Marx’s Capital highlights a number of 
difficulties with Rosdolsky’s interpretation of the Grundrisse in relation to Capital. But Mepham 
particularly chides Rosdolsky for taking fetishism and alienation in Marx “to be the same thing”. John 
Mepham, “From the Grundrisse to Capital. The Making of Marx’s Method”, in Issues in Marxist 
Philosophy, ed. John Mepham and David Ruben, vol. 1 Dialectics and Method (Brighton: Harvester,
1979) , p. 154. Roman Rosdolsky, The Making of Marx’s Capital, trans. Pete Burgess (London: Pluto,
1980) . Mepham makes a distinction between what he sees as Marx’s early emphasis upon the alienated 
agency of money and the agency of class, relations of production, and the tendential laws of 
development of the capitalist mode of production in Capital. Ibid., p. 155. Mepham contrasts Marx’s
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At first glance it might seem that Marx is overly concerned with what he sees 
as a profane, brutal and increasingly shameless system, 300 and that he is insufficiently 
emphatic in his characterization of capitalism’s strengths. However the real 
weaknesses with his work rest elsewhere: It is not that he over-emphasizes the 
problems capitalism creates - although Marx does a Stirling job at pointing out its 
failures, much more could in fact be said - it is rather that he seems to draw too 
sketchy a view of those areas of cultural value that point to some abundance beyond 
the wizened economic rationale of the system. Because it is in this very area that 
ideology steers its most jagged course, it may be that Marx creates too many 
untheorized empty spaces for a critique of ideology to have much force. Why is it 
that his theorizing returns repeatedly to the vexatious problem of a dialectical and 
unfixed objectivity? Are we here given any clue as to the nature of any limitations 
within ideological contradiction itself? We will attempt to address this issue by 
considering how Marx sees the trappings of forms of apparent compromise of 
contradiction within the wide variety of types of deception, illusion, mythologizing, 
embellishment and idealistic anticipation that comprise the ideological. In these 
following sections of this part of the chapter we will consider the objectivities of 
labour and money as commodities and how ideology plays a part in their constitution 
as forms in which an everyday reality is created and reproduced. We will first 
consider how Marx approaches the process of commodification itself in order to see 
why commodification is for him an ideological process.
This *topsy-turvy world is the real world*: Ideology, the Commodity Form and the
Process of Fetishization
Marx understands the commodity both as a useful object that can satisfy 
human needs and as a product which can be exchanged for other goods. It is only
statement on money as the “sensuous, objective existence of this alienation” in Marx’s 1844 note on 
Mill, with the case of fetishism in Capital, “that is a theoretical ideology in which the order of 
determination is inverted and in which causal agency is misplaced onto the concrete”. Ibid., p. 156. 
Mepham sees a polarity with the alienated intermediary of money on one side and people relating to 
people on the other. This concept of fetishism, Mepham concludes, is “rooted in the problematic of 
Marx’s critique of political economy”, as if alienation is not. Ibid., p. 157.
299 It is thus not really the case, as Ernest Mandel argues, that that “Marx reduced human alienation in 
society based on commodity production essentially to the reification of human and social relations 
caused by commodity relations”. Ernest Mandel, The Formation o f the Economic Thought o f Karl 
Marx, trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Monthly Review, 1971), p. 184. As we have seen, Marx first 
understands alienation as an estrangement made significant in conditions of unfreedom. He then 
considers specific instances of this such as that within a commodity society.
300 Marx and Engels write of the “naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation” that has arisen in place 
of former forms of exploitation veiled by religious and political illusions. See, Marx and Engels, 
Communist Manifesto, pp. 45, 46.
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under particular historical conditions, however, that the commodity acquires a specific 
social character. 301 The first category in which bourgeois wealth presents itself is that 
of the commodity.302 The commodity represents a crucial element of capitalist society. 
The capitalist production of commodities “has become an epoch-making mode of 
exploitation” . 303 A commodity is defined generally as “an object outside us, a thing 
that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another” . 304 Commodities 
consist of various values for their use and for their exchange. 305 What all commodities 
have in common is what Marx refers to as the “mere congelation of homogenous 
human labour, of labour-power expended without regard to the mode of its 
expenditure”306, what is often also referred to as abstract labour. 307 “A commodity 
appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood. Its analysis shows 
that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and 
theological niceties. ” 308 Marx refers to the commodity as an imaginary, 
phantasmagorical, fantastic form, as a ‘mysterious thing’, a ‘social hieroglyphic’, a 
transient apparition, as having an occult quality, as containing hidden, secret, mist-
301 Marx, Capital, vol. II, p. 37.
302 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 881.
303 Marx, Capital, vol. II, p. 37.
304 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 43.
305 Marx explains the nature of commodities in terms of the dual functions they express. Commodities 
are both use-values and exchange values, they are both useful objects which are utilized for the 
satisfaction of needs and they are products which can be exchanged for other products. In a society 
based upon generalized commodity production it is in the realm of exchange that value is realized. 
Marx sets out the particular conditions for the generalization of commodity production in terms of 
specific developments in the relationships of production; these relationships emerge with the complete 
transformation of labour ability into a commodity, which gives rise to the category of the value of 
labour ability. The generalization of commodity production is thus only realized in the sphere of the 
circulation of commodities, or what is taken to be the capitalist market. Marx’s discussion of the 
conditions for the generalization of commodity production can be found in the second volume of 
Capital, p. 36. For a further discussion of this issue see Althusser and Balibar, Reading Capital. 
Again, for Marx, this is no abstract, eternal social condition; it is entirely related to specific conditions 
centred in the character of production. Commodity exchange is regulated by the average labour time, 
or socially necessary labour, required in order to produce a given commodity. Labour too, has a dual 
character. Labour implies both the individual concrete useful labour involved in the production process 
and the social value of that labour, or abstract labour, as it is expressed through commodity exchange. 
It is commodity production itself then that gives rise to the dual character of both value and labour and 
to their superficially mysterious forms. These particular divisions are not natural, eternal facets of the 
human condition but are historically specific conditions of the production process under capitalism.
306 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 46.
307 As we have just mentioned above, Marx argues that human labour has a two-fold character -  it is 
both concrete and abstract labour. Indeed Marx is moved to write that he was “the first to point out and 
to examine critically this two-fold nature of the labour contained in commodities”. Ibid., p. 49. This 
discovery Marx claimed to be of vital importance to his theorization of commodification and thus “the 
riddle presented by money”. Ibid., p. 54. For an analysis of the concept of abstract labour see Norman 
Fischer, “The Ontology of Abstract Labor”, Review of Radical Political Economics, no. 14 (Summer, 
1982): pp. 27-35.
308 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 76.
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enveloped, strange, illusory, puzzling aspects, shot through with symbol, riddles, 
magic and necromancy, all of which need to be deciphered. 309 That the commodity 
exists in these forms is a part of what Marx refers to as the process of the 
‘fetishization’ of commodities, a characteristic which emerges due to the peculiar 
social character of the labour that produces commodities. As Michael Taussig points 
out, the very concept of fetishism denotes both a quality of ghostliness and an 
“uncertain quality of fluctuation between thinghood and spirit” . 310 But before we 
conclude that Marx sees in this objectifying process something merely objective, let 
us recall that Marx reminds us of the origin of the fetish -  the idea of a “crude desire 
of the fetish-worshipper” to smash the fetish “when it ceases to be its most obedient 
servant” 311 -  as indicative of contemporary self-delusion. The problem is one of the 
subject believing that the object world will comply with her desires. What he asks us 
to consider is what the nature of the fantasy is that arises from desire. This is, of 
course, a complex issue. And, perhaps not so surprisingly, Marx starts out to tackle 
this question by considering the ‘mysteriousness’ of the commodity form. What then 
is the mystery?
The forms of commodities are described as strange and mysterious in the 
sense that, in the process of exchange, commodities appear to become things with 
social relations of their own, rather than as the objectified labour capacity of which 
they are comprised. Value is a social reality because it is human labour. Just as in the 
case of money enabling one who has it to possess human capabilities without being 
humanly capable, commodities generally appear in a similarly superficially 
mystifying form. Capitalism, Marx argues, has “a determinate social character” . 312 
Capital is the separation from labour; it is that which confronts labour “as an 
independent power” . 313 All production is an objectification of the individual.314 At the 
same time this process of objectification requires a “living subject” . 315 But whilst 
“unity appears as accidental, separation as normal” , 316 this process is ‘apparently
309 See Cohen’s work, Profane Illumination, in which the author argues, in particular reference to 
Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire, that Marx’s description of the phantasmagoria is the substance of Marx’s 
work not mere rhetoric. See ibid, pp. 244-249.
310 Michael Taussig, “Maleficium: State Fetishism”, in Fetishism as Cultural Discourse, eds. Emily 
Apter and William Pietz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 217.
311 Marx, “The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung”, Collected Works, vol. I, p. 189.
312 Marx, Theories o f Surplus-Value, vol. I, p. 408.
313 Ibid.
314 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 226.
315 Ibid., p. 272.
316 Marx, Theories o f Surplus-Value, vol. I, p. 409.
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mysterious’ . 317 The difficulty with recognizing the actual process involved in what 
appears to be the enigmatical character of the product of human labour becomes all 
the more acute in the mesmerizing, fleeting, arbitrary expression of exchange relations 
which have come to characterize modem capitalism. 318 An analysis of these relations 
cannot, therefore, deal merely with the surface appearance of social relations, it must 
deal with the less immediately apparent connections which exist between appearance 
and reality. For this reason, Marx seeks to examine the internal framework that 
connects these relations and gives rise to their fetishised form. 319 For Marx, the 
modem world is not simply the world that its immediate appearance suggests: “It is an 
enchanted, perverted, topsy-turvy world, in which Monsieur le Capital and Madame la 
Terre do their ghost-walking as social characters and at the same time directly as mere 
things.” It is a world whose mode of production has become mystified, which has 
converted social relations into things, and has effected the “direct coalescence of the
317 Ibid., p. 390.
318 For an analysis of the problem of misrecognition in relation to the commodity see E. K. Hunt, 
“Marx’s Concept of Human Nature and the Labor Theory of Value”, Review of Radical Political 
Economics, no. 14 (Summer, 1982), pp. 7-25 and Marco Lippi, Value and Naturalism in Marx, trans. 
Hilary Steedman (London: New Left Books, 1979).
319 Various theorists have put forward arguments against aspects of the theory of commodity fetishism 
in relation to a theory of ‘historical materialism’. Alex Callinicos, for example, interprets Marx’s view 
of commodity fetishism as a theoretically problematic specific historical example of the operation of 
ideology. This is largely because he considers that Marx’s analysis suggests the possibility of only one 
form of appearance of the fetishization of commodities, and because this entails that the agents of 
production will perceive reality in one entirely circumscribed way; in other words that the 
consciousness of the agents of production will, through the fetishization of commodities, be determined 
“purely by virtue of the position he or she occupies”. Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy, p. 131. 
This is problematic, according to Callinicos, because it assumes the possibility of immediate 
knowledge, unconceptualized and without multiple interpretations. The theory of fetishism can only 
give rise to the idea of the spontaneous generation of false consciousness, ibid., pp. 131, 132. The 
assumption of immediate knowledge must be rejected for political as well as philosophical reasons, 
argues Callinicos, because it inevitably lends support to a pessimistic version of Kautskyian 
evolutionism. As we have mentioned, in contrast with the theory of commodity fetishism, Callinicos 
argues that the most genuinely materialist conception of ideology is to be found in Marx’s well known 
explication of ideologies in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in 
which he writes of “the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic - in short, ideological forms 
in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out”. These ideological forms are 
contrasted with the material transformation of the economic conditions of production. It is on this 
basis, Callinicos argues, that it is possible to construct a theory of ideological beliefs that need not be 
false nor which need necessarily benefit the ruling class. Alex Callinicos, Making History: Agency, 
Structure and Change in Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity, 1987), p. 148. Grahame Lock, for 
example, argues that the exchange process does not really require a theory of commodity fetishism in 
order to explain the economic and juridical structure of all exchange relations based upon legal 
contract. Lock, The State and I, p. 77. Balibar extends this argument further by arguing that it would 
be better if the theory of fetishism would in fact disappear, “except perhaps as a means of critically 
turning existing economic categories against themselves, against their ‘apologetic’ use in bourgeois 
economic theory and practice”. Etienne Balibar, Cinq etudes du materialisme historique, p. 219, 
quoted in Lock, ibid. This he argues on the basis that an ideological effect can only be explained by 
relations which are historically constituted in class struggle. These relations are specific social 
relations which are distinct from the relations of production, “even though determined by these latter 
‘in the last instance’.” Balibar, ibid., pp. 220-221, quoted in Lock, ibid.
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material production relations with their historical and social determination” . 320 
Crucially, however, this “topsy-turvy world is the real world” . 321 Marx nowhere 
suggests that the mystified nature of commodities is counterposed to a real existence; 
mystification is part of reality. History, as in the history of capitalism, weighs as a 
collective nightmare322 - it is real and has real consequences for everyday dreamless 
life. We should be struck again by the inappropriateness of any interpretation of such 
a theory as something to be equated with the idea of false consciousness.323 At the 
same time we need to consider whether Marx is suggesting a type of subjective 
relation to these ideological processes amounting to that which Maurice Godelier 
terms a “spontaneous illusory awareness” . 324 In other words, is Marx attributing the 
problem of a fetishized sense of reality to the social reality of commodification itself 
or to its relation to a captured subjectivity?
Marx argues that the fetishization of commodities occurs because of the 
peculiar character of the labour that produces commodities. The value of different 
commodities, as well as the labour involved in their production becomes obscured as 
a relation between things rather than as a social relation. 325 The important issue Marx 
leads us to consider is whether what is mystified within the character of the worker’s 
own conception of the process of exchange is that of a sense of her own separation, as 
a producer of use-values, from the process of their distribution.326 Relations of
320 Marx, Capital, vol. Ill, p. 830.
321 Marx to Ruge, May, 1843, p. 203.
322 Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire, p. 146.
323 Marx’s theory of fetishization, of mystification within reality, is clearly very different from the idea 
of ideology as false consciousness. The theorization of the fetishization of the system of capitalism 
explicitly rejects the idea that the process of production can be approached in terms of a separation 
between the content of the technical process of production and the form of capitalist relations of 
production. If Marx had put forward a theory of false consciousness it would have emerged on the 
basis of the idea of a division between the material substance of the economic base of social life and 
the ideological superstructure which merely distorts the reality of the base. In such a view it is only 
material life that gives rise to distorted reflections and the constitution of material life must therefore be 
a clearly autonomous empirical reality. False consciousness in this sense would be found exclusively 
in the realm of ideology and would not be a part of material reality. This is not a view to which Marx 
subscribes. For Marx, ideologies arise in relation to contradictions within social relations and do not 
exist at some remove in the realm of a ‘superstructure’.
324 Godelier, Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology, p. 171. Godelier argues that these spontaneous 
fantasies and illusory beliefs are not the problem of self-deception but are the necessary representations 
of the social reality of a commodity system.
323 Marx’s central argument in Capital is that production must be seen as a contradictory social relation 
for the mode of production itself and thus the problems which emerge for capitalism in the production 
of relative surplus value and in the tendency for the rate of profit to fall are inherent in the 
contradictions of production relations themselves and are not the result of problems of production being 
at variance with distribution and exchange.
326 Again if we consider Clarke’s position on this we can see Marx’s argument more clearly. It will be 
recalled that Clarke’s critique of a technicist view of production is directed towards those theories
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exploitation, he tells us, are very much personified relations. 327 Certainly here we 
detect a strong sense of the implications of the social character of the complicated 
relations between people and the commodity. Marx seems to think that once a 
commodified form becomes real for people a definite sense of powerlessness 
overwhelms the individual. The individual’s independent capacity is rapidly 
destroyed. 328
Commodification and its fetishization are social conditions for alienation. 
Alienation inhabits the realm of social objectivity in the organization and production 
of the system of capitalism as much as it pervades the alienated subject. One’s 
situation within this alienated life is determined merely by chance. But it is in the 
manner of what the Surrealists would later come to call ‘objective chance’ . 329 In 
arguing this Marx opens the constitution of the materiality of ideas to the dynamic of 
social process and change. Thus the fetishization of commodities is too subject to 
change - it is a process of fetishization and refetishization. Alienation does not remain 
steadfast within this process either. The ideological is similarly a wavering between 
concealment and disclosure. But part of the changeable nature of these processes is 
the fact that in exchange relations the acknowledgement of the other is as important to 
the construction of needs as is one’s own involvement. Acquisition is something that 
becomes signified. It is in this process that the individual becomes “a means, an 
instrument of your object even for yourself’. It is here too that “your desire is its 
slave”. What Marx theorizes is the problem of a “mutual servitude to the object”, a
which attempt to separate relations of distribution from relations of production on the basis that 
production and distribution relations are determined on different bases (put crudely, production, on 
technology, and distribution on ownership). This Clarke interprets as a bourgeois separation of the 
economic and the political. In its place Clarke argues for a view of the relations of production as 
consisting fundamentally of the interrelationship of economic, political and ideological forms of 
capitalist social relations. The substance of this argument is important for a consideration of Marx’s 
theory of ideology. If the argument is made positing the basic unity of forms of social relations then 
the process in which fetishization takes place cannot be arbitrarily separated from its relation to the 
other process of the social relations of capitalism. Clarke’s comment that the “citizen, commodity 
owner, and conscious subject are not three different people, they are one and the same”, suggests that 
the processes of differentiation into ideological, political and economic forms occurs conceptually 
subsequent to the occurrence of their unity as social relations of production. Clarke, The State Debate, 
p. 84. Marx presents us with a number of different ideas on the social constitution of production 
relations. At one level the social character of these relations means that all social relations are 
‘embodied’. See Marx, Theories o f Surplus-Value, vol. I, p. 391. But this does not preclude processes 
of compulsion becoming mystified and ultimately modifying and making powerless the independence 
of, in this case, labour in relation to the social form of labour in capitalist society.
327 Marx, Capital, vol. Ill, p. 830.
328 Marx, Theories o f Surplus-Value, vol. I, p. 391.
329 See, for example, Andre Breton’s text Limits Not Frontiers o f Surrealism first published in 1937, 
reprinted in What is Surrealism?: Selected Writings, p. 154.
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reality in which relations of dominance and slavery are given full expression.330 But 
because the process of objectification is also one that involves ‘the living subject’, as 
we have mentioned, this means that the subject exists within this relation as not only a 
capacity but as a “possibility” . 331 This theorization is fundamentally important to 
Marx’s critique. We will now look at the most basic example of this complicated 
relation Marx views in the mutual servitude and ‘permitted freedom’ of the wage 
relation.
Permitted Freedom: Labour and the Process of Fetishization
As we will now see, Marx considers at length the nauseating process by which 
the worker produces poverty for workers and wealth for capitalists. At the same time, 
he also considers the dynamic of its relations. There is something embedded within 
this process, Marx attempts to examine, which turns the results of the system into its 
presuppositions. 332 As important as these processes are, it is more than the fact that 
the capitalist consciousness is ‘selfish, egotistic value’ 333 and that capital’s command 
manifests as a reification of social connectedness; 334 it is also that the expectation of 
freedom must break through the layers of reification and that, for this, ideology’s 
unstable convictions will always indicate the disharmony of the present and the 
possibility of the future. Ideology, then, is never merely the controlled, even the 
anarchically controlled, manipulative output of the seeming victors of capitalism. The 
“real development” of individuals in and against ideology is in the suspension of this 
barrier “which is recognized as a barrier, not taken for a sacred limit” :335 But as a 
barrier ideology certainly can exist and be perceived as such and, even if not revered 
as something sacred, can still hold all the allure of something seemingly necessary. 
The ‘process of fetishisation,m is a constant wavering between the forced 
acknowledgement, the apparently achieved, the repressed prospect and the forced 
retreat.
Marx concentrates upon commodities because they are the objectification of 
social labour. Whatever form wealth takes in society it “always consists of use-
330 Marx, “Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy”, p. 277.
331 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 272.
332 Ibid., p. 759.
333 Ibid., p. 303.
334 Ibid., p. 160. Marx refers to the objectified relations of exchange value as “nothing more than a 
mutual relation between people’s productive activities”.
335 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 542.
336 Marx discusses the process of fetishization of social relations in Capital, vol. Ill, pp. 814-831 .
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values” .337 But as a commodity a use-value has a determinate form once it acquires an 
exchange-value. “Labour which creates exchange-value is [...] abstract general 
labour” ; 338 “it is a characteristic feature of labour which posits exchange-value that it 
causes the social relations of individuals to appear in the perverted form of a social 
relation between things”. Although exchange-value is a relation between people it is 
a relation “hidden by a material veil” . 339 This is Marx’s unique contribution to an 
understanding of social relations involved in labour and commodification. Everyone 
from Moses to Adam Smith has realized that labour is a source of material wealth, but 
Marx sees, as a result, the “direct reification of universal labour-time, i.e., the product 
of universal alienation and of the supersession of all individual labour” .340 It is the 
conventions of our everyday life which make it appear merely ordinary that social 
relations of production assume the shape of things “so that the relations into which 
people enter in the course of their work appear as the relations of things to one 
another and of things to people” . 341 In the case of a commodity, this mystification is 
reasonably simple in that most people understand more or less clearly that the 
relations of commodities as exchange-values are really the relations of people to the 
productive activities of one another. However, the more this sort of production 
proceeds, and particularly once a monetary system develops around such production, 
this “semblance of simplicity disappears”. Illusions around money arise “from the 
failure to perceive that money, though a physical object with distinct properties, 
represents a social relation” . 342 With labour what is most important for Marx, as we 
have previously mentioned, is that the form of this appearance is “prosaically real, and 
by no means imaginary”, it is a mystification that is characteristic of all social forms 
of labour positing exchange-value. If this is the case with commodities and all the 
more striking with money, it is clear that the commodification of labour brings 
together a concentrated form of this sort of mystification. 343
This understanding of ideology by Marx will lead us in the final chapter of the 
thesis to a conceptualization of ideology as the contestation surrounding 
circumscribed possibilities of a system in which the realm of controlled freedom 
clashes with a more heretical freedom. Marx’s approach to ideology is fundamentally
337 Marx, A Contribution to the Critique o f Political Economy, p. 27.
338 Ibid., pp. 28, 29.
339 Ibid., p. 34.
340 Ibid., pp. 37, 47.
341 Ibid., p. 34.
342 Ibid., p. 35.
343 Ibid., p. 49.
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bound to his view of the openness of activity or practice.344 The existence of the 
principle of universal saleability is not evidence of a frozen world of fetishism. 
Commodity fetishism can be interpreted in this manner as the concretization of the 
process whereby social relations are dominated by the capital relation and as 
expressing the theoretical limitation of such domination. Marx appears to argue that 
if commodity fetishism is seen less as the rather circular and separated relation of an 
individual to the alienation of that individual but instead as a part of the totality of 
relations of capitalist production and exchange in which exchange is subordinate to 
production, then its expression as a potential form of ideology is more clearly 
understood. This is not to suggest any disavowal of the role of the subject in these 
processes. As Amariglio and Callari argue, Marx employs the concept of commodity 
fetishism “to introduce questions about the ‘social constitution of the individual’ ” .345
344 Human practice for Marx first presents itself as the transformation of the world in which people 
live, for the purpose of reproducing material life. In its essential sense this idea of the reproduction of 
material life is simply the requirement of the repeated basic satisfaction of needs. Once people begin to 
produce their means of subsistence the range of needs to be satisfied expands, and a consciousness of 
this process of production takes place. In a second sense this process of reproduction also implies the 
dialectics of the development of the relations of capitalism. This practice involves labour. When Marx 
discusses the development of consciousness he considers the types of divisions of labour that emerge; 
firstly a simple sexual division and later a division between material and mental labour. It is once this 
crucial division between intellectual and material labour occurs that idealist concepts of ‘pure’ theory, 
theology, philosophy, morality, and so on, can be put forward: “From this moment onwards 
consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, 
that it really represents something without representing something real”; consciousness is now in “a 
position to emancipate itself from the world”, quips Marx. Marx, The German Ideology, p. 50. The 
labour process is an intentional activity which had “already existed in the imagination of the labourer at 
its commencement”. Marx argues that this process brings about a change to the material on which 
labour is performed and it results in the realization of a purpose. This requires that the individual be 
“steadily in consonance” with the purpose of the labour. This presupposes the role of the 
consciousness in the prior deliberation of the functions to be carried out. Marx distinguishes this 
character of human labour from that of the spider or the bee: “what distinguishes the worst architect 
from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in 
reality”. Marx, Capital, vol. 1, p. 174. In other words it is a conscious activity engaged in in order to 
realize an intention. In the process of transforming their world people also transform themselves. The 
idea of the labour process entails a broad conception of the forms that human activity might take. 
Labour is not merely sweaty, physical exertion but can also encompass the entire range of activities 
which might be said to make up human life. In this sense human activity is determinant of that which 
wholly constitutes what it is to be human. In other words, what it is to be human becomes entirely 
connected to activities undertaken for the reproduction of life. We might want to question here 
whether this is a sense of the reproduction of material life or a sensuous life more generally. Certainly 
there are reasons for thinking that the latter was important to Marx, and yet Marx partly wants to 
distinguish his conception of activity from a variety of idealist and religious views holding currency at 
the time of his writing. For example, Feuerbach’s concentration upon contemplation and feeling is 
criticized by Marx where it is put forward to the exclusion of a more practical sense of the individual’s 
existence, in Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 44; as is Stimer’s religious conception of 
‘man’. Ibid., p. 63; as are Bruno Bauer’s ideas. Ibid., p. 47. Norman D. Livergood’s work, Activity in 
Marx’s Philosophy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967) deals with the issue of the principle of activity 
and practice in Marx’s philosophy, and importantly, considers this throughout Marx’s various works.
345 Jack Amariglio and Antonio Callari, “Marxian Value Theory and the Problem of the Subject: The 
Role of Commodity Fetishism”, in Fetishism as Cultural Discourse, eds. Emily Apter and William 
Pietz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 190.
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But as we can see the terms of Marx’s ‘social constitution of the individual’ do tend to 
place unnecessary constraints upon what we might take such a constitution to mean.346 
We might agree that the fetishistic nature of commodities is not primarily the effect of 
an alienated consciousness but rather takes place within such alienation but this does 
not necessarily allow us to see the ideological nature of this process any more clearly. 
Fetishism can well be a product of a particular construction of society (a generalized 
commodity society) at the same time that a subjective alienation is intertwined with 
this fetishism of commodities. Marx is obviously contending here with the perceived 
problem of the nature of fetishism being dismissed as an illusory awareness of the 
nature of social reality and yet his overwhelming marginalization of the subjective in 
relation to fetishism is an ultimately unnecessary step to take.347 Perhaps in the 
concept of labour in relation to fetishism we can see a greater sense of the alienated in 
Marx’s work. Let us then consider how Marx theorizes labour as a particular form in 
relation to the commodification of life.
One of the fundamental commodities within capitalism which Marx’s work 
focuses upon is that of the capacity of people to work, sometimes referred to by the 
technicist and rather unfortunate term, ‘labour-power’ . 348 The capacity to work is the 
commodity that most people possess and are free to sell and the commodity that 
capitalism must buy in order to realize surplus value. 349 It is labour that creates use- 
value, “an activity that appropriates particular nature-given materials to particular 
human wants” .350 It is in this sense that Marx views labour as a necessary condition 
for human existence. However, it is because the process of exchange within 
capitalism involves the appropriation of the commodity of the capacity of some to 
work that the capital/labour relation always contains within it exploitation. The
346 For a general work that considers the role of the individual in some Marxist thought, see D.F.B. 
Tucker, Marxism and Individualism (New York: St. Martin’s, 1980).
347 This is, of course, an aspect of Marx’s analysis that some Marxists claim as the ‘scientific’ character 
of his work. We have viewed this tendency in relation to structuralism in the work of Althusser.
348 The term ‘labour ability’ or ‘labour capacity’ as used by Marx in the Grundrisse is employed in 
preference to the more technicist ‘labour-power’. The latter’s connotations of brutish, animal strength, 
as in ‘horse-power’, are enough to make its use largely inappropriate. Engels’ addition to Marx’s work 
concerning the English language distinction between work and labour (work is the process of 
producing use-values; labour the process of creating value) seems to merely further a technicist 
interpretation of Marx’s intention. See Engels’ addition to Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 181, n. 1. Whilst 
the expression Arbeitskraft is sometimes used in the Grundrisse this should be understood as labour 
capacity or capability rather than ‘labour power’, as it is most often translated. See for example, Marx, 
Grundrisse, p. 345.
349 There is, of course, as Marx reminds us nothing natural about this condition. “Nature does not 
produce on the one side owners of money or commodities, and on the other men possessing nothing but 
their own labour-power. This relation has no natural basis, neither is its social basis one that is 
common to all historical periods”. Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 166.
350 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 50.
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appropriation of the commodity of labour capacity implies the category of an 
appropriator. The actual forms and extent of the inequalities arising from this relation 
are, of course, subject to much variation. The formal equality and freedom that is 
expressed in the relation of exchange is significant because of its contradictory 
character and its contradictory character is in part that which both prompts and 
enables its ideological manifestations.
At one level, the exchange of labour capacity is the mystification and mere 
semblance to which Marx refers.351 It is a mystification because trapped within the 
content of the transaction is something that is alien, in this sense, to the substance of a 
free and equal exchange. But to suppose from this that the notion of formal equality 
has lost all substance within capitalism, or has been reduced to an obviously tarnished, 
tinselly cheapness, is to misunderstand the contradictory character of the relation. 
Cynicism does not, of itself, undermine the prosaically real. Many commentators on 
Marx’s theory of ideology have interpreted this analysis to mean that ideology is that 
which is distorted by the concealment of contradiction. 352 Ideology within fetishism 
is, however, more the existence of contradiction than it is in distortions arising from 
this. It is fetishization itself which is the problem for Marx. People do not need to 
distort this reality in order to succumb to ideology. Fetishism itself is a process of 
ideology.353
Labour can appear upon the market as a commodity “only if, and so far as, its 
possessor, the individual whose labour-power it is, offers it for sale, or sells it, as a 
commodity.” It is upon this basis that the worker and “the owner of money meet in 
the market, and deal with each other as on the basis of equal rights, with this 
difference alone, that one is buyer, the other seller; both, therefore, equal in the eyes 
of the law. ” 354 This capacity for labour and the freedom to sell it, as mentioned, 
distinguishes the worker from the slave: The worker is not selling herself “rump and 
stump, once for all”, rather, by temporarily placing her labour capacity at the disposal
351 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 509. Marx refers to the “semblance of exchange”; where exchange is 
regarded in isolation from capital, it appears as an independent system, which is “a mere illusion, but a 
necessary illusion”. It is as a ‘necessary illusion’ that it takes on an ideological form.
352 Larrain argues that ideology “has to do with the concealment of real contradictions”. Larrain, 
Marxism and Ideology , p. 133.
353 Mepham argues that the concept of fetishism “has primarily an epistemological significance” that 
refers to the “specific effects of the capitalist relations of production on the ways in which social life 
tends to be represented”. This Mepham contrasts with the concept of alienation which, unlike 
fetishism, designates “some generalized dehumanization of man”. Mepham, “From the Grundrisse to 
Capital”, p. 157. Mepham seems to miss the point that the specific effects of capitalism are totally 
implicated in the very real dehumanization of people. These are not separate effects but parts of the 
same problem.
354 Marx, Capital, vol I, p. 165.
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of a buyer, for a definite period of time, the worker can instead look upon her labour 
capacity as her own property, as her own commodity. 355 The worker is therefore free 
in a double sense: She is free in the sense that “as a free man he can dispose of his 
labour-power as his own commodity and that on the other hand he has no other 
commodity for sale, is short of everything necessary for the realisation of his labour- 
power” . 356 This double sense of freedom is thus doubly fetishized. This “double, 
differentiated existence must develop into a difference, Marx tells us. 357 Marx 
considers that this one historical condition “comprises a world’s history” . 358 Within 
this sphere of circulation where such appearances occur, it is only “Bentham who 
comes out the victor”, as Althusser expresses it. 359 For the freedom and equality 
expressed in this contract entered into by both buyer and seller, “constrained only by 
their own free will” , 360 is, in the sphere of production, the equality of the worker to 
labour for the capitalist, and the freedom of the worker to bring her own hide to the 
market and to expect nothing but a tanning. 361 It is of course these expectations and 
what they signify that are fundamentally important to the ideological character of 
work. As various recent commentators have pointed out, today’s equivalent of slave- 
labour in computerized, automated, and increasingly immaterial types of labour 
performed, is that of the cyborg, the human machine. 362 This sort of labour and the
355 Ibid.
356 Ibid., p. 166.
357 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 147.
358 “Capital, therefore, announces from its first appearance a new epoch in the process of social 
production”. Marx, Capital, vol I, p. 167.
359 Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, p. 85.
360 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 172.
361 Ibid.
362 The appearance of the idea of the cyborg in social theory owes much to J. G. Ballard’s construction 
of a strange post-human world of body-machine hybrids in his well-known novel of 1973, Crash 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1973). A wide variety of theorists have integrated the idea of the cyborg in 
their analyses. For a sustained exposition of the theory see Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto: 
Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century”, in Simians, Cyborgs, 
and Women: The Reinvention o f Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991). To what extent this idea is a 
significant theoretical progression upon Marx’s idea of workers as appendages of machines is 
questionable. Certainly there are differences between being an appendage of a machine and being a 
human/machine hybrid, or worse, a former body now superseded by an insidious machine, but the 
general idea of workers who are to varying degrees molded by the needs of a technological capitalism 
seems to be the general point and is one which all the theorists of this idea use. In any case, Marx talks 
of workers both as appendages of machines and as being transformed into parts of machines 
themselves. See Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 398. It should of course be pointed out that vast numbers of 
workers throughout the world, including many in the so-called Third World, continue to labour under 
conditions that reproduce them not only as appendages to machines but as machines themselves. This 
labour is performed without computers or automation, and relies solely, and cheaply, on the use of 
manual human capacities to undertake work that could in many instances be achieved by non-human 
machines. The only reason why 50,000 workers descend each day into the Serra Pelada open-cut gold 
mine in Brazil and haul sacks of rock up the mine-face is because their labour is cheaper than the 
purchase and maintenance of machinery, as the photographer Sabastiao Salgado has documented so
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social constitution of the individual it entails is equally open to the theoretical 
problem of attributing a certain self-recognition on the part of the subject to some 
essential constitution within the social function of commodity production and wage- 
labour.363 Is this what Marx is telling us by way of his critique of the social 
constitution of labour capacity?
This expectation, and that of what it consists, is fundamental to ideological 
processes. Marx recognizes the juridical significance of the process of exchange and 
in doing so posits the relation of objective and subjective moments of conscious as 
well as more directly fetishized interaction. People do not sell themselves or their 
labour but rather their labour capacity, in other words, their ability to produce value. 
This is the freedom that capitalism grants to those who work - the permission to sell 
one’s capacity to work. Whatever else work involves - prestige, hierarchy, 
sycophancy, relations of domination, transient rewards - by selling their capacity to 
work people ‘sink to the level of a commodity’, “the most wretched commodity of 
all” . 364 Marx is not suggesting that people are commodities but rather that they have 
been reduced to this level because they are owners of a commodity that is realized as 
labour capacity. Workers are owners or guardians of a commodity rather than being
powerfully. From above, these ‘mud men’ appear as a human chain, unrecognizable from oneanother, 
as a human machine moving up and down the mine-face. This situation is little different from that 
which Marx describes in Volume One of Capital where women were used instead of horses for hauling 
canal boats “because the labour required to produce horses and machines is an accurately known 
quantity, while that required to maintain the women of the surplus-population is below all calculation”. 
See Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 372.
363 There are, however, enormous differences in the sorts of analyses offered on the basis of this 
theory. More typically the idea of the cyborg is evoked in apocalyptic tones as testimony to the 
complete annihilation of the individual by technology; much less typically is the sort of analysis 
developed by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt which views the new subjectivity of the cyborg as 
indicative of the centrality of the concept of labour in and against capital, in what are profoundly 
modified social conditions within the development of capitalism. The type of analysis that readily fits 
the former tendency is that, for example, put forward by Timothy Druckrey in his introductory essay to 
the fittingly forebodingly titled work Culture on the Brink: Ideologies o f Technology, ed. Gretchen 
Bender and Timothy Druckrey (Seattle: Bay Press, 1994). By way of contrast, see, for example, 
Annette Fitzsimons’ essay “Women, Power and Technology”, in Knowing the Difference: Feminist 
Perspectives in Epistemology, eds. Kathleen Lennon and Margaret Whitford (London: Routledge, 
1994), pp. 122-131. In this essay Fitzsimons argues against what she sees as Elizabeth Grosz’ negative 
or reactive project as a strategy of change within a feminist critique of technology. A theory of 
technology based on the idea of male dominance gives a limited analysis of power. For an example of 
a theorization of the subjectivity of the cyborg as showing the centrality of the concept of labour in and 
against capital see, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Labor o f Dionysus: A Critique o f the State-Form 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994). For example, as to new forms of labour that have 
emerged in relation to the automation of factories and the computerization of parts of society, Negri 
and Hardt question why these forms of labour should lead some post-modernists into new levels of 
catastrophic despair. Negri and Hardt argue that these new forms of labour mean, more importantly 
than anything else, the renewed collective determination of labour within ever-stricter categories of 
communication and cooperation, which, whatever their contradictions, provide a constant, 
ontologically solid basis for the collective aggregation of labour.
364 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 322.
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themselves a commodity. 365 They are not therefore the victims of false consciousness 
but have a subjective interaction within ideological conditions. It is in this sense that 
they possess a formal freedom - the freedom to sell their capacity to labour. They are 
not slaves in the strict sense but free workers.366
There is, however, something peculiarly eery in the fact that it is labour 
capacity that becomes a commodity. It is not a creation of potentiality, such as 
something produced, but human potentiality itself which directly becomes a 
commodity for the ultimate purpose of profit. It is living labour’s capacity and a 
capacity as a sole possession of value upon the market; “living labour appears as a 
mere means to realize objectified, dead labour, to penetrate it with an animating soul 
while losing its own soul to it” .367 Marx then questions what it is that this process 
suggests: The machine, he tells us in almost Nietzschean terms, “accommodates itself 
to man’s weakness, in order to turn weak man into a machine” . 368 The enormity of this 
sort of commodification of human potential strikes Marx as fundamental to the 
enslaved mentality upon which capitalism must depend. In such a situation people 
have indeed become poor as people, as Marx writes. 369 We are left wondering whether 
the unease we might feel with this situation is more that this is the manner in which all 
labour is objectified or more that the strangeness of it goes unrecognized because it is 
fetishized? Here the prosaic objectivity seems to take the upper hand by making 
seemingly natural such a strange and alien existence. And it is certainly this process
365 It will be apparent that I do not see this as a part of Marx’s supposedly decisive development from 
‘early’ to ‘late’ phases. To suggest that Marx’s early work implies that workers are commodities and 
that his more mature work corrects this mistaken view with the realization that workers in fact remain 
the owners of a commodity, is mistaken. It is considered that Marx wrongly refers in the Grundrisse to 
workers as “free of all belongings and possessions [...]free o f all property”, as if this suggests that he 
was unaware that people do in fact own the property of their capacity to work. Ibid., p. 507. 
Rosdolsky argues that the fact that the worker owns her labour-power and only grants temporary 
disposal over it to capital in exchange is of decisive importance because “it counts as one of those 
features of the relation of wage-labour which raise it historically above earlier modes of exploitation”. 
Rosdolsky, The Making o f Marx’s ‘Capital’, p. 195. In general terms Marx attempt to show that, at one 
level, bourgeois equality and freedom are a semblance, and a deceptive semblance; at the same time, 
this semblance expresses itself with such palpable reality that its manifestation as mere semblance 
needs constantly to be questioned. People do own private property - at its most basic in the form of 
labour-power, and often also the means of subsistence. The fact that workers do own their capacity to 
labour is decisive for the substantiation of ideologies based upon the idea of the sanctity of private 
property. In this fact of the possession of the property of labour ability, such ideologies cease to be the 
alien forces of oppression they might otherwise manifest themselves as; instead they can express a 
relation in which workers can recognize a part they play. The purpose of Marx’s critique is to 
understand the social basis of juridical freedom and equality within capitalism rather than constructing 
false dichotomies between labour and private property.
366 Marx, Capital, vol I, p. 165.
367 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 461.
368 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 360.
369 Ibid., p. 358.
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that Marx returns to repeatedly to emphasize the problem that commodification as an 
ideological manifestation entails.
It is, of course, from this understanding that Marx is able to develop his crucial 
realization that capitalist production, based as it is upon exploitation and domination, 
is, at the same time, perfectly compatible with the idea and reality of juridical freedom 
and equality. Workers are the free and equal possessors of their own property, their 
capacity to labour. They are permitted to sell this capacity according to juridical 
relations. The basis of wage-labour is the possession of this commodity as private 
property. Within commodity relations it is the specific relation of dependence that is 
of greatest significance in the determination of subjectivity. Underlying a relation of 
dependence is a transformation in the relation between the individual and her labour 
as expressed in the wage slavery of the worker and the relative independence of the 
capitalist.370 This relative sense of freedom seems to present Marx with the spectre of 
the destruction of self-knowledge and worth. Thus this specific social character of 
labour under capitalism has necessary consequences for the way in which human 
subjectivity is constructed.371 The mystification of the commodity form, occurring 
precisely because labour is treated as labour in the abstract, as a reduction to a 
specific, average quantity, distorts and mystifies the relation between workers: It thus 
distorts and mystifies the very value of the individual. The fetishization of 
commodities objectifies actual social relations as relations between things: It 
substitutes for actual, varied human labour, quantities of abstract labour that possess 
merely equivalent value. 372
The mystified notion that emerges of free and equal exchange underpins the 
idea of an autonomous and undetermined consciousness, the free will of the 
individual. From this emerges a complete circularity - value, as accumulated capital 
or surplus value, is dependent upon an abstract quantification of labour that entails an 
essential equivalence of all acts of labour and an essential equality of labourers on the 
basis of the quantifiable equivalence of their labour ability: But value “does not stalk 
about with a label describing what it is”, rather its tendency is to convert every 
product into “a social hieroglyphic” - an ideological form in which contradiction
370 See for example Marx’s chapter on “The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation’, in Capital, vol. 
1, pp. 574-666.
371 For example, that labour is reduced to a form which fails to qualitatively differentiate the skills 
involved, skilled labour being merely simple labour intensified, that labour becomes a category 
characterized by its ability to be measured as uniform quantities of labour, that its social character is 
confined merely to its expression in a commodity form, all mean that the dominant relationship 
between individuals emerging from this relation is that of the ownership of alienable commodities.
372 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 78.
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resides. 373 A part of this hieroglyphic is the relation of dependency that is a necessary 
outcome of a division of labour that allows capitalism to produce not only value but 
surplus value. This dependency must be recognized by both the dependent and those 
upon whom the dependent depends but it is recognized in a very particular form. This 
dependency is not recognized in the diaphanous light of its necessary inequality, 
rather, it is recognized in the ideological form in which it manifests itself, the juridical 
relation of the equality of the contract. This ideological form of equality is itself 
dependent upon the assumed equivalence of the producers of commodities becoming 
manifest in the demands of the system, i.e., the drive towards capital accumulation 
given impetus by the developments of constant changes in production. The circularity 
of this process is no aberration, it is the logical outcome of the workings of the system 
itself. The resultant ambiguity in the value ascribed to the individual of capitalism, 
and the problematic turns of its modem expression, should come as little surprise. 
Marx indeed refers on various occasions to this very process of an inevitable 
ambiguity. 374 What, then, might we leam from Marx’s understanding of these 
objective conditions that seem almost to have begun before any subjective 
determination, as the quote at the outset of this section claimed? And what might we 
feel is left unanswered in this treatment?
Capitalism, for Marx, is a “form-giving activity” that materializes and 
modifies its object375 and, given the centrality of this process to most people’s lives, is 
likely to have consequences for many aspects of everyday life. 376 The system is an 
historically produced social process. 377 The processes of capitalist production are 
themselves part of a complexity of interrelated conditions that arise and are 
continually reformed within barriers which the system itself creates. “Every limit
373 Ibid., p. 79.
374 A very useful example of Marx’s understanding of capitalist ambiguity is explained in the analysis 
Marx gives of the ‘trinity formula’, in the third volume of Capital that we have already mentioned. See 
Marx, Capital, vol. Ill, p. 817.
375 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 301.
376 When Marx refers to capitalism as the “general illumination” in which the modem world is bathed 
this argument is often interpreted as expressing merely an economic determinism. Marx, ibid., p. 107. 
Capitalism, for Marx, is much more than its economic realm, and understanding its operation in 
modem society entails comprehending a wide range of social, political and ideological relations for 
which the organisation of society on the basis of a generalised commodity production may have 
significance. In a recent work on the social theories of Marx and Weber, Derek Sayer refers, in Marx’s 
term, to capitalism as the “general light” in which the modem world is bathed, and proceeds, in an 
interesting account of these two theorists, to argue how far removed their analyses are from numerous 
interpretations of their work which take such a proposition concerning capitalism and the modem world 
to express merely an economic determinism. See Sayer, Capitalism and Modernity, p. 1.
377 Marx, Capital, vol. Ill, p. 815.
The Critique of Social Life 391
appears as a barrier to be overcome” .378 We have already noted that, for Marx, general 
descriptions of society are abstractions that extract the common element in order to 
save repetition. 379 This general category is itself fragmented and segmented and splits 
into different determinations.380 Such a society, according to Marx, is based upon the 
forced unity of its elements. 381 This situation is indicative of an “antagonistic split” 382 
that is basic to commodity exchange.383 A society based on antagonistic relations will 
have specifiable and yet at the same time unpredictable consequences for the 
continued process of commodification. What appears as necessary development is, 
for Marx, rather the “legitimation of chance” .384 A part of the differentia specifica of 
capitalism is that, in addition to its appropriation of things, the accumulation of capital 
also appropriates a particular human condition in the mental and physical elements of 
the labour performed, that of human subjectivity. But it is also of fundamental 
importance for Marx that contained within the present forms of capitalism are 
“foreshadowings of the future” . 385 Something beyond the present is “implicit in the 
actual forms of existing reality” .386 This is also apparent within the realm of ideas 
where there is a conflict “between its ideal vocation and its actually existing
378 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 408.
379 Such a process is the method adopted by Marx. In the Grundrisse, for example, Marx explicitly 
sets out his method as starting from the abstract in order to explain the particular and the concrete; 
“from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until I arrived at the simplest 
determinations”. A conception of the whole (Vorstellung) although important is too chaotic a 
conception and so a move analytically “towards ever more simple concepts” (.Begriff) is required. 
Marx, Grundrisse, p. 100. This same approach is found in Capital with Marx’s discussion of 
commodity fetishism. Here, Marx sets out from the most abstract expression of fetishism through his 
analysis of the commodity itself. In order to arrive at an understanding of how the process of 
mystification occurs in particular situations, recognizing its expression in the concrete is also 
necessary. But it is because it is at the level of immediate appearances that the process of mystification 
takes hold - a mystification which mystifies the abstract relations between elements of the system - that 
grasping the abstract is important. Thus the immediate appearance of capital as interest, land as rent, 
and labour as wages needs to be understood as a fetishization of relations among the direct producers of 
commodities in the form of social relations among the commodities themselves. Without a grasp of the 
abstract such an understanding is not possible. Marx, Capital, vol. I, passim.
380 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 85. Despite this clear description of the fragmentation within abstraction 
Marx is frequently considered as we have seen, by those who seek to dismiss his work, as an economic 
determinist.
381 Ibid., p. 150.
382 Ibid.
383 Antagonism must then be analysed as a part of the conditions and structural constraints of the 
system in operation. Antagonism does not express itself in neat divisions between its social, economic, 
political, ideological and other dimensions; any analysis of such phenomena needs to set out from the 
basis of the interactive nature of their articulation through which the manifestation of particular forms 
may be theorized.
384 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 109.
385 Ibid., p. 461.
386 Marx to Ruge, September, 1843, p. 208.
392 Ideology Critique and A Philosophy of Freedom
premises” . 387 Contemporary conditions of capitalism, by their very existence, are 
“engaged in suspending themselves” and in doing so they will posit presuppositions 
for a world beyond capitalism.388
In this we can see a dialectical examination of the dialectic of the object - the 
form in which an unffee system is able to capture a subjectivity not only in its wake 
but in its very inception. This dialectic of past and future, of determinations and 
chance, of antagonistic splits and forced unities of both objective and subjective - is 
an important part of a theorization of radical change and should not be underestimated 
in this sense. Nor should Marx’s ability to concretize so fundamental an aspect of the 
functioning of the objective within unpredictable social relations be easily dismissed. 
Subjectivity is very much present - even if held slightly off-stage - in this theoretical 
manoeuvre. This is because alienation is theorized largely in terms of a process in 
which the outside world treats individuals as enslaved beings. Marx considers that 
this process also results in people treating their world as something alien, and yet, 
other than in their relation to the authority of capital, what it is about people which 
promotes this is dealt with only marginally. It seems that, for Marx, people are 
abandoned more than abandoning beings. It is not so straightforwardly the case that 
Marx, in accordance with much Romantic writing from the period of the French 
Revolution onwards, tends to suggest an emptiness at the core of the self for which a 
contested pursuit of freedom provides some sufficiency against the void. Marx’s 
revolutionary romanticism veers much more in the direction of wanting to find a 
subject adequate to the task of complete redemption. The difficulty we are presented 
with is in not knowing where the self-experience of alienated life acts upon a self- 
identity and self-understanding that ventures beyond an absent sense of self. Let us 
now consider the significance of the commodity of money to assess whether it is here 
that Marx reveals more obviously the strange compulsion of the object and the 
peculiar vulnerability of the subject.
The ‘equation of the incompatibleThe Philosophical Problematic of Money
As we will later see, part of Marx’s critique of the place of religion within 
commodification considers the role of the worldly god of money. In this section of 
the chapter we want to indicate the issue that is central to Marx’s critique of money: 
Money is a human creation. It is also, in the main, a visible illusion, and this is its 
central ideological component. Its use within capitalism has witnessed not merely
387 Ibid.
388 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 461.
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various forms of control of its creators but has given rise to a strange independence 
that money assumes in relation to humanity.389 It returns to people not their own value 
and their own creativity but the value of money itself It fundamentally alters 
relations between people to that of owners of commodities.390 This value it insinuates 
everywhere, upon any possible thing that can be commodified. Money exchange 
becomes a “means of life”.391 Money forces not only humanity but potentially every 
aspect of the world to exist on its terms. In this it is a despot.392 It is a process that 
becomes “madness”, madness “as a moment of economics and as a determinant of the 
practical life of peoples”.393 It saps from life any human meaning by commanding its 
own powers of attributing value. Human value withers and atrophies while the value 
of money dictates the worth of all that it encounters. This process is that of the 
spectacle - money has become more real than that which it represents, and that which 
it represents derives its worth in money terms. “I am lame, but money procures me 
twenty-four legs. Consequently, I am not lame”. “I am a wicked, dishonest, 
unscrupulous and stupid individual, but money is respected, and so also is its 
owner”.394 With money, a stupid, twenty-four legged person can become an object of 
desire and endless possibility because money commodifies desire and attempts to 
ensnare the possible. It comes to dominate because 7 ’argent n ’a pas de maitre',395 
Marx detects the reified, the ideological that is money where money is the alienated 
capacity of people.
What, however, is the role of people within this incompatible equation? 
Money in capitalist societies is a social relation; it acts as a relation of power within 
the antagonistic expression of alienated labour. It is the “physical medium into which 
exchange values are dipped, and in which they obtain the form corresponding to their 
general character”.396 Commodities have value because they are the crystallization of 
social labour.397 For Marx, the appropriation of the creativity of people for the
389 For a history of money see Marc Shell, Money, Language, and Thought: Literary and Philosophical 
Economies From the Medieval to the Modern Era (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
390 This insight Marx attributes to the “brilliancy of Aristotle’s genius”. Aritstotle alone, Marx argues , 
discovered in the expression of the value of commodities a relation of equality”. Marx, Capital, vol. I,
p. 66.
391 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 193.
392 Ibid., p. 199.
393 Ibid., p. 269.
394 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 377.
395 Ibid., p. 319. Marx cites the saying ‘Money knows no master’ to express the “complete domination 
of dead matter over men”.
396 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 167.
397 Karl Marx, Wages, Price and Profit (Peking: Foreign Languages, 1973), p. 34.
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purpose of profit shackles all who participate in such a system. Turning creative 
potential into alienated commodities available upon the market fosters the illusion of 
satiable desire. Central to these facets of the system is money as the object of greed. 
Once wealth has become individualized, its commodified reality lends it a particular 
power over society, over the world of gratifications and labours. On this basis all 
human creativity is potentially able to be commodified. The process of 
commodification becomes a barrier to be overcome, a barrier against which the 
human consciousness collides or is absorbed. But in “the modem world, where 
production appears as the aim of mankind and wealth as the aim of production” 
something more than this occurs. Capitalism gives the impression that wealth is the 
aim of production and nothing more when, beyond this, it is inevitably the 
universality of individual needs, capacities and pleasures created through universal 
exchange. Here, the individual strives “not to remain something he has become, but is 
in the absolute movement of becoming” . 398 Marx conceptualizes money as something 
other than its one-dimensional function for capitalism. Money clashes with and 
cajoles a subjectivity in the process of becoming by way of ideology. The self that 
emerges in the advent of a moneyed world is an unsettled series of potential 
metamorphoses whose impermanence mimics the very sort of ideological 
transposition that Marx sees in the phantasmagorical character of a commodity world.
This is not to suggest an avoidance of the significance in Marx’s work of 
money as a form of command for capital. Indeed, much of Marx’s analysis of money 
focuses upon the use of money for capitalism. In so doing he often conceptualizes the 
contradictory character of this form of command. In capitalist society money is not 
simply a quality of measure for bartering but is an instrument of exchange. Money 
comes to symbolize and represent the exchange value of all other commodities. It is 
an exchange value because it is the realization of a specific amount of labour time.399 
It is in its role as the vehicle of command of labour that money takes on its 
specifically capitalistic form. Labour continues to produce value that produces 
surplus money through which the cycle of work, as the production of surplus value, is 
maintained. Exchange value must be expressed in a form other than its immediate 
particular product, in its value as quantity, because this value is not that which, in a 
profit system, will ever be returned to labour. Money is thus a mediated general 
product.400 It is the pimp between need and object, between one’s life and one’s
398 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 488.
399 Ibid., pp. 166, 167.
400 Ibid., p. 167.
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means of life. 401 But whilst money mediates one’s own life it also mediates the 
existence of other people for oneself. It is the objectification of general labour time. 402 
Making commodities into mutually equal and equivalent objectifications of labour 
time involves contradictions which find their expression in a money which is distinct 
from labour time. Labour time itself exists only subjectively, only in the form of 
activity. 403 Money is an expression of capitalism to the extent that it becomes the 
“nexus rerum et hominum' ’ of modem production. 404 Its capacity to signify the 
universal terrain upon which people are reduced to subjects of exchange marks a 
break with other forms in which conflicting interests are filtered or resolved. Money 
thus signifies the imposition of work on the basis of surplus value. It heralds a 
pervasive commodification. All creatures have been made into property, the fish in 
the water, the birds in the air, the plants on the earth, 405 and money is the medium 
through which all are commodified.
The problem with money is an ideological problem. Money allows the 
appearance of free and independent reciprocity within exchange relations. It works in 
the service of a type of dissembling, a “functional w-adequation”, as Spivak refers to 
it. 406 It transfers titles of ownership into the hands of the buyer, and this confers a 
power upon the owner. In the process of exchange what is presumed to be equated is 
the value of the product not the labour by which the product is produced. Money is a 
general medium of exchange because a specific product, and specific labour must be 
exchanged for exchangeability.407 In money, the medium of exchange becomes a 
thing. Even more importantly, the individual objectifies (vergegenständlicht) herself 
in money as a thing. 408 It is not, therefore an objectively objectified product but relies 
for its meaning upon the constant interplay of subject and object within conditions of 
exchange. In the collisions of exchange the unconscious acts of those who exchange 
are posited ideologically in the very autonomy that money as a social relation entails. 
Commodity exchange is not the simple process of, one who buys, sells, just as one
401 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 375.
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who sells also buys, as it is with bartering. The apparent independence of one of these 
processes against the other means that the medium of money is the splitting of 
exchange into two acts - a process in which the possibility of unravelling resides. 
Money is “the god among commodities” 409 but whilst the process of exchange is 
appropriation “through and by the means of divestiture and alienation”, circulation 
necessarily brings to light that its point of departure is the unfree social individual. 
This, as we have considered, is because money represents an “alien social power 
standing above” the mutual interaction of individuals.410 It is “a product for me only 
in so far as it has been alienated, become for others”; “it is for the other only in so far 
as he himself alienates his product” . 411 It is the alienated capacity of humanity.412 The 
omnipotence of money, its function as the object most worth possessing, is thus also 
its inevitable universality, its ability to buy everything and appropriate all objects.413 
Money is “auri sacra fames” - that accursed hunger for itself.414 But does this 
otherness within identification (a complex process in itself) entail the subject’s self- 
identification or, as with other types of commodities as we have seen Marx theorize, 
an identification with the process by which objectification takes place?
Marx sees in the commodification of money subjective activity. It is a 
subjectivity not merely in relation to the representation of the object; subjectivity is 
also an aspect of the reality of money. The subjectivity of money appears as the 
“emptying-out” of human content, its universal objectification as total alienation. 415 
Here Marx feels that its alien social power arises from the mutual influence of 
conscious individuals on oneanother but that it is neither completely located in their 
consciousness, “nor subsumed under them as a whole” .416 This objectification is, 
however, its appearance and purpose for capital. But does Marx make clear what is 
left over from this process, what escapes being subsumed, what provides any basis for 
a self-disappropriation? The problem as Marx sees it is that as a social relation money 
is also the indication of the universality of need. As a complete emptying out of 
human content it is only ever “satisfaction from a limited standpoint”, a vulgar self- 
satisfaction.417 What does this suggest about the subject’s role in this process? Whilst
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its individual moments arise from conscious purposes of individuals, the totality of 
the process, as we have just mentioned, is for Marx “neither located in their 
consciousness, nor subsumed under them” .418 Of what then does the totality consist? 
At one level we can see that money is a social relation in which the antagonistic 
relations of capitalism are necessarily expressed, but is the totality not also entailed in 
subjective processes of its “self-contradictory and illusory” aspects? 419 Money’s 
‘blood-stained cheek’ is a part of the form in which it arises, Marx argues, 
paraphrasing Marie Augier, even though it is the capitalistic use of money which drips 
blood and dirt from every pore.420 The relation of content to form is arrived at through 
its totality, in this sense. What Marx proceeds to argue is that the individual is most 
strongly enmeshed in the realization of money as a symbol - a symbol as objectified 
commodity.421 Again, contradiction is inherent here in its relations.422 The 
individuation of the individual within money is also unavoidably the individual’s 
objectification in relations of greed and craving.423 The ability to accumulate money 
requires relations of domination. Thus from the contradiction of money is created the 
possibility of justice and freedom within the individual’s relations with others. A 
world of wealth which “appears satisfied with itself’ is merely “vulgar” .424 This 
vulgarity is, however, the locus in which the individual comes to recognize herself, 
the place where once again we are returned to the objectified relation of the subject’s 
interaction with the object under consideration. Where does the phantasmagorical 
begin within this unrecognized and yet potentially recognizable relation?
The problem Marx sees with money as universal exchange is not simply that 
human social significance is reduced when human powers are subjugated to the power 
of money.425 The creation of a need for money is a real need created by the system. 
At once both material and symbolic, money allows value to be realized. This 
“universal whore” 426 is a symbol that has an objective existence.427 It acts as symbolic 
in the sense of containing particular sorts of symbols -  the kind which, in the
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Baudelarian sense, look at you with their familiar glances.428 It can exist in forms as 
diverse as the materialization of abstract wealth, as ‘gilded coins’, “dead treasure” , 429 
speculative430 or “fictitious capital” 431 but whatever its form, money has become a 
recognized, or perhaps more acceptable, end rather than a means.432 In the Grundrisse, 
Marx explains at length the variety of determinations of money. Money is firstly a 
measure of the value of a commodity; it is also a means of circulation and a realizer of 
prices;433 it also appears as an end in itself, outside circulation and out of its usual form 
as money, and instead either as luxury articles or, if still as money, accumulated as 
‘treasure’ or surplus money.434 Money is also transformed into capital.435 All of these 
determinations ultimately give to money a specific form of social existence. Form or 
‘value-form’ in this sense means an historical social relation.436 It is what becomes 
alienated from those who participate in the exchange of commodities and that which 
is materialized as money. Money becomes a “driving-wheel for the development of 
all forces of production, material and spiritual” .437 All human abilities which emerge 
out of social relations suffer deformation into money. This is why Marx considers 
money to be so important. By commodifying everything with which it comes into 
contact, money exerts a power quite unlike any other. And a key to this power is 
money’s ability to commodify the capacity to work, thereby turning the most basic 
products necessary for life into alien property which workers are forced to pay for 
from their wages. It is as a ‘negative unity’ that money expresses its own 
contradiction. This contradiction is also the ‘Rhodus problem’ mentioned in Capital - 
the problem of how to generate a surplus for capital accumulation when only 
equivalents are exchanged.438 Circulation, Marx considers, does not carry within it the 
principle of self-renewal. Its immediacy therefore is a semblance of the real process
428 Charles Baudelaire, Fleurs du mal, trans. James McGowan, intro. Jonathan Culler (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). “Man wends his way through forests of symbols/Which look at him with their 
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of which it consists. 439 The real process is one that is mediated by the conditions of 
production. But what are we to make of what is real and what is semblance within 
such a process? And what is it that makes it real or artificial -  the objectivity it has or 
assumes, or the subjective relation it necessitates?
We have mentioned Marx’s concern with the social outcome of a world based 
upon self-interest, but the centrality of this concern as it applies to capitalist 
commodification needs to be emphasized. In a society based upon commodity 
exchange, individuals become “subsumed under social production” once individual 
products or activities are transformed into exchange value and money.440 Exchange 
value is individualized for people in the fonn of money. 441 Money not only makes 
unrestricted greed possible442 it comes to form a fundamental part of relations between 
people involved in exchange. What is basic to this is the condition of self-interest. 
“The individual”, according to Marx, “carries his social power, as well as his bond 
with society, in his pocket. ” 443 This destructive, controlling, anti-social, 
individualizing self-interest operates within a system that once talked of other values - 
of social connectedness, universality and mutual responsibility and is able to continue 
to do so in an ideological sense. Money is instead the medium of universal confusion 
and exchange of all things, including all human qualities. 444 At the outset of this 
section we considered Marx’s comment that money is able to perform all those 
activities which the individual is denied.445 This is the objective power of money. 
This power facilitates a type of deferral of human potentiality. It creates desire 
without any certainty of fulfilment. Money within capitalism is thus the “truly 
creative power”, which supposes that, for those without money, “demand is simply a 
figment of the imagination” . 446
For Marx, money is indeed “the equation of the incompatible” 447 that reduces 
everything to its own form of abstraction. Caprice and infatuation prey on a sense of 
powerlessness that people have; every product “is a bait with which to entice the 
essence of the other, his money” . 448 A mania for wealth becomes its own community
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destroying any other sense of community above it. More than this, it becomes itself 
the community, the common being once encapsulated in relations between people.449 
Commodification annihilates freedom by demanding labour as a necessity. 
Commodification is the social process of the material conditions of human life.450 It is 
also those relations into which individuals enter in the process of reproducing their 
life.451 Hence people become ‘the ever calculating slaves of appetites’ that it 
stimulates.452 People revert “to living in a cave, but the cave is now polluted by the 
mephitic and pestilential breath of civilization”, and people “actually ha[ve] to pay for 
this mortuary”, Marx is moved to state.453 The fact that they do pay is part of what is 
entailed in the success of a money ideology. Ideology in this context is indeed the 
“apparent satisfaction of need” that we considered in the first section of this chapter.454
Marx considers a range of such characteristics within the context of their 
relationship to a commodity, money-based, unequal society. Greed is not only 
craving and a “mania for possessions”, it confers a power on people whether or not 
one function of money or the possessions it can buy is simply to ‘glitter’ .455 It is a 
view of wealth that is individualized in things. Money is thus “the object of greed”. 
From this greed comes both hedonism and miserliness.456 The “cult of money” can be 
one of self-denial and frugality as much as one of profligacy.457 For the satisfaction of 
greed, industriousness must know no bounds. It must replace the aim of labour as a 
particular product standing in a particular relation to the particular need of the 
individual with labour that serves the purpose of wealth 458 And yet needs of the 
individual persist. Human capacities seem to present a path beyond individualized 
merchandise and yet the human capacity to labour serves only the need of wealth. 
With the use of money, capitalism engages the individual in a contract of material 
reward. Where the individual’s reward is itself money, the ability to make labour 
more productive is not so difficult to achieve. In this way it turns greed into the “urge 
of all”; it is ingenious in the creation of new objects for a social need; it becomes “the 
general substance of survival for all”. The only important process for the individual
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450 Marx, Capital, vol. Ill, p. 818.
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becomes to “pile it up” .459 Particular sorts of accumulation require particular sorts of 
relations - “accumulating sheep does not make one into a shepherd”. To accumulate 
slaves, or land, or someone else’s surplus labour requires, as we have seen, relations 
of domination and subordination.460 Money is its own contradiction because for most 
it is a pure abstraction, “a mere conceit”. “Where wealth as such seems to appear in 
an entirely material, tangible form, its existence is only in my head, it is a pure 
fantasy” .461 It enables one to possess all human abilities only to the extent that one 
cannot be humanly able. This lack of humanity needs, however, to be recognized as 
such, and in this Marx assumes a great deal of his craving and manic subjects of 
money. Money is for Marx a visible illusion, a “visible divinity”, as he refers to it.462
A calculating slave enters then into a visible illusion within exchange 
relations: Is this what Marx intends to suggest? Money is certainly lodged in the 
psyche by metonymy, transferring the properties of one object to any other. And 
presumably wherever the self is reduced to its possessions the fragility of existence 
can also be exposed. The self can never be the certainty of its existence while it is 
merely the sum of what it owns. That money takes on a fantastical existence in one’s 
head places it at the centre of the ideological contestation within capitalist relations. 
But does this make it a visible illusion, an ideology of the calculating slave? The 
social power bulging in one’s pocket and swelling one’s ego can do little to alter the 
essential meaninglessness of money and yet its own illusions, however visible, make 
it a formidable power.463 “Why do they have faith in the thing?”, Marx asks reflecting 
more it would seem upon the fragile, crisis-prone, money-centred circumstances of 
the life of the commodity rather than upon the fragile, money-centred individual of 
capitalism. In order to unravel this apparent mystery of such a faith Marx concerns 
himself with the most basic form by which exchange is realized -  that of a forced 
acceptance. Perhaps it is this that allows him to explain the particular vulnerability of 
the individual to the lustre of money. We will now look at the problem of ‘forced 
acceptance’, which Marx isolates as fundamental to the construction of contradiction 
and the ideological, in order to consider in more detail where problems with this 
conceptualization might arise.
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The Manifestation of Forced Acceptance: Contradiction as the Social Form of
Capitalist Reality
Capitalism is an antagonistic form of social life, according to Marx. As much 
as individuals themselves live out forms of antagonistic relations, this antagonism, 
Marx views, “emanates from the individuals’ social conditions of existence” . 464 This 
is an important distinction for Marx and one that is fundamental to his understanding 
of the ‘forced acceptance’ involved in social relations. In order to know something 
about the sort of antagonism that exists, rather than that we have the potential, as 
humans, to experience antagonism, Marx sets out to investigate the particular social 
conditions through which antagonism arises. This might seem to unnecessarily 
restrict the subjective element of antagonistic relations, although it does not prevent 
Marx from viewing contradiction as a part of the existence of antagonism itself. At 
the same time that it realizes its potential, antagonism creates the conditions for its 
own solution. 465 Marx does not presume the existence of a society based upon 
commodity production but considers various aspects of the social form of commodity 
society as it generally occurs.
It is from this analysis that he is able to theorize the relation between labour 
and value. “For capital to exist as capital, to be able to live off profit, as well as to 
accumulate, its gain must = the sum of the surplus time of many simultaneous living 
working days” . 466 Whilst labour alone produces - “it is the only substance of products 
as values”46’ - it is capital which realizes profit. Surplus value is realized on the basis 
of alienated labour. Capital “forces the workers beyond necessary labour to surplus 
labour” . 468 This is the necessary condition for the existence of capital. This condition 
is then pre-posited as a moment of many such moments in the motion of capital itself 
- “regardless of how they may arise historically”: But this realization process of 
labour is, at the same time, its “de-realization process” . 469 The process of creating, on 
one side, wealth and, on the other, the capacity to realize surplus value, is the positing 
of the “real objective conditions of living labour” and the positing of them “as alien, 
independent existences” .470 Without presuming the existence of these conditions it is 
obvious that Marx still sees in the ‘real objective conditions’ something decisive for
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the development of ideology. It is the nature of these conditions as ones of a ‘forced 
acceptance’. Let us consider an example.
One of the basic conditions within the production of surplus value is the 
contractual exchange involved in the sale and purchase of the ability to perfonn 
labour. Around this contractual exchange exist ideologies of individual consent, 
obligation and so forth: But the exchange of labour for labour is not the condition of 
the individual’s possession. The property relation is not the result but the 
presupposition of an individual’s labour.471 There is thus a forced acceptance of this 
everyday reality. The source and creation of one’s life appears in a practical sense to 
exist beyond one’s own control: “My life is necessarily grounded outside itself if it is 
not my own creation”, Marx argues.472 He understands that the “more you have, the 
greater is your alienated life and the more you store up of your estranged life”, and yet 
oddly is decidedly less able to tell us what this might mean for any individual 
emancipation from such greed and self-delusion.473 Marx instead constantly returns us 
to the objectivity of the system because it is here that he is able to isolate the 
contradictions he takes to be indicative of humanity’s estrangement. Marx sees the 
processes of capitalism as creating basic tensions that its relations are unable to 
conceal. For in all its processes, in its striving for universality, in its presenting to the 
worker the possibility of the capacity for control, in its idea of the individual’s 
flexibility in relation to the processes of capitalism, in its creation of vast and 
seemingly endless fields of new experience and potential consumption, capitalism 
inevitably also creates the reality that this cannot be realized in a generalized manner. 
This problem we are able to see as acutely today as it would have appeared in Marx’s 
time - perhaps indeed more acutely, as the reality of one’s existence within 
consumption today takes place within the widespread insinuation of methods through 
which people are influenced to consume, such as advertising, in which much of one’s 
identity is bound up with a sense of ‘having’ rather than ‘being’. Marx sees his own 
time as one in which the tendencies of capitalism express themselves in a “universal 
venality” , 474 where truth, love and honour are bartered for wool and sugar.475 He 
attacks what he views as the central problem of the system - the reduction of human 
need to the needs of production. The sense of ‘having’ is a “simple estrangement” of
471 Ibid., p. 515.
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all the senses.476 It is an “arid being-for-itself’.477 This is because what often results is 
the realization of a distorted individual egoism existing alongside an adulation of 
authority, an adulation most readily embodied in a subservience to the State. This 
subservience is nothing more than a “crass materialism, the materialism of passive 
obedience, the worship of authority, the mechanism of fixed, formal action, of rigid 
principles, views and traditions”, Marx says, railing against what he sees as Hegel’s 
rationalist depiction of the State.478 But instead of analyzing the consequences of a 
passive obedience and worship of authority Marx tells us that in the tensions of a 
forced acceptance the objectivity of capitalism confronts its nemesis. In opening up 
these possibilities and in instituting profound changes in social relations, capitalism 
reveals the unavoidable reality that it cannot deliver in a universalized sense that 
which it so rashly, but so necessarily, promises. This might well be so but he does not 
tell us what a life that is no longer one’s own creation means for the subject’s relation 
to the ideological forces of this process: Nor does he consider what consequences 
there might be with living out an existence based upon visible illusions, upon 
knowable objects of experience that remain unknown to the individual.
Here we can start to see how Marx brings together his focus upon an 
objectivity that entails a forced acceptance with a particular theorizing of subjective 
relations. Subjectivity, for Marx, is the subjectivity of capitalism - a worship of 
authority and a materialism of passive obedience that provide precisely the 
circumstances in which an externally imposed life is best able to develop. To what 
extent passivity is conditioned and to what extent it is a tendency given substance 
under conditions of control is left for us to muse upon. Marx is more concerned to 
show how the subjective is constantly expressed within universalizing ‘objective 
appearances’. We have looked previously at some specific examples Marx develops 
of this in terms of what it is about this objectivity as a process that gives it such
476 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 352.
477 Marx, “Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy”, p. 456.
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Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955). For a view of Hegel that is critical of both Hegel’s method and his 
view of the State see Lucio Colletti, Marxism and Hegel, trans. Lawrence Gamer (London: New Left 
Books, 1973). For a view that is critical of these approaches to Hegel see Robert Fine, “Hegel’s 
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eds. Wemer Bonefeld, Richard Gunn, John Holloway and Kosmas Psychopedis (London: Pluto, 1995), 
pp. 84-109. For a general account of Hegel’s political philosophy in relation to the State see Shlomo 
Avineri, Hegel’s Theory o f the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
The Critique of Social Life 405
powers. We have also considered why Marx sees the alienation of things in capitalist 
society as linked to the fragmentation of ideological antagonism and in what sense 
these habits of everyday life in capitalism exist as matters of ideological contestation. 
We have yet to consider whether Marx theorizes the problem of the struggle of 
humanity against its own estranged nature. This we will undertake in the third section 
of the chapter. Let us first assess whether thus far Marx seems to place too much 
emphasis on the eerie objectivity of the ideologies of commodification and not 
enough upon the shadows they cast upon the psyche.
Capturing ‘the shadow of movement and the movement of shadows’
Marx seeks to discover why it is that the individual objectifies herself in an 
‘accursed hunger’ .479 What are those aspects of the rule of capitalism that have 
conditioned humanity to a debased and dehumanized life? This question provokes 
Marx’s detailed investigation of fetishized commodification and labour as unequal 
exchange. The central issue Marx addresses is that of why human social relations in 
capitalism exist in the form of relationships between things. It is a thinghood whose 
consequences for being are enormous. Whilst it is obvious that Marx is concerned 
with the issue as to whether the fetishization of commodities entails a consciousness 
of an unfree life, what a close reading makes apparent is his primary interest in the 
issue of the materiality of the power of a system so constructed, and, importantly, with 
the limits of that power.480 In this Marx has much that is worthwhile examining from 
the perspective of situating the ideological. He wants to find the interrelated 
movements of processes. 481 The fetishization he detects is an ideological existence 
within an enchanted, perverted world; it becomes a “religion of everyday life” :482 
Fetishization alienates not only the objectness of reality but the relation the subject 
has to this reality. But in this we can find a particular form of objectivism that he 
applies, not only to the objectness he deems much reality to be, but also to the 
philosophy of subjectivity, as a type of objective subjectivity, that he constructs in 
relation to his conception of reality.
Certainly he sees in those social conditions that assume the form, of objective 
powers the immense impact of consequences of objectivity. This objectivity becomes 
real for people only when the individual relates to her own activity as “unfree
479 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 163.
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activity”, when the individual “relates to it as activity in the service, under the rule, 
coercion and yoke of another man” .483 This form of powers, of “overpowering 
objects”, is able to institute the power of things independently of relations amongst 
individuals themselves.484 He does not suggest that this objectivity is independent of 
people; rather it is that it distorts the relations people have with one another, thereby 
creating an ‘overpowering’ objectivity. What we see then is that Marx opts for 
neither a completely objectivist position nor one in which an open subjectivity is 
theorized. And yet despite this more indefinite, nuanced approach certain pertinent 
questions are left unasked. Most particularly we are left without a sense of how Marx 
believes a radical surpassing of alienation might be achieved without an 
understanding of the various subjective and objective conditions of which alienation is 
then a consequence. What beyond the most basic ‘radical needs’, the needs of food, 
shelter, clothing, has given rise to an inventiveness in relation to need? If the subject 
has become enslaved, what is it that has provoked her own calculatedness in relation 
to this enslavement? These are questions which are never really answered in Marx’s 
work.
What we are given is a sense of why it is that objective conditions are able to 
assume an “ever more colossal independence” .485 All circumstances which affect a 
person as a subject “more or less modify all his functions and activities” , 486 Marx 
feels. And yet this does not tell us so much about the subject as it does about the 
object capable of modifying the subject’s activities.4*1 What is it that is so
483 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 331.
484 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 652.
485 Ibid., p. 831.
486 Marx, Theories o f Surplus Value, vol. I, p. 288.
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societies. Perkins, ibid., pp. 10, 127. Perkins quotes 1.1. Rubin approvingly with his argument that the
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overpowering about objectivity? As we have seen in this section, for Marx, 
appropriation through sale “is the fundamental form of the social system of 
production” within capitalism. 488 The transference of use-values into commodities is 
achieved via exchange value.489 Commodities are “in love with money” . 490 There are 
things formed of necessity in the course of exchange. Exchange relations in 
capitalism commodify that which is exchanged. Thus, not only are the products 
produced commodities but the medium through which they are realized (i.e. money) is 
a commodity, as is the labour involved in their production. Within these processes, 
Marx discerns the formation of a fragmented power haunting individuals and their 
spontaneous activities. More importantly than anything else he wants to impress upon 
his reader the significance of this objectivity. It is a significance realized in very 
particular forms. Marx is certainly concerned with relationships between open-ended 
moments, and these relationships, as Spivak argues, “harbor discontinuities” . 491 But
“theory of fetishism is, per se, the basis of Marx’s entire economic system and in particular of his 
theory of value”, from Rubin’s work originally published in 1928, Essays on Marx’s Theory o f Value, 
trans. Milos Samardzija and Fredy Perlman (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1973), p. 5. Perkins 
interprets Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism as the concretization of his former and more abstract 
concept of alienation. For Perkins, however, Marx’s replacement of the idea of alienation with that of 
commodity fetishism is not a rejection of any former idealism; fetishism is merely the particular 
specification of the more generalized alienation within commodity society. The contradiction Marx 
exposes in Capital between exchange and use-values is merely the specific expression of “the 
enslavement or estrangement of human activity to a non-human purpose”. In Perkins’ opinion it would 
be unwise to abandon the concept of alienation that Marx’s earlier work has developed as an 
understanding of alienation “allows us to draw upon a vision of human potential that is not immediately 
apparent if we confine our field of vision to everyday reality”. The concept of alienation “provides us 
with a normative standard of social critique” that is able to draw attention to the dehumanization of 
bourgeois society beyond that which may or may not be immediately apparent to those whose lives are 
debased by alienation’s consequences. Perkins, Marxism and the Proletariat, pp. 127-128. Perkins’ 
following argument is that Marx does not sufficiently develop this analysis of the relationship between 
alienation and the nature of commodity society, or has not done so in a way that has been sufficiently 
clear for most Marxists following Marx to adequately interpret. It is in Lukäcs’s work, according to 
Perkins, that a clearer account of the issue is provided. Callinicos, in contrast, whilst viewing the 
general structure of Capital as “radically anti-Hegelian” in its disavowal of Hegelian categories and 
motifs such as alienation, considers the concept of commodity fetishism to reproduce a distinction 
between essence and appearance which posits a necessary form of appearance of capitalism in the 
generating of an automatic ideological misrecognition. Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy, p. 60. No 
such necessary appearance and its resultant form of consciousness can be deduced from the operations 
of the capitalist system, according to Callinicos. Consciousness is a reality “which admits of no unique 
interpretation”; it must be judged “by its relative degree of success in interpreting the observable, but 
always reinterpretable behaviour of capitalism”. Ibid., p. 131.
488 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 881.
489 For a variety of critiques of Marx’s concept of value see, for example, Spivak, “Scattered 
Speculations on the Question of Value”, pp. 154-75: Allin Cottrell, “Value Theory and the Critique of 
Essentialism”, Economy and Society, 10, no. 2 (1981): pp. 235-242; Antonio Callari, “History, 
Epistemology, and the Labor Theory of Value”, Research in Political Economy, no. 9 (1986): pp. 69- 
93; Ian Steedman, et. al., The Value Controversy (London: Verso, 1981); Anthony Cutler, et.al., Maine’s 
‘Capital’ and Capitalism Today, vol. I (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977).
490 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 109.
491 Spivak, “Scattered Speculations on the Question of Value”, p. 158.
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where these discontinuities rest in relation to the subject, given the very ideological 
nature of her constitution within commodity relations, is more difficult to discern.
It is obvious in following Marx’s arguments concerning the playing out of 
aspects of the ideological that his consistent emphasis is upon the structured and yet 
open potential of process. This unclosed aspect is perhaps more readily apparent in 
the fonn of ideology than in other forms. It occurs at the level of the social subject of 
labour and money as well as that of the individual of unfreedom. No matter how 
hybrid their content, ideologies operate at the level of potential or realized 
contestation around a static assumption about existing social conditions in which a 
variety of subjectivities occur: But, as Marx is at pains to show, social conditions are 
just as likely to pull away from their ideologies as remain fixed to them. This may not 
necessarily mean that a given ideology is then exhausted by the march of social 
change, at an objective or subjective level or in the relation between them, but the gap 
between social reality and its justifications may well become apparent. This 
discontinuity is then filtered through the individual, as it were, presumably with 
consequences for the grasping of a consciousness of one’s experiences. What we 
have been presented with is a realm of necessity that is an insufficient and yet potent 
realm of experience for the individual.
Marx considers this issue with his analysis of the generalized form of the 
commodification of society. The problem with turning society into “one immense 
factory” is that it presupposes the subjection of people to forms of control simply for 
the benefit of capitalism’s productiveness.492 This presupposition seems to enfold the 
individual within herself. Commodification assumes fixed categories of the subject. 
In this objectification of the subject even the idea of social co-operation is 
transformed into “an inroad upon such sacred things as the rights of property, freedom 
and unrestricted play for the bent of the individual capitalist” . 493 Where this 
transformation is accepted, ideology has temporarily succeeded. But simultaneously, 
or in a simultaneously disjunctured fashion, Marx seems to suggest, the vulnerability 
of a fetishized objectivity will become apparent. In the gaudy supermarket of things 
that commodity society supplies for us, ways of thinking are the readily available 
lines spilling out from the shelves: But the more this situation persists, in order simply 
to continue, the more the insinuation of commodification must take place simply for 
its own sake. Ideological justification, in this sense, will extirpate its purpose if it is to 
simply remain still. And yet, as we have considered here in this section, necessity has
492 Marx, Capital, vol. I, pp. 337, 336
493 Ibid., p. 337.
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its own forms of imposition, its own dictates, many of which appear to operate before 
we have consciously entered into them. We ourselves, however, do not seem to be as 
vulnerable to such workings of an unconscious inner landscape as is the determinacy 
of the system itself. The nature of Marx’s openness in this regard remains so because, 
unlike Althusser, he does not concede a realm of unconscious desire existing prior to 
any conscious intention. But this then leaves Marx vulnerable to accusations that he 
dismisses from his consideration a realm in which something of the conditions that 
give rise to alienation or conditions for alienation might be apparent. If this is the 
case, then we must surely sense that this would compromise the sort of theoretical 
openness Marx is trying to achieve.
All of these factors have repercussions for the way in which people make 
intelligible and acceptable aspects of their lives. Marx explains the sorts of needs that 
might be met by way of these processes in terms of an alienated existence. The 
possibility of becoming something other than the alienated product of an unjust 
system, the possibility of realizing one’s human capacity exists, but the problem is in 
whether a life of self-seeking interest, so amply reinforced by the way in which life is 
lived within capitalism, can provide a reason for people to do otherwise. The problem 
is perhaps one of grappling for a theorization of the inner life of the subject in Marx’s 
work when no such independent theorization exists. Is it, for Marx, that the 
boundaries drawn between inner and outer worlds are too definite, whereas they really 
are only mediations of one or the other? Marx’s tendency to focus upon the social 
context of human strivings gives a far more detailed picture of the insufficiency of the 
external world. In looking at ideas, for example, Marx is not so concerned with their 
origin or their character as ideas but is rather more interested in what determines them 
as social events.
Marx’s best known formulation of the ideological is seen in his account of the 
fetishization of commodities. This theorization seems superficially to assert that the 
emergence of such reification is the result of the interplay of the mechanics of the 
system: But this is to misunderstand Marx’s approach. Marx’s construction of the 
process of fetishization is one centred upon contradiction and, specifically, 
contradiction in the mode of being denied - in other words it reveals its existence in 
and through that by which it is contradicted. This is precisely why Marx argues that 
fetishized relations appear as ‘what they are’. Fetishism can only exist in its internal 
relatedness to that by which it is socially situated. The theorization of fetishism is not 
one detached from its object but is situated within it and is constituted through it. 
Thus fetishism is not a theory of an objectivist, lifeless mechanics of the system but is 
a theory of the conflict between people and an alienated form of existence. Whilst 
Marx does not minimize the part played by people and their consciousness in this
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process, it is to the workings of the processes of commodity accumulation that most of 
his attention is given. Here, the ideological resolution of the commodity in fetishized, 
alienated existence is the equivalent of the command of authority, the ideology of 
fear. But what the link is between consciousness and the processes of wage labour 
and commodification is only clear as it concerns the needs and limits of capital. This 
does not mean that Marx understands capitalism as in any sense self-sustaining, nor 
does it imply any separation into an ‘essence’ and an ‘appearance’; it is, rather, a 
theorization of the reality in which capitalism objectifies the labour contained within 
that which labour produces, resulting in a fetishization of commodities. It is a 
theorization of the movement of the contradictions of oppression.494 Whether this then 
entails an identification and an empathizing with commodities on the part of those 
who both use and produce them is a separate, although obviously related, issue. In 
this particular example, then, the importance of consciousness to ideology is more 
implied than explicitly articulated. Certainly the process by which capital emerges as 
an entity that commands, means that it is as much a psychological war as it is a 
“constant war” 495 between objectified participants.
Is it correct for us to sense a certain attenuation of the ideological as 
contradiction here within these conditions and processes of fetishization, the ability of 
money to objectify, the capacity for the subject to need the object world to comply 
with her alienated desires? Where Marx starts to unravel the workings of the psyche 
as a subject for ideology is in his situating the inner life within the more readily 
known terrain of the motivations and prescriptions of capitalism. What we are given 
here is as shockingly impressive as it is often ffustratingly cursory; but it is certainly 
on the basis of these fleeting insights that we can begin to develop some sense of the 
social and psychological implications of ideology. Where we might find a basis for 
its contradictions beyond those inscribed within the limitations of the object itself is 
more difficult to ascertain. What we still need to consider is whether Marx provides 
any greater insight into the problem of the alienated subject who confronts her own 
action and thought as thought that has become other. Does Marx indeed theorize the 
process of the self in relation to self-estrangement? We will, in the following section 
of the thesis, consider this issue of how Marx theorizes ideology in relation to the 
struggle for meaning as an aspect of self-realization. This it is hoped will enable us to 
begin to see in what relation to the ideological Marx more fully poses the possibility 
of humanity’s self-encounter.
494 For a discussion of examples of this, see John Holloway, “Marxism: A Theoretical and Political 
Programme”, Common Sense, no. 7 (1989).
495 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 220.
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Section Three: Ideology and the Problem of Freedom and
Self-Realization
The first essential condition for freedom, however, is self-knowledge, and self- 
knowledge is an impossibility without self-confession.
Marx, Debates on Freedom of the Press
The Reawakening of Human Dignity
We will now look more specifically at what the relation between ideology and 
freedom suggests in Marx’s work and then engage with the variety of ideas he 
develops in relation to the critical issue of the aspiration of humanity through 
spirituality. In religion, Marx sees the ideological as contested reality. Religion can 
be both an expression of suffering and a protestation against it. We will attempt to 
unravel the complex nature of a system of beliefs and ideas that spirituality presents to 
Marx. As we will see, it is with Marx’s approach to spirituality that the 
epistemological critique of ideology can be shown to be most tenuous. This is clearly 
a very different conclusion to draw than is usually put forward in analyses of Marx’s 
theorizing. What we want to understand here is how Marx brings together a critique 
of estrangement with an analysis of social antagonism by theorizing the role of 
spirituality in unfree society. This, it should be restated, is a particular interpretation 
of the spirit of much of Marx’s approach to liberation and spirituality. There are 
places in his work where something much more akin to an epistemological approach 
to religion and spirituality can be found -  a view of spirituality along the lines of a 
type of false consciousness or naive mystification is the predictable result.496 Again, 
we want to look beyond scattered polemical statements and evaluate the more serious
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496 Even in such places, however, it is interesting that Marx often is able to theorize something beyond 
a straightforwardly epistemological view of religion as ideology. In the “Critique of Hegel’s 
Philosophy o f Right”, for example, where Marx claims that the state and society produce religion, 
which is “an inverted consciousness of the world”, he immediately points out that this is so because this 
state and society “are an inverted world”. This makes the basis upon which religion emerges a false 
basis, not because the spiritual quest itself is inauthentic but because a world of unfreedom is. Marx, 
Critique o f Hegel’s 'Philosophy o f Right’, p. 244. It is also worth noting that a materialist critique of 
religion was widely discussed in France in the eighteenth century.
497 Some commentators have understood this point in Marx - most particularly various liberation 
theologists who have realized in practice the ramifications of this very contradiction which Marx 
outlines. For a short, useful article that understands this sense of Marx’s approach to spirituality see 
Joel Kovel, “Marxism and Spirituality”, in Marxism in the Postmodern Age: Confronting the New 
World Order, eds. Antonio Callari, Stephen Cullenberg and Carole Biewener (New York: Guildford,
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a pertinent example of Marx’s approach to ideology critique. Let us now consider 
why Marx theorizes spirituality as a vehicle for liberation and the salvaging of a 
threatened sense of humanity.
We mentioned at the end of the first section of the chapter Marx’s argument 
for ‘the total redemption of humanity’. It is this process that Marx feels is required 
for freedom to be attained. As we mentioned earlier, Marx summarizes his approach 
to this as being provided by the theoretical unity offered by Feuerbach’s Philosophie 
der Zukunft (Philosophy o f the Future) and his Wesen des Glaubens (.Essence o f 
Faith):498 For Marx, humanity will redeem itself only when there is a “fresh 
confirmation of human powers and a fresh enrichment of human nature” .499 However 
one might wish to interpret Marx’s commitment to the idea of redemption, in it we 
can discern much of Marx’s romanticist vision of life, humanity and self-identity. It 
is, however, a particular kind of romanticism we find in Marx’s work; for it does not 
primarily involve the instantiation in social practices of an identification between the 
individual and the void, nor is it suggestive of a constant undercurrent of fear, 
emptiness and the intimation of death, which we find in much romanticist work that 
has taken seriously a sense of an infinite in which God has fled. This is partly 
because he feels that the “imagination is extinguished in fear”, a fear that operates as 
an inner force capable of reducing people to the level of determination. 500 For Marx, 
redemption is necessitated as much by the destruction of the individual in conditions 
of social antagonism as it is by the absences felt in the wake of the passing of the 
eternal and the universal of transcendental belief. Spirituality reveals to the individual 
something of her own alienated nature and it is this that provides Marx with a basis 
for theorizing the necessity of redemption.
As we have seen, necessity emerges as a potentially knowable and yet still 
obscure reality, a visible illusion that becomes a religion of everyday life within the 
realms of commodified existence. The realm of spirituality presents something very 
different: It is the realm of social generality, universality and freedom from the 
rationale of the commodity. When it ceases to be these things it ceases to be any sort 
of realization of the redemptive. It is as vulnerable as any other sphere of human
1995), pp. 42-50. In relation to ideology critique, however, Marx’s approach to religion is invariably 
seen as an example of a ‘false consciousness’ thesis.
498 Marx to Feuerbach, August 11, 1844, Collected Works, vol. Ill, p. 354. Marx also claims in a letter 
to Ruge that “Feuerbach’s aphorisms seem to me incorrect only in one respect, that he refers too much 
to nature and too little to politics”. Marx to Ruge, March 1843, Collected Works, vol. I, p. 400.
499 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 358.
500 Marx, “Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy”, pp. 420, 452. This sort of “unextinguishable” fear 
Marx distinguishes from what he considers human fear, in other words, feeling. Ibid., p. 453.
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experience to the illusions and ideologies of the times, but Marx places before us the 
idea that its transcendental aesthetic is the image of the self-encounter. The realm of 
spirituality is therefore the realm of the struggle for meaning, the realm of the 
ideological. As we mentioned earlier, it is somewhat ironic that the issue of religion 
is used by commentators to represent a typical example of Marx’s view of ideology as 
false consciousness. For it is precisely Marx’s treatment of spirituality that reveals a 
view of ideology which runs counter to this. Marx’s view of spirituality shows the 
very sort of understanding of ideology which I attribute to him as a view of the 
contradictory within ideology, of an ontology. There is no straightforward dismissal 
of religion as illusory consciousness in Marx’s work. 501
What Marx theorizes in renewal is the possibility to make sacred a profane 
world. There is little use in believing that an enlightened rationality steeped in this- 
worldliness will return the sacred and the profane to their proper places. In 
capitalism, all that is holy has been profaned. 502 The ultimate outcome of this 
profanity is uncertain, and yet the limitations to humanity and the contradictory 
constraints placed upon the individual’s sense of being are so profound as to have 
enacted an epoch. The commodification of the self and labour run counter to the 
sacred. “Do not labour for the food which perishes, but for the food which endures to 
eternal life”, is Jesus’ command to the people of Tiberias.503 What we will see in 
Marx’s theorization of spirituality is an exploration of the problem of self-identity via 
the often jagged path of the interrelation between a sublimation of the self and the 
expression of need. What Marx has presented us with in the earlier critiques we 
considered of unfreedom and the commodity form is the idea of a humanity that is yet 
to be realized, despite the self being constructed in avarice, narcissism and self- 
delusion. The living tomb of the individual who emerges out of capitalist relations of 
money and work is cast in a situation of waiting for the fake, fetishized objectivity of 
these relations to begin to unravel; her social and economic self is captive to this 
objectivity. But what of this individual’s spiritual or imaginative self? Is it here that 
Marx is able to theorize something more than the fetishized objectivity of the 
ideological struggle for meaning?
501 Still less is there the more usual view of much Enlightenment philosophy of religion as a form of 
mere clerical conspiracy. As Michael Löwy argues, Marx’s analysis owes more to a type of left neo- 
Hegelianism in which the central issue in relation to religion and humanity is that of the alienation of a 
human essence or being. Michael Löwy, “Marxism and Religion: The Challenge of Liberation 
Theology” in On Changing the World: Essays in Political Philosophy, from Karl Marx to Walter 
Benjamin (New Jersey: Humanities, 1993), p. 24.
502 Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto, p. 46.
503 John, 6: 27.
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Marx puts forward a complex understanding of the fragmentary and often 
contradictory aspirations held within spiritual values, aspirations which extend 
beyond a sense of any immediate property of the self Marx sees in religion a 
fundamentally important arena of protestation against the given order of things. There 
is certainly a critique of the social use of religion contained within this: Marx argues 
that Judaism and Christianity have each been so complicit in the destruction of the 
realm of the sacred that no path to this realm simply exists without question within 
institutionalized religion. Having invited the worldly god of Mammon to share in 
their vision of a life divided between the sacred and the profane, these religions have 
compromised their commitment to a true and profound spirituality. 504 Organized 
religion has seduced people away from the truth of their own freedom. This is the 
core of Marx’s opposition to institutionalized religion. At its best, organized religion 
is the offer of hope and transcendence: At its worst, it is the institutionalization of 
ideological caricature.
Marx’s approach to religion is also a critical engagement with the idea of 
spirituality and the sacred. This area of Marx’s analysis is generally poorly 
understood. 505 More usually, Marx’s view of religion is crudely reduced to an 
opposition to all human striving outside the material realm. 506 Such a view does scant
504 Related to this Marx considers that a certain narrowness of social relations between people and 
between people and nature is reflected in beliefs and practices of those “ancient social organisms” that 
have left behind a communistic existence but have not yet arrived at commodity exchange in its 
bourgeois form. This obviously suggests a type of determinism in relation to Marx’s depiction of 
religious practice but is at the same time a critique of the sort of fetishism that develops in relation to 
the commodity which has destroyed the integrity of numerous ancient communities. See Marx, 
Capital, vol. I, pp. 83-84.
505 See, for example, Trevor Ling’s various works on Marx and religion. In Buddha, Marx and God: 
Some aspects o f religion in the modern world (London: Macmillan, 1979) Ling argues that “according 
to the Marxian view, religion arises out of a sickness of society [...] It is an aspect of man’s alienation 
from his true nature, and for this reason it must be opposed”. Ibid., p. 123. Ling delves no further into 
Marx’s views than this, although elsewhere the various influences on Marx’s views on religion are 
considered in a broader manner. See, for example, Trevor Ling, Karl Marx and Religion: In Europe 
and India (London: Macmillan, 1980). Ling is typical of many commentators in this area who elide the 
work of Marx and Engels regardless of whether or not such ellision results in a distortion of Marx’s 
writing. For example, Engels’ comment in the Anti-Diihring that “All religion [...] is nothing but the 
fantastic reflection in men’s minds of those external forces which control their daily life, a reflection in 
which terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces” is taken to be the same as Marx’s 
comments on religion in volume I of Capital where Marx says that religion reflects the real world. 
Engels, Anti-Diihring, p. 382. Ling claims for Marx the view on suffering that “Religion accounts for 
the sufferings of men, said Marx in effect, on the grounds that man is not God, that is to say, that he is 
weak, imperfect and sinful, and that there is no escape from this situation so long as man is in this 
world. Only in another world will man be relieved of suffering”. See Ling, Buddha, Marx and God, 
p. 126. We have already considered that this is not Marx’s view of suffering. By way of contrast, we 
can consider Kovel’s “Marxism and Spirituality”.
506 The reductionist interpretation of Marx and spirituality posits Marx’s understanding of religion as a 
form of ideology in a completely one-dimensional manner. Religion in this view is seen as a form of 
false consciousness, as illusory belief and wrong-headed, if not mindless, faith. Rosen, for example,
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justice to what is, in Marx, a much more complex and multi-faceted appraisal of the 
role of the spiritual in the social world. Again we encounter the problem, which we 
have mentioned previously, that what is taken to be the ideological in Marx’s work is 
reduced in advance to formulaic assumptions that ignore the spirit of the work. We 
will attempt to re-capture the substance of Marx’s approach to the ideological within 
spirituality in what follows.
Religion as the ‘table of contents of theoretical struggles’: The Critique of the 
Profane and the Unrecompensed of Religion
Marx shares with Ludwig Feuerbach the belief that people make religion, 
religion does not make people507, but Marx also wants to understand why an awareness 
of God as self-consciousness develops in an alienated way. What is it about a world 
of venal exchange that gives rise to a dichotomized spirituality? Neither Marx nor 
Feuerbach infers by this a materialism, as has been argued by many, but rather each is 
interested in religion as an emanation of the human psyche . 508 Humanity is something 
other than the fetishized commodity it is reduced to in exchange relations; it is more 
than its alienated manifestation in a division between essence and appearance: 
Humanity is an ensemble of relations, a lived plenitude of vulnerabilities and 
aspirations, which materialism is bound to ignore . 509 This potentiality is something to
claims that Marx’s critique of religion, his “error in its profane form”, means false consciousness, false 
attitudes and the inability of people to form true identities for themselves. Rosen, On Voluntary 
Servitude, p. 175. This is mistaken. Rosen misses the point about what it is for Marx that is profane - 
the desecration of life rests in the fact that people are forced to live in a world without comfort and that 
the very consolation which religion might provide is often illusory and always incomplete. Marx s 
comment on religion as the opium of the people is taken by numerous commentators to mean that 
people are lulled into a state of false contentment, as if this state could not possibly involve a drug of 
choice. Marx, Critique o f Hegel’s ‘Philosophy o f Right’, p. 244. Marx understands that religion plays 
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also anaesthetise people to the continuation of unnecessary suffering that institutions of religion fail to 
oppose. As the liberation theologist, Gustavo Gutierrez, argues, institutionalized religion is 
tranquillizing to the extent that it calms the concerns of those it should directly address. Gustavo 
Gutierrez, The Power o f the Poor in History: Selected Writings, trans. Robert R. Barr (London: SCM 
Press, 1983), p. 123.
507 Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine o f the State, p. 87.
508 Marx on occasions refers to Feuerbach as having founded a “true materialism” in his emphasis upon 
the centrality of the relation between people to his theorization of social life. Marx, Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 381.
509 In this sense I would take issue with Bhikhu Parekh’s claim that, when confronted with abstractions 
such as materialism and idealism, Marx “either opted for one of the two extremes, or sought to mediate 
them without noticing that the mediation was neither possible nor necessary”. Parekh, Marx’s Theoiy 
o f Ideology , pp. 79-92. As we have now seen in a variety of examples, and especially in this one of 
Marx’s treatment of religion, Marx neither attempts to privilege materialism, for example, over 
idealism nor suggests some mediation of the two, but rather prepares the basis for moving beyond these 
categories. Whether this is then successfully achieved is another matter. Even where he refers to 
naturalism or humanism as presenting the “unifying truth” of idealism and materialism he does so here
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be discovered.510 It is a separation to be overcome. It is for this reason that Marx 
concerns himself with the exploration of a spiritual self, its creation and recreation. A 
view that people make religion does not, for Feuerbach, discount the mysterious 
within religiosity - indeed, it may well enable it to be expressed and recognized by 
people. At one level, Marx also argues an aspect of this. Marx’s views seem, in fact, 
entirely consistent with elements of a gnostic position on the idea of people creating 
God and religion. Thus according to the gnostic Gospel of Philip, written sometime 
before A.D. 350: “God created humanity; [but now human beings] create God. That 
is the way it is in the world - human beings make gods, and worship their creation”.511
At another level it is important to recognize that Marx also intends this 
humanist interpretation of religion as a critique of the dehumanizing potential within 
humanity and the religions that have prevailed under conditions of unfreedom. For 
Marx, people are not abstract creatures floating outside the world.512 Their religiosity 
and even their spirituality are a part of this world. As we have argued, Marx sees the 
present world as one of “sordid avarice” and an “anxious calculation”513 in which the 
individual has sold her birthright.514 This world at times includes aspects of religiosity 
captured by the commodity. And it is here that the ideological complexity is often 
most apparent. The “plastic gods in the market places”, Marx argues, “are the 
genuine embellishment of the people”.515 There is no point dismissing this as a false 
consciousness; both the embellished nature and plastic character of this emanation of 
religiosity are very real. There is also no point, Marx seems to indicate, theorizing the 
subject here as confronting this reality as an exteriority -  in practice, she is “entangled 
in it”.516 The very development of exchange relations is linked by Marx to forms
on the basis o f maintaining the fundamental difference between humanism and that of idealism and 
materialism. Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 389. The sort of humanism Marx has 
in mind moves beyond idealism and materialism. As we have considered, when Marx calls for a 
‘ruthless critique of everything existing’ he is referring both to the conditions of the times but also to 
the theories explaining these conditions as well. Marx to Ruge, September 1843, p. 207.
510 For a sense o f the way in which Marx (in relation to Spinoza) approaches materialism and the 
process of demystification, see Gordon Hull, “Marx’s Anomalous Reading of Spinoza”, Interpretation, 
vol. 28, no. 1 (Fall 2000), pp. 17-31.
511 Gospel o f Philip, 71. 35-72. 4, in The Gnostic Scriptures, ed., trans. and intro. Layton, Bentley 
(New York: Doubleday, 1987). The common gnostic view, particularly amongst followers of 
Valentinus, was that humanity created the divine world.
512 Marx, Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’, p. 244.
513 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 557.
514 Ibid., p. 307.
515 Marx, “Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy”, p. 437.
516 Ibid.
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taken by Christianity.517 Feuerbach’s epigrammatic summation of this course of 
events he addresses to ‘The Ironically Happy Rationalist’, for evidently the outcome 
of a commodified piety is clear: “What a small terrain modernity has left the Holy 
Spirit to live on! Soon even this tiny plot will be sold off ’ . 518 Modernity’s ineluctable 
tendency towards the venal makes of many instances of spirituality a religiosity of the 
profane. And yet, at times, it is this same world in which the institutionalization of 
religion and the struggle for spiritual expression reveal their discord or perhaps even 
seek separate paths.
For Marx, there is in the unrecompensed parts of religion a radical inheritance 
with which humanity is actively involved. Even where Marx tends toward a more 
epistemological analysis of religion, we still have a sense that it is the problem of 
religious belief becoming incommensurate with the richness of the world of the 
imagination of the individual and instead being realized merely as a “phantastic” form 
of the self-same reality by which those who are controlled live out their lives, that is 
important.519 The consequences we can draw from this are many. There is a general 
supposition by Marx that the source of religious need (as opposed to spirituality) is in 
the fragmentation of the individual - people lead a fractured existence in which their 
constantly renewed presence in the world often clashes with a sense of being as a part 
of humanity, which is non-present but equally important. Humanity possesses an 
“imagining reason” . 520 The way in which humanity faces the current world, a world 
that is the world of the profane, is with both a consciousness and certain ontological 
determinations. A profane world creates needs in people but also needs against these 
needs. As we have seen, Marx views capitalism and its unfreedom as much more than 
an economic structure. When a sense of ‘being’ erodes against a tide of ‘having’ 
there are more profound changes occurring within humanity than that simply of the 
organization of a mode of production at an economic level. There is, for Marx, a 
process of the deformation of the individual’s own sense of self entailed within an 
unfree society such as capitalism. This deformation of the self runs counter to the 
substance of a spiritual liberation. And just as one can be held sway by “egoistic
517 For a society of undifferentiated labour and the production of commodities “Christianity with its 
cultus of the abstract man, more especially in its bourgeois developments, Protestantism, Deism, and 
the like, is the most fitting form of religion”. Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 83.
518 Ludwig Feuerbach, Thoughts on Death and Immortality: from the Papers o f a Thinker, along with 
an Appendix o f Theological-Satirical Epigrams, Edited by One o f His Friends, trans. James A. Massey 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 240.
519 Marx’s various comments to the effect that the religious world is but the reflex of the real world 
reflect this view. See, for example, Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 83. Engels on this point, as we have seen, 
says that religion is “nothing but the phantastic reflection in men’s minds of those external forces 
which control their daily life”. Engels, Anti-Dühring, p. 382.
520 Marx, “Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy”, p. 419.
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need” so too can one be “restrained by religion” . 521 Marx quotes the Book of 
Revelation - ‘that no man might buy or sell’ - to indicate the utterly commonplace 
corruption of the individual through exploitation and exchange, but also to indicate its 
thoroughly objectionable character to the spirit of religion.522 In the impulse towards a 
realm that rejects the profane, Marx sees the ‘inner light’, that spreads outwards. One 
can seek such a liberation or remain trapped within an illusory sense of religious 
awareness that merely underscores the extent to which individuals have alienated 
themselves in their own representations. In this protestation against all that is venal 
and unfree Marx detects “a consuming flame”. And yet one needs to be able to 
recognize “the self-seeking interest which brings nothing of a higher order to 
realization” .523 Let us look, then, at how Marx evaluates the problem of an 
instrumentalized religiosity.
The Critique o f Instrumental Religiosity
Whether the spirituality people have expresses an opposition to enslavement, 
or whether, despite this, people are their own impoverishment, are matters that, for 
Marx, occur primarily within the context of the world of which one is a part. 524 In the 
case of the development of religion and what this tends to signify, this is even more 
obviously the case. Religions are historically definable movements as much as they 
are centred upon some concept of spiritual mystery and the transcendence of the 
world. There are, of course, issues pertaining to particular religious doctrines 
themselves that are of substantial importance for the development of religion. Marx 
finds the Lutheran recognition of religiosity as an inner sense of humanity an 
important historical development in this way. 525 But it is the more general sense of the 
human tribune and its transformation into a Kingdom that, for Marx, makes of 
religion “the general theory of this world” . 526 Spirituality is not indicative of an empty 
future but is rather “the halo”, an eschatological to be mystically experienced in the 
lived moment. We saw in the first section of this chapter that Marx viewed alienation 
in terms of the following problem - that the more entangled the self becomes in work 
the less she finds a sense of self that actually belongs to herself. It is likewise, Marx
521 Marx, On the Jewish Question, p. 241.
522 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 237, n. 16.
523 Ibid., p. 244.
524 In the Gospel o f Thomas we are told “but if you will not know yourselves, then you dwell in 
poverty and it is you who are that poverty”. Gospel o f Thomas, in The Gnostic Scriptures, ed., trans. 
and intro. Layton, Bentley (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 32.49 - 33.5.
525 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 342.
526 Marx, Critique o f Hegel’s ‘Philosophy o f Right’, p. 244.
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tells us, with religion. “The more man puts into God, the less he retains within 
himself’ -  in other words, what God is, he is not.527 The spontaneous activity of the 
human imagination somehow detaches itself from the individual and reappears as the 
alien activity of a god or a devil.528 Activity is turned into passivity; power becomes 
impotence. 529 In addition there is the problem within many religions of a perpetual 
and immature acceptance of external authority.530 Religious consciousness, according 
to Marx, is involved in a “painful contradiction” .531 It cannot be resolved in the 
deification of social relations and the personification of their rule. It is entirely for 
this reason that he argues that “the religious spirit can never be truly secularized”. 
Religion “remains the ideal, unsecular consciousness of its members” . 532 Religion is 
“the self-consciousness and self-esteem” of people.533 Outside total emancipation, 
‘religious spirit’ can merely anticipate spiritual freedom; but in so doing it presents a 
vital criticism of the secular world. This is why, in Marx’s view, it emerges that the 
“separation of the ‘spirit of the Gospel’ from the ‘letter of the Gospel’ is an irreligious 
act” . 534
To properly appreciate this approach it should be recalled that Marx is in 
revolt against orthodox institutions and their authority, which he sees as steeped in 
commerce and thus lacking in legitimacy. It is also for him a problem that religions 
tend to present themselves as a way of knowing reality, when in fact they present a 
knowledge and justification of profane reality. 535 In this sense his critique is taken 
outside the realm of self-consciousness and is situated within the world of 
commodified exchange, alienation and festering inequality. It is here that Marx feels 
religion serves as a cloak for the profane. Where capital demands satiation of its
527 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 324.
528 Ibid., pp. 326-327.
529 Ibid., p. 327.
530 Godelier’s argument that the reverse of power is obligation is relevant to this discussion. It is 
certainly the case, as he argues, that taboos, prohibitions and constraints as a part of the rituals of 
religious practices can mean a “restriction of power, rather than an accumulation of it”: But this 
statement of the problem of constraint is rather too generalized to enable us to see what is being 
exchanged within the process of a religious acceptance of external authority. Part of the problem of 
constraint is that of for what reason constraint is accepted and therefore whose responsibility it is that 
such constraint is effective. In this sense we need to know what is being provided as much as what is 
being constrained by the acceptance of external authority. See Godelier, Perspectives in Marxist 
Anthropology, p. 179.
531 Marx, On the Jewish Question, p. 224.
532 Ibid., p. 225.
533 Marx, Critique o f Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’, p. 244.
534 Marx, On the Jewish Question, p. 224.
535 Godelier’s point here in relation to science later taking the place of religion in accounting for the 
order of things is relevant. Godelier, Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology, p. 178.
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“were-wolf hunger for surplus-labour” regardless of how this might interfere with 
religious devotion, the Christian state has merely endorsed the rights of capital.536 
Religion is a part of the world of huckstering, with Mammon as its idol. It is fatally 
entwined in human alienation. In the “so-called Christian state”, Marx argues, “it is 
estrangement which carries weight, and not man himself’ .537 Again, it is not that 
mysticism is necessarily a detachment from the world; Marx’s principal concern is the 
need to make the secular sacred. To use and be used, rather than to encounter 
humanity, is profane behaviour. 538 Marx attacks the dichotomy between religious 
experience and a profane otherness; a flat, divided life from which there is only 
occasional respite. For Marx, the place of the sacred is not a church or synagogue, a 
Sabbath or a holy day. Life itself needs to be sacred for humanity to fully live in the 
present. Within organized religion God has been made an object, almost like any 
other.539 This concretizing Marx sees is not only objectionable to the Hebrew tradition 
but is a mockery of Christianity as well.
An important part of Marx’s critique of religion is put forward in his critique 
of the relation between religion and the State. In an article for the Rheinische Zeitung, 
Marx writes that the “truly religious state is the theocratic state; the head of such a 
state must be either the God of religion, Jehovah himself, as in the Jewish state, or 
God’s representative, the Dalai Lama in Tibet”. The problem Marx sees for 
Christianity within the Prussian state is that “where, as under Protestantism, there is 
no supreme head of the church, the rule of religion is nothing but the religion of rule, 
the cult of the government’s will” .540 As Marx’s friend, the poet and writer Heinrich 
Heine argued, the Prussian State preferred that the idea of the existence of God be 
maintained for “whoever tears himself away from his God will sooner or later break
536 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 252. Marx writes: “In England even now occasionally in rural districts a 
labourer is condemned to imprisonment for desecrating the Sabbath, by working in his front garden. 
The same labourer is punished for breach of contract if he remains away from his metal, paper, or glass 
works on the Sunday, even if it be from a religious whim. The orthodox Parliament will hear nothing 
of Sabbath-breaking if it occurs in the process of expanding capital”. Ibid., p. 252, n. 1.
537 Marx, On the Jewish Question, p. 225.
538 Marx shares with Kant’s dictum that one should never treat another merely as a means, but as an 
end, as much as he does with Hegel’s realist reply to Kant that “What does that have to do with the 
Norman conquest of England?”. Quoted by John C. Raines, “From Passive to Active Man”, in 
Marxism and Radical Religion, ed. John C. Raines and Thomas Dean (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1970), p. 116.
539 Marx argues that the monotheism of Judaism is in fact a polytheism of many needs, particularly 
egoistic, practical needs. Somewhat crudely he states that it is a polytheism “that makes even the 
lavatory an object of divine law”. Marx, On the Jewish Question, pp. 238-239.
540 Karl Marx, Leading Article in no. 179 of Kölnische Zeitung (1842), Collected Works, vol. 1, p. 199.
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with his earthly superiors too” . 541 If it is a part of the will of the government, religion 
is unable to perform its spiritual duty as a critic of property and injustice. 542 Long 
before Weber, Marx saw the dispiriting connections between Protestantism and the 
spirit of capitalism.
It should not be forgotten that the Prussian State exercized its repressive power 
in direct and indirect forms against many of Marx’s friends and colleagues who had 
embarked upon a criticism of institutionalized religion.543 In many of these cases this 
criticism took the form of the defence of Christ against the Christians. Bruno Bauer, 
who had been Marx’s lecturer and a member of the Young Hegelian ‘Doctor’s Club’, 
of which Marx was a part, was dismissed from his position at the University of Bonn 
by the Minister of Culture after the publication of a critical work on the Synoptic 
Gospels, followed by “The Trumpet of the Last Judgment” .544 David Strauss had 
already suffered this same fate as a result of his critical commitment to Christianity.545 
Others such as Arnold Ruge and Ludwig Feuerbach had become victims of State 
repression.546 Given this course of events within Marx’s milieu, it is not surprising that
541 Heinrich Heine, Memorials o f Krähwinkel''s Days o f Terror, quoted in S. Körner, Kant 
(Harmondworth: Penguin, 1967), p. 128.
542 For an analysis of early Christian views on property see, Geoffrey de Ste Croix, “Early Christian 
Attitudes to Property and Slavery”, Studies in Church History, no. 12 (1973): pp. 1-38.
543 And in some cases of Marx himself. Marx informs Ruge that the various attempts at suppression do 
not surprise him; indeed, he says that he would prefer the more excessive form of censorship in 
banning and suppression than the “censorship of tendency” which had proceeded the more severe 
version. “You know what my opinion of the censorship instruction has been from the outset. I see 
here only a consequence; in the suppression of the Rheinische Zeitung I see a definite advance of 
political consciousness, and for that reason I am resigning. Moreover, I had begun to be stifled in that 
atmosphere. [...] I have become tired of hypocrisy, stupidity, gross arbitrariness, and of our bowing 
and scraping, dodging, and hair-splitting over words. Consequently, the government has given me 
back my freedom”. Marx to Ruge, January, 1843, Collected Works, vol. I, p. 397.
514 Bruno Bauer, “The Trumpet of the Last Judgment”, in The Young Hegelians: An Anthology, ed. 
Lawrence Stepelevich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Kritik der Evangelischen 
Geschichte der Synoptiker was published in 1841.
545 Strauss’s extensive study of the Gospels in his Life o f Jesus was an attack upon both orthodox 
supematuralism and rationalist naturalism. It instead proposes the place of the mythical and the 
miraculous as they are evident within the modem world. On this basis, Strauss argued that the truth of 
Christianity could be defended. For his efforts Strauss was immediately dismissed from his post at a 
seminary in Tübingen. David Friedrich Strauss, The Life o f Jesus Critically Examined, trans. George 
Eliot (London: SCM Press, 1973), f.p. 1835.
546 Whilst working at the University of Halle, Marx’s friend Arnold Ruge edited the journal the 
Höllische Jahrbücher that was banned in Prussia in 1841. This was not the first time Ruge had 
suffered at the hands of state repression having already spent six years in prison as a result of his 
membership of a student organization. It was, however, time well spent; during his incarceration, Ruge 
devoted himself to the task of reading Hegel. Feuerbach’s victimization by the state began early in his 
life with police surveillance greeting his arrival at the University of Berlin in 1824. Although this 
initial interest taken by the state seemed to have been because Feuerbach’s brother, Karl, had been too 
outspoken a critic of German social conditions (for which he was detained, uncharged, for fourteen 
months) it soon took the form of a more direct target after the publication of Feuerbach’s Thoughts on
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he saw institutionalized religion as the cult of the government’s will - that the rule of 
religion was nothing but the religion of rule.
Again, the point should be emphasized that Marx’s critique is no simple attack 
upon religion per se\ Marx criticizes a secularized religion, thereby defending 
religiosity within capitalism beyond the State. A spiritual belief should call upon us 
to choose aut Caesar aut Christus, as Bloch puts forward. 547 In his article “Comments 
on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction” (itself, ironically, censored, despite the 
new, more liberal laws being introduced to overturn the previously more draconian 
stance embodied in censorship laws) Marx astutely observes the possibility of greater 
repression rather than less because the new laws represented so close an identification 
between political and religious interests.548 Here, in Marx’s early journalism, he puts 
the unequivocal question: “He who wants to ally himself with religion owing to 
religious feelings must concede it the decisive voice in all questions, or do you 
perhaps understand by religion the cult of your own unlimited authority and 
governmental wisdom? ” .549 Once religion becomes the support of secular authority, 
its own authority is lost, not because it concerns itself with politics but because it 
cannot “concern itself with politics in its own way”. In such circumstances, religion 
becomes “the general sanction for what exists” . 550 Marx detects in this a familiar 
ideological manoeuvre - the liberal defence of religion as absorbed within the 
Christian state is the best way to achieve the end of institutionalized religion’s 
independent, critical role in society. Marx’s criticism of a secularized religion is not, 
however, that which had surfaced in Hegel’s time - particularly that embodied in 
Friedrich Schleiermacher’s major theological work, On Religion: Speeches to its 
Cultured Despisers.55' In this work, Schleiermacher argues that those who are 
alienated from religion are alienated from aspects of its institutional form, not from 
religion itself. The many who have been satisfied “to juggle with the trappings” have 
failed to discern the essence of religion, an essence which cannot be found in any 
sensuous, material form.552 A sense of the Infinite cannot be reduced to such a level. 
In a sense, then, Schleiermacher separates out what is unlimited and pure in the
Death and Immortality. By the end of the 1820s copies of the work had been confiscated by censorship 
authorities.
547 Ernst Bloch, Atheism in Christianity: The Religion o f the Exodus and the Kingdom, trans. J. T. 
Swann (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), especially, pp. 123-195, passim.
548 Marx, “Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction”, pp. 109-131.
549 Ibid., p. 118.
550 Ibid.
551 F. D. E. Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (New York: Harper, 
1958).
552 Ibid., p. 1.
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feeling that is God - a redemption dependent upon Jesus - from human attempts to 
give this taste for the Infinite conceptual and material expression. Marx too sees a 
difference between spirituality and institutionalized forms of religion but the 
redemption of humanity, he argues, will occur within humanity itself.
One of the underlying problems for institutionalized religion is that money 
debases all the gods of mankind and turns them into commodities.553 Religion is 
inevitably a part of this world: It is “from the outset consciousness of the 
transcendental arising from actually existing forces”.554 Thomas Münzer, the 
revolutionary theologian of the early sixteenth century, is, as we have previously 
briefly mentioned, quoted by Marx as declaring it “intolerable that ‘all creatures have 
been made into property, the fish in the water, the birds in the air, the plants on the 
earth - all living things must also become free’”.555 Münzer is chosen by Marx very 
deliberately. As is the case with Marx, Münzer’s commitment to freedom is his 
rejection of commodification. Münzer’s Gideon-inspired holy war of the peasants 
against the godless princes in Thüringia in 1525 might too have impressed Marx, 
where it merely confounded Engels.556 Münzer’s critique of Lutherism was that it was 
in essence a betrayal of a radical reforming of the direction of the Church, resulting 
instead in a complicity with the pursuit of material wealth and the forces of 
oppression.557 Marx draws a comparison between Adam Smith and Luther 
highlighting an aspect of this same problem. Luther had “negated the idea of priests 
as something separate and apart from the layman by transferring the priest into the 
heart of the layman”, just as Smith abolished the “external and mindless objectivity” 
of wealth “inasmuch as private property is embodied in man himself and man himself 
is recognized as its essence”.558 The problem with Luther’s theology is that it has not 
resulted in the sort of change it might have supposed - one is still left with a repressive 
inner priest. In The Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx criticizes Luther for putting “on the
553 Marx, On the Jewish Question, p. 239.
554 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 102.
355 Marx, On the Jewish Question, p. 239.
556 Friedrich Engels, The Peasant War in Germany, Collected Works, vol. X. Also see Löwy, 
“Marxism and Religion: The Challenge of Liberation Theology” pp. 25-26. Löwy argues that Engels 
here tends to reduce religion to a form of strategem: The mystical depth of Munzer’s millenarianism 
seems to escape Engels.
537 For a brief examination of the place of Thomas Münzer (sometimes spelt Muntzer, Muenzer or 
Muentzer) in Christian thought see Paul Johnson, A History of Christianity (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1990), pp. 261-262. For more detailed analyses of Münzer see Gordon Rupp, Patterns o f Reformation 
(London: Epworth, 1969) and H. J. Goertz and A. Friesen, eds. Thomas Muentzer (Darmstadt: 1978). 
On the relationship between Luther and Münzer see, E. G. Rupp, ‘“True History’: Martin Luther and 
Thomas Muentzer”, in History, Society and the Churches: essays in honour of Owen Chadwick, eds. D. 
Beales and G. Best (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
558 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 342.
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mask of the apostle Paul”, a timid act of necromancy in which the “venerable disguise 
and borrowed language” is an attempt merely to hide the failure of Luther’s own 
revolutionary transformation.559 The dead were resurrected here not to “exaggerate the 
given task in the imagination” but to “flee from solving it in reality” .560 Luther’s 
narrow-minded anti-semitism and his simplistic, unimaginative contempt for peasants 
engaged in revolt, might also have informed Marx’s criticism, although most of his 
other references to Luther concern what he sees as his naive attack against usury.561 
Any theology which is merely a ‘heavenly political economy’, which is only the 
“theory of the production, distribution, exchange and consumption of ‘spiritual 
wealth’ and of the treasures of heaven” is held up to severe criticism by Marx.562 We 
will look later at what it is that Marx considers a communistic spirituality offers the 
individual, but here, by way of his critique of that which has been lost from such a 
state of belief, we are able to gain a sense of the values and ideas Marx feels a 
spirituality outside the confines of the profane might offer. It is through such an 
understanding that we are able to return to the issue of ideological contention within a 
struggle for freedom.
We have seen that Marx’s critique of religion as reification is a critique of 
religion’s place within a commodified world: It is not an attempt to present religion as 
false consciousness. The task of spirituality is to revolt against all forms of alienation 
that degrade by making of the subject an object, all those conditions which prevent 
people from being their own creators. Religion both represents the alienation of life 
and is a protestation against dehumanization. The atheists of the Hegelian left 
reminded Marx of Sancho Panza who, according to Cervantes’ Don Quixote, 
mercilessly beat hannless attendants at a funeral procession. Does this indicate that 
Marx sees religion as a dying, harmless emanation? 563 Not really: Marx sees the 
change from religion as a public to a private matter, which the French Revolution had 
helped to bring about, as the loss of religiosity from religion. He argues that what is 
spiritual about organized religion has gone. It is for this reason that the ire of the left 
Hegelians is misplaced. It is not that the critique of religion has become otiose. 
Organized religion has divested itself of the spiritual. In so doing, religion has
559 Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire,^. 146.
560 Ibid., p. 148.
561 See, for example, Marx, Capital, vol. Ill, p. 394.
562 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 130.
563 It should also be emphasized that when Bauer saw the criticism of religion as complete with the 
dissemination of his work this was because there was indeed a type of finality in the separation 
between critical philosophy and the Protestantism of his time. Bauer’s work was then very different 
from Strauss’s in this respect.
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become static and empty, a suspended striving. It is a dead rather than a living flower. 
In this sense Marx realizes that criticizing the institutions of religion as less than 
religious is becoming a matter of pointing out the obvious. Let us now look more 
closely at the issue of the ideological within religion by first considering the relation 
between religion and illusion.
Religion and Illusion
What we have so far seen in Marx’s work is an understanding of the many 
dimensions of the issue of religion and spirituality in the modem world. What we 
need now to consider is how this critique enables us to theorize what striving, if any, 
exists between spirituality and ideology. Religion, Marx feels, should be “the 
spontaneous activity of the human imagination” but becomes a loss of the self.564 And 
yet he also recognizes that one cannot be completely lost to oneself because one has 
needs. 565 How does spirituality fit into this sense of needs? Despite seeing the 
difference between spirituality and illusion, Marx is still at times prone to artificially 
separating religious estrangement as a part of the realm of consciousness from ‘real 
life’ . 566 Again, the problem here is that spirituality becomes equated with a type of 
false consciousness. Whilst admitting historical variation in the extent to which 
consciousness is inserted into ‘real life’, social and religious life seem on occasion to 
represent not merely distinguishable but separate realms. This may be partly a 
problem of terminology. Religion, for Marx, is clearly something different from 
spirituality even though the same word is used at times to convey a sense of these 
different entities. When Marx considers the place of religion within consciousness as 
opposed to economic estrangement he refers to the enormous variation throughout 
different cultures in which “the actual and acknowledged life of the people has its 
being more in consciousness or in the external world” .567 In this sense ‘real life’ is the 
world which capitalism assumes, in most cases evincing the destruction of the realm 
of the sacred within religion. In most repressive, property based societies “only the 
smell of incense and holy water remains” 568 of an earlier spirituality. Much of this
564 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, pp. 326, 327.
565 Ibid., pp. 334, 335.
566 Ibid., p. 349.
567 Ibid.
568 Franklin Rosemont in his article “Karl Marx and the Iroquois” quotes this passage from Karl Marx, 
The Ethnological Notebooks o f Karl Marx: Studies of Morgan, Phear, Maine, Lubbock, transcribed and 
ed. Lawrence Kräder (Assen: Van Gorcum & Co., 1972). See Franklin Rosemont, “Karl Marx and the 
Iroquois”, Arsenal / Surrealist Subversion no. 4 (1989), p. 207.
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spirituality has been poisoned by the “pestilential breath of civilization” . 569 In Capital, 
Marx is quite clear that, as in the world of productive activity within capitalism, in the 
religious world it is the reifications of religion that “appear as independent beings 
endowed with life” ; 570 the separation perceived between social and religious life is a 
fetishized reality. And yet here we also find the comment, strikingly similar to that of 
the Manuscripts, that: “As, in religion, man is governed by the products of his own 
brain, so in capitalistic production, he is governed by the products of his own hand” . 571 
The religious world, Marx argues, is “the reflex of the real world” .572 Here, Marx is 
referring to Christianity and, in particular, Protestantism, with its cult of the abstract 
person and its ability to reduce people to an homogenous standard for the purpose of 
rule and control. 573 Just as production has come to have mastery over people, the 
institutionalized church has come to control the religiosity of its followers.574 Forms 
of social creativity that preceded capitalistic forms “are treated by the bourgeoisie in 
much the same way as the Fathers of the Church treated pre-Christian religions” . 575 
We will see shortly that the spirituality of various ‘pre-Christian religions’ is regarded 
by Marx as an essential part of a communistic life - there is no illusion or unreality in 
this, rather the free expression of beliefs outside their reduction to the level of 
commodification.
It seems that Marx has some difficulty in fully appreciating the deliberate and 
unconscious correspondence religion has to various needs and strivings of humanity. 
He argues that the criticism of religion will ‘disillusion’ people, meaning that it will 
disavow them of their illusions so “that he will think, act and fashion his reality like a 
man who has discarded his illusions and regained his senses” .576 Is this necessarily the 
case? Certainly his imagining that philosophers will play the revolutionary role once 
assumed by monks in this respect is hopeful indeed.577 At the same time, from such 
criticism, Marx understands the emergence of something constructive however 
vulnerable and difficult its processes might be. “Criticism has tom away the 
imaginary flowers with which man’s chains were decked, not in order that he should 
wear his chains without the comfort of illusions, but that he may throw off the chains
569 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 359.
570 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 77.
571 Ibid., p. 582.
572 Ibid., p. 83.
573 Ibid.
574 Ibid., p. 85.
575 Ibid.
576 Marx, Critique o f Hegel’s Philosophy o f Right \  p. 244.
577 Ibid., p. 251.
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and pluck the living flowers”, Marx urges.578 To have a world of living flowers is of 
course preferable to a world in which people are enchained and enchain themselves, 
however much these chains appear in a “mist-enveloped” 579 form. Marx seems to 
suggest that the “weapon of criticism” can only be successfully wielded where people 
grasp things at the level of the very self, where people overturn the poverty that they 
are, within the debasement of their social condition. 580 It is not a realization of how 
wretched people are that enables them to free themselves from religion, it is the 
understanding that they do not have to be wretched. The atheist is just as likely to 
have illusions and to participate in the world of ideology. Recognizing this, it is 
perhaps easier to see why Marx places such emphasis upon critique. This is a 
fundamentally important distinction and suggests something vital about the way in 
which Marx views spirituality as subjective possibility rather that as hopeless 
delusion. It is also an unstated acknowledgement of the limitations of ideology; 
ideology both creates and shatters illusions. For Marx it is not possible to proceed, as 
David Friedrich Strauss did, for example, by critically interpreting Christ’s life and 
yet still being content with allowing this criticism to remain abstract. 581 Marx’s 
critique of the Young Hegelians strikes an immediate polemical chord but his 
intention is not that of easy caricature. For Marx, the seriousness of the debate is 
necessitated by the neglect of a transformative criticism. It is for this reason that he 
refers repeatedly to the Hegelian concept of Außiebung - a transcendence by way of 
fully grasping that with which one contends.582 Marx seems to suggest that critique 
can outwit the pretence of an ineluctable fear when the self is confronted with the self, 
without the comfort and justification of religion: And yet it is difficult to ignore the 
repeated pull of the sigh of oppression rather than the demand for ‘real happiness’ that 
characterizes a central part of the structure of belief of modernity. Modernity’s 
preference for the sigh, in both its religious and its cynical variants, would seem to 
indicate this problem.
Let us summarize our analysis thus far. What we have here is a clear critique 
of the abuse of spirituality for profane ends. It is also an engagement with what 
spirituality can mean within the context of freedom and its denial. 583 Marx argues that
578 Marx, Critique o f Hegel's 'Philosophy o f Right’, p. 244.
579 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 77.
580 Marx, Critique o f Hegel’s ‘Philosophy o f Right’, p. 244.
581 Strauss, The Life o f Jesus Critically Examined.
582 As polemical as Marx’s words often sound in works such as The German Ideology, his point is to 
transcend rather than to indulge in withering criticism.
583 For a study of such issues within this tradition see Lucien Goldmann’s important work The Hidden 
God (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964).
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the starting point of socialism is not atheism (the negation of God) but “the 
theoretically and practically sensuous consciousness of man and nature as essential 
beings” . 584 Religion, in contrast, is the unreality of nature and people. It is in this 
sense that communism is the “negation of the negation” 585 - in other words the 
negation of the atheistic anti-religious. Such atheism is “for the most part an 
abstraction” . 586 Communism too is merely a “dogmatic abstraction” when it is a one­
sided supposed realization of socialistic principles. This is particularly the case where 
it fails to take into account the consciousness and ideas of a given period of 
humanity’s existence. 587 Marx’s enormous respect for Wilhelm Weitling’s writing on 
emancipation, in such works of Weitling’s as Guarantees o f Harmony and Freedom 
and The Poor Sinner’s Gospel, provokes him to consider the difficulty of the 
execution of abstract ideas and, at the same time, the assumption of realities without 
some imagined and possible conception of freedom.588 A spirituality or a socialism 
that manages to reconcile itself with injustice will, for Marx, never have any sort of 
integrity. Let us now further investigate how Marx develops his critique of religion 
by considering the relation he theorizes between religious belief and the expression of 
need. We will do this by examining what is at issue in Marx’s critical engagement 
with Feuerbach.
Religion as Judgement: Marx on Feuerbach
We mentioned earlier the significance of the sense in which Marx sees the 
workings of the individual’s “own inner priest” -  most importantly it represents for 
him the presence of an internal watcher situated within the sometimes antagonistic 
relation between pacification and emancipation.589 But Marx also indicates the ‘inner 
priest’ can take the form of a religiosity that merely reinforces the power of the Priest 
as an external arbiter by removing from criticism the complicity of organized religion 
in profane life. Marx makes use of Feuerbach’s critique of Christianity in order to 
address this issue. We will look at what it is that Feuerbach argues in order to be able 
to better appreciate how an aspect of Marx’s understanding of spirituality involves a 
sense of this-worldly judgement.
584 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 357.
585 Ibid., p. 358.
586 Ibid., p. 349.
587 Marx to Ruge, September 1843, p. 207.
588 See Karl Marx, “Critical Notes on the Article ‘The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a 
Prussian’”, in Early Writings, p. 415; and Marx to Ruge, September 1843, p. 207.
589 Marx, Critique o f  Hegel’s ‘Philosophy o f Right’, p. 252.
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For Feuerbach, “religion is a judgment” - what people blame and condemn is 
the non-divine.590 This is a solemnizing of the critical discrimination between the 
perfect and the imperfect, the divine and the non-divine.591 Feuerbach objects to the 
emotional religiosity and piety of institutionalized religion in the post-Napoleonic 
period. This he sees as linked to a concentration upon individualism within 
modernity’s severance with the idea of value in commonality. The new isolated self 
has only its estrangement from which it might derive ideals of perfection. The 
“recompense of history does not satisfy modem subjects, who take as the measure of 
reality only their experience, their own knowledge” . 592 Thus religious belief is an 
expression of human social needs. For Feuerbach, theology is really an anthropology 
(anthropos - the study of humanity) which reveals the objectified awareness people 
have or fail to have of themselves. Theology is therefore an anthropology that 
misunderstands itself. Feuerbach asks what is the basis of a specifically religious 
concept in the human psyche and answers by arguing that people imagine God 
because they cannot attribute the highest qualities of knowledge and will to other 
humans. These qualities are projected onto another world which people call God. 
The underlying problem with humanity is that: “Man has given objectivity to himself, 
but has not recognised the object as his own nature” .593 As we have seen, for Marx, 
what is important is the social and historical mediation of religious ideas and this too 
involves a sense of the estrangement through which human aspirations become 
filtered, and, specifically, it entails types of transference of human values onto objects 
or objectified beings.
Both Feuerbach and Marx are concerned with religion as “the echo of our cry 
of anguish”, as Feuerbach calls it. 594 Both owe to the mystic Sebastian Franck von 
Word the sentiment contained within his expression that “God is an unutterable sigh 
deep in the soul” . 595 Each of these writers recognizes the fundamental nature of a 
striving for meaning, and does so on the basis of theorizing unfreedom as a separation 
of the self from others. This is an important and distinctive point for us to consider in 
our understanding of a critique of ideology. “Man thinks”, Feuerbach says, “that is,
590 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence o f Christianity, trans. George Elliot (New York: Harper & Row, 
1957), p. 97.
591 Ibid.
592 Feuerbach, Thoughts on Death and Immortality, p. 135.
593 Feuerbach, The Essence o f Christianity, p. 13.
594 Feuerbach, The Essence o f Christianity, p. 121. This echo as prayer hearing itself and feeling 
perceiving itself is, for Feuerbach, what God is.
595 Feuerbach’s translation of von Word is “God is an unutterable sigh, lying in the depths of the 
heart”. He goes on to say that “this saying is the most remarkable, the profoundest, truest expression of 
Christian mysticism”. Ibid, p. 122.
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he converses with himself’, and the individual does this in relation to others. “Man is 
himself at once I and thou” .596 This capability to put oneself in the place of another 
has far-reaching implications when and if one recognizes the contradictions of 
freedom and unfreedom. Feuerbach examines the alienated consciousness that seeks 
an escape from its reality. “It is strange that humans recoil only from the abysses of 
the future but not from those of the past, that they turn away in distress, troubled 
about being or not-being only after life but not before it, that they look forwards and 
not backwards” . 597 Why is it necessary, Feuerbach is moved to question, to “go 
beyond this life? ” .598 The self-forgetting that is death is not restricted to the “eternal 
sleep and unconscious peace of nothingness”; the exhaling of spirit and life “when 
there is nothing left but the last dry shell of your personhood” can inflict the living as 
much as the dead.
This surrender, Feuerbach tells us, is death, a death of one’s ethical essence. 
This question of why we fear a death realm of the future and yet do not bother with 
our living or past death involves a profound interrogation of the self. Both Feuerbach 
and Marx touch upon this issue primarily by questioning the sort of lives we lead in 
the present and what these lives suggest about the human values we have acquired and 
achieved. Feuerbach makes us poignantly aware of the “barren, dry self’ whose 
selfishness bums “like tinder”; whose greed borders on madness and is a disease 
precisely because the individual has surrendered herself “to things that cannot include 
the human self’. Money is such a thing -  it prevents the individual from expressing 
what the self is: the “human self is infinite”. With money and determinate things the 
individual “surrenders himself to an object to which he cannot surrender the self and 
which, therefore, always returns and reflects back to him his unsurrendered, 
unfulfilled self’. One then finds oneself in the “perverted” condition of the “desire to 
devour the object”; a “terrible contradiction” of being “poor in wealth”, “empty in 
abundance” . 599 This is, as we have seen, the substance of Marx’s critique of 
commodification. It is necessary then for us to be aware of this context of a spiritual 
critique of a commodified world in which Marx participates. Most importantly, Marx 
indicates that a self beyond the ‘terrible contradiction’, of which Feuerbach speaks, is 
yet to be fully realized. Religion, he argues, becomes “the fantastic realization of the 
human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality” . 600
596
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598
599
600
Ibid., p. 2.
Feuerbach, Thoughts on Death and Immortality, pp. 114-115. 
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Marx, Critique o f Hegel’s ‘Philosophy o f Right’, p. 244.
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Humanity is something that is still to be created. What has hampered humanity in this 
realization of a self is a constant recourse to the deadening state of being a slave to 
cunning and unnecessary appetites. “Let the dead bury the dead, and pity them”, 
Marx provocatively writes, echoing Jesus’ fillip to his disciples. “Our kind will be the 
first to enter into a new life whilst still alive” .601
Marx sees in the determination of the self by way of alienation a halting of the 
potentiality of people through a failure to conceive its connection to latent forms; 602 
this provides him with his central understanding of subjectivity. What it is that the 
self is able to sustain within a spiritual awareness is a sense of potentiality via the act 
of consciousness despite, or perhaps because of, the very objectification of 
consciousness entailed in a commodified life. There is something in a protesting 
consciousness that is able to suggest the self-encounter which commodity life 
repeatedly forces us to defer. This something is its distance from the world of 
moneyed greed and self-delusion. A religion that fails to maintain this distance 
cannot offer any alternative to unfreedom. It will be dead to the “burning sunlight of 
actual life”, as Feuerbach writes; it will be, in Marx’s words, only the “illusory sun” . 603
We mentioned the importance of the concept of the ‘waking dream’ to Marx; 
we have argued, indeed, that it is in this way that he tends to theorize ideology and the 
struggle for meaning. It is more than merely noteworthy to point out then that, for 
Feuerbach, it is religion that is “the dream of waking consciousness” .604 Both 
Feuerbach and Marx are able to discern some of the contradictions and dualities of the 
ideological in the form of spirituality. As well as understanding the role of the 
alienated consciousness in relation to spiritual awareness Marx also takes up the 
Feuerbachian issue of religious consciousness in relation to a more externalized view 
of the social situatedness of religions. Marx’s comments on “the religion of 
Hindustan” bear out a sense of an appreciation of spiritual traditions in which a 
Feuerbachian view of the abysses of the past and future are present. Marx writes that 
this religion “of the Monk, and of the Bayadere” anticipates in its “ancient traditions” 
“a world of voluptuousness and a world of woes” .605 Of Christianity, Marx feels that a
601 Marx’s comment is made in his letter to Ruge, May 1843, p. 200. Jesus’ invocation to one of his 
disciples is mentioned in the Gospel of Matthew, 8: 21-22 and again in Luke, 9: 59-60. Marx again 
uses the expression “let the dead bury their dead” in The Eighteenth Brumaire, p. 149; and in The 
German Ideology, p. 149.
602 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 385.
603 Feuerbach, Thoughts on Death and Immortality, p. 82; Marx, Critique o f Hegel’s ‘Philosophy o f 
Right’, p. 244.
604 Feuerbach, The Essence o f Christianity, p. 141.
605 Karl Marx, “British Rule in India”, New-York Daily Tribune, 25 June, 1853, Collected Works, vol. 
XII, pp. 125-133.
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certain ‘potentiality’ in terms of the development of a self-critical attitude needs to be 
attained in order that its relation to former beliefs and mythologies might be 
understood.606
There is much with which Marx is in agreement in relation to Feuerbach’s 
writing - so much so that at times Marx seems overly churlish in his criticism of 
Feuerbach. 607 When Feuerbach deals with issues of self-alienation in its religious 
aspect he seems to grasp decisively the hypostatization of human desires in which 
people feel a need to transfer the value of their humanity within a mundane world into 
one which they construct as transcendental. Feuerbach also criticizes that very 
reification of the concept of the person in Hegel, which then prompts him to instead 
empirically ground his abstract genus of ‘man’ in the form of the individual. But this 
is, of course, where Marx’s criticism of Feuerbach is most strident: Marx claims that 
it is Feuerbach’s contemplative materialism that fails to appreciate social history. 
Feuerbach argues that active perception is a form of apprehension soiled and stained 
by egotism, but this sort of neo-Stoicism, Marx seems to be saying, leaving unspoken 
society and the socialized individual and satisfying itself with a purely 
anthropological, generic concept of humanity and its atomized individuals, is little 
able to come to terms with the subjective within activity. 608 Thus Marx’s retort in 
Thesis One is that, for Feuerbach, “practical activity is apprehended and fixed only in 
its dirty-Judaical manifestation” 609 - in other words it is fixed only in its profane 
hucksterism. For Marx, the subject within the world is the world as well.
Feuerbach’s supposed mistake is to see religion as a sort of division of the world “into 
a religious world and a secular one” . 610 The world, for Marx, is the world - its 
religious beliefs and protestations, its atheism, its competing philosophies and its 
ideological forms. It is the dynamism of this world that we need to understand.611 In
606 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 106.
607 Marx’s argument against Feuerbach relates more to what he sees as the ultimately limited sphere to 
which Feuerbach’s critique is directed rather than to a fundamental disagreement with his general 
approach and yet Marx’s discontent with the sort of materialism Feuerbach offers is obvious. When 
Marx contrasts the thought of Feuerbach and Hegel, he finds Feuerbach a ‘very poor’ figure. See Marx 
to Schweitzer, Jan. 24, 1865, Collected Works, vol. XX, pp. 26-33. As important as Feuerbach’s work 
is to Marx it cannot really be maintained that Marx remains a disciple of Feuerbach as various scholars 
following Labriola contend. See, for example, A. James Gregor, “Marx, Feuerbach and the Reform of  
the Hegelian Dialectic”, Science and Society, 29, 1 (1965), p. 71.
608 On issues related to this see, Teilhard de Chardin, Christianity and Evolution, trans. R. Hague 
(London: Collins, 1971).
609 Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, Thesis I, p. 421.
610 Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, Thesis IV, p. 422.
6,1 We have seen this in his general depiction of the religious impulse - but even in his choice of 
theorists of spirituality we can see this tendency. For example, Jakob Boehme, the seventeenth century 
mystic, is referred to by Marx and Engels for his development of the theory of a ‘Qual’, or the
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identifying this dynamism Marx is undoubtedly correct, but we sense here an overly 
hasty resort to the certainty that the movement of objectivity, reality or our experience 
might have. Moreover his contention with Feuerbach here is maintained only at the 
expense of an understanding of the latter’s thought. Feuerbach argues that the sort of 
activity that results in the realization of an object as a means to an end needs to be 
distinguished from “miraculous agency”, the realization of an end without means.612 
In the former category he places an activity such as work, a realm in which the 
individual “bounds his wishes by the idea of necessity”; in the latter category one is 
able to exclude “all thoughts of intermediateness and dependence”, it is an affirmation 
without limitation.613 For Marx not to be able to appreciate the significance of this 
critique one might more immediately suspect a certain disingenuousness on his part, 
and yet this failure is indicative of a broader problem we find in Marx’s understanding 
of the contradictions of ideology and their relation to subjectivity. Marx’s inability to 
engage with the more subtle issues of types of consciousness and activity that 
Feuerbach’s work suggests is a failure to shift a critical analysis of the ideological into 
the territory of unravelling something of the self-encounter of the enfolded, 
contradictory self.614
We can further consider this issue in terms of whether the problem Marx is 
concerned with is that essentially of Hegel’s concern with theodicy.615 Whether or not 
a justification of God is, for Marx, any type of vindication of the course of history, it 
is clearly not a demonstration of a rational unfolding in the world: But does this also 
obscure, for Marx, the question of subjectivity in his attempt to account for processes 
seemingly already begun before we are in a position to determine them? Marx 
ponders whether the German criticism of religion is, in the main, complete; 616 in other
explanation of the dynamism of the world. Boehme’s work represents a stark contrast with the left 
Hegelian critique current during the formulation of Marx’s ideas. For Boehme, ‘Qua!’ is 
‘incomprehensible and irrational’ which is ‘the nature of every individual thing’. In The Holy Family, 
Boehme’s ‘Qual’ is mentioned as a way of understanding motion “not only in the form of mechanical” 
motion “but chiefly in the form of an impulse, a vital spirit, a tension”. Marx and Engels, The Holy 
Family, p. 151. For an explanation of Boehme’s thought see John Joseph Stoudt, Sunrise to Eternity: A 
Study in Jacob Boehme ’s Life and Thought, pref. Paul Tillich (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1957). It should of course be noted that Feuerbach too held Boehme in high esteem, describing 
the mystic as having “a profoundly religious mind”. Feuerbach, The Essence o f Christianity, p. 93.
612 Feuerbach, The Essence o f Christianity, 130.
613 Ibid, p. 123.
614 It should be pointed out that undue emphasis can be placed on Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach, when 
they were no more or less than speculative ideas jotted down in a notebook that was never published 
during Marx’s lifetime. However, it is also the case, that in arguing what we have said in relation to 
Marx’s understanding of subjectivity and his critique of the substance of Feuerbach’s work, we have a 
criticism of more than the Theses in mind.
615 See Hegel, The Philosophy o f History, especially part IV.
616 Marx, Critique o f Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’, p. 243.
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words, whether the critique of religion is the prerequisite of all critique because of the 
problem of evil in society, and because it provides some generalized refutation of 
error.617 In a general sense, we might well want to argue that injustice and exploitation 
are expressions of a type of evil within the world. Jose Miranda, for example, draws a 
link between the totality of evil that St. Paul, the apostle, refers to as kosmos, and the 
‘capitalism’ of Marx’s critique: 618 But, for Marx, the important issue is the need to 
oppose all ideas and activities that reconcile people to an evil world, as if this world is 
somehow willed by God, or, in a more secular sense, as if it is an inescapable 
inevitability. An engagement with religion is therefore, at this level, a critical 
engagement with the ideological. Marx indicates the completion of theodicy because 
he sees the need to change the conditions that give rise to evil and to the theory of 
evil. These conditions, as we have already seen, although of significant impact upon 
the individual, are theorized as conditions that are in many senses ‘beyond’ the 
individual. Perfection is neither to be found in organized religion nor in the state, nor 
in that political expediency of the “perfected Christian state”, which is not a Christian 
state but rather “the atheist state, the democratic, the state which relegates religion to 
the level of the other elements of civil society” . 619 Where Hegel sees the state as 
transcending the conflicting interests of civil society, Marx sees it as an external 
necessity produced by antagonistic forces in an unconscious and arbitrary way. “Just 
as it is not religion that creates man but man who creates religion, so it is not the 
constitution that creates the people but the people which creates the constitution” .620
The problem for Marx is in accounting for the evil of the world at the same 
time as needing to theorize the reason for a contemplative and active compromise 
with this reality. In self-interest we have been enchained, Marx has told us, the 
human will has in many fundamental ways been corrupted by living out such an 
existence. Where, then, do we look for the panlogistic moment, or the actions that 
might create the world anew? We have already considered that it is not reason’s 
cunning that, for Marx, produces suffering and alienation. Likewise, it is not simply 
the profane that has produced religious belief. Hegel’s master/slave paradigm of self- 
consciousness divides the world into those who risk death to achieve a ‘consciousness 
for itself and those who choose an unrecognized or enslaved life rather than death.621 
Within this interdependent, dialectical relationship between master and slave, the
617 Ibid.
618 Porfirio Miranda, Marx and the Bible, p. 250.
619 Marx, On the Jewish Question, p. 222.
620 Marx, Critique o f Hegel’s Doctrine o f the State, p. 87.
621 See Hegel, The Phenomenology o f Mind, especially section 4.
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realization of History and a higher freedom can take place. We have already noted 
that, where Hegel sees the consciousness of people as an objectification and self­
alienation of God, Feuerbach claims the imagining of God is the self-alienation and 
objectification of humanity. “The beginning, middle and end of religion is MAN”, 
Feuerbach states. 622 Thus, for Feuerbach, Hegel deifies thought at the expense of 
humanity. For Hegel, speculative wisdom offers an adequate conception of what is 
only imagined in religion and only represented in classical art. There is some 
decisive and yet often quite elusive separation between the real and the illusory. Both 
Marx and Feuerbach see in religious consciousness gradations of reality, in relation to 
which the individual might live in sensuous awareness, imaginative contemplation or 
contented illusion. This too, as we have seen, is the substance of Marx’s critique of a 
dehumanized world -  the illusions, fears and compromises this world involves are the 
outcome of a subjective engagement with the world. But does this make of the 
ideological, as nuanced and as paradoxical as this presentation by Marx is, an 
instrument of creative possibility as much as it is one of force, fetishization and 
somewhat fateful eventualities?
Hovering over this conception of history in which real and imagined worlds 
collide is the more profound problem of the ‘death of God’ in relation to which both 
Marx and Hegel theorize the necessity of a recognition of a free humanity. At one 
level, sacrifice is here pitted against the self-interest demanded by a selfish system; 
the image of Jesus exists as a constant reminder of our inability to resist the lure of 
selfish needs: At another, the ‘death of God’ is the emptiness of a godless world that 
has robbed humanity of a transformative morality in which any type of faith might be 
posited. Where this leaves humanity is not really considered. The problem seems to 
be that we are not presented with a subjectivity or even an imaginative capability 
beyond a constant instantiation of a material existence conditioned by objectivities. 
Granted that these objectivities are often expressed in terms of the contradictions they 
underpin; but as to how the concrete and specific of an ideological world is itself dealt 
with and constructed by the subject, we are, even in the case of a more sensitive 
reading of spirituality, left to imagine where it might be that the subject could 
creatively interact with the object.
Marx obviously takes much from Feuerbach’s view of whether religion is the 
objectified, reified form in which the unity of the subjective and objective spirit 
appears to people as unity, concluding, as we have seen, that religion is both a 
reflection of alienation and its rejection. The person who has ‘not yet gained herself
622 Feuerbach, The Essence o f Christianity, p. 184.
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or lost herself again’ 623 is the individual who struggles within and against the confines 
of a devalued humanity. Humanity’s struggle is with all forms of domination - 
psychological, social, and historical. The problem of evil certainly gives meaning to a 
religiosity otherwise lost to institutionalization and external command but Marx still 
impresses upon his reader the need for a type of spirituality beyond the imposition of 
suffering, abuse and the seemingly persistent presence of evil in the world. This 
sphere of spirituality is seen, for Marx, in examples “in which man behaves as a 
communal being”, and yet it is this same sphere that is “degraded to a level below the 
sphere in which he behaves as a partial being”, and this degraded realm that then 
provides for people their reality and sense of authenticity.624 What then is it that Marx 
wants to convey about a spirituality that escapes such degradation? Is it here that he 
is able to develop a fuller sense of the subjective within experience rather than as a 
necessary category of an objective continuity of meaning? Let us consider an 
example of how Marx theorizes such a sphere of spirituality and the subjective.
Religion and the Promise o f Freedom
We have seen that, for Marx, religion becomes another form of superstition, of 
empty fantasy, opiate and consolation, when it is not based upon total emancipation.625 
Without the quality of emancipatory consciousness we ‘live life like strangers’, as 
Luther pointed out. 626 Much of Marx’s work, as we have seen, is directed towards 
accounting for what he sees as the central determinants of this state in which the 
existence of dialectical moments is the chief expression of an ideological struggle for 
meaning. By way of contrast, Marx sees examples of spiritual celebration in 
indigenous peoples as a form of spirituality that is integrated into communistic life. It 
“is bliss to have”, Marx tells us, like Indian holy men, “the thought of pure bliss” .627 
Here we are presented with a consciousness not bound by the constraints of 
commodification. It is only where property becomes the end and aim of life that 
people and their practices are reduced to the condition of serfs or labourers, including 
the serfs or labourers of any externally imposed religious purpose. But with this he 
does not think that the crushing of spirituality by a rapacious commodification
623 Marx, Critique o f Hegel’s ‘Philosophy o f Right p. 244.
624 Marx, On the Jewish Question, p. 231.
625 This view of religion is not of course unique to Marx. As Michael Löwy points out, the idea of 
religion as a form of opiate can be found in different forms in the writings of Kant, Herder, Feuerbach, 
Bruno Bauer and Heine. Michael Löwy, “Marxism and Religion: The Challenge of Liberation 
Theology”, p. 24.
626 Luther quoted in Feuerbach, The Essence o f Christianity, p. 307, par. 14.
627 Marx, “Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy”, pp. 451-452.
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(sometimes in collusion with a self-interested religiosity) should now be replaced with 
an empty atheism. Arguing against Epicurus, Marx sets out the deep problems 
associated with making the world empty, so that what one ends up with is “the void 
resting in itself, the otiose god” . 628
Marx’s emphasis upon sensuous activity means that his critique of spirituality 
involves a sense of the transcendent or transformative nature of conscious activity. It 
is this that he has argued has been deadened by the force of relations of unequal 
dependency, egotism and possessiveness. We pronounce judgement on purpose and 
this is part of our substantiality. 629 Marx sees spirituality as immanent in nature and as 
a part of an emancipatory yearning, suggesting that the epigram “You are what you 
eat”, coined appropriately by Feuerbach, is revealed as much in a spiritual emptiness 
as in its sensuous expression. The problem of the fulfilment of being is one that 
concerns both consciousness and a situatedness within one’s conditions of existence. 
Let us look at some examples of this approach to spirituality to see whether it is here 
that we might engage more fully with Marx’s understanding of subjectivity.
In the Ethnological Notebooks, Marx refers to various forms of worship and 
ritual amongst North American Indian tribes in which a sense of personal dignity and 
common bond is enriched.630 Here we are given a sense of how an individuality, more 
certain than fearful of itself, is able to be expressed in relation to others. Marx regards 
the practices in which a spiritual consciousness is sustained as a vital part of the 
meaning and grounding of the self within society. In the Notebooks, Marx is scathing 
in his criticism of John Lubbock’s The Origin o f Civilisation, for example, in its 
condescending remarks about the ‘superstitious’ beliefs and practices of Australian 
aborigines.631 Lubbock’s assertion that a belief in the soul is confined to ‘the highest 
races’ is immediately placed with the addendum that “Caesar assures us that among 
ancient Britons money was habitually lent on postobits - promises to pay in another 
world” . 632 Likewise, when Lubbock ridicules early spirituality with his claim that “the 
savage who worships an animal or a tree, would see no absurdity in worshipping a 
man”, Marx retorts: “As if the civilised Englishman did not ‘worship’ the Queen or 
Mr. Gladstone! ” .633 Lubbock finds it absurd that early indigenous peoples of the 
Western Pacific would claim to themselves the right of divinity: “T am a god’,
628 Ibid., p. 430.
629 Ibid., p. 438.
630 Marx, The Ethnological Notebooks, pp. 149-150.
631 Ibid., p. 349.
632 Ibid.
633 Ibid., p. 345.
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Tuikilakila would sometimes say; and he believed it too” .634 This perception of divine 
reality in which one becomes divine reality is akin to that held by various gnostics 
who believed that whoever achieves gnosis becomes no longer a Christian but a 
Christ. 635 It is also in essence what Marx means when he says that people need to 
‘gain themselves’ and ‘be their own sun’ .636 When one is estranged from oneself 
thoughts become “fixed phantoms existing outside nature and man”. There is a 
problem, Marx goes on to argue, with believing that this apparently externalized 
nature needs to be superseded: This is what Hegel argues in relation to the abstract 
thinker vis-a-vis sensuousness and externality. Marx argues that humanity needs to 
move beyond “the stage of self-reference in alienation”. Externality is taken to be “a 
flaw, a weakness, something which ought not to be”, rather than the “self- 
externalizing sensuousness” it is, a sensuousness that is accessible to “sensuous 
man” .637 “Man”, Marx argues, “is directly a natural being” .638 Alienation has meant 
the “denaturing [Entwesung] of individual activity” .639 It is in relation to this that 
spiritual practices in which no contrived division is maintained between nature and 
humanity, reality and the divine or sacred, is held by Marx as an example for modem 
humanity. This is what he argues a communism must mean -  a fully developed 
naturalism that equals humanism and a fully developed humanism that equals 
naturalism. 640 Such a view, which is heretical for most institutionalized religion, Marx 
argues is fundamental to challenging alienation. Spirituality amongst the gens, where 
all participate and depend for security upon each other, is a very different matter from 
the abstract relations of authority of organized religion. 641 It is in the former that Marx 
finds people are capable of being one with both their activity and their conscious 
being. Here, one’s individual expression of one’s own life brings about the immediate 
expression of the life of other people and the confirmation of one’s human, communal
634 Ibid., p. 346.
635 Gospel of Philip, 67.26-7, p. 140.
636 Marx, Critique o f Hegel’s ‘Philosophy o f Right’, p. 244.
637 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, pp. 398, 399.
638 Ibid., p. 389.
639 Ibid., p. 374.
640 Ibid., p. 348.
641 It is worthwhile noting just how unusual such a perception of non-capitalist society was at this time. 
As Godelier argues, when Marx was writing there were no published archaeologies of ancient Greece 
or Rome, the archaeologies of countries viewed as the ‘Near-East’, except for Egypt, were just 
beginning and the archaeologies and knowledge of China’s ancient history, Japan and the pre- 
Columbian civilizations had not yet come to light. See Godelier, Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology, 
p. 103.
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nature. Communism, whether of a past or future expression, is the “free expression” 
of life. 642 How then, does Marx view the yearnings of a contemporary spirituality?
As we have already considered, what Marx attempts to show is that religion is 
a representation of a world in which imperfection, injustice and inhumanity reign. 
Thus religion is not only a matter of self-consciousness - a self-consciousness 
appropriate to a reality of need - but is also the result of human activity within social 
and political conditions. These two elements of consciousness and activity within 
social conditions are not antithetical to oneanother. Marx does not emphasize one at 
the expense of the other: He sees human activity as very much the interrelation of 
consciousness and social conditions.643 It is because of this that the accessibility of 
freedom always exists. We can interpret Marx as asking, as it were, in deference to 
the resurrection of Christ, that Christianity keeps sacred the promise of freedom.644 
But what this then requires of our sense of what freedom might mean, as well as the 
subjective will to achieve it, places the historical task and purpose of spiritual 
engagement at considerable risk of failure. 645 Any history of religion that fails to take
642 Marx, “Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements o f Political Economy”, p. 278.
643 Indeed it is worth noting in passing that it is very much a part of the Judaeo-Christian conception of 
the world to define freedom in relation to participation within creative activity. It is more the Hellenic 
conception of freedom as consciousness of necessity that underemphasizes creative action.
644 Occasionally the comment is made that Marx’s reluctance to describe a future society is in part due 
to his Jewish inheritance. See, for example, George Friedman, The Political Philosophy of the 
Frankfurt School (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 101-102. It is also claimed that Marx’s 
antipathy to religion is a completely impersonal response because of a lack of a genuine Erlebnis - a 
religious experience. Nicholas Lobkowicz makes this claim in his article “Marx’s Attitude Toward 
Religion”, in Marx and the Western World, ed. Nicholas Lobkowicz (Notre Dame, Indiana: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1967), p. 314. Given the inability of many commentators to fully appreciate 
Marx’s approach to religion it is hardly surprising that views as to Marx’s own place within religion are 
widely divergent. To place Marx within the personal context of the influence of religious experience it 
is important to acknowledge the impact of both Christianity and Judaism upon his life. Marx was bom 
in the Rhineland town of Trier which had been Christian since the time of Constantine. After the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815 the region came under the control of Prussia. Laws were established 
discriminating against Jews holding public office and practising law. Marx’s family had a number of 
prominent Jews. On his father’s side there was the distinguished sixteenth century rabbinic scholar of 
Krakow, Joseph ben Gerson Hacohen and Meyer ben Yitzchak Katzenellenbogen, a chief rabbi of 
Padua. Marx’s mother, Henriette Presburg, was from a rabbinic family from Holland. Marx’s father, 
Heinrich Marx was baptised into the Lutheran Church after his mother’s death. Karl Marx was 
baptised in order that he could attend elementary school. Marx attended the Friedrich Wilhelm 
Gymnasium in Trier, a state school which had formerly been a Jesuit college. Many of his teachers 
were anti-Prussian progressives. The school was indeed to come under suspicion from the Prussian 
state for its perceived radicalism.
645 Walter Benjamin informs the reader of his Illuminations that the Torah instructs in remembrance 
and prohibits investigation of the future. Benjamin, Illuminations, p. 264. But, Benjamin explains, this 
does not imply that for Jews the future is turned into “homogenous, empty time”. Ibid. So too with 
Marx, if the future is stripped of its magic, there is still the strait gate through which the possibility of 
change might enter at any time. Marx’s opposition to painting a picture of the future is clearly a part of 
his opposition to the notion of a fixity of process or form. Religion, for Marx, is a part of the social 
world of humanity and in this world he views the presence of the constant possibility of change.
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account of its social relations is uncritical, Marx states. 646 Likewise, any 
conceptualization of consciousness that too fails to be situated within history cannot 
form the basis of a critique of the world. As the theologian Jürgen Moltmann states, 
“there is no Apolitical theology”, “there is no Apolitical church, neither in history nor 
in the kingdom of God” . 647 But we must have some ability to judge what it is that 
becomes uncritical, what expectation goes unfulfilled and perhaps undiscemed. This 
is certainly a problem with which Marx contends. There is, for him, no pre-ordained 
destiny that humanity must fulfil, and yet the dictates of a system of wage-labour are 
extensive. But are we provided here with anything that suggests something other than 
a type of critique of ‘pure reason’? We are reminded that all theorizations, theological 
or philosophical, which teach that life is elsewhere, act as a constant infusion of 
opium because they rob people of the ability to change their present circumstances. It 
is for this reason that institutionalized religion is the mere “aroma” of spirituality. 648 
Such resignation in the face of degradation and deformation strikes Marx as 
fundamentally misguided. 649 “It is, in reality, much easier to discover by analysis the 
earthly core of the misty creations of religion, than, conversely, it is, to develop from 
the actual relations of life the corresponding celestialised forms of those relations” . 650
Marx’s critique of the determinants of this ‘earthly core’ does not obviously 
discount the significance of a realm of latent wishes and needs for which the spiritual 
is created, but nor does it provide us with an understanding of this latency. We are 
unable to infer from his work what role the modem imagination might play other than 
as a form of escape from conditions that oppress. Marx returns us to the problem of 
the objectivity by which critique is governed. Institutionalized religion has forgotten 
the celestial and the spiritual just as it has failed to overturn the dehumanization of 
humanity. “Not having is the most despairing spiritualism, a complete unreality of the 
human being, a complete reality of the dehumanised being, a very positive having, a 
having of hunger, of cold, of disease, of crime, of debasement, of hebetude, of all 
inhumanity and abnormity”, Marx states. 651 Religion is the expression of real misery 
and at the same time is a protestation against it. It is the spirit of a spiritless condition,
646 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 352, n. 2.
647 Jürgen Moltmann, On Human Dignity: Political Theology and Ethics, trans. M. Douglas Meeks 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), p. 99.
648 Marx, Critique o f Hegel’s ‘Philosophy o f Right’, p. 244.
649 The Dominican priest, Camilo Torres, who was gunned down by the Columbian military in 1966, 
argues a strident version of this: “The Catholic who is not a revolutionary is living in mortal sin”. 
Camilo Torres Restrepo, Revolutionär Priest: The Complete Writings and Messages o f Camilo Torres, 
ed. John Gerassi (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), p. 9.
650 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 352, n. 2.
651 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, pp. 50-51.
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“the heart of a heartless world” . 652 But how it engages with the ‘complete unreality of 
the human being’, and whether it acts at a level beyond the reality or unreality of the 
individual’s existence is difficult for us to ascertain from Marx’s writing. Certainly 
the potentially calming, passifying, hallucinatory and analgesic capacities of religion 
do not alter the fact that it plays a number of different roles in criticism of this world - 
religion is an expression of an alienated world, not only an opiate to be used against 
such a profane and distressing reality.
It is hard to know whether Marx would share with Nietzsche’s sentiment that 
“there has been only one Christian, and he died on the Cross” , 653 but certainly Marx 
sees in the Bible a measure against which “the so-called Christian state stands 
condemned” .654 As Bloch notes, the “Bible has always been the Church’s bad 
conscience” :655 His will is far from having been done on earth as it is in heaven. The 
real transformation of the world requires of a religion its ability to act as a ferment of 
change, not as an opiate. In all spheres of social life there is the reign of the 
“middleman”, and the sphere of religion is no exception. In “religion God is pushed 
into the background by the ‘Mediator’, and the latter again is shoved back by the 
priests” . 656 Inconsistencies are presented as if they should be left unchallenged: Thus 
sin is treated “sometimes as the law of human existence, then at other times as the 
story of the fall from grace” .657 Either way, once sin has been identified with 
insubordination it is then sinful to claim otherwise. For Marx, the sin is in not 
rebelling against injustice, in refusing the responsibility to change the world. Religion 
is “an ought whose realization is impossible”, that “cannot convince itself of the 
reality of its own existence except through lies and therefore remains in its own eyes a 
perpetual object of doubt, an unreliable and problematic object” .658 Religion that 
reinforces as a necessity an alienated society in which people are the puppets of 
society’s structures merely paves the path of an abdication of individual responsibility 
and will not lead to freedom. The problem is not simply that God is dead -  as 
Nietzsche reminds us, the real problem is that “we have killed him” .659 The 
comfortless state we then find ourselves in leads to the invention of all kinds of 
games, sacred and otherwise, by which we seek to escape our own murderessness.
652 Marx, Critique o f Hegel’s ‘Philosophy o f Right’, p. 244.
653 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, par. 39, p. 151.
654 Marx, On the Jewish Question, p. 225.
655 Bloch, Atheism in Christianity, p. 21.
656 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 696, n. 3.
657 Marx, Grundrisse, p, 888.
658 Marx, On the Jewish Question, p. 225.
659 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, par. 125.
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What we see in Marx’s work is an important basis for a dialectical analysis of 
the problem humanity has in attaining freedom without this difficulty being in any 
sense fleshed out for us. Marx tells us that this difficulty presents itself in a multi­
dimensional form, as is conveyed in his argument concerning suffering and religion: 
He states here that religion gives expression to real suffering. As a protestation 
against the ugliness of this world religion constantly provides a picture of another 
world and varying degrees of criticism of this one. Religion gives expression to cries 
against injustice and oppression. Within conditions of dehumanization the spiritual 
can offer a path of resistance. People are therefore not made comfortably content by 
religion’s ability to function as an opiate. It also opens people to the pain of a 
drugless, dreamless, profane world. We are given then a sense of the dual character 
of spirituality’s place in an unfree existence, and yet where this sometimes 
paradoxical intervention of religion might lead remains largely uninvestigated.
Marx’s critique of religion is contained within the parameters of assumptions 
concerning the contradictions of the theological essence of religion, which of itself, as 
Feuerbach’s writing gives testimony to, is a useful starting point for an understanding 
of the place of spirituality within conditions of unfreedom. It is here that a “disgust at 
sensible life”, as Feuerbach refers to it, can give expression to liberatory impulses. 660 
For this reason Marx argues not that people do without religion but that they seek the 
liberation that religion suggests is possible - although a liberation not in another world 
but in this. “To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call 
on them to give up a condition that requires illusions”, Marx states. Religion is thus 
the “illusory sun” that revolves around people as long as they do not revolve around 
themselves. 661 Partly because of the role of protestation that religion can play and 
partly due to his commitment to attacking injustice, Marx repeatedly defends the right 
to religious belief and practice as a path to freedom. Commentators who choose to 
present Marx as singly hostile to religion ignore or downplay this central aspect of his 
approach to religiosity. 662 Marx’s critique of Bruno Bauer is a sustained criticism of 
the idea that Jews should emancipate themselves from Judaism if they are to seek 
political emancipation. According to Bauer, people must sacrifice the ‘privilege of 
faith’ in order to be in a position to partake of universal human rights. This, for Marx, 
is evidence of “the one-sidedness of Bauer’s treatment of the Jewish question” . 663
660 Feuerbach, Thoughts on Death and Immortality, p. 73.
661 Marx, Critique o f Hegel’s ‘Philosophy o f Right’, p. 244.
662 In polemical spirit in the Critique o f the Gotha Programme, Marx states that: “Everyone should be 
able to attend to his religious as well as his bodily needs without the police sticking their noses in.” 
Karl Marx, Critique o f the Gotha Programme (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), p. 29.
663 Marx, On the Jewish Question, p. 215.
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Marx attacks Bauer for dismissing the importance of the injustice meted out to the 
Jews and defending his position with an insufficient, empty universalism. What it is, 
however, that Marx takes as the subject’s involvement in a religious belief such as 
Judaism, and what an understanding of justice might mean in a spiritual sense, are not 
made clear. We are presented with the critique of the critique but where this leaves a 
theorization of subjectivity in which the real value as well as difficulty of a cultural 
inheritance might play some part, is open for us to consider.
As Miranda points out, using Blochian terminology, there is in Marx the 
conceptual understanding of the eschaton, the novum or an ultimum, a theorization of 
the realization of justice within the human world of which both present and future are 
constitutive. 664 Communism, for Marx is “not a stable state which is to be 
established”; it is rather “the real movement which abolishes the present state of 
things”. The conditions of this movement, Marx makes clear, “result from the 
premises now in existence” . 665 What Marx means when he links Christianity to the 
state is to show that religion has become a part of the development of the state in 
society; it is not outside society. And by indicating the passing of religion this is what 
is meant - organized religion is related to society, it cannot be presupposed a priori. 
Thus there is a spirituality that finds no home in organized religion but is concerned 
with social change and communism. It is the ‘heretical imperative’ to which Peter 
Berger refers. 666 And this is one reason why, Marx argues, religion is “the table of 
contents of the theoretical struggles of mankind” . 667
'Fear and the Being Beyond’
Spirituality is indicated by and gives expression to a wide variety of contended 
meaning and ideological antagonisms - the sacred versus the profane; self-knowledge 
versus the external imposition of ideas; the promise of emancipation and redemption 
versus fixity, control and stasis; past and future. At one level, aspects of spirituality 
can be attributed to the inventive need arising from an antagonistic and profane 
system of external control and internal doubt - this is often what it has become in the 
absence of the realization of freedom: But at another, it is a powerful indication of an 
alternative meaning to life, a presentiment of values that counter a commodified 
existence. Marx’s understanding of spirituality provides many insights into the
664 Porfiro Miranda, Marx and the Bible, p. 136.
665 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 57.
666 Peter Berger, The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities o f Religious Affirmation (New 
York: Doubleday, 1979).
667 Marx to Ruge, Sept. 1843, p. 208.
444 Ideology Critique and A Philosophy o f Freedom
subject’s struggle with her own reason for being and with the system’s own rationale. 
We see set out a realm of fear to which we can respond in a variety of ways. Our true 
being within this state of fear we are yet to realize but we can glimpse its possibility in 
actions within the world that bring us in relation with our freedom. In any 
compromise between these, or in the struggle between them, we can view a sense of 
what we have argued can be taken to mean the ideological in Marx’s work. In 
ideology Marx sees the existence of a world made banal by fulfilment (and this is 
most particularly apparent in the promise and false perfection that a commodified 
world holds out) and the not-yet fulfilled. Whilst Marx maintains that the operations 
of a dialectic work at the level of a seemingly determined arena such as the 
commodification process, it is more in an area such as spirituality that we can see the 
workings of a subjective consciousness not yet completely lost to an inability to 
imagine beyond the given. What we are provided with in this vein by Marx is 
scattered and incomplete but nonetheless provocative.
In this extended examination of Marx’s treatment of religion and spirituality 
we have hopefully developed a clear sense of contradiction at work within an instance 
of the ideological. Marx theorizes a range of values inherent within spirituality - a 
need to anaesthetize oneself from suffering as well as a desire to confront and protest 
against this suffering; a need to escape the venal and a need to explore a genuine 
alternative to it; a need to express one’s relation to a cultural heritage and the need to 
sense the future within the present. Religion can become an illusion like any other 
and can find itself reduced to the level of an instrumentalized reason. As an object of 
control and commodified existence religion becomes a part of the profane, mocking 
the sacred as effectively as any justification of greed and inequality. Spirituality 
signifies the antagonisms of a system struggling with the problem of liberation. It is a 
part of the world and yet it also indicates something beyond our present existence.
The issues that remain for us to ponder in relation to spirituality are many -  we 
have merely indicated here the difficulty of theorizing the place of subjectivity within 
so contradictory an existence -  an existence at once composed of determining, 
determined, and latent, unresolved moments. Marx indicates something important for 
us in his critique of religion in relation to the ‘complete unreality of the human being’. 
We must attempt to understand more fully what this reality or unreality of the 
individual’s existence can mean. We will proceed to a discussion of this issue in the 
following and final chapter of the thesis. Let us first assess what we have gained from 
an examination of Marx’s writings and consider how we might use these insights to 
further theorize ideology.
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Conclusion
We have considered in each section of the chapter the problem of a 
contradictory freedom upon which a system of alienation, command and consumption 
is able to be perpetuated. It is on this basis that we are able to theorize aspects of the 
ideological. Ideology can suggest movements and counter-movements within 
external and internal, mediated and unmediated, controlled and spontaneous, 
necessity. In Marx’s detailed account of the development of an enslaved subjectivity 
we can see both the problem of freedom and unfreedom and a reason for inventive 
need in the shape of ideology. It is here that the problem of fear arises -  fear of the 
self as an imagining, creative being and fear of the other -  but also the contradictions 
and discontinuities of this cultural heritage. Being is confronted by a mass of 
accidental existences and institutions, a subjective spirit of the ‘musts’ of reality and 
the strivings of the self.668 It is when these determinations of the subject act as an alien 
force that fears of the self and the other so easily emerge. Marx then gives us a clear 
sense of the contradictions that a general alienation presents.
What Marx grasps is that capitalism’s development appears in such a way that 
the individual alienates herself.669 This process of self-alienation is crucial to Marx’s 
understanding of the problem of an unfree existence.670 Self-alienation is the 
condition in which, for a variety of reasons, people are not free to assert their 
individuality or being.671 Importantly, self-alienation as an antithetical form also 
produces the “conditions of its own suspension” . 672 There is process because there is 
change and the possibility of change: But however much life under capitalism entails 
antithesis and contradiction, 673 a capitalist world has emerged in which people are now 
ruled by abstractions.674 The world is drowned in an endless landscape of abstractions, 
a realm of purely formal, remote categories.675 This Marx emphasizes with his 
consideration of processes of objectification, in labour, in money, in the commodity
668 Marx, “Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy”, p. 437.
669 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 541.
670 What he makes clear is that self-alienation is not the same thing as a process of the self­
estrangement of ‘man’. This, he contends is what idealist philosophers take as an abstracted ideal, of 
what it is to be a human person. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, pp. 97-98. It is worth 
mentioning here in passing that Althusser’s critique of Marx’s emphasis upon alienation fundamentally 
mistakes this difference that Marx sets out.
671 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 154.
672 Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 541-542.
673 Ibid., p. 147.
674 Ibid., p. 164.
675 Marx, The Poverty o f Philosophy, p. 90.
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form generally. This is a world that humanity would do better to step beyond. And 
yet whilst the goal to move beyond the given exists, its realization is far from having 
been attained. Marx attempts in various different ways to address this problem, not 
merely in terms of conditions that appear to militate against any such realization but 
also in terms of the persistence of a concrete goal where “the fulfilment is not less 
than the yearning” .676 This tension becomes increasingly difficult for us to discern in 
Marx’s treatment of the objectivity of an object world. Commodification seems to 
beget only further commodification and the contradictions of its processes seem more 
grounded in the outer limits of the tendency towards commodification itself than in 
the subject’s relation to this tendency. The ideological here is less of a contradictory 
possibility than a necessity whose realization the object contains within its form.
Where a sense of the transcendent emerges in relation to the ideological 
existence of the reality of alienation is in Marx’s understanding of humanity’s claims 
against an alienated world. We viewed this in the first section of the chapter with 
Marx’s discussion of a self who struggles between her need for social freedom and the 
having a certain faith in the existence of a present freedom. This compromise reveals 
an ideological tension. We have seen an example of this sense of contradiction most 
clearly in Marx’s examination of spirituality. Here we see a concrete examination of 
the subjectivity of a calculating slave - a slave enacting the possibility of freedom. 
There always exists a latency here for the blocking of consciousness in relation to 
possibility - but within the ideological contradiction of spiritual yearning is the 
expectation of freedom as much as its deceptive and self-deceptive denial.
We have considered the area of the mediated conditions of unfreedom and a 
commodity existence that Marx theorizes as a form of need. This has enabled us to 
see Marx’s romanticist preoccupation with the strange, haunting objectivity of need 
that is then theorized as providing insight into the nature of existence itself. We have 
attempted to assess with this whether, in so doing, Marx underplays the subjective and 
encounters difficulty in giving more overt expression to subjective experience, or 
whether he captures in the objectivity of the social formation people confront, the 
denial of freedom that such a world of the appearance of attainable possibility as the 
“radically impossible” must be.677 As was made clear in the introduction to this 
chapter, the central problem Marx sees as defining most of human existence is the 
dehumanization of those individuals who lack freedom. The realm of freedom is in
676 Abelard, quoted in Bloch, On Karl Marx, p. 44.
677 Adorno, “Something’s Missing”, p. 4.
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every sense the “dream of a thing” , 678 the going beyond all known times of servility 
and domination. It is for this reason that Marx views struggles over conditions that 
create enslavement as basic to a realm of necessity beyond which will actually begin 
the development towards a realm of freedom. 679 Dehumanization is in no way 
restricted to life under capitalism but began to occur as soon as possession became a 
matter of exchange or property. Marx focuses upon capitalism because not only is 
this the social system of his time but, importantly, because capitalism is the system in 
which the tendency towards dehumanization has become both extensive and 
generalized. It is only under capitalism that all relations can be determined as 
contractual relations in which the buying and selling of commodities is the basic 
condition of the uninterrupted circulation of value. Only in capitalism does the unity 
of the production and circulation process give rise to new formations in which “the 
thread of internal connections is increasingly lost” .680 But more than this, capitalism 
presents a very particular kind of dehumanization - it is the unfreedom of freedom, the 
unfreedom of a limited, constricted freedom. The difficulties that this presents 
prompt Marx’s entire detailed investigation of the ways in which capitalism operates 
and is reproduced. The purpose of his investigation is to “simply show' the world why 
it is struggling” and is defiantly posited on the basis of a challenge to change the 
world.681
If there is no unified systematization of ideology in Marx this is because the 
openness of his approach does not allow for a singular formula to explain the outcome 
of the changing interrelation between people, their ideas and their social world. 
Balibar somewhat confusingly refers to this as Marx’s “permanent oscillation between 
‘falling short o f  and ‘going beyond’ philosophy” ; 682 for whilst this indicates the 
problems with reducing Marx’s work to the construction of positivist ‘laws’, Marx’s 
approach is neither one of systematized method, nor one of philosophy in Balibar’s 
sense, but is that of philosophical critique,683 As we have mentioned earlier in the
678 Marx to Ruge, September 1843, p. 209. The Livingstone and Benton translation somewhat 
prosaically has this passage as “the world has long since dreamed of something”.
679 Marx, Capital, vol. Ill, p. 820.
680 Ibid., p. 828.
681 Marx to Ruge, September 1843, p. 209. Marx’s work is about such change but, as to any belief that 
the world would necessarily change, Marx reiterates to Ruge: Our “enterprise may or may not come 
about”. Ibid., p. 206.
682 Balibar, The Philosophy o f Marx, p. 4.
683 Critique, for Marx, takes on a particular meaning; it is not merely that he was a part of a period of 
German philosophy characterized by an engagement in the critique of dominant thinkers and strands of 
thought. Nor is it simply the fact of criticizing Hegel or political economy by way of unravelling a 
system of thought on its own terms: It is an alternative theorization the terms of which are subject to re- 
evaluation in accordance with changes in what is being investigated. This moves theory on from the
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chapter, this is not without its difficulties -  Marx’s critique does not often prepare us 
for shifting beyond an understanding of the problems of a type of reasoning as it has 
developed in an unfree world. Rarely too does it suggest much to us of the 
subjectivity of which a creative humanity is capable. He assures us that an imagining 
reason exists but does not explain very much more about its constitution in being. It 
is perhaps here that a radical philosophy or aesthetic of the contradictory existence of 
the individual would be most suited. In the next chapter we will attempt to do this by 
way of theorizing an ethos of the imagination.
We mentioned early in this chapter that the area in which Marx’s work offers 
too fleeting an analysis of the ideological is that of the cultural constellation of reality. 
It is here that the ideological as antagonism, as the dream’s mystification and 
remystification, shifts and collides in the most haphazard manner, making of ideology 
a most uncertain embellishment. What is there of ideology’s inauthentic 
harmonization within the context of overt political and economic crisis? The ugliness 
of fascistic racism, for example, is not idealist embellishment but is the already known 
invention of lies emerging out of a period of economic uncertainty. Indeed, it is a sort 
of abstracted inversion, a distorted image, a phantom sublimating other needs and 
deferred ideals. In the final chapter of the thesis we will return to an analysis of this 
shifting ground of the context and content of ideology - between its mythologizing 
embellishment and its invented deceit. Whilst Marx’s work does not account for any 
such shifts of this nature, his theorization of ideology allows us to grasp the 
antagonism within ideology itself. Without this theorization, ideology takes the 
function of a self-generated necessity for which there can be no transcendence, from 
which there can be no redemption. We have seen this understanding of the 
antagonism that is ideology within Marx’s discussion of spirituality.
The difficulties Marx encounters are in bringing together theoretically an 
emphasis upon the place of human activity and thought within a world that every day 
prepares itself for the condition of exploitation. It is within this murky realm that 
Marx theorizes ideology. People are not simply slaves to dehumanizing ideas but are 
‘calculating slaves’. They are capable of challenging the imposition of forced 
constraints just as they are ultimately the perpetuators of their own enslavement. 
Their dehumanization brings a consciousness of dehumanization and yet it also
Hegelian idea of self-critique, o f a type of looking over one’s shoulder to question the adequacy of 
one’s mind in this reflexive process. Marx also questions the basis of categories of thought but so too 
does he question the material concreteness of the activities of human subjects, and the relation between 
categories of thought and concrete objects and activities. It is for this reason that he turns much of his 
attention to specific social forms of concrete activity within capitalist society - labour and the processes 
of commodification.
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appears as a condition outside their control. Barriers appear seemingly before people 
are aware they have created them, and yet, that they are barriers, invites their 
destruction. This is the contradictory, difficult dynamic that Marx sees in social 
relations within capitalism. From this theorization, we are able to understand more 
fully the shifting, antagonistic terrain that is ideology.
It will be clear that this is a very different interpretation of Marx than many 
other representations of his work. As mentioned at the outset, various other 
interpretations have contributed much to a critical understanding of one of modem 
philosophy’s major figures. This chapter has attempted to allow for some reflection 
upon an aspect of Marx’s approach to the critique of ideology. The necessity to do 
justice to Marx’s complex and thought-provoking understanding of a world without 
freedom appears as great as it ever has with all the hallmarks of present-day 
ideological contestation indicating the continuing struggle between freedom and banal 
necessity. Marx’s work is a provocative critique of unfreedom as everyday life. It 
has provided us with a particular way to approach the problem ideology elicits of the 
self-encounter -  that of the place of the ‘calculating slave’ within conditions of 
inventive need.
What then might we conclude? It seems as though Marx wishes to remind us 
of ‘the long forgotten ritual’ “by which the house of our life was erected”, as 
Benjamin expresses it.684 We often appear to not fully understand why we have 
forgotten, and thus this issue looms large in Marx’s assessment of our ability to 
struggle with the ‘remoteness’ that is our consciousness; but he would also seem to 
find it more fundamental, having indicated the ritual, to point out its objective 
character. That the outcome cannot be predicted of any such ideological juddering, in 
relation to contradictions, is most importantly because the subjective element of any 
such process likewise possesses no finished self-identity: But does Marx’s analysis 
allow us to see this process more clearly? As we have considered, Marx’s primary 
concern is to ask what it is that both enables and limits people as social beings.685 If 
the system is one in which limitations are a part of its fabric, are these barriers real or 
merely dogmatic limitations upon the fullest realization of social being? Despite 
Marx’s detailed investigations into the workings of the processes of capital 
accumulation, we are sometimes left with a superficially barren view of the relation 
between subjective and objective conditions, particularly as this relation manifests in 
the condition of the psyche. Marx does, of course, pose the more fundamental
684 Benjamin, One Way Street, p. 46.
685 For a discussion of some related ideas see David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1984).
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question of the problem of self-alienation, for which the system of capitalism and its 
ideologies are an important part. The answer here, in his detection of a debilitating 
servility, tells us much. It is extremely important to understand that within capitalism 
there have emerged psychological characteristics of ego-centredness, narcissism, 
isolation, restlessness, insecurity and discontent, which the competitive egotism of the 
system is little able to proceed without or effectively reject. What, for example, is the 
psychological basis of consumerism if not a feverish discontent? What constitutes 
these characteristics is in various ways more than their derivation from capitalism but 
the system of capitalism is nonetheless the promise of their present existence. There 
is no gathering reason, no steadfastly attached conscience of the Absolute to which 
Marx turns. This in itself allows us to direct our attention to aspects of both inner and 
outer worlds that enforce a commodifying rationale. What is clearly apparent in 
Marx’s writings is that, as a constantly playing event, the system looms darkly upon 
the subject. And yet, because this realm is not the basis of creativity, however 
effective it may be, we are left wondering where the impetus for a creative 
transformation might reside. The process of surrendering one’s creativity necessitates 
no self-encounter. On the contrary, Marx repeatedly emphasizes the deadening effect 
such an action is able to have. It could well be the case that “the semblance of 
humanity is practically complete” , 686 but where does this leave an emancipation from 
this semblance? An economy of producers and consumers certainly brings about a 
calculated enslavement of all its participants but it rarely indicates any way out of its 
own dictates.
Today, for example, at one level, talk of freedom beyond the contempt that is 
cynicism has obviously diminished - capitalism presently seems cut off from some of 
its more duplicitous liberal mythology. At another level, the idea is used, and 
presumably believed in, with devastatingly real effect -  wars are being waged in its 
name. At another level still, we find the concept of freedom as a part of an ethics not 
only of human dignity but also of an ability to identify in a fundamental way with a 
dialectic of self and the other than self. In each sense there might well be very real 
differences between an abstract, unmediated sense of freedom and its being brought to 
bear on actual events. Under such conditions what becomes quite open too is how 
any determinacy or indeterminacy will be played out. The imposition of any abstract 
claim for freedom could well result in demands for an actual freedom; even a cynical 
self-knowing might itself be precarious. For most of the twentieth century radical 
thinkers concerned with theorizing ideology have placed ideology within the 
interstices of a particular reality of its context - this reality being its naked self-interest
6S6 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 44.
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and its mythologizing justification - in notions of equality, freedom, universal rights, 
and the general will. Ideology has then been viewed as the duplicitous propounding 
of values to which the reality of capitalism is presumed to be clearly antithetical. 
Marx’s work certainly enables us to question whether this is the only terrain of 
ideology. There is a sense in which this idea of ideology as mythologizing 
justification is present in Marx. The idea of an exclusive realm of ‘Freedom, 
Equality, Property and Bentham’ 687 is held up to the light of a system of gross 
inequality, injustice and control: And yet much of Marx’s analysis of the values of the 
system seems to indicate less a world of duplicitous hypocrisy than a world of the 
extremes of the adulation of private greed; a world whose sickly form we increasingly 
readily recognize. In the development of capitalism, Marx writes, “open and self- 
conscious baseness” inevitably triumphs over “hidden and unconscious baseness, 
greed over self-indulgence” .688 As it continues to develop, the system “is forced to 
cast off its hypocrisy and step forth in all its cynicism” .689 The system becomes more 
shameless. Does this then mean that ideology is less of an issue, that a world which 
presents itself in all its naked ingloriousness no longer requires a web of deceit and 
the plastic, fake loftiness of sentiments to cover its unfreedom?
The problem for this present form of unfreedom is that the easy, guiltless 
promotion of greed is neither able to really deliver nor to abstract itself from a sense 
of inevitable outward and inward control. Roast pigeons do not fly into people’s 
mouths; 690 heaven has not descended to earth. Liberation from the images of things 
that serve only to alienate and restrict people from their own possibilities seems only 
more remote, although inevitably more desirable. Capitalism produces the question 
its ideology never really answers - not in its mythologizing ideologies nor in its realm 
of invented reality. Thanks to the mean, wizened semblance of a life the economics 
of the system produces, the fetishization and mystification of ideology fail to conceal 
much which capitalism sneakily hides or occasionally playfully reveals. Marx’s 
purpose is not one of peering through the now-made-clearer glass of ideology: It is to 
posit the question of the point of humanity against the existence of ideology. It is in 
this sense that he offers an ontological dimension through which the ideological might 
then be understood. Marx’s understanding of the psychology of a system of the
687 Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 172.
688 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 340.
689 Ibid., p. 342.
690 Marx writes in criticism of German philosophy with its view that the “uninitiated world had only to 
wait around for the roasted pigeons of absolute science to fly into its open mouth”. See Marx to Ruge, 
September 1843, p. 207.
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devaluation of people, of greed and “the war of the avaricious” 691 is the most vital part 
of his approach to what are effects of ideology. Ideology exists within the “loss of 
reality” 692 - the alienation, extemalization and objectification - from which people 
suffer. It is against those who fail to see the interconnectedness of the system, who 
fall short of drawing the link between the particular ways in which the system of 
capitalism operates and the suffering which all its ideology, both mystified and 
invented, continues to defy, that Marx directs what he refers to as his critique.693
If, as we have argued, there is little in Marx to suggest that what is beyond the 
determinants of capitalism is simply a reflection of these determinants, then we are 
still left with the issue of why any deep or very effectively superficially affinity exists 
between the way in which unfreedom operates and the way in which people think and 
behave. This returns us to the question of why people become ‘calculating slaves’. 
Marx suggests a number of different considerations: There are divisions between 
people that give rise to oppression and alienation; capitalism itself entails a certain 
type of freedom, a freedom on its own terms, and a forced acceptance of these terms; 
there are antagonistic divisions between people, on the basis of race, gender, 
spirituality and culture; there is extensive commodification that makes people 
subservient to the rule of law and money; there is a particular quality of 
commodification that enables it to conceal the labour involved in production, in other 
words, an effect producing a fetishization of commodities. This process of 
fetishization is also that which characterizes social relations more generally, in that 
what is free and spontaneous within human relations is capable of being reproduced as 
something alienated and exploitative. Most tellingly, Marx considers the processes by 
which people come to treat both themselves and others as mere things: “Each serves 
the other in order to serve himself; each makes use of the other, reciprocally, as his 
means. Now both things are contained in the consciousness of the two individuals”. 
The problem, as Marx sees it, is that each person arrives at an end only in so far as she 
serves the other as means: Each becomes means for the other only as an end in 
oneself. The reciprocity of this situation interests the person only in so far as it 
satisfies one’s interest to the exclusion of, without reference to, that of the other. The 
individual can, at most, “have the consoling awareness that the satisfaction of his 
antithetical individual interest is precisely the realization of the suspended antithesis, 
of the social, general interest”. It is a self-seeking interest that brings “nothing of a
691 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 323.
692 Ibid., p. 324.
693 This critique, Marx argues, is undertaken for a wide variety of reasons, at times to discredit 
‘fancies’, at other times to “dispel the doubts assailing me”. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy, p. 20.
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higher order to realization”. “The general interest is precisely the generality of self- 
seeking interests”. Out of this act of exchange the individual is reflected in herself as 
its exclusive and dominant subject. “With that, then the complete freedom of the 
individual is posited”. Thus when the economic form of exchange posits the all-sided 
equality of its subjects, “then the content, the individual as well as the objective 
material which drives towards the exchange, is freedom” . 694 This is the most decisive 
aspect of human behaviour that Marx documents in relation to the problem of 
ideology.
If we return to the quotations from Marx’s work at the outset of the three 
sections of the chapter we can see that Marx was aware of the problematic terrain 
encapsulating the denial of freedom. He indicates the importance of external 
determinants, for example, poverty, wage-labour, and so on, as well as suggesting the 
role of the internal workings of the human psyche, such as the fear of freedom - most 
importantly by emphasizing their interrelatedness, such that the products and needs of 
humanity become intertwined. He highlights the possibility for overturning 
oppression and creating the conditions for life and also acknowledges the seemingly 
predetermined existence of certain social relations: But these explanations do not 
really make the issue any less problematic. For when Marx states that “as individuals 
express their life, so they are” 695 we can be quite certain that he intends that we 
understand the intemality of human consciousness to social relations, but far less sure 
that what is meant can be accepted as a straightforward relation between the lived 
outcome of life and subjectivity. Marx pins too much upon the social subjects who 
emerge in relation to the command of capital without first explaining why a fear of 
freedom and a fear of authority so capture the human imagination. Indeed, much of 
this issue of whether a capacity for freedom can sufficiently challenge an alienated 
life is left shrouded in mystery in Marx’s work. The existence of dehumanization 
must become indigestible. At the same time we have encountered repeatedly the 
senses in which Marx views the subject as a possibility. What people possess in 
dream form certainly needs to be made conscious, although it is not in any sense clear 
how the world will be aroused from the dream of itself. And, as we have considered, 
it is the purpose of ideology to accommodate people to everything less than this 
consciousness. We need then to grant that what is presented in Marx’s work is a 
decisive critique of the present construction of power and yet an insufficient account 
of the problem of consciousness and the absence of freedom. It is on this basis that 
we will proceed in the following chapter to offer a contemporary critique of ideology.
694 Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 244-245.
695 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 37.
PART THREE
AN ETHOS OF THE IMAGINATION
CHAPTER FIVE
THE DIALECTIC OF IDEOLOGY AND PRESENTIMENT: 
IDEOLOGY AS THE WAKING DREAM
Introduction
The world is given to man as if it were a puzzle to solve.
Bataille, Inner Experience
The riddle confronting humanity in relation to ideology is why a creative 
discretion on the part of the subject so often results in her diminution and the seeming 
accretion of reality to the object with which the subject is entangled. The puzzle here is 
not only why such a process occurs but what the actual nature of the process entails. We 
want to understand this process because it is precisely this kind of transposition of reality 
that constitutes the ideological. It is also the relation of subject to object, the self to her 
world, that is fundamental to an anticipatory consciousness and an engagement with the 
ideological. It is each of these interrelated aspects of a contemporary engagement with 
ideas that we have argued allows us to posit the relevance of a critique of ideology. We 
indicated at the outset of the thesis that the presence of ideology constantly reveals a 
relation between subject and object -  we will here argue that this relation is an absorption 
by the subject in the object in which an engagement of subject and object takes place, but 
also that here we find the capacity of the subject to effect a certain distance from the 
object. This is because ideology attempts to occupy a space between reality and irreality; 
it is based in reality, it emerges on the basis of the reality of need and suffering but this 
reality tends to wash over the ideological without being altered by it. Such a situation 
makes of the ideological a frequently contradictory unity in which consciousness and 
representation -  the symbols and ideas and actions of thought that are involved in 
attempts to find meaning -  come into relation with what we earlier referred to as a 
‘radical immanence of life’ -  the determinations and conditions, some predictable some 
quite intentionless, through which actions of thought come into being.
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The reasons for this are of course varied and complex. One way in which we 
have attempted to understand this is by viewing fundamental contradictions and distances 
between thought and being, self and exteriority as a part of a process that the ideological 
is able to interrupt. In quite what way such interruption will become manifest is itself a 
frequently open issue. We have considered a number of approaches to the conditionality 
of thought or conscious and unconscious action that outline the difficulty the subject 
faces in relation to a confrontation with or perpetuation of the ideological. We have also 
indicated something very different from this by suggesting a more open potentiality in 
relation to a subjective construction of the ideological. This process concerns the ability 
of the consciousness to modify its own representations and to make of certain 
determinations a more open, partial conditionality. Given this situation, we want to know 
what it is about the object that lends to it this status of a conditioned event, where the 
subject resides in this only ever partially fulfilled condition, and what it is that indicates a 
mediation between subject and object that also constitutes the decisive process of a 
transposition of reality. It is by understanding these processes that we hope to be able to 
put forward some ideas in relation to a critique of subjectivity and ideology.
To do this we will look at some contemporary instances of the ideological in order 
to say something about their way of being -  in this case, the processes and movements by 
which a relation between subject and object or exteriority is realized. We will focus upon 
two forms, forms whose basis in myth and nihilism are steeped in the richly paradoxical 
relation of need to imagination, which appear in the seemingly subjective states of 
cynicism and sentimentality. These states reveal to us an aspect of how certain ideas are 
currently inscribed in reality as ideology. We will first approach these states by 
accounting for the broader contemporary context of such ideology that is, and is at the 
same time the cultural heritage of, a ‘citadel society’. As we argued in the first chapter of 
the thesis, such a society is one of unnecessary suffering, conformity and injustice in 
which, detached from any embedded sense of ethics, reason serves the purpose of 
command and the threat of violence, surveillance and gratuitous interference. One 
situates oneself within this exteriority and this is where the ‘intrigue of subjectivity’ -  the 
complexity of entangled elements making up subjectivity - is brought into being.1 This is 
not to claim that the existence of the citadel is any guarantee of ideologies that serve its
1 Emmanuel Levinas uses this concept of an ‘intrigue’ in the sense of a plot or situation in which a 
multiplicity of elements are brought together, and applies it to a number of different situations such as 
‘hope’ and ‘being’ as well as ‘subjectivity’. See Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being, or Beyond 
Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).
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purpose: It is more to point out the kinds of connections that can exist between 
determinations and conditions of existence and the ideas by which we understand 
ourselves in relation to this. On this basis we will be able to pose the issue of the relation 
of a radical immanence of life -  a sense of the immediacy of the experience of life itself — 
in contradistinction to the ideological. It is this sense that we will later argue is vital to an 
ability to view the self in ethical relation to the world. This will hopefully give us a better 
sense of how we might understand ideology and its critique.
Being and Meaning
It is through this entanglement of subjectivity with the images and representations 
humanity constructs that we encounter struggles for existence and authenticity that are 
underpinned by consciousness and knowledge as experience. It is thus in the 
representation of life to consciousness that meaning is construed. The difficulty here, and 
the ideological illustrates this well, is that the connections we make between ideas 
suggest to us the power of our imagination as an entity within our command, but at the 
same time as an expanding, incomplete darkness our task is to explore. However creative 
the conscious and unconscious elements of the imagination might be they also rely upon 
mechanisms that we cannot perceive -  not as a failure to see and understand but quite 
simply because ‘the eye cannot see itse lf . 2 But this is more complicated still, for we 
sense ourselves seeing and also seek out those means by which we might have some 
recognition of this process even if it is ultimately a false mirror with which we are 
confronted. The question is, of course, one of how we relate to the ‘blind spot’ of our 
existence -  whether we approach the darkness as a dawning and awakening, or whether 
we shrink from its possibilities. We will consider an aspect of this via an examination of 
the ambiguity of desire and fear in a citadel culture -  an examination that will allow us to 
posit a more mediated sense of these states following from what we saw as their rather 
more objectivist presentation in the forms of reification and interpellation earlier in the 
thesis. This examination will also provide us with a sense of the partial conditionality of 
cynicism and sentimentality and the relation of these as ideological states to the existence 
of desire and fear. In desire and fear what has been traditionally viewed is an object of 
need that becomes expressed in real although quite hollow forms of command. We can 
acknowledge this aspect of their existence in a relation of command and obedience and
2 Rüdiger Safransky, Schopenhauer and the wild years o f  philosophy, trans. Ewald Osers (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), p. 114.
460 Ideology Critique and A Philosophy of Freedom
yet at the same time see something altogether different -  that of an awakening or 
immanence that does not identify on the same basis as need but rather as an imaginative 
yearning for the transcendence of such need.
The investigation we will present of various contemporary subjective states will 
direct us back to the ideological and to how we might today theorize its critique. For it is 
through the ideological that these states are often played out, most obviously in the form 
of a dimension of unfreedom or abandonment to unnecessary suffering that severely 
limits an ethical reciprocity between people and holds in jeopardy access to an 
imaginative self-awareness. In this we are able to theorize the relation of life- as need, 
suffering, the hunger for what has not yet been realized -  to a consciousness of life, an 
awareness or judgement in which the ideological is interspersed. As we have already 
established in the first chapter of the thesis, this does not entail any necessary countering 
of reality to the illusions of consciousness; rather it is the argument that the ideological 
representation of reality is a deferral of reality through its inability to effect any change in 
its real being. It is here, as we have argued, that the separations of subject and object, 
thought and deed are most significant.
Imagining ‘Oneself as Another ’
What we will set out here is the possibility of a critique of ideology to take 
seriously a recognition of the other, a possibility which obviously calls into question the 
suspension or abrogation of such critique, but which also brings into view the sphere of 
being towards which the ideological assumes a type of powerlessness. What is accessible 
to us is the possibility to imagine ‘oneself as another’, to use Ricouer’s splendid phrase .3 
The ethics of otherness we will theorize here is not an empty abstraction for which a 
concrete dialectics is no longer appropriate. 4 On the contrary, what we will attempt to 
show is that this ethics is precisely the kind of opening of self that a system of 
unnecessary suffering dictates and thus obliges us to consider. In an ethics there is the
3 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blarney (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
As Ricoeur explains, he intends the phrase not only in the sense of comparison (oneself similar to another) 
but as an implication (oneself inasmuch as being other). Ibid., p. 3.
4 Terry Eagleton has recently suggested that just such a split pervades the work of contemporary theory -  
between a French theoretical tendency towards a rather abstract otherness and a German dialectical sense of 
a revolutionary transformative potential. Terry Eagleton, ‘“Subjects and Truths’, Review of Alain Badiou, 
Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding o f Evil”, New Left Review (May/June, 2001), pp. 155-160. 
Eagleton’s view is that this split is a very much necessary result of the tendencies within contemporary 
theory and yet I hope to show that this is not the only way in which these ideas might be theorized.
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possibility for thought and deed to, if not fully coincide, then, at the very least, become 
articulated in some meaningful relation to each other. This proposition is certainly not 
without its difficulties -  the realm of the ethical is not given to us in advance, it is 
something that needs to be consciously created, and therefore a sense of what it is or can 
be cannot be blithely assumed. Whilst this means that assumptions that the place of such 
a realm can be guaranteed a priori are misguided, it also means that ideas that 
responsibility for the self and other cannot possibly exist are equally fanciful.
These latter ideas have come to characterize much of the post-structural ist and 
post-modernist approaches to ethics with a sense that because there cannot be any 
authoritative cognitive position or guarantees of rights and responsibilities we must 
therefore abandon the wholly immodest claim to an ethical response. And related to this 
of course is the assertion that the impossibility of the ethical is fundamentally nothing 
other than the impossibility of the subject: As there are no authors, no self to take 
responsibility or claim rights, all we have is a Lyotardian ‘no-man’s land’, the experience 
of risk and the undecidable. 5 If this in part sounds like an up-dated version of the 
dadaistic opposition to early twentieth century metaphysical ideas of ethics, aesthetics 
and the like -  that a triumphant nothing stands in place of a dubious soulfulness in the 
face of the destruction of culture -  then we should also reflect upon the inability of the 
post-modern variant to offer anything like a sense of the miraculous that engaged the 
dadaists in their critique of the early modernist metaphysicians. The ‘no-man’s land’ that 
we are presented with today as the substance of a critique of the ethical is hardly any type 
of an advance upon dealing with what are now issues that require even more of a sense of 
our imaginative interaction with existence. And given that this existence appears as an 
endless dance around the golden calf, or more accurately, as Bloch refers to it, “the calf­
skin with nothing underneath” , 6 our necessity to comprehend the significance of this 
grows ever more urgent: For in such a way of being, the critics of an ethics seem to be 
telling us, redemption is no longer an issue; indeed, the fate of humanity is a lost cause- 
lost to a tangled confusion of momentary impulses and desires. Resistance is no longer to 
a social order that holds a pistol to humanity’s head, as Adorno thought, 7 but from one 
that has been splattered into an infinity of unrecognizable pieces. What this implies is 
that subjectivity is theorized as a condition created by the specific economic or power
s Keenan, Fables o f Responsibility, pp. 4, 5.
6 Bloch, The Spirit o f  Utopia, p. 247.
7 Theodor W. Adorno, “Commitment”, trans. Francis McDonagh, in Aesthetics and Politics, trans. and ed. 
Ronald Taylor (London: Verso, 1986), p. 180.
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conditions in which it resides and is not seen as any dynamic part of this creation. To the 
extent that the ego is considered to persist in these circumstances it is as a mere technique 
of power structures. The times we face are difficult, theoretically and in their naked 
carelessness, so much so indeed that greeting an ethics with an overripe suspicion is not a 
sufficient response. Thus we will need to develop some rather different ways of 
theorizing an ethos that addresses some of these concerns throughout the course of the 
chapter.
We have explored at length a path through the seeming mystery of the outcome of 
the ideological that gives much credence to the appearance of a strongly objective, 
mediating, although largely unmediated, historical causality. Where the subjective is 
theorized here it is done so largely only to the degree that the necessity of the object 
requires a self-validating subjective moment in order to satisfy the abstract formality of 
the dialectic. When the dialectic is itself dispensed with the subjective moment all but 
disappears and is understood only in terms of the necessity of the object. What we have 
derived from such analyses is certainly a type of answer to ideology’s puzzle -  the hard 
solidity of the object surely does seem to make ever weaker an active, creative 
interference of the subject in her world. This in turn seems to cast the distance the 
subject is able to have from the object as a type of disappearance of the self. But perhaps 
because this explanation has wrapped up the problem of ideology rather too neatly and 
too well, we want, in this chapter, to consider anew the place of subjectivity, or more 
properly the mediation between subject and object, within ideology.
In the first chapter of the thesis we posited, against most theorizing on ideology, 
the simple contention that ideology is a human product. It might be argued that many 
theorists would concur with this contention and yet the situation is not as straightforward 
as this: As we have seen, the most significant theorists of the ideological barely mention 
the existence of the subject as the constructor or determining consciousness responsible 
for ideology or the constraint upon the meaning of being which the ideological can entail. 
Ideology is taken to be responsible for determining people rather than seeing that people 
produce ideology. To the extent that the subject is theorized in relation to ideology, what 
is set out is the subject as a categorial outcome of objective objects. Here, in this chapter, 
we will see, in contrast, the theoretical consequences of a view of ideology as a human 
product or the result of a subjective that is continually projected into its own 
determinations.
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We will understand subjectivity here, much the way Levinas defines it, as the 
“everyday extra-ordinary dimension” of one’s responsibility for the other, “for what is 
not in my power”; it is a “subjection to being before which it effaces itself ’ .8 A sense of 
subjectivity that falls short of this is indeed what we feel should be subjected to critique. 
A responsibility for life generally needs to include what might superficially strike us as 
something of a contradiction -  that of a responsibility for that which is not in our power. 
But this is precisely what an engagement with a radical immanence of life must m ean- 
an ability to extend to even, and perhaps especially, that over which we do not have 
power, a fundamental responsibility. This sort of otherness is something that transcends 
all selfhood. And this immediately places before us the T-We’ relation that we have 
argued is the basis of the self. The understanding we are putting forward allows us to see 
a type of dynamic which subjectivity possesses: The subject is not merely a passive 
subject in terms of being subjected to but is an active part of the construction of her life. 
She is also a being more fully realized in her ability to experience a certain selflessness. 
In this way we will be able to see more clearly that ideology is not itself the productive 
principle of representations -  a skewed interpretation of the power and assumed 
objectivity of ideology taken as given by many contemporary theorists of the ideological 
-  but is instead the production by humanity of representations and im ^es in compliance 
with a range of conditions and practices through which ideology might be actualized.
One of the most important effects this has for our present undertaking is in 
enabling us to question the validity of the traditional, and even a more critical, view of 
ideology as a problem of a type of objectivist manipulation by way of false need and 
desire. In its place we are able to begin to develop an entirely different understanding of 
the ideological within everyday life. In this final chapter we will open up such a view to 
further scrutiny by questioning the role of the subject in the construction and perpetuation 
of the ideological, in the interruption of self-awareness that involves a sense of 
responsibility for the other. We will attempt to reveal a subjectivity whose capacity for a 
degree of self-responsibility is expressed in its relation to ideology -  by way of its 
critique. In this way we will take ideology critique in a very different direction than 
either its former adherents chose to take it, or even the proponents of its reformulation in 
variants of deconstructionist thought set out for it: For despite differences within subject 
matter, both the more recent oftentimes highly rhetorical critique of culture, and its often
8 Emmanuel Levinas, God, Death, and Time, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2000), pp. 185,148.
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more political forbear, assume a critical position only in relation to what they find within 
an object world. When, in the more recent case, this object is largely critique about 
critique itself, we are bound to ask what such a mode of reflection addresses beyond the 
unproductively ingrained self-doubt of a disenchanted culture.9 In place of a sense of an 
endless displacement of meaning we want to seek out the traces of engagement, and at 
times the quite intended meaning and interpretation, that is manifest within the 
ideological.
The Ideological and Self-Questioning
Here, in this thesis, we wish to offer something more radical than categories of 
closure or negative critique. We are suggesting instead the importance of understanding 
ideology as one basis in which manifold ways of seeking meaning via a range of different 
conditions involving deception, knowledge, illusion, ambiguity, doubt, clarity, 
imagination, and their mediations, can be provoked. Importantly, then, ideology is 
interpreted here as involving a type of intention or affectivity, even if it is precisely the 
act of intention that is displaced by the manifestation of ideology. What we repeatedly 
encounter with the ideological is a form of stimulus or intoxication that can provoke an 
uncertain range of responses: It can be the type of intoxication, in Nietzsche’s sense, that 
people value more than nourishment, a deceptive stimulant for which people will obey 
and do more than obey ; 10 or it can be a stimulant that enables the self to question the 
boundaries through which one’s engagement in intoxication persists by placing before the 
self a world in anticipation or intention from which reality falls short, a compulsion to 
transform the present into the perfect. * 11
This immediately raises for us another aspect of what the ideological involves, 
and that is subjectivity. Who it might be that is seeking meaning is of course a difficult 
and somewhat fraught issue involved in this. Whilst it is perhaps untenable to proceed 
with the substance of this question as if a very real and philosophically significant 
interrogation of subjectivity has not taken place, it is also unreasonable to merely accept
9 One is reminded of Marx’s critique of the Hegelians where he claims that they oppose nothing but 
phrases to phrases and thus miss an essential connection between their critique and its relation to existence. 
Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 36.
10 Nietzsche, Daybreak, par. 188.
11 Nietzsche also considers this form of intoxication in his work Twilight o f the Idols, in which he also 
considers the concepts of Apollinian and Dionysian forms of intoxication. Nietzsche, Twilight o f the Idols 
and The Anti-Christ, par. 10.
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the type of simple elimination of the subject that much contemporary philosophy has 
asserted. What we will pursue in this chapter is the challenge of a subject of existence 
that constitutes a consciousness, a being, a selfhood qua entity, subject to alienation and 
distancing, but not depersonalized, not the basic ‘hereness’ (haecceitas) of some 
deconstructionist theorizing. 12 Such a state of hereness or emission might apply to 
conditions of the complete depersonalization of the subject, such as Levinas theorizes in a 
state of nothingness, a ‘there is’ that has ‘no exits’ ; 13 but it is not the basis of the existence 
of a consciousness, or some sort of feeling for existence, such as that of alienation. 
However jagged and unclear its outline, subjectivity is a part of the ideological. If we 
view ideology most fundamentally as some sort of obscuring of the consciousness to its 
actions, a severing of thought and deed, then we need to understand the existence of both 
deception, or that which obscures, and the need that this existence then fulfils within the 
self. Thus a critique of ideology entails a critique of subjectivity and thus a critique of 
those conditions in which the subject’s freedom is constrained. To achieve a radical 
immanence of life, something about the inability for being to simply be life needs to 
become apparent.
However critically posed, an ultimate resignation to the notion of a unified, 
decisionless and subjectless culture is the promotion of just such a culture. It is a safe 
self-delusion that, whether unwittingly or otherwise, belongs most fundamentally to, and 
is reciprocated within, the privileges internal to a conformist, unfree society. This is 
precisely where ideology critique is able to intervene in what it necessarily takes to be 
disputed cultural practice. The subject in ideology is a subject of existence but this 
subject is also capable of an immediate sense of self, which, we are arguing, is originally 
or most substantively concerned with experiencing the self as another. Thus we will 
situate subjectivity as the actions of a creative consciousness and imagination capable of 
transformation by realizing its fundamental responsibility for the place of the self in the 
world.
In order to do this we will need to venture beyond some of the limitations the 
critique of ideology entails and consider, in addition, the possibility of a contemporary
12 Jean-Luc Nancy refers to a ‘hereness’ (haecceitas) or place emission, reception, or transition in place of 
the discourse of the subject. Jean-Luc Nancy, “Introduction”, in Who Comes After the Subject?, eds. 
Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 5.
13 Emmanuel Levinas, “There is: Existence without Existents”, trans. Alphonso Lingis, in The Levinas 
Reader, ed. Sean Hand (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 30-36. This might also apply to Heidegger’s 
theorization of being.
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ethos that takes into account the place of the imagination, otherness and an anticipatory 
consciousness. This ethos is not unrelated to the problem of ideology: Indeed, in this 
chapter, I will argue for the need to look more thoroughly at the relation between 
subjectivity and ideology in order to highlight the terrain for an investigation of the 
subjective conditions of the transformation of the ideological and, by necessity, the 
transformation of the self. 14 And yet in an ethos, which in its Greek sense is a dwelling 
place or abode, based on understanding existence as a concern for others and for their 
fundamental freedom, we see the basis for the transcendence of the inevitable logic that 
the critique of ideology tends to present: The critique of ideology is fundamentally 
underpinned by the assumption of an antagonistic struggle of existence that powerfully 
confronts the reality of separation and inequality. Whilst antagonism persists, an ethos 
cannot surpass this struggle but rather offer, in addition, the reason for an ethical 
commitment to life. We must thus note some of the limitations of the critique of ideology 
-  a critique whose underlying assumption of a fundamental antagonism is so well suited 
to an analysis of estrangement, alienation and exploitation and yet which needs to more 
explicitly develop in the direction of a philosophy of an ethical commitment to life. For 
today this struggle is played out in partly familiar, partly less recognizable terms between 
a politically dissenting subject -  the subject of alienation and exploitation -  and what 
Rossanda refers to as a “democratic equilibrium”, one that, as she sees it, has not fully 
come to terms with its own fascist, racist and ultra-nationalist tendencies.15
It is these tendencies we would add that today constitute much of the unfreedom 
that characterizes a contemporary politics, an unfreedom in which ideologies of craving 
and fear are expressed through the very real lack of connectedness humanity experiences. 
And what we will see is that this equilibrium both incorporates and further marginalizes 
the alienated subject. Here an inhibiting reality is reinforced by way of a limited sense of 
self-knowledge and a view of the impossibility of a self-transcendence. In this 
consciousness there is a decisive severing of the self from any identification with another, 
a disconnection with human dignity and an exile from self-knowledge -  a self-knowledge
14 The existence of the self and any possible transformation take place within a complex array of 
mediations. In Part Two of the thesis we focused upon two broad conditions -  that of the commodification 
of life and the presence of inner expanses of fear. These conditions are at times expressed in an ideological 
manner and here we find the potential for a contention with meaning. The condition in which the 
ideological emerges is the absence of freedom. The dialectical tendency means that the weight of this 
absence is constantly felt, whether or not it is acknowledged as such.
15 Rossana Rossanda, “Two Hundred Questions for Anyone Who Wants to Be Communist in the 1990s”, 
trans. Maurizia Boscagh, in Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics, eds. Paolo Vimo and Michael 
Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 68.
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that is, as Marx has told us, “the first essential condition of freedom” .16 A critique of 
ideology, we would argue, is able to shed light upon this complex interrelation of forces -  
a web of tensions in which a system whose needs shift in the direction of a withering 
away of those elements of representation and participation upon which its legitimacy has 
traditionally been centred, is also then a system whose formal political compromise is 
deemed to be increasingly hollow.
Outline o f  a Contemporary Theorization o f  the Ideological
It should be stated that the inquiry we are presenting here is one that is 
preparatory in nature and as such will proceed by way of attempting to build a 
progressively more substantial picture of interrelated themes in which a contemporary 
critique of ideology and subjectivity can be placed. It will in particular discuss a number 
of themes pertinent to a contemporary approach to ideology critique that also provide the 
basis for a critical understanding of subjectivity. The general manner in which this 
material is considered is guided by the novel approach to the ideological that we set out at 
the beginning of the thesis -  that of viewing ideology as a part of an anticipatory type of 
consciousness within a cultural heritage. This renewal of ideology critique requires a 
critique of subjectivity. It is here that an approach to ideology along the lines of the 
ontological critique I have put forward as a radical departure from the orthodoxy of a 
critique of reason or perspective is able to be most utilized. In doing this the work will 
engage briefly with a spectrum of some relevant theoretical perspectives in which 
contemporary critique is presently situated. In this final chapter, then, we will put 
forward an argument for a renewal of ideology critique on the basis of an innovative 
sense of what such critique might offer a contemporary philosophy. This we see not only 
in the ability of a critique of the ideological to acknowledge and differentiate the 
elements that constitute antagonism but in its connection to a necessary ethics. 
Throughout, we will attempt to make one substantial argument -  that in ideology is the 
felt presence of that which is missing -  freedom - and that this absence of freedom, 
expressed repeatedly in ideological antagonism, is the mediation between types of 
subjective and objective need. The need to construct meaning in a world of unfreedom 
means that ideology is the act of dissembling, of justification and excuse: but it is also 
part of the movement against these capacities, it is part of their questioning and their 
rejection. In ideology, the object of control and distraction is met at least halfway by an
16 Marx, “Debates on Freedom of the Press”, p. 132.
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anticipatory consciousness that places human existence, in its transcendental or inward 
sense, as a capacity to move beyond the given. We will proceed to a theorization of 
ideology in these terms progressively throughout the chapter.
Given the unavoidably abstract and somewhat elusive nature of the concepts 
analyzed, we will attempt to make explicit certain essential features of the type of 
questioning we are presenting here. The structure for this analysis is relatively 
straightforward: Section One is divided into three sub-sections and will argue that a 
renewal of the critique of ideology requires a critique of subjectivity and that this, in turn, 
necessitates an understanding of the subject/object relation. Although we will want to 
proceed to a theorization of what we feel has been largely ignored within the critique of 
ideology -  a sense of the creative potential of the subject in realizing an ethical 
relationship to her world - the relation of the subject to exteriority also needs to take into 
account where the object impinges upon the subject. We will here consider one aspect of 
the exteriority of the contemporary subject -  that of an existence lived out within a citadel 
culture, as we have mentioned. We will then examine a sense of the correlation of being 
and consciousness within the quality of ambivalence and the struggle for authenticity that 
underpins the manifestation of the ideological as desire and fear within a contemporary 
world. Related to this we will present a sense of subjective states that emerge out of this 
exteriority in the forms of cynicism and sentimentality. These we will consider as 
contemporary examples of contradiction within the ideological.
Section Two will consider more specifically what is at issue in a philosophy of the 
relation between subject and object by pursuing in more detail the ambiguity of 
subjective states through which the ideological is manifested. Lastly, Section Three will 
consider the open, anticipatory aspect of the ideological from which certain ‘guiding 
images’, or an ‘ethos’ uniting thought, imagination and deed, can be realized.
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Section One: The Renewal of Ideology Critique and the 
Problem of the Enfolded Self
A poet might say that God had placed forgetfulness as door-keeper in the temple of 
human dignity.
Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human
The Horizon o f the Ideological
Extending the field  o f  the ideological
In the first chapter of the thesis, we considered at length the ground that the 
ideological in a philosophical sense could be said to occupy. We indicated here the 
problems involved with narrowing a sense of the ideological to epistemological or 
sociological concerns of a particular kind, i.e., of a type that considers the problem of 
ideology to be one primarily of external, amorphous power relations that are presented 
with far too little attention given to the people who themselves participate within these 
power relations. We mentioned in relation to this problem, and conveyed a deepening 
sense of its ramifications within Part Two of the thesis, the absence of a theorization of 
the ontological within much ideology critique. We noted how the concerns we 
highlighted of the fracturing of subject and object within a spectacularized 
commodification, a psychology of control and internalized fear and the development of 
inventive needs in conditions of unfreedom are all issues that concern the question of 
being in relation to the ideological. And, in relation to the latter issue brought to our 
attention in Marx’s work, we considered that there is some sense of an ontology 
presented. As we have just outlined, in this chapter we want to propose a further 
questioning of this to include a signification that is fundamentally concerned with what a 
struggle for meaning might entail for a critique of subjectivity. This concerns the idea of 
an ethical, imaginative sense of self and specifically a self for the other, a signification 
which ideology both threatens and awakens. In this section we will outline some aspects 
of a theory for a renewal of the critique of ideology in relation to the problem of 
existence. This first sub-section will consider what it is that constitutes the ‘horizon of 
the ideological’ by first extending a sense of the field of ideology and its critique and then
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by articulating the meaning of the philosophical problematic with which we are dealing. 
In the following sub-sections we will, by way of an initial critical engagement with the 
critique of ideology and subjectivity we have thus far presented in the thesis, shift this 
critique towards an ontological critique.
Let us begin by explaining how we have chosen to approach ideology critique and 
the problem of existence. What we see as central to an extended sense of the ideological 
is an engagement with the question of the self as an ‘enfolded self within ‘the darkness 
of the lived moment’ 17 -  in particular the issue of how and why the social being as an 
active and yet repeatedly constrained subjectivity is immersed in and responds to a world 
of contradictions. We are approaching this here with a number of different issues in 
mind. We first need to have a sense of the terrain of the self-encounter- in conditions of 
unfreedom and in an ethics that indicates a realm beyond the given. This we understand 
as indicated by the contradictory nature of the ideological itself. Ideology suggests a 
transposition of reality and deferral of immediacy in which the contradictions and 
tensions of being can be found. What can be detected here is the potential that being is, 
and for this reason we have chosen to outline an ethics based on presentiment. All of 
these elements are a part of an extension of the terrain of the ideological and the necessity 
of critique. We will look at these in turn.
The T-We’problematic
For this discussion we choose to use the well-established philosophical concept of 
the ‘other’ -  although any relation this bears to the way in which it is commonly 
reformulated via Kierkegaard in various abstract post-structuralist versions is, at best, 
tenuous. What we want to indicate with this concept is not any sort of difficult 
impossibility but an important way in which the relation each of us has to the rest of 
nature can be conceptualized. What we thus indicate is the ‘I-We’ problem present in 
much emancipatory thought. This eventually must mean theorizing a direct, lived sense 
of existence itself -  not only as a philosophic construct but as experiential feeling that is 
accessible to all. 18 Concepts other than the ‘other’ might better serve our purpose and yet
17 Both of these are terms derived from Bloch. See Bloch, The Spirit o f Utopia, pp. 252, 192.
18 As we have previously indicated in various notes, the work of Levinas has been exemplary in its own 
and very originally provocative way in relation to this issue. Whilst there are undoubtedly many difficult 
theoretical problems that Levinas’ work on otherness gives rise to, it is simply inadequate to dismiss his 
contribution to this field of study. In this respect Alain Badiou’s otherwise stimulating critique of the
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it is difficult to find alternatives that possess a sufficient history and depth within the 
philosophical lexicon. Marx’s ‘species being’ simply does not provide us with the sort of 
scope that is today required -  the ‘other’ can and must be as much the environment we 
mistreat as an exploitable means to selfish ends as the colleague, family member, 
neighbour or fellow member of humanity. Marx is much closer to the mark when he 
refers to the state of not being alone in the world as that of being ‘another’, or where he 
more directly states that “What I cannot be for others, I am not and cannot be for 
myself’ . 19 So too is Lukäcs’s idea, which we considered earlier in the thesis, of the 
realization of thought in deed resulting in the self becoming the ‘other’. Bloch refers to 
the self-encounter as that which hears itself in the essence of the “inconstruable, the 
absolute question, in the very problem of the We”, and perhaps this sense of the relation 
between the self and the “manifold” best describes the idea we wish to develop. 20
Ethics o f presentiment
We view a sense of being as part of an ethics because the concept of an ethics 
calls for some commitment beyond a satisfaction with the given: It entails a sense of the 
questioning of who and what we are in the world that is a fundamental part of 
understanding ourselves inasmuch as others and others as we would ourselves. The 
emphasis this places on a sense of a self or being is no inevitable sleight of hand 
reinvesting in the ethical the notion of a necessary individualism, or, in its more post­
modernist turn, the idea of infinite difference that can know no generality, solidarity or 
universal sense of responsibility: It must indeed be quite the opposite -  for it is in our 
fundamental connectedness to all life that we can realize an ethics. And this 
connectedness or its lack becomes apparent to us on the basis of particular unfreedoms. 
Whether a connectedness comes through actions of solidarity with others or through a 
more detached contemplation of suffering it is only by way of an initial recognition of 
being or selfhood that a state of selflessness can be attained. It is here, within the self, 
that, as Bloch argues, “one finally has to begin” .21 This selfhood, this self-encounter, is a 
sense of responsibility in being, in realizing and making substantial one’s connection to 
other beings in the world and to the world itself. At its most creative, the self-encounter
contemporary philosophical approach to ethics is inadequate in its treatment of Levinas. Alain Badiou, 
Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding o f Evil, trans. Peter Hallward (London: Verso, 2001).
19 Marx, “Debates on Freedom of the Press”, p. 177.
20 Bloch, The Spirit o f Utopia, pp. 247, 227.
21 Ibid., p. 165.
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can realize its ultimately essential link to the issue of what we are and what we are for: 
but it necessarily begins as a self-encounter, “the preparation of the inner word, without 
which every gaze outward remains empty and no magnet, no force to attract the inner 
word outwardly as well, to help it break through the error of this world” . 22 For an ethics 
to be possible we need to be able to identify the self as other, for the self to the other is 
the other with whom one is able to express a connectedness or disconnectedness on the 
basis of a relation to freedom. Much of the content of any such ethics, including its 
positive content, is a matter to be discovered, for of the present period at least one would 
have to say that any extended sense of an ethics is far from having been realized. We live 
in the condition of a “hollow space with sparks”, as Bloch describes much of modernity. 23 
And although our own time might make more apparent the hollowness than the sparks, 
the whole of this varied content is important for us to consider. We will not attempt in 
this present work any substantial theorization of what this content might be but certainly 
highlight the need for such an investigation.
What we can do is offer a theorization of some tendencies and latency of 
existence that we detect as expressions of the sort of contradiction within the ideological 
that we have argued best conveys its existence in conditions of contemporary unfreedom. 
And perhaps in this sense we should not be too hasty in describing what of this would 
appear to us as the shallow and vacant rather than the stuff of substance and thus perhaps 
of more radical potential. For in relation to the ideological, basic tensions mean that any 
particular outcome is difficult to predict. For example, the struggle for meaning that we 
have indicated as a basic impetus of the ideological cannot be readily contained within 
pre-given modes of reasoning. We will see this shortly in relation to what is taken by 
some theorists to be a type of cynical reasoning characterizing the exposition of 
contemporary ideas.
We can also, as a part of a sense of the tension that is the ideological, give a 
general sense of the relation an ethics has to a philosophical problematic. Metaphysics 
and ethics provide for us bases for posing the question of the relation between thought 
and deed, a relation that is itself the basis of all politics and culture, through which the 
ideological is expressed. A position in relation to the ethical that amounts to the 
abandonment of the political mistakes the purpose of a critical ethics. To base this ethics 
on a sense of the good or happiness is a significant way in which we can appreciate our
22 Ibid., pp. 246, 247.
23 Bloch, “Postscript, 1962”, in Heritage o f Our Times, p. 8.
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relation to existence -  it entails a virtue inspired by life as best as it can be lived and 
endows the virtuous with a requirement for which we possess ample skills. But to be 
happy may not adequately prepare us for what it is to be fully human, and that is to 
suffer, including to suffer, like Hesse’s Harry Haller, with eagerness and with beauty, and 
to need to understand the cause of that suffering. For this, a sense of well-being may not 
be enough. Happiness may itself become a trap, it might be a merely ‘frail happiness’, in 
Rousseau’s sense, or a promise of momentary escape from life as it is actually lived. It 
can come into conflict with the grounds of the imagination, a collision within reality in 
which the ideological turn is ever-present. For this life in which happiness is not fixed 
and, indeed, is often contradictory, we require something more, something that takes us 
beyond and outside ourselves. This we have summarized, in Blochian terms, as a sense 
that we have not-yet become what we are. We are possibility. We are in a state of 
potential where the realization of what we can be is before us. This potential, this 
presentiment, is glimpsed in numerous ways within the lives we live in the present, 
including, I am arguing, in the ideological manifestations of our current antagonisms and 
contradictions. To understand ourselves as another may be less an epiphany than a 
constant watchfulness of being that brings us back again and again to the point of 
selfhood from which we depart and from which we can judge our connection or 
disconnection from others. It is this terrain of being that the critique of ideology needs to 
address.
Ideology as a transposition o f reality
Ideology is decisively concerned with a transposition of reality that is itself still 
perfectly real but which places reality in an incapacitated or obdurately represented state. 
In this sense the ideological includes within its reality a certain ontological dimension of 
irreality that, as Henry argues, precludes a fully immediate internal experience of the 
self. 24 In this irreality we seem too ‘estranged from or entranced’ by reality itself and thus 
are unable to delineate ‘reality as it is’ . 25 Ideology is, however, as we have already made 
quite clear, part of or underlined by, a struggle for meaning. The sort of consciousness, 
judgement or awareness that ideology entails, made real by way of the representations 
and images that are a part of its repertoire, is also inevitably an aspect of its critique. This 
is not to say that the undoing of ideology is ideology itself but more that the relation of
24 Henry, Marx, p. 161.
25 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 130.
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ideology to its critique is a necessary part of its exteriority as represented being. The 
mere idea of gravity, as Marx reminds us, cannot cause the submerged person to drown, 26 
but idea and reality are rarely so tom apart from each other that we would want to rely 
upon one without the other. Metaphorically we are the eye but, as we have previously 
mentioned, the eye cannot see itself. Consciousness does, however, bear a relation to 
lived experience, most obviously where it is placed in conflict with the interiority of life. 
If we maintain that ideology effects a transposition of reality, thereby substituting lived 
experience with representations or irreality, we are surely drawn back to contrasting 
ideology with reality: And yet perhaps not necessarily so; for if the decisive effectiveness 
of ideology is in its assumption of an irreality it is just as much in the relation of this 
irreality to being that we need to seek its particular force.
The struggle for meaning that ideology underscores involves a consciousness that 
constitutes a substitution of life with representation at the same time that the living 
interiority of being exists. Ideology can defer a realization of an immediacy of self but it 
cannot deny the existence of any original lived experience. It can, therefore, both 
threaten and awaken a sense of the self as other. To suggpst that the existence of 
ideology is the necessary denial of a radical immanence of self is to ablate the dialectical 
relation between thought and deed. Thus the sense of the critique of ideology as a 
demythologization or demystification (Verkehr), which many would suggest has itself 
come to be viewed as a myth,27 need not of course have been seen as bound by a 
straightforward notion of the emancipation of reason, whose own critique might effect a 
delay in the emergence of any given signified. This limitation imposed upon the 
ideological, reducing it to a pre-determined purpose and claiming for it, often in a highly 
polemical manner, a realism with which it could be contrasted, prevented attempts to look 
for significations elsewhere. Likewise, the ideological did not need to be couched in 
terms of the presupposition of an external world possessing a primacy over consciousness 
and making obvious, to the realist, a mythical, ideological existence. As we have seen, a 
disclosure of truth involves as much about possibility and partial conditionality as it does 
any unravelling of a ruse; illusory realities, devoid of all mystification and mythology, 
can exist in ideological form. Levinas argues that the notion of a suspect reason has very 
much forced itself upon us in relation to the “spiritual misery of the industrial era”, and
26 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 30.
27 Gianni Vattimo, for example, argues this. Gianni Vattimo, The Transparent Society, trans. David Webb 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 39.
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what we have contended is that this misery is both realized and realized by way of a 
transposition of its reality in ideological terms. In this sense, the critique of ideology is 
indeed a type of ‘agonized groaning’ denouncing that to which reason would otherwise 
remain insensitive. 28 But perhaps any countering of ideology and reason is itself 
mistaken, suggesting, as it does, a simple separation within that element in which one 
might situate oneself, or indeed indicating something beyond their respective appeals to 
reality as consolation for both reason and ideology. This might of course be to distort the 
function of critique which is, and only is, an exposition of the substitution we have just 
highlighted. The lived immediate sense of self is not critique but is life itself- a practice 
open to engagement with, and most particularly realized through, a sense of fundamental 
connectedness with the other.
Ideology and the necessity o f  critique
The renewal of a critique of ideology I am proposing here indicates something 
quite different from a view of demythologizadon -  it is the renewal of a type of 
philosophical problematic in which questions as to the relation humanity has with the 
event of being, and thus with the conditional event of exteriority and the unconditional of 
subjectivity, might be posed. The self is an ‘enfolded self. It is a questioning, a 
reflecting into itself of its interior and exterior being. Further to this, a critique of 
ideology can enable us to see the basis of existence as understanding ‘oneself as another’ 
precisely because it involves a struggle for truth that ultimately itself entails a relation in 
which each becomes a sign of the other. This truth, this potential of being, must be seen 
as a part of a virtue ethics. The difficulty is that ideology always suggests a type of 
separation of the subject from her reality, however this might be constructed, that is, at 
the same time, the very reality in which the subject exists. This conundrum cannot be 
resolved within what are often quite contrived oppositions within reality that makes of the 
ideological a falsification, or, at the very least, a mere forgetfulness of reason. For 
although a type of forgetfulness does exist at the basis of a separation between thought 
and deed, it will not become apparent to us by way of some contrast with reality. 
Ideology instead suggests to us the intertwined presence of an existent as a hollowed out
28 Reason, as Levinas with reference to Amos argues, “is capable of considering as ordered a world in 
which the poor man is sold for a pair of sandals”. Emmanuel Levinas, “Ideology and Idealism”, trans. 
Sanford Ames and Arthur Lesley, in The Levinas Reader, p. 238.
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place between self and being,29 and its critique underscores the need of the self to have 
apprehended some future sense of a responsibility to the other within the present- to be 
able to understand the direct relation between forgetfulness and an inability to realize 
human dignity. Thus the critique of ideology is part of a fundamental dialectic of 
freedom and its absence, rather than a negative critique of falseness. The utopian element 
of ideology is not only its presence in unfreedom but the outcome of a state of becoming 
in which the subject exists. The ideological exists on the terrain of a search for 
authenticity, when existence achieves some mastery over everyday life and a moment of 
self-awareness can be achieved and thought and deed coincide. The thesis of this thesis 
is, then, a significant departure from the broad orthodoxy in this field, to which even 
some of its less orthodox theorists, as we have seen, have in one way or another 
subscribed.
This argument not only explains the persistence of ideology but also gives the 
basis for our suggestion of the continued necessity of ideology critique. What we have 
just provided is an approach to ideology by way of critique that returns us to the source of 
the philosophical problem in ontology and subjectivity. This examination is not about 
positing an epistemological counter to the falseness of consciousness, nor is it one which 
is primarily restricted to an account of the objectivity of ideology through which 
identification is constituted. What we have instead emphasized is the importance of a 
subjectivity determined by the relationship of self as being, a relationship in which 
connectedness is the basic fact of existence. The critique of ideology we have developed 
here is one that situates ideology within an ontological horizon, or openness of being, 
through which self-knowledge can be derived. It is in this realm that the critique of 
ideology can have real meaning.
In the following sub-section we will suggest the type of shift needed in relation 
more directly to the ground we earlier covered in the thesis, so as to demonstrate the 
usefulness to a critique of ideology of important departures from the themes with which 
we previously engaged. Ideology, as we have seen, has traditionally been viewed as 
directly antithetical to self-understanding because it is viewed itself as a type of 
manipulated knowledge, a cunning to be revealed to consciousness only by a completed 
extemalization of subjectivity -  a meaning that is beyond ideology and outside the 
individual herself. By the end of this section we hope to have presented an argument for
29 In this context, Levinas refers to “an interruption of essence” and a break with illusions and ruses 
indicated in the preservation of being underlying ideology. Levinas, ibid., p. 239.
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understanding ideology as a type of tension over itself (for ideology can never be truly at 
ease with itself) within changing conditions of a struggle for meaning that occurs within 
contradictory, antagonistic realities, as well as suggesting the soundness of the individual 
not awaiting a knowledge or confirmation of herself from some externally authorized 
source of sanctioned meaning, other than that of a sense of selfhood which humanity 
holds in common and that places each individual in connection with every other. This 
relation the subject and her subjectivity has to the social, is the basis of freedom and thus 
also, in its restriction or distortion, the unfreedom that much of humanity continues to 
experience. In this unfreedom we encounter ideology as a form of antagonism, as 
contradiction and ambiguity. It is the constraint upon self-awareness, the barrier to an 
ethical sense of responsibility for the other and yet always a reason for the necessity of 
these ethical states. We will consider some examples of this, as part of the continuation 
of the ideological, in the cultural archetypes of cynicism and sentimentality, by way of 
giving a sense of the context of present-day ideology within a citadel culture. But let us 
first briefly situate the horizon we have just outlined within a philosophical problematic 
which we take to constitute the ideological in relation to, and in some instances in 
contrast with, what we have encountered earlier in the thesis.
The philosophical problematic
We are left then with the continuing problem of how to theorize ideology in order 
to understand the significance of its critique. We have set out a number of issues we take 
to be crucial to such a critique and now need to examine them theoretically in relation to 
the extended sense of the ideological we have just presented. We have thus far sensed 
that ideology involves a type of subjectivity that manifests itself in relation to the object 
or being in consciousness, self-consciousness or the play of the unconscious. We have 
also interpreted it as possessing an ontological value as a represented being, an exteriority 
or object. In a variety of different ways we have derived a basis for an examination of the 
ideological along these lines from the significant theorizations of ideology we considered 
in Part Two of the thesis. Thus the writings of Lukäcs, Althusser and most particularly 
Marx, have all provided important indications of what we should consider as vital to a 
contemporary critique of ideology. Let us try to examine this critically by placing the 
theorization of the ideological where offered within the context of particular cultural 
archetypes.
For Lukäcs, the new social reality confronting radical politics of the early 1920s 
was the massive expansion of rationalizing thought as a part of a systematized
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bureaucratization of modem society. This he tended to view as the arrival of an 
involuntary form of servitude. For Althusser, the expansion of the State loomed even 
larger and also concerned the way in which the every-day social conditions in which 
people live are structured in accordance with the tawdry flatness of the power of the 
State, at once both democratic and authoritarian. A sense of the external nature of power, 
internally inscripted, is powerfully addressed in the works of these theorists. The period 
leading to Lukäcs’s overwhelming concern with bureaucratic power was marked by an 
increasing sense and reality of crisis.30 His European world was a world now unhinged 
and vitiated by successive economic crisis, war, and the use of methods of repressive 
containment against working class power. Fascistic and corporatist means of political 
integration of the working class both paved paths of militaristic nationalism. October 
1917 in Russia shone briefly as a beacon against an increasingly ‘blood-dimmed tide’.31 
Lukäcs’s work correctly perceived much of the development of early twentieth century 
society in terms of a growing reification - a type of false consciousness emerging out of 
the increasing use of technocratic and rationalized methods of accumulation and the 
defeat of revolutions. The administration of things places humanity at the behest of a 
seemingly endless array of forms of control, including forms of the control of the self. 
Where this leaves a consciousness of one’s place within such a world and a 
consciousness of some other world than this, are issues that necessarily pervade this 
critique of ideology. For Lukäcs, there is both a continuation of the problem of 
commodification as set out by Marx and an appreciable amplification of its impact upon 
emancipatory politics. And yet do we have a sense here of how he accounts theoretically 
for this very change he perceives? The period in which Lukäcs puts forward his 
theorization of ideology is a cusp in which illusion begins to overwhelm ideology’s 
earlier incarnation as it attempted to secure a basic structure for the initial advance and 
globalization of capitalism. Ideology as illusion, embellishment and the mystification of
30 The dissolution of the nineteenth century ideology of laissez-faire and the rise of imperialism and 
protectionism on the basis of a generalized overproduction, presented itself to capital in the form of the 
intensification of international competition, and to the State in terms of increasing fiscal, financial and 
monetary crises of declining revenues and disrupted payments. Growing popular radicalism and working 
class struggles emerging out of the intensification of work and increasing unemployment met with an 
increasing institutionalization of the socialization of capitalist production and labour. Limited recognition 
of trade unions, some social reform and extension of the franchise took place within the limits of a 
sustained accumulation of domestic productive capital. Imperialism and protectionism meant the removal 
of barriers to accumulation implied by limited supplies of the means of production and limited avenues for 
surplus products. Increasing crisis under these circumstances would ultimately manifest itself in a swollen 
tempest of international competition, leading to the barbaric extravaganza of inter-imperialist war.
31 W. B. Yeats, “The Second Coming”, Selected Poetry (London: Macmillan, 1967).
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ideas is the path taken to establishing the system politically, juridically and culturally. 
Lukacs’s work indicates much of this changed environment but ignores the dynamic of 
change of which this transition is a part. His theorization then seems to rely upon an 
objectivism because the dialectical interaction of a changing realm of the objective and 
subjective is not drawn out. Whilst realizing the problems with any simple theory of the 
correspondence between subject and object, Lukacs’s theory of reification ultimately 
offers something akin to a theory of false versus authentic consciousness. Whilst, for 
Marx, there is no reason to trust in any transcendent struggle of progress to securely 
found a new form of existence, for Lukacs, the lessons of The Eighteenth Brumaire are 
held at some remove. The possibility that consciousness has exhausted its potential for 
renewed life exists, and yet this is really to be determined only by the vagaries of 
economic crisis. It seems for Lukacs that in the absence of such conditions, and thus 
without access to their imputed consciousness, people are resigned to their fate as 
enslaved beings. Consciousness is otherwise indifferent to questions of its existence 
within the world. Lukacs’s notion of the psychology of the individual of a reified 
consciousness is like that of the outlook of Nietzsche’s last man, late to the feast of tasks 
and unable to think beyond the confines of his own comfort. 32 Without cataclysmic 
economic events Lukacs’s potentially last people are unable to step outside the oneness 
they share with a commodified world. They do not struggle against their reified, 
alienated existence but either suffer it silently and seemingly acceptingly, or they realize 
it by way of an imputed class consciousness as something they have, by this realization, 
overcome. Let us not underestimate the power of this critique, for today we face a 
tediously similar sense of the projection of self by way of every kind of false, 
commodified belief. And yet, like then, although now in different forms, we also have 
incursions into this pretence of completedness. Contradictions within and against the 
alienated, commodified self exist. It is precisely this we have attempted to theorize with 
this thesis.
Lukacs’s focus upon the spectacle of commodification allows us to see the myriad 
forms in which a fetishized reticulation of subject and object intersect and mortise. The 
subsequent fracturing of subject and object he theorizes is a topic that has unavoidably 
engaged humanity’s critical attention for much of the last century. This is in part because 
the issue of a meaning of the self has reformulated itself throughout the modem period
32 Nietzsche’s ‘last man’ or ‘ultimate man’ is the “most contemptible man” for in his smallness of vision 
and escape from discomfort he “makes everything small”. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part I, par. 
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around the continuing reality of alienation. This issue of meaning has encountered many 
of its own structural limitations by way of the ideological and yet what we are arguing is 
that the ideological is itself a part of a process in which the unrealized potential of the self 
can be provoked. What this inevitably means is the relevance of a renewal of a sense that 
humanity has experienced a problematic severing of thought from deed, subject from 
object. Lukäcs certainly alerts us to the seriousness of what is implied in this difficult 
fracturing. If today we see reason to theorize the place of human transformation 
decisively outside the clutches of the spectacle, it is still only upon an appreciation of the 
very real sundering of the relation between subject and object that the spectacle has 
entailed (even by way of seeming to obliterate any distinction subject and object might 
possess) that we are able to proceed. Lukäcs might not have been able to draw from his 
critique of reification enough to situate the problem of ideology squarely in relation to a 
type of experiential value, but his work certainly provides us with the impetus to attempt 
to meet this challenge. And the recognition that the extreme or most absolute form of 
commodification is not any necessary reason for the undoing of its reifying spell was, in 
any case, Lukäcs’s own warning. A sensitivity to the profound disenchantment of 
modem alienation lent his ideology critique much weight: And even if ultimately we are 
left more with a sense of the power of an enslaving object (in the form of reification) than 
we are with any understanding of the importance of the subject’s relation to both 
regimented and unregimented experience as a part of everyday life, we are still able to 
position this very real difficulty in relation to that of any possible transformation. If, as 
Gianni Vattimo considers, using Paolo Flores d’Arcais’ phrase, we now find ourselves 
having to face a situation of the ‘betrayal of disenchantment’, this is not because the basis 
of disenchantment, in fragmentation, loss, nihilism, and the like, has in any sense 
disappeared. 33 We will, later in this chapter, look at ways in which a certain ideological 
absorption of what it is disenchantment represents has more recently taken place.
What this concern with disenchantment and the fracturing of the subject from her 
self has given us is a strong sense of the irreality to which reification fundamentally 
belongs. We are, as Lukäcs writes “only a vague bundle of wish and fear, of desire and 
suffering; something that at every moment perishes in its own unreality” . 34 This 
representation that reification is sets the problem of a distancing from being which we
33 Vattimo, The Transparent Society, p. 90. Flores’ essay, “Disenchantment Betrayed” appears as Paolo 
Flores d’Arcais, “II disincanto tradito”, Micromega, no, 2.
34 Lukäcs, “On Poverty of Spirit”, p. 382.
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must understand in order to develop a critique of the ideological. For Lukacs, of course, 
a basic ambivalence exists at the heart of disenchantment -  if disenchantment is 
fragmentation and evisceration it is also the undoing of the spell of enchantment; and this 
ambivalence is the key to both its ideological power and its fragility. This too, then, must 
be our starting point, for it is in an ambivalence with regard to subjective states that we 
can locate a relation to an underlying dialectic that takes place, and it is this dialectical 
dimension that we want to uncover for a critique of ideology. Lukäcs’s sense of how we 
might be set free from being eternally suspended within this ambivalence becomes short- 
circuited, as we have seen, with his particular theoretical leap from knowledge to 
transformation. His belief in an oppression-engendered consciousness of the 
commodity’s wanton insistence we can remain sceptical of and yet wish for just as 
fervently: It is simply that now, at the close of the century that for Lukacs dawned as the 
possibility of the end of ideology through a consciousness of it, we must wearily 
acknowledge that the presence of a surfeit of ironic recognition would seem to have 
brought ideology no closer to its nadir.
The dialectic we need to uncover rests elsewhere, or perhaps somewhere more 
fundamental -  primarily in the varied dimensions of the relationship between the self and 
the world, an existence that “lives by negating, consuming and contradicting itself’ . 35 
The relation between consciousness and the immediate experience of the self is not nearly 
as straightforward as Lukacs proposes; we therefore must conclude that the realm of the 
coalescence of thought and deed requires a quite different theorization than the one he 
presents. We will pursue a sense of this shortly by way of an examination of the 
contemporary ideological irreality of sentimentality. What we can clearly appreciate is 
the perspicacity of Lukäcs’s insight into the fundamental problem of the ideological -  the 
strange separation that emerges between thought and deed whose consequences, and very 
significance within itself, become obscure to us. We will consider in a following section 
that contemporary takes on this problem that find an abnegation from deed or some kind 
of shrinking from its supposed manipulations to be a matter to be celebrated as the 
expression of a necessarily victorious ‘nonpraxis’ or refraining from acting are 
misjudgements of both the ideological and potentialities of being. The theorist of the 
contemporary manifestation of cynical reason, Peter Sloterdijk, for example, argues that 
“higher qualities of insight can come to expression than in any deed”, as if the most
35 Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”, p. 61.
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modem inflection of self-knowledge now required this dissolution of the connection 
between thought and deed.36
At the same time it is important for us to realize that modernity has meant that a 
sense of an objective reasoning standing outside the self, whose own connectedness 
between thought and deed it presumes to judge, has opened itself to many problems. Its 
overly close association with an unacceptable unfreedom is in part the reason for this. It 
is also, however, because it has failed to sufficiently account for the dynamic involved in 
self-knowledge. And this problem is not resolved by shunting subjectivity from its 
theorization or by removing from subjectivity any necessity to account for its own deeds. 
Althusser’s problem here is two-fold: His belief, for example, in a rational theorization 
capable of distancing itself so thoroughly from ideology that it might be freed from some 
of ideology’s necessity, seems unable to imagine what we now take for granted of an 
element of ‘cynical reasoning’ writ large upon the contemporary psyche. And yet he is 
neither able to furnish us with a subjectivity capable of putting such cynicism in its place 
nor is he prepared to offer us very much beyond a ‘deliberate unconscious’ that might 
exist as an active part of any such cynicism. We will shortly consider the problem that 
cynicism presents for a theorization of ideology and where critique might fruitfully be 
pitched to scrutinize dimensions of it that tend to be ignored. Althusser does, however, 
take us into interesting territory by questioning (and concluding, ultimately, largely in the 
negative) the extent to which the realm of the imagination and unconscious is able to 
escape the structuring process of capitalism and its overwhelming, controlling power. 
Again, we need to know something of this realm in order to be able to theorize 
subjectivity in relation to the ideological.
Althusser’s situatedness in the post-war boom and in Keynesianism is no less 
interesting for its unfolding of the continuing saga of the crisis of the world of his 
existence. This time accommodated within a reservoir of domestic and international 
credit, overaccumulation in the 1960s witnessed the erosion of profitability, declining 
productive investment and, once more, intensified class antagonism. Independence 
movements overpowered colonial savagery and the tocsin of revolution again sounded in 
Parisian streets. The social democratic ideology of increasing living standards, full 
employment, and adequate welfare entitlements compelled the State to sustain 
accumulation through fiscal and monetary expansionism. Again this marvel of necessary
36 Sloterdijk, Critique o f Cynical Reason, p. 540.
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constructedness could not avert overaccumulation, and limits to speculative and 
inflationary means soon became apparent. This crisis saw periodic outbursts of domestic 
conflict alongside the intensification of divisions within class, race and gender-based 
politics. Although Althusser was then beyond caring, by the 1980s, it was on the basis of 
these divisions that the ideology of monetarism was to ensure its parasitic grip. 
Althusser’s great contribution to the debate on ideology rests in his acute understanding 
of the deep-seated psychology of a fear of authority that enables all ideologies of the 
State to work. Here, despite his declarations that ideology has nothing to do with 
consciousness, a structured unconscious merely takes the place of consciousness, leaving 
humanity suffering from, as it were, a false unconsciousness. It would seem that 
Althusser is likewise out of step with his time - another cusp in the phase of the problems 
of capitalist cohesiveness, where ideology as mystification had begun to show signs of 
having exhausted its usefulness. More apparent from the 1970s onwards, the crisis of 
Keynsianism is also the crisis of ideology as illusion - illusion which is increasingly 
apparent and thus more wilful deception and invention than mystification. Philosophy 
might always arrive post-festum, as Althusser argues,37 but for too much of a 
contemporary theorization of subjectivity it seems questionable whether it ever arrives at 
all. Althusser captures something of the ‘objective’ side of this in his view of ideology 
not as illusion but as a part of unconscious fear, but this he abstracts into an objectivist 
autonomism, where the subjective within and of ideology itself is absent.
Althusser presents us with a sense of the other, but always as that to which we 
submit, and submit at our peril. The other is the other of control over us, never the one 
for whom we must finally and liberatingly renounce any sense of ultimate control. It is 
difficult to know how this paranoid unconscious could be any type of self affirmation of 
being. Let us not forget of course that it is Althusser who gives us a sense, as we have 
just mentioned, of the calculated nature of an unconscious caught within the seeming 
compulsions of fear and control -  a ‘deliberate unconscious’ through which the 
ideological is realized. What we have interpreted here in this concept in Althusser’s work 
is the difficult substantiveness of objectified relations as they impinge upon a 
consciousness still capable of giving some direction to the outcome of an interpellated 
subjectivity. Here we might then theorize what it is that the unconscious suggests to us 
that possesses some suppressed homogeneity with the objectivity humanity represents to 
itself. Bringing a self-awareness to this moment would surely mean acknowledging the
37 Althusser, “On the Materialist Dialectic”, p. 174.
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ability of the self to grasp its representations in unconscious thought with a view to what 
is not-yet realized as such. Althusser’s analysis of ideology’s necessary illusions doing 
battle with a deliberate unconscious makes us consider the basic dislocation of the subject 
which its wayward consciousness and uneasy distance from being implies. Lukacs has 
perhaps better prepared the ground, or more properly groundlessness, of this gap within 
being by reminding us of a certain homelessness situated somewhere more fundamentally 
further still in which the subject is left to wander. These insights prompt us to consider 
the tension that ideology represents, not merely by way of alerting us to the alienation 
and unconscious fear that dwell within the ideological but by presenting to us, and 
necessarily somewhat ironically so, a sense of the role of the subject within these 
problems of existence and gaps within being.
From Marx’s work we have derived one way in which we can approach this 
relation between subject and object -  that of the mediation of need and creativity, which 
is simply and appropriately summarized by this philosopher as ‘life’ : 38 For Marx 
interprets this gap between the subject and being as the possibility of change - a 
determinate, situated reality able to be fundamentally altered by praxis. “Let the dead 
bury their dead”; a new life in which the realization of a sense of freedom can be attained 
“must be re-awakened” . 39 Although we cannot detect in a consciousness of this 
dislocation the sort of achievement of change Marx deemed its most logical outcome, 
elements within this change are not always readily perceivable; what is important is that 
we have here highlighted the very relation between the subject and ideology with which 
Marx credited unfree humanity -  that of an inventive enslavement. This state of 
enslavement is, for Marx, not merely a difficult consciousness with which the individual 
needs to grapple: it is also, and at least as disturbingly, the lived experience of a social 
world.
It is indeed this philosophy of human reality that marks out Marx’s approach to 
the ideological as fundamentally different from those methodologies developed on the 
basis of a Cartesian philosophy of mind. Marx’s understanding of subjectivity is not 
based upon an abstraction of thought but is constructed on the basis of a sense of the 
outcome of ‘real collisions’ between the individual and the many conditions of her life. It
38 Marx poses the question he takes to be most fundamental to his entire philosophy in a letter to Ruge. In 
a dehumanized world, Marx conjectures, what is left for human beings “to be and to wish?” and answers 
this by stating simply “What they wish is to live”. Marx to Ruge, May 1843, p. 201.
39 Ibid., pp. 200,201.
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is this potentially extraordinarily nuanced sense with which Marx provides us of what it 
is that constitutes ‘being’ -  the thoughts and actions of a real person situated within a 
social world -  that forms the basis of our approach to subjectivity. As we have made 
clear, it is the relation between subject and object within the presence of ideology that we 
consider to be a still largely untheorized aspect of ideology critique. It is in opening out 
this issue that we hope to have made some contribution to through the course of this 
thesis. And so it is with a sense of the problem of the calculating slave as a type of 
metaphysics of being that we are able to centre our approach to subjectivity and the 
ideological. With this we will attempt to understand the problem of fear and desire as a 
relation between life and its determinations in which consciousness develops as a way in 
which one gives meaning to life and also as a basis for the ‘real collisions’ of life and self 
of which Marx speaks.
Where all these theorizations are situated is within the parameters of critique, and 
this, more than anything, enables us to question the relation of being to subjectivity. 
Each theorization in its own way provides for us some explanation of ‘the darkness of the 
lived moment’, of the type of transformation of the knowing self into a dependent, 
blindly following subject, and of how the subject might escape this direction. What we 
have interpreted of these forays into a critical examination of the object is the unfolding 
of being on the basis of paradox and contradiction. It is indeed this area that opens for us 
a sense of the necessity of an ethical relation through which humanity might realize itself. 
Contradiction within the context in which the possibility for responsibility for the other 
exists, suggests significations of an engagement between people beyond the present, and 
most particularly beyond the antagonistic present. The apparent fixity and givenness of 
the system as presently constructed is subjected to repeated scrutiny. It is here, as we will 
continue to theorize, that the ideological can provide the circumstance for a questioning 
of the sufficiency of present being: For without the ideological the need for a justification 
for unfreedom, for a confused, constrained hesitancy before existence, or lack of self- 
awareness, would be less clear.
Let us investigate this further in the light of an appreciation of some philosophical 
aspects of cultural heritage. We will begin with what will be a continuing examination in 
this chapter of subjectivity and consciousness via the expression of cultural archetypes. 
We will start this sub-section by presenting the problem of objects and subjective states 
in relation to the concepts we have theorized throughout the thesis -  fear and desire. We 
will conclude the sub-section by offering a contemporary example of the problem of 
objects and subjective states by way of a critique of a citadel culture. For it is only by
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situating prevailing ideological states such as cynicism and sentimentality within cultural 
archetypes of desire and fear, and by understanding that these archetypes are the 
expression of particular manifestations of unfreedom (such as a citadel society) that we 
are able to develop a contemporary critique of ideology and subjectivity.
Existence as Cultural Heritage
Objects and Subjective states
Bloch talks of human beings needing something like a cross between a mirror and 
a painted picture when we look inside; 40 we need intensified images that show us our 
potential and not merely the temporal meaning of what we are. Many different images 
have of course emerged and been moulded and reshaped according to humanity’s 
changing needs. But the images of modernity have tended overwhelmingly to revolve 
around the issue of estrangements and a questioning of the authenticity or inauthenticity 
of experience. It is within such images that we can find the workings of a spectacularized 
commodification of life, the unconscious experience of fear and control and the invention 
of needs in relation to unfreedom that we have highlighted throughout the thesis. Here 
we will attempt to account for these as cultural archetypes and complex psychological 
states through which the ideological as contradiction operates. The focus on these 
archetypes in Part Two of the thesis was largely as objectivities, sometimes ghostly 
objectivities, with which the subject was forced to contend: and with this we have pointed 
out some of the difficulties with viewing as external determinations matters that are better 
understood as mediated realities. In what is to follow we want to look more properly at 
these archetypes as expressive of the mediation of subject and object. For this reason we 
will refer to the archetypes of ‘desire’ and ‘fear’ in order to draw greater attention to their 
existence as subjective as well as objective aspects of human existence. But let us first 
indicate something of the terrain with which we are dealing.
Grasping at reality
The complex area of desire and fear is a field in which we find the continuation of 
the ideological and thus much scope for its critique. It is here that we encounter the 
ideological as antagonism, as the realm of the partially conditioned and the possible, in
40 Bloch, The Principle o f Hope, vol. Ill, p. 931.
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which subject and object are mediated. It is also an area in which we are able to theorize 
the relation of fulfilment to what is missing. For there is something more than merely a 
predictable shift between submission and indifference, plenitude and lack that marks the 
hold that fear and desire have. Fear and desire are constructed out of attempts to secure 
or acquire reality. That they also express a more fundamental anxiety in relation to being 
-  a fear of nothingness -  is surely a part of the confrontation subjective states encounter 
within existence: For ultimately all attempts to capture and retain reality will only bring 
us closer to the unavoidable limit of human destiny realized as death. Between this and 
the everyday experience of reality much that binds us to being of course occurs: and one 
important aspect of this is the manner in which our existence is addressed to the things or 
objects of our experience. As part of an ideological construction, fear and desire act both 
as things and as subjective states. But it is in their relation to a certain type of self- 
forgetfulness, an experience upon which the ideological depends, that we are most 
interested for this present analysis.
Fear and desire are part of a larger experience of self-formation in which their 
ideological expression is repeatedly generated out of tendencies and latency of myth and 
nihilism. These tendencies we need only view as the broad parameters of forces and 
elements in which fearfulness and the object of need are brought together as ‘real 
collisions’, but which, at the same time, lend to the ideological a coherence and power it 
might otherwise struggle to possess. In myth and the abyss no pre-ordained relation or 
attitude to existence can be assumed - but, as ideological elements, a part of their 
development is surely that of artificially suspending a self-awareness that fear and desire 
might otherwise engender. One conclusion to be drawn from this could be that processes 
of deception and constant misidentification situate the subject in an endlessly 
contradictory relation to an ideological reality -  that, as a result of fear and desire, 
humanity is necessarily caught within a fictional world of false need and self-control: But 
this cannot explain to us what it is that any such falseness is itself wanting and needing by 
way of desire and fear.
An explanation via a theorization of alienation as the basis of the subject’s need to 
assimilate the fundamental dissatisfaction of desire, and thus to be subject to the fears that 
a recognition of absence institutes for us, is fraught with the paradoxes of this state of 
alienated existence, and yet remains a forceful statement of the problem of the human 
condition. The human experience of estrangement is a difficult issue for the critique of 
ideology precisely because it presents to us such fundamental contradictions. We can be 
aware of the situatedness of desire within conditions of alienation and yet still not have
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fully understood this as a subjective and objective experience. Stanely Rosen argues that 
desire is the desire for oneself, “or for my interior essence from which I have become 
detached” , 41 and this certainly is one aspect of the problem: But so too is the sense of just 
what relation to representation, if any, the subject has and what this means for the place 
of reality in this relation. As Henry argues, “to represent to oneself a thaler does not 
imply that one has one in one’s pocket” .42 What we are capable of imagining must also 
be a part of this question of subjectivity in relation to the object. Thinking a subject 
outside the terms of representation of an object rather than being in the condition of 
objectivity does, of course, mean shifting an analysis to the question of being itself.
The terms of this search might not necessarily coincide with the ideological, and it 
is partly for this reason that the very idea of alienation has been prematurely marginalized 
from philosophical debate. Along with the dismissal of ideology is that which the 
ideological seemed to most effectively address, and so a suspicion as to the actual 
existence of alienation has attended the marginalization of ideology critique. But 
alienation continues to exist, and the fear and desire that arise in relation to the existence 
of alienation operate as important positions taken in relation to existence and thus in 
relation to a sense of self. What alienation is a sign of is conditions of servitude that can 
be expressed in and through a wide variety of social relations. It is, however, as 
representations, as consciousness, that they constitute a dimension of irreality for the 
ideological. It is then firstly this dimension that we need to understand.
These paradoxes and contradictions of subjective states create for us today a 
number of difficult issues to consider. At first glance it would certainly seem that 
present-day strategies and technologies of command manage to perform a strange 
implosion of the internally externalized nature of the alienating effect: Instead of 
substantiating the distancing that alienation entails in the forms of objecification through 
which it is produced, alienation today appears more as an almost seamlessly incorporated 
part of the contemporary subject’s thoroughly rationalized, organizational profile. The 
exteriority that constitutes alienation is recognized neither as this nor as an attitude taken 
with regard to existence. This does not need to mean that there is no possibility of 
anroutside’ or critical distance, or that there is instead only a life inside the citadel, a life
41 Stanley Rosen, G. W. F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science o f Wisdom (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1974), p. 41.
42 Michel Henry, “The Critique of the Subject”, trans. Peter T. Connor in Who Comes After the Subject?, 
eds. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 159.
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whose alienating effects can no longer be perceived or distinguished from life simply as it 
is lived. Fear and desire make sense to us by way of images that we rarely experience 
directly or perfectly clearly. Indeed, as ideologies, these archetypes cannot constitute 
direct subjective experience. This is not because we fail to experience them as 
fundamental emotional states -  we often do -  but because the state in which they exist as 
ideology shifts their experience between reality and irreality. What this means is that the 
nature of alienation is certainly capable of being moulded to the dictates of new and 
changing forms of identity and value, including those forms in which subjectivity is re­
established along the lines of both a need for unmediated command and an aversion to 
self-understanding as a responsibility to others - in other words, a subjectivity that 
interacts with an inhibiting reality or irreality. This makes the character of fear and desire 
as things, as objects, much more compelling, most of all where a hesitation or abdication 
from existence is implicated.
The paradoxical unfreedom of everyday life
Why should we define this as the ideological and not as some more definitive 
judgement in relation to these subjective states? As we have just mentioned, there is 
something in the ideological character of subjective states that distances the self from an 
immediate experience of these states as life. Involved in any recoil from existence is the 
capacity to suspend or render ineffectual self-awareness; but not merely self-awareness. 
Experience too becomes excluded from consciousness within this ontological dimension 
of irreality. Where this entails a severing of one’s connectedness to the other what 
follows is a weariness or hesitancy with existence itself, and it is here that justification, 
impotency and refusal as self-forgetfulness is primary. This constitutes a realm in which 
the ideological is not merely present but necessitated. This should then make us question 
the assumption that ideology is merely a means to some expressed purpose, rather than 
seeing it as something that inheres within itself, or more precisely within its 
representations and images. But let us first take a step back from these expressions of 
what we know to be antagonistic existence to consider how the orientation of 
contemporary forms of the ideological might reveal to us why particular manifestations 
of a subjective mediation of objectivity (in fear and desire) might situate us within 
conditions of unfreedom.
Involved in a sense of contemporary antagonism we have highlighted an impulse 
that is frequently ignored or marginalized in the theorization of ideology - the quest for 
meaning, or understanding, in conditions of unfreedom. This is what we have mentioned
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in terms of an anticipatory consciousness and will later investigate further by considering 
the dialectical relation between ideology and presentiment. This dialectic is present in 
much of the knowledge and creativity of human life. The hope to find meaning is not, 
however, in any sense straightforward: We may not even recognize any playing out of a 
dialectic of freedom and control other than in the disparate, incommensurate relation of 
our imagination to reality. And this realm of the imagination might well remain one in 
which a cultural heritage has made us apprehensive or disregarding in the expression of 
our creativity. We might well be too preoccupied with the banality of distractions of a 
commodified world or too trapped within the fears that an authoritarian existence entails. 
Debord indeed argues that present-day existence is one in which the commodity is now 
beyond criticism -  “no one can be the enemy of what exists, nor transgress the omerta 
which applies to everything” . 43 The meaning given to reality can at times place us only 
within the confines of a consciousness of the representations one gives to oneself of a 
reality from which life has escaped or been merely marginally present. The direct, 
immediate experience of life might have washed over and leaked out from real being. 
We might be too fearful or distrustful of our own capacity to change these realities and 
the desire to question our quiddity and actuality: As Nietzsche asks us, “Not being birds, 
how do you propose to nest on an abyss? ” 44 Certainly if we are unable to even imagine 
ourselves in sure-winged flight, then the view of the abyss we have created will very 
likely overwhelm us. But does this mean that the relation between interiority and 
exteriority has become fractured beyond even any perception, and thus that consciousness 
as some conception of the self through exteriority is now impossible?
We have throughout the thesis presented what we take to be some fundamentally 
important aspects of this abyss -  the commodification, in a spectacularized form, of 
almost every part of existence, the reproduction of unconscious fear and constraint and, 
partly as a response to these, the formation of inventive needs. The attainment of the 
dignity of humanity, we have argued, is not easily adjusted to these potential pitfalls.
43 Debord, Comments on Society o f  the Spectacle, par. VIII. Debord continues: “Wherever the spectacle 
has its dominion the only organized forces are those which want the spectacle. [ ...]  We have dispensed 
with that disturbing conception, which was dominant for over two hundred years, in which a society was 
open to criticism or transformation, reform or revolution”. Ibid.
44 This translation o f Nietzsche is from Georges Bataille’s work On Nietzsche, trans. Bruce Boon (St. Paul, 
Minnesota: Paragon House, 1994), p. 46 and captures rather more than Hollingdale’s translation o f ‘The 
Illustrious Sages’ as ‘The Famous Philosophers’ which is construed thus: “You are no eagles: so neither do 
you know the spirit’s joy in terror. And he who is not a bird shall not make his home above abysses”. See 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book For Everyone and No One, trans. R. J. Hollingdale 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987), p. 128.
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Indeed, in the face of these problems, humanity has responded overwhelmingly in terms 
of a calculating slave, beholden to the strange lure of the dangers of the abyss it has 
created and yet unable to possess the courage required to knowingly face this 
predicament. However, in spite of the perils of such an existence, the creativity and 
imaginative yearnings of humanity persist and, indeed, engage with the very unfreedoms 
of everyday life that we have indicated. There is in fact no more fruitful place for the 
search for knowledge, which will in any case reach out for its due, than the abyss over 
which we hover. ‘The power of myth is indeed given its necessary veracity within 
conditions of the fragility and inconsistency of constructions of human freedom. Live 
dangerously!’, Nietzsche commends, in order to seek in all things for what in them must 
be overcome.45 Doing so, however, has meant contending with the many and varied 
exigencies of power and, perhaps more importantly, with one’s understanding of, and 
response to, power. The power of our will and our will to power are complicated 
constructions indeed. This tangled web of individual and collective, historical, social and 
cultural needs, desires and motivations is where we want to situate the ideological. This 
world in which attempts to make sense of constraint and antagonism are expressed 
through the ideological is also a world containing, what Neal Ascherson has recently 
referred to as, ‘spaces of authenticity’. These spaces exist as a type of spontaneity or 
truthfulness against which a tyranny of fakeness resides. 46 As Ascherson contends, these 
spaces provide humanity with a moral survival. If this problematic realm of meaning 
seems to present us with an impossibly difficult field of investigation then it is perhaps 
worthwhile restating that our focus is upon only one aspect of this -  it is centred upon the 
dialectical relation between freedom and unfreedom and on specific instances of this said 
dynamic. This relation is itself, of course, a dense and complex area for us to consider, 
but again our focus is deliberately narrow: we have looked at and will continue to 
consider two specific ‘malaises of unfreedom’ -  here in this chapter archetypes of myth 
and nihilism given form in desire and fear. But it is first to a theorization of the context 
of these forms as malaises in contemporary social existence that we need to turn. Let us 
consider this by concentrating for a moment upon a current element and real collision of 
being encapsulated within a citadel culture.
45 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, par. 283.
46 Neal Ascherson, “Reflections on International Space”, London Review o f Books, 24 May, 2001, p. 10. 
Ascherson refers to a contemporary state in which everything is fake: “fake patriotism and fake history, 
fake elections and fake public enthusiasm; phoney economic statistics and hypocritical constitutions and 
imposing”. Ibid.
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Life inside the citadel
What is interesting in any ontology of ideological antagonism for us today is the 
sense of the incompleteness of an understanding of the relation between the objective and 
subjective. This is particularly apparent to us by way of a theorization of ideology. It 
was not, however, fully apparent to the theorists of ideology we have considered. As we 
have seen, a tendency to emphasize the realm of the ideological as a type of 
superstructural emanation of a very objectivist base, as well as and perhaps more 
importantly, the very objective-seeming tide of modem changes in capitalism 
(bureaucratization, rationalization, the extension of an economic rationale into numerous 
aspects of life previously lived outside the clutches of commodification, and so on) 
alerted these theorists to the unavoidably objective side of ideology. What is also clear is 
that an awareness of these conditions as loss, alienation and the inability of the self to 
realize capacities and needs, permitted something crucial to a sense of the possibility of 
humanity to transform its conditions.
The same shared sense of a loss or overwhelmingly manipulated construction of 
the self as a result of the fragmentation of a system of alienated production has, in more 
recent times, undergone a spectacular inversion by being transformed into accounts of the 
playful heterogeneity of a world of endless choice and yet ultimately fixed actuality. 
However we might want to interpret the reasons for this turn, it surely makes us need to 
question whether ideology critique is indeed best addressed to a view of actuality rather 
than possibility. For it is undoubtedly the case that the problems of unfreedom would 
seem heavily grounded in a leaden actuality: The transformation of exchange into monied 
commodities seems to distort our sense of value more than our deluded desires; authority 
bludgeons us more than our own submission. But if we ask ourselves why a 
disconnection between what appears as actual and what we imagine is possible, between 
object and subject, delusion and hope, has emerged, then we are bound to see the side of 
the relation between subject and object that has so eluded most ideology critique -  that of 
the subjective and its mediation. This is no doubt able to be uncovered in a sense of the 
alienated desire, and yet continuing need, for the self-encounter the individual 
experiences, but what if these are no longer held to make any sense to the contemporary 
subject? Is it the case that only “the greatest impudence still has words for reality” ? 47
47 Sloterdijk, Critique o f Cynical Reason, p. 546.
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One reality that, throughout the thesis, we have contended exists, whether it might 
be considered impertinent to do so or not, is that ideology currently takes place in 
something like a ‘citadel culture’, as Werckmeister refers to it. What we want to first 
consider here by mentioning this is what sort of a condition or conditional event this 
inhibiting reality poses for the subject and her ideological engagement in the world. We 
have already suggested not only that this culture has persisted for some time but that 
citadel society, its narrowing of thought and ‘painful self-indulgence’, have more recently 
most certainly made critique difficult. 48 The turn to a self-reflective focus upon language 
structure and the sort of, at once, both inconclusive and all-encompassing explication of 
philosophy which this entails, has made of the relationship between experience and 
consciousness a long-forgotten exercise. More importantly, it has replaced ideology 
critique as “the philosophical form of reflection germane to argumentative culture” with 
an endlessly decisionless crisis consciousness that is self-assured in its place outside the 
need to withstand critique. 49 As Werckmeister sees it, such a mode of reflection will 
inevitably be “tied to passing moments or repetitiously reactive, naive or cynical” , 50 and 
fit schematically well with the privileges of a citadel society - but this does not mean that 
we can return blithely to any former sense of a critique of ideology as political critique. 
The generalized fear contained within a world of surveillance and supposed security -  the 
“dense net of democracy’s self-policing”, as is argued of the culture of the citadel - 
makes critique an endangered activity and, from the perspective of the citadel itself, a 
totally unnecessary activity. The fact that much radical philosophy has merely accepted 
this unmistakable message from the garrison of unfreedom is a sad reflection of the times, 
but one which we contend, here, in this chapter, is worth challenging.
These theoretical difficulties surely indicate something of the conditional problem 
of a citadel culture itself, where the very fear and insecurity upon which such a culture 
depends comes to be believed in, and acted in accordance with, the reified necessity its 
ideologies affirm. If the citadel’s assumed necessity is a trap, it is one that has been 
structured not only out of a retreat from critical engagement (to which the excesses of 
post-modernism lent considerable credence) but by the very real powers of the citadel 
itself. How such power manifests itself subjectively as everyday forms of life is a 
difficult and complex issue: Certainly there are processes of subjectivization, in the
48 Werckmeister, Citadel Culture. We may theorize that it has persisted from a period perhaps well before 
the deconstruction of critique of the 1970s.
49 Ibid., p. 20.
50 Ibid., p. 22.
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Foucauldian sense, that somehow create parallels between self-identity and consciousness 
and external techniques of power, but whether these primarily involve subjective 
individualization and procedures of objective totalization as such, is more open to 
question . 51 For this dichotomy between subjective individualization and objective 
totalization seems very much more threatened with indistinction in today’s political 
climate than the sort of dichotomies of absolutism/democracy, emancipation/control, or 
radical/conservative that so bother neo-Foucauldians. Without doubt we live in a world 
in which, as I have previously argued, the nature of what democracy means is redefined 
to encompass the very much less than democratic existence in which we participate; a 
world where what is constituted as self-hood is in fact the deadly conformity of 
submission to an ideal that is based on selfishness and egocentricity in the most 
generalized, massified sense. But this does not mean that we are unable to reflect upon 
this critically, unless of course we have abandoned the critique of ideology that once 
served this purpose reasonably well.
At this time of distinctly bad conscience we need to be able to recognize the 
nature of the worlds in which we live. Where a system shows very few signs of 
democratic values and many more of authoritarian, totalitarian excess, of intolerance, 
hatred and detachment from a sense of the plight of others, we need to be able to assess 
this in its own terms, including its ideological terms, to reveal the very distance from 
democracy or towards totalitarianism that our current existence has travelled. The 
alternative critique -  to deduce some inner solidarity between democracy and 
totalitarianism (more usually undertaken perhaps at an historico-philosophical level, it 
should be said, than as an historiographical claim, but one that nonetheless consigns 
conceptual difference to historical irrelevancy) -  prevents us from seeing not only the 
latent form of the possibilities of rejuvenation but the present contradictions upon which 
possibility is based. If we ask ourselves from where it might be that new realities 
emerge, it is necessarily related to the possibility, to what is not yet determined, of the 
present. On this basis, we would argue further to this that the kind of political and 
philosophical critique offered by a critique of ideology is much more in keeping with the 
current tenor of the times -  times in which the self-conscious cynicism and grandiose
51 Alain Badiou in a not particularly straightforward way, defines subjectivization thus: “Subjectivization -  
as the aporetic nexus of a name-too-many and an un-known operation -  is what traces in situ the becoming 
multiple of the true, starting from the nonexistent point at which the event has convoked the void and 
interpolated itself between the void and itself’. Alain Badiou, “On a Finally Objectless Subject”, trans. 
Bruce Fink, in Who Comes After the Subject?, eds. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy 
(London: Routledge, 1991), p. 28.
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disbelief of a post-modern sensibility is being successively disaffirmed by repeated 
instances of distances away from or towards a quest for a critical awareness, perhaps even 
at times engaging us in a type of ‘sovereignty of the moment’ or form of life in which we 
are able to experience thought in its potentiality. But the question remains as to how any 
sense of self-experience might constitute a beingness when much of this emerges out of 
an alienated existence. What kind of decision is left within what many have already 
agreed upon as a decisionless culture? Has not a cynical reason so diminished any self­
certainty that the call to self-understanding seems hollow in its very seriousness? 
Cynicism, as we will shortly see, never emerges on its own without the expression and/or 
repression of other types of reason. But, more than this, it is part of a play of elements 
and powers that shows some attempt to engage in the processes of the world for what 
they are. That it is ultimately only able to do this as a negative moment of an engagement 
in the world, as only a sublimated introjection of presentiment, is the problem that we 
will shortly pursue. This, as we will argue, will show us something of the contradictory 
expression of the ideological in contemporary life.
The deployment o f  paranoia and the subject/object separation
What then might we conjecture in relation to a citadel culture and the seeming 
obliteration of a critical distance between processes of subjectivization and procedures of 
objective totalization? The problem is not with individualized understandings of 
subjectivity and the relation of the subject to her world, as is so often suggested; it is 
much more with a bland conformity of acceptance that assumes a level of generalization 
and does not question the individual’s own separation of thought and deed. This 
conformist generalization, as we will consider later in the chapter, ignores a sense of 
being in common. We are returned, then, to the problem of the separation between 
subject and object, a separation that frequently manifests itself in what appears as a 
determination of the subject by objective procedures, as a kind of false harmonization 
between subject and object. In relation to the self-directed external control that a citadel 
culture must find, this separation takes place predominantly on the basis of paranoia- a 
fear of and a fear directed towards what is outside the individual subject.
A citadel culture involves redefining a position in relation to the sort of cynical 
awareness that a contemporary consciousness brings to modem power relations. A fear 
reduced to the level of the other who also experiences the presence of the citadel, is able 
to already address the disbelief one might feel confronts manifestations of power. It is in 
this sense a relocation of fear derived from an experience of a citadel culture itself to any
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other, and very often precisely those others, whose own freedom the citadel most curtails. 
Paranoia presupposes a being who can recognize herself in a relation of radical 
separation. And one’s thought here need not determine the meaning of one’s deed -  in 
fact a fracturing most serves the tendency to turn the violation of free being into a type of 
detachment where freedom becomes a recognition of one’s right to realize this 
detachment. Whether this recourse to potential violence against each other that a citadel 
culture bestows on each one of us is realized by more impassive or nonchalant means, 
such as we experience in everyday conditions of fetishization and exploitation, or 
whether it is through more overtly intemperate, uncontrollable outbursts of hatred and 
frenzy, this detachment itself is deeply corrupting.
Assessing what is novel about these manifestations of fear within a citadel culture 
is not our particular purpose here: For although there would appear to be a number of 
newly-fashioned ways in which the violence of such a culture can be realized this 
detachment it requires is also the context for much of the critique of ideology we have 
witnessed in the ‘modernist’ approach to ideas. To understand the idea of an ideological 
relation between subject and object as a problem of cultural inheritance does mean that 
we are bound to consider those elements of spectacular power, which, as Debord tells us, 
are so “despotic in spirit” 52 and that quite obviously structure aspects of the lives people 
lead. But so too does it entail a much more extensive engagement with the subjective 
aspect of the instantiation of power and unfreedom, and one that is able to offer more 
than a psychological fit for the empowered or disempowered: For is it the case that they 
really ‘know not what they do’, as Zizek writes, or better still, for it is ultimately a 
personal question, that I continually fail to know what it is that I do? Is our existence not 
constantly one of the opportunity of bearing witness? If this is the case what does this 
then mean for any ethical commitment to life? At a superficial level, this of course is the 
process that takes place -  a failure to fully assess one’s relation to one’s world, a failure 
to know oneself -  but this might not tell us very much about the mediation between 
subject and object that subtends this failure. Let us look at some contemporary examples 
of this problem in the light of what we have just argued about a citadel culture. These 
examples concern the problem of authenticity and the situatedness of being in relation to 
what it is of the object and our subjective states that we are able to inhabit. We will here 
consider the examples of cynicism and sentimentality as contemporary instances of the 
ideological.
52 Debord, Comments on the Society o f the Spectacle, p. 6.
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A Contemporary Critique o f Subjectivity and the Ideological
Recipes fo r  the weak self: cynical and sentimental reason as inauthenticity
Well before Adorno’s 1939 criticism of Kierkegaard that would lead to his more 
general critique of what he considered ‘the German ideology’ of existentialism - that 
approach to subjectivity he thought pervaded by ‘the jargon of authenticity’ - the idea of a 
false authenticity had captured the modem imagination.53 Nietzsche, as Adomo well 
recognized, was the previous generation’s scourge of the inauthentic (although to 
somewhat different purpose than Adomo suggests), and Marx before him, as Adomo 
surely means us to sense, was the inquisitor of his own generation, sinking his serpent’s 
tooth into the purveyors of an earlier ‘German ideology’.54 This issue of how to read the 
genealogy of ideas is, as we might recall, what Marx took to be the problem of the 
critique put forward by Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer and Stimer -  here he detected an 
approach to the kinds of representations humanity forms as being, erroneously, one of the 
dismissal of ideas as false conceptions. What Adorno, however problematically, 
sensitizes us to is the realm of the “actual, conditioned, and contestable” that a jargon of 
authenticity papers over with a reverential silence, assuming or consciously adopting an 
‘aura’ of lofty meaning that, for Critical Theory, could only ever be a frozen emanation of 
its own impossibility.55
If the problem of the possibility of a contemporary authenticity seemed to congeal 
here, mid-way through the century of perhaps its greatest challenge, earlier treatments of 
much the same difficulty had too raised the spectre of an unreachable self-understanding. 
Whether some exteriority prevented this moment of understanding or whether it was 
more the nature of the self -  a self that tended to fall into the cup of wisdom rather than 
tasting its more measured contents, this a habit Kierkegaard chastised himself for56 -  
authenticity was considered hellishly difficult to attain. Lukäcs, as we have previously 
considered, cast doubt upon the self-knowledge of the enslaved, as if such a concept
53 Adorno’s essay “On Kierkegaard’s Doctrine o f Love” o f 1939, as has been remarked, anticipates his 
work The Jargon of Authenticity o f  1964, subtitled in the German The German Ideology.
54 O f course, as we mentioned in the chapter on Marx’s approach to ideology, what Marx takes to be ‘the 
German ideology’ is something much broader than a strictly German idealism.
55 Adomo, The Jargon of Authenticity, yp. 11,9.
56 Soren Kierkegaard, The Journals o f Soren Kierkegaard, ed. and trans. Alexander Dru (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1951), p. 17. “It seems as though I had not drunk from the cup o f wisdom, but had fallen 
into it.”
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suggested something implausible about the ability of the subject to impinge upon the 
object in this fashion, coming to construct out of self-knowledge and the self-overcoming 
of false divisions between thought and deed, a similarly fake authenticity.
What is it that is at issue here in this investment in subjectivity of an 
inauthenticity beyond the subject’s knowledge? Is the problem really one of recognition 
(the traditional ideological problem) or do we witness here the setting in train a 
philosophical tendency that has itself outlasted the twentieth century to equate everyday 
life with a sense of an inescapable inauthenticity? For if it is the latter we are surely 
presented with the difficulty of detecting where the authentic finishes and the inauthentic 
begins, or vice versa, to know that it is now the all-pervasive reign of the inauthentic with 
which we are faced, and to sense where reality intervenes within a process that grips in 
massively ideological fashion.
If we consider for a moment what it is we encounter in Lukacs’s approach to the 
authentic we can see that a commitment to an ontology devolves itself into a largely 
closed necessity of the determination of causality. As the most widespread form of 
ideological control, reification is the necessity of the historical process, an historical 
process which unfolds, in Hegelian fashion, as a series of conditions whose momentary 
existence is determined by the past. This past need not be presented as a fixed 
determinism and yet Lukäcs tends to provide his reader with little alternative to the 
impenetrable confluence of domination and reified thought. It is difficult here to perceive 
the place of the accidental, of interruptions between conditions and impulses through 
which the subject is not merely scattered but able to act both consciously and 
unconsciously. The reified subject, the subject of control, suggests the triumph of the 
actual. The possible has already been captured materially by the present and there is no 
space for the construction of a new content that has not already been causally determined. 
The relation between the self and existence is preserved, embalmed by an external 
determination. Authenticity awaits another determination. Interestingly, this is very 
much at odds with some of Lukacs’s early theorizing on the necessarily problematic state 
of the soul weighed down by ideals: Here, Lukäcs could see that the victory of reality was 
never final; that reality is repeatedly challenged by new rebellions of the idea and that the 
very strength of reality itself is the melancholy of existence within the conflictual duality 
of diminished belief and a world incapable of showing us any way through this 
uncertainty. A transcendence that is anchored only in experience is an empty
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immanence, a surface of shredded substance and tattered god-forsakenness: For Lukäcs, 
there is the need to “return to the home of all things” .57 During the early period of his 
writing, this he saw as the “self-surmounting of a subjectivity that has gone as far as it 
was possible to go” - the highest freedom that can be achieved in a world abandoned by 
God. 58 When later we encounter in Lukäcs the category of a party-led surmounting of a 
subjectivity now fully imposed rather than struggled with, in constituted and constitutive 
relations of historico-philosophical realities, then we realize that the via dolorosa of 
interiority has all but disappeared within his thinking. What has also attenuated is any 
sense of a possible that is not already a fully realized actual. It is here that we witness the 
assumption of an always-compromised authenticity, save that beyond the need for 
authenticity itself. The authentic, sui generis, cannot exist. A critique of subjectivity as 
the transformation of the self has been lost.
This assumption marks the work not only of much modernism but post­
modernism as well. Indeed, what is interesting to consider is the persistence of a sense of 
false authenticity, from the negative critique of much early and mid-twentieth century 
philosophy to the post-modernist contribution later in the century. In both cases the 
ideological plays the role of a mechanical externality, its totalizing presence or totalizing 
absence a cause equated with an effect. We will shortly consider an example. Let us first 
mention that the way in which we will approach our examination of cynicism and 
sentimentality is to view these cultural archetypes as contemporary forms of 
disenchantment. It is, as we will later come to theorize, an ambivalent disenchantment 
and it is this ambivalence that casts the whole question of authenticity in a rather different 
light.
Cynicism: ‘The garden gnome in quotation marks ’
For some time there has been a somewhat self-conscious awareness that there is, 
what Peter Sloterdijk refers to as, a ‘cynical reason’ characterizing much of one’s 
everyday confrontation with prevailing ideologies. Depending upon one’s outlook this 
cynical reason is the bete noire of the authentic, its manifestation as a false form of 
authenticity in a necessarily demythified world, or a clever ruse to make us think that 
authenticity is now a thing of the past. Because this cynicism (and here we are referring
57 Lukäcs, The Theory o f the Novel, p. 92.
58 Ibid., pp. 93,92.
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to its most recent advent during the ‘post-modern’ 1980s) was itself, or very quickly 
became, a useful marketing strategy, it is somewhat difficult to disentangle it from its 
own spectacularization. Sloterdijk regards cynicism as the “discontent in our culture”; it 
is “enlightened false consciousness”, a “modernized, unhappy consciousness”, which, 
significantly, “no longer feels affected by any critique of ideology”.59 In contra­
distinction to Sloterdijk’s argument, the important point to consider is that, as a kind of 
consciousness that occupies a place between myth and reality, a type of reason such as 
cynicism always exists alongside other and sometimes quite contradictory approaches to 
reality. Sloterdijk’s argument emerges on the assumption that philosophy is now in its 
death throes (due to the failure of any “great themes” to be realized, “it is as if a naive 
elan had suddenly been lost”, as if “Western civilisation has worn out its Christian 
costume”). What is left is a cynicism about the world.
The sort of decline in a belief in reason, which Sloterdijk’s idea of loss suggests, 
is in fact as much indicated by modernity as it can be sensed in the supposed eclipse of 
modernity itself: Indeed, perhaps the most lasting legacy of modernism has been its 
engagement with the difficult questioning of just what we might take reason to be, rather 
than any simplistic adulation of reason, progress, and the like. That, today, we see this in 
terms of a sense of continual deferral, of the generation of sites of difference that remain 
contained within the types of power by which they are dominated (rationalization, 
technological capacity, a culture socialized to mutability, and so on) is very much a part 
of the modem condition. The modem, as Adelino Zanini argues, is a constant residue of 
being.60 What has changed is the current absorption of the very extremities of 
modernity’s nightmare into the everyday restructuring of contemporary life. The idea 
that a very real impossibility lay in store for the authentic has now been easily subsumed
59 Sloterdijk argues: “Being concerned, caring about people, securing peace, feeling responsible, caring 
about the quality of life and about the environment - none of that really works.” Sloterdijk explains the 
impetus for cynicism in a critical impulse “overpowered by a sour temperament”. In the hands of Critical 
Theory this impulse has put forward a moral position not of an elevated, distanced critique but what 
Sloterdijk calls a priori pain - a micrology that is able, from the “standpoint of having no standpoint” to 
express the discomfort of things having “become too close for comfort for us”. A critique of cynical 
reason, however, seeks to expose to critique a spiritual and moral scandal, thereby developing the 
connection between cynicism and realism. Critical Theory, for Sloterdijk, merely furthers “melancholic 
stagnation”. Sloterdijk’s explanation of the critique of cynicism is rather inelegantly summarized by 
Andreas Huyssen in his foreword to Sloterdijk’s work as “a new type of postenlightened schizocynicism 
that remains immune to traditional forms of ideology critique”. See Sloterdijk, Critique o f Cynical Reason, 
Foreword, Preface and Chapter 1.
60 Adelino Zanini, “Weak Thought between Being and Difference”, trans. Michael Hardt, in Radical 
Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics, eds. Paolo Vimo and Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 53.
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within a cynical, fearful culture. Thus a variety of approaches to ideas -  from the most 
cynical to the most sentimental -  is just as likely to characterize contemporary culture 
(what Sloterdijk and many others would see as post-modern culture) as that which has 
taken place earlier; only today we see the particular archetypes of cynicism and 
sentimentality manifest in concentrated form in a more immediate coincidence between 
the discontinuities of fragmented, contingent work and social conditions and the fears and 
desires humanity expresses. It is not as if we have suddenly emerged into an era of a 
caustic jeering at society’s more fanciful claims, having left behind a former obsequious 
respect for these same promises.
The process of emotional opportunism conveyed in the cynical and the 
sentimental has developed in relation to long-emergent tendencies towards the 
intensification of technologies of power and various functions of production that the 
present is merely better able to exploit. A shift towards increasingly technologized, 
rationalized and information-based work methods has meant the need to enclose 
subjectivity within a rationale of the dictates of organizational structure and command. 61 
A failure to recognize this results in an inability to appreciate the rise of an equally naive 
elan in various different beliefs in the wake of the fraying of what was always a contrived 
sense of the triumph of reason.62 We will shortly consider this in the example of 
sentimentality. The re-grouping necessitated by the demands of a globalized unfreedom 
is fundamentally concerned with subjectivity intoned in ideological terms. Whether by 
placing greater emphasis upon a particular manifestation of the ideological (as in 
cynicism, for example) we then infer a characterization of an era itself, is certainly worth 
considering; although it should be said that to do so would require a rather fuller 
examination of the cultural archetypes of the times than we are presenting here. 
Sloterdijk himself seems to sense something too overwhelming in a concept of cynicism 
that does not allow for a degree of antagonism. He distinguishes a cynicism represented 
by a popular rejection of official culture from the cynicism of the ‘rulers’ by referring to 
the former as ‘kynicism’. Kynicism, “the cheeky, positive side of cynicism” is in this 
sense a type of counter-strategy, the only subversive reason left for contemporary critical 
intellectuals. A new critique is needed he considers that comes to terms with a cynicism,
61 The sort of transformation I have in mind here has been occurring from at least the 1970s and, in some 
fundamentally connected ways, well before.
62 I am only all too well aware here that this requires considerably more explanation: It will, however, need 
to await another project.
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which “ventures forth with naked truths that, in the way they are presented, contain 
something false”.63
A differentiation between types of cynicism is useful and yet Sloterdijk’s 
description seems to offer considerably less than Nietzsche’s distinction between types of 
scepticism. For Nietzsche there is a “gentle, gracious, lulling poppy” scepticism, a 
“security police” for that delicate, easily frightened creature, the sceptic, which results in 
a paralysis of the will “now gloomy like a cloud over-charged with question-marks” and 
nihilistic denial - and a ‘stronger’ type of scepticism that “does not believe but retains 
itself’, that “undermines and takes into possession”.64 This contrast presents a more 
useful distinction between types of scepticism or cynicism because it acknowledges both 
the debilitating and the experimental forms of scepticism. And here, with such a 
distinction, we can allow for a more complex mediation of reality by the subject of 
ideology. For, in cynicism, there is often little more than a dubious appropriation of the 
object or, as Peter Bürger refers to it, the problem of the ironic appropriation of kitsch. 
By the end of the 1980s, Bürger argues, the need to display one’s sense of irony had 
reached such common status that one could not help “suspecting a garden gnome of being 
an ironic quotation”, which, as Bürger points out, is “particularly perplexing given that a 
garden gnome in quotation marks is in no way distinguishable from what one might call 
the real thing”.65 This ultimately reductionist tendency of finding irony in each and every 
aspect of life was bound to give a certain necessary, ironic inauthenticity to the cultural 
products of an exhausted era. At the same time, the easy resort to a self-parodying sense 
of the inauthentic has no doubt made bearing witness to a democratic equilibrium of 
barbarism, intolerance and neglect much more comfortable to sustain.
The fact that cynicism exists is not really in dispute; what is, however, is that it 
has somehow become the only sentiment left for humanity to believe in. Undoubtedly, 
subjects of ideology are in many cases aware of the falsity or ruling interests involved in 
ideological claims to universality: they are able, with very little difficulty on occasions, to 
pierce through the false solemnity and insincerity, not to mention the hypocrisy, of grand 
claims to universal justice, equality and freedom. Whether they are able to view 
transparently with quite the same detached, knowing disbelief the claims of commodified
63 See Sloterdijk, Critique o f Cynical Reason, Preface, p. xxxix.
64 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, pars. 208, 209.
65 Peter Bürger, “Aporias of Modem Aesthetics”, New Left Review, no. 184 (November/December, 1990): 
pp. 47-48.
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desire in the form of branded product hype, of the overwhelming slavishness and 
conformity involved in wage-labour, of the fear and self-doubt required of a citadel 
culture, let alone the more existential matters of the impossibility of achieving eternal 
happiness or freedom from death, is more open to question. Nietzsche’s yearning for a 
state of forgetfulness -  “the capacity to feel unhistorically during its duration” which he 
believes suggests the rightness of cynicism does not really provoke enough of a claim 
against the inauthentic: and, as he has already told us, it is in any case merely the 
uninterruptedly small happiness of the herd animal -  a state we might indeed envy and 
even do well on occasions to achieve, but not the motivation for the possibility of being, a 
possibility which is inevitably based upon both fear and hope . 66 It is also the case that 
this cynicism, on the part of those who see through the false claims of ideology, is a 
position quite obviously exploited by those who attempt to control and live out the reality 
of ideologies. A cynicism of the prevailing culture, and a knowledge of the gulf between 
what is presented and what is reality, is often taken into account by the purveyors of 
ideology to the extent that the obvious falseness of ideology is acknowledged in advance 
with a knowing, ironic sense of acceptance. And perhaps here those very claims for the 
universality of justice, equality and freedom need to be taken considerably more 
seriously, in the form of demands upon a polity frequently satisfied with doing very little 
to enact such claims, rather than with scoffing at their naivety of falsely propounded 
existence.
Viewed in an abstract context, the idea of a cynical reason seems a useful 
description of a certain sensibility involved in a self-reflective awareness of ideology. In 
this sense, cynicism reveals its contradictory basis in the ideological. It plays on a certain 
repulsion and separation for which it certainly provides some insight, but largely as a 
negative moment that at best sublimates an anticipatory consciousness. Of course, to 
suppose that cynicism has now replaced what was presumably a former naivety in 
relation to ideology is claiming too much. Cynicism is not as widespread as Sloterdijk’s 
thesis suggests; ideology continues to be uncynically reproduced and accepted in 
numerous instances. 67 It is at once claiming too much and yet not nearly enough. Even if
66 Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”, pp. 60, 61.
67 Sloterdijk’s claim regarding the dominance of a cynical reason is similar to the once-fashionable wisdom 
of various contemporary theorists with their claims that a McDonald’s consumer culture now dominates 
across the globe. Jean-Franpois Lyotard’s well known description of the empty eclecticism of 
contemporary culture suggests this idea, where one “listens to reggae, watches a western, eats McDonald’s 
food for lunch and local cuisine for dinner, wears Paris perfume in Tokyo and ‘retro’ clothes in Hong 
Kong”. In the midst of such post-modernist whimsy, not surprisingly Lyotard argues that “knowledge is a
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cynical attitudes do tend currently to prevail, this situation does not of itself explain what 
consequences, if any, cynicism might have upon the effectivity of ideology. It cannot be 
assumed that a cynical reason is necessarily a subversive position in relation to ideology. 
It is probably more likely that cynicism embodies a sort of ironic indecision or the 
romantic charm of ambiguity which, as we have already considered, tends more towards 
a political indifference than the politics of engagement.68 Indeed, as Timothy Bewes 
argues, cynicism is “symptomatic of a crisis in the constitution and practice of the 
political itself’.69 But perhaps most importantly cynicism needs to be seen as merely one 
type of reasoning about the world, a reasoning whose articulation has rarely, no matter 
how dominant it has seemed to be, supplanted alternative sentiments. The ironic realism 
that seemed so significant a part of the 1980s is naturally appearing rather dated precisely 
because life has continued in ways so little changed by its smug, ironic self-certainties. 
What we have is the expression of a range of different sentiments with importance to a 
critique of ideology -  these sentiments encompass both the authentic and the inauthentic 
and in much more than their most narrowly conceived terms.70 The possibility of 
authenticity is not exhausted by the mocking celebration of the inauthentic.
Whilst it is certainly the case that in many ways certain contemporary ideologies 
have ceased to act directly upon people without first being mediated through active and
matter of TV games”. See Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 76. The hyperbole of Lyotard’s 
account has been well criticized. Terry Eagleton, for example, argues that there are also “millions of other 
subjects, less exotic than Lyotard’s jet-setters”. See Terry Eagleton, “Capitalism, Modernism and 
Postmodernism”, \n New Left Review, no. 152 (July/August, 1985): p. 72.
68 We considered earlier, for example, Moretti’s point in relation to indecision. Franco Moretti, “The Spell 
of Indecision”, New Left Review, no. 164 (July/August, 1987): pp. 27-32. Moretti’s argument is made 
against left apologies for Modernism but his use of the idea of irony is also directed towards current forms 
of indecision.
69 Bewes, Cynicism and Postmodernity, p. 2.
70 As well as a cynical knowledge in the face of ideological distortions there is also what Slavoj Zizek 
writes of as the objective status of ideological fantasy within social reality itself. Zizek argues for a 
present-day variant upon Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism. Marx’s view of fetishism is interpreted 
by Zizek to currently manifest itself, in ideological terms, as the transference of the ideological belief of 
subjects to the ideological belief of things. Commodified objects are themselves conferred with beliefs in 
place of those held by subjects. It could well be argued that this is in essence Marx’s view of commodity 
fetishism although Zizek adds to this argument with his consideration of Lacan’s psychoanalytic 
investigations into the transference of beliefs, where the belief of one person maintains its integrity when 
delegated to another. “Even if we, the spectators, are just drowsily watching the show, objectively [...] we 
are doing our duty of compassion for the heroes”, Zizek writes of Lacan’s example of the role the Chorus 
plays in classical tragedy for the otherwise preoccupied spectator. Zizek, The Sublime Object o f Ideology, 
p. 35. This sort of transference attaches to the standard fetishization of commodities a further dimension 
than the idea of subjective belief but not any more than that conveyed in Marx’s analysis of the function of 
money in the Grundrisse.
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reflective filters of disbelief, detachment and disillusionment, ideological beliefs continue 
to be upheld, if not by their overt expression of any realized truth, then undoubtedly by 
their ability to conform to a certain reality, a reality which, in the last resort if not sooner, 
will frequently be secured by force.71 Ideology is unlikely to remain petrified within 
otherwise changing conditions. At certain times it might serve the interests it best 
accommodates by processes of their embellishment and mystification -  at other times, 
times perhaps less conducive to illusion, it might be the invention of need which we see 
most clearly in its presence. Present day cynicism in the face of current ideologies 
involves processes of recognition in relation to perceptions and experience of the world at 
the same time as it involves references to a certain internal reason. 72 Whether this means 
that the real is part of a structure, a reality which expresses, what Althusser refers to as, a 
distance or an internal dislocation in the real, 73 is often more difficult to immediately 
assess. 74 But even if it is clear that subjectivity is not constructed through an 
identification that is coincident with a given reality or ideological manifestation of a 
reality, it is still the case that numerous significant processes of combination between the 
subject and events mark the passage of the self within reality. Possession, money, 
exchange - all demonstrate this sort of alienation and estrangement via the philosophical 
meaning of their engagement within conditions of antagonism. The usefulness of
71 Whether this is the sort of ultimately externally imposed force -  the force of which Marx writes of the 
labour contract of the 1860s: “Between equal rights force decides” - or whether it is a more internalized 
force, this dynamic of compulsion involves complex relationships of mystification and invention. Whether 
one applies this force to oneself or has it applied is a more open question. Whilst mystifying ideologies 
persist, the neo-liberalism of recent decades is not so much about the mystification of values of democracy 
and social equality; it is much more about the invention of the ‘free’ market, ‘free’ competition, and the 
redemptive power of money. Theories of ideology would seem to need some way of accounting for such 
changes in the manner in which ideologies operate and are situated. Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 225. What is 
transferred in this exchange is not merely the sentiment of the owner of another’s labour expressed in the 
seller of one’s own, and sometimes only, property. Marx recognizes a complex interactive process, a 
dynamic dialectic in operation between the ability of one to own and the other merely to sell.
72 Thus, juridical notions of property, for example, are able to appropriate the real in such a way that what 
is real and material becomes an object in law. People experience the ideological ‘truth’ of ownership of 
property as a real, material practice, which, at the same time, renders the notion of exclusive property with 
a certain truth in relation to its own inner logic. It is not some naive, empiricist notion of ‘the Real’ which 
is supposed, against which the destruction of ideology can be deduced.
73 Althusser and Balibar, Reading Capital, p. 17.
74 Rene Daumal approaches this problem well with his example of a reality in relation to its object: “A 
knife [...] is neither true nor false. But someone who grasps it by the blade is truly in error”. Rene Daumal, 
Mount Analogue, trans. Roger Shattuck (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), p. 88. Even if one actually 
desires the reality of slicing through one’s fingers, the reality of the potential action of the blade remains 
the same. The materiality of ideology may not be so simple, as searingly as it is able to cut through and 
indeed lop from one’s consciousness the potentiality of one’s freedom, and yet it is some of this which 
radical theory must confront.
506 Ideology Critique and A Philosophy of Freedom
cynicism is most obviously in its ability to effect a type of estrangement, a distancing 
from the object that in many ways affords the object a certain ability to withdraw aspects 
of itself from view. The estrangement is also a very subjective experience that allows a 
knowledge of the object, which the subject takes to be beyond a simple identification 
with the object, as somehow outside or smarter than the type of obvious manipulation 
associated with contemporary commodity culture. It is, however, a negative power, an 
inauthenticity, a “recipe for the feeling of power [...] for those in whom precisely this is 
lacking” . 75
The issue we need to consider is whether this sense of the condition of the 
ideological implies that cynicism as an ideology is the realization of an already 
guaranteed value. Cynicism certainly seems to exist quite well alongside a mode of 
understanding that ensures a knowing estrangement. And this contemporary version of 
estrangement, which contains disenchantment as the impossibility of an alternative 
future, is entirely appropriate to unfreedom, and specifically to a ‘democratic’ unfreedom. 
Indeed, a cynical reason might be just the kind of attitude that an established regime of 
unfreedom, aware of the completely unachievable nature of a universal order of free, 
equal and autonomous people, is well able to quite generously accommodate. Better 
cynicism than any cognition of tyranny. In fact here we might concur with Marx who 
finds a certain level of contempt for general values in society as very much a part of 
bourgeois life under capitalism . 76 For Marx, a cynical, levelling process is part of the 
very fibre of a capitalist economy, dominated as it is by the mere exchange value and 
quantity of things, and the tendency towards “the measureless as measure”, as both Hegel 
and Marx express it. 77 This process has not of course been able “to transform man into a 
hat” 78 and, partly for this reason, a consciousness based on cynicism represents the 
compromised bourgeois ideal. As we have mentioned, it is surely not in the interests of 
ruling powers for those it controls to take seriously the universality of their own
75 Nietzsche, Daybreak, par. 65.
76 Referring to the moral indifference of a society which reproduces itself on the basis of the exchange 
value of commodities, Marx writes of the commodity, “[a] bom leveller and a cynic, it is always ready to 
exchange not only soul, but body, with any and every other commodity, be the same more repulsive than 
Maritomes herself.” Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 89.
77 Quoted in Lifshitz, The Philosophy o f Art o f Karl Marx, p. 97. This is also a phrase Marx uses in the 
Grundrisse in his discussion of the measurement of money by its quantity. Marx writes: “This 
measuredness contradicts its character, which must be oriented towards the measureless”. Marx, 
Grundrisse, p. 271.
78 Marx, A Contribution to the Critique o f Political Economy, p. 188.
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ideological beliefs. 79 People who seriously expect an equality and freedom 
commensurate with that by which humanity rules and is ruled are surely a constant 
danger to the existing order. Cynicism gives the very real appearance of a democracy of 
values by establishing its sense of a knowing, unable-to-b&duped, instant consciousness, 
which has always perceived falseness before it even takes hold. This assumption of 
invulnerability in the face of contemporary culture is nicely coupled by a sentimental 
reason that openly and happily displays its vulnerability to the emotion of the object. Let 
us now consider this side of contemporary ideological belief.
Sentimentality -  ‘the flagging wing o f feeling ’
One reason why cynicism (or kynicism, for that matter) is not the basis of a 
subversion or nullification of reality its theorists might have wished of it is that it exists 
alongside what I will term a ‘sentimental reason’, to which it is sometimes opposed and 
which it is sometimes deeply entwined. Neither type of reason, I will argue, is a direct 
refusal of reification but instead often a contrived assumption of a universalized 
simulacrum that rather oddly, at the same time, takes its relation to reality very much to 
heart. Sentimentality pervades the world of commodification, it is an overt way of 
selling, and a way of believing in the commodities to be bought. It has often been 
philosophically understood, as Hegel considered it, as a content of effect rather than 
substance, 80 but this critique of sentimentality immediately suggests a critically accessible 
divide between objectivity and what is merely its effects or sensuous fa9ade. As Adorno 
naturally asks of such a separation, does this not reify objectivity? 81 The ideological 
aspect of sentimental reason is not only in the superficiality and pretence it aspires to but 
in its objective manifestation as a prevented or circumvented contradiction. Let us look 
at this further.
If in cynicism we can detect a certain type of estrangement and distancing from 
the object, however ultimately disingenuous this might be, in sentimentality we see a 
sickly, cloying, idealized embrace of any superficial aspect of the commodity’s 
marketable value. Such an embracing of the object is well suited to a contemporary
79 A generalized cynicism might be perhaps the only ideological way to maintain a system where “the 
bourgeois today bums as heretics and hangs as criminals those to whom he erects monuments tomorrow”. 
Hermann Hesse, Steppenwolf, trans. Basil Creighton (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 75.
80 This is how Hegel, for example, understands sentimentalism in aesthetics. G.W.F. Hegel, Aesthetics: 
Lectures on Fine Arts, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), p. 830.
81 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 385.
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culture of the rapid reproduction of desires and the promise of immediate access. This 
sort of democracy of the commodity offers the sense that anyone with the requisite place 
in exchange (increasingly in the form of having credit, often, in other words, debt, rather 
than money as such) is able to participate in this concatenation embracing the object or its 
feeling, for a price.
The destructive frenzy of contemporary capitalism and its bizarre celebration of a 
defeated past within the present is the underpinning of the mawkish wish-fulfilment of 
sentimentality. It is the failed attempt to re-enchant a disenchanted culture.82 In a 
previous chapter we considered that the mirror society looks into for self-recognition is, 
in Althusserian terms, ‘precisely the mirror it must break if it is to know itself. And as 
long as we have some other picture of humanity through which we are able to see 
ourselves, then perhaps such action can extend beyond a cynical self-satisfied reasoning. 
For confrontation between the illusions of the object and the illusions of the self is 
perhaps nowhere more necessary than in the critique of sentimentality. Sentimentality is 
an ideology that requires a ‘deliberate unconsciousness’ in the face of its superficially 
humanizing illusions and naive consciousness. It is a direct example of Sartrean 
mauvaise fo i because it is possible to sense in it the distance from authenticity from 
which we have fled. Here we find the sort of sincerity that involves the attachment of 
hypocritical meaning to what is a real lack of freedom. Its artificial intimacy is the 
exercise of mass, bureaucratic authority. It is in this sense a dogmatic servitude. 
Benjamin writes of it tellingly as “the flagging wing of feeling, which settles down 
anywhere at all because it can go on no further” . 83 The problem is that this exhausted 
feeling is still capable of giving life to a dead culture, and it is with this that it can remain 
true enough for a life of whittled-down ethical value. It lacks the authenticity required to
82 As we have argued throughout the thesis a widespread disenchantment governs many aspects of the 
ideological struggle for meaning within a commodified society. Much of what is produced is done so under 
conditions of suffering and estrangement and an externalized, reified existence is normalized in forms of 
distraction, semblance and dishonesty in such a way that we seem contained by the dictates of a commodity 
world. And yet as human beings we are fundamentally creative, imaginative beings who create for 
ourselves a sense of what it is that is significant for us within our lives. This often means that discord exists 
between what it is the individual seeks and the nature of the thing sought and found. We experience this 
tension within a broad range of contradictions between our knowledge of our self as a profound existence 
and the reality of our everyday trivial, conformist, dominated lives. These processes lead to an 
‘estrangement effect’ as we have mentioned before and it is in this that we are able to theorize something of 
the dialectical reality of the ideological.
83 Walter Benjamin, Deutsche Menschen (Frankfurt am Main.: Suhrkamp, 1962), 75f, quoted in Peter 
Szondi, “Walter Benjamin’s City Portraits (1962)”, in On Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and 
Recollections, ed. Gary Smith (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), p. 29.
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counter the malaises of unfreedom84 but it does provide more than the reproduction of 
desire as inventions for the singular purpose of gain. It plays upon attraction and 
immersion within the givenness of reality. It is the expression of a corrupted 
presentiment.
In both cynicism and sentimentality there is something of a failure to rediscover 
being within thought, but there is still the embodied practice of some kind of a quest for 
knowledge in which an engaged, active and thinking subjectivity is expressed. It is not 
altogether surprising that a culture of technique and diffuse, disjointed knowledge - the 
culture of modernity -  produces, simultaneously, aspects of a cynical and a sentimental 
reason. These cultural archetypes hover between emotion and a type of representation 
that assumes a distancing from representation; they possess a type of proximity to the 
nature of the object without ever directly engaging with our relation to reality itself. 
They attempt a denial of the essence of technique and knowledge in a world of 
unfreedom -  that essence being one of exclusion, control and myriad forms of 
containment - by an assertion of appearance, its more-than-real semblance (cynicism) or 
its fake appearance (sentimentality). This is, most inescapably, the realm of the 
ideological. It is the ideological in its fundamentally contradictory form. What this also 
indicates for us is a sense of the relation between subject and object realized in perceptual 
modes of existence, of which we will attempt to give greater account in the following 
section. Cynicism and sentimentality reveal a sense of presentiment, most obviously 
because they express some engagement with the unfulfilled, with some future sense of 
otherness for which the present must account. Whether this engagement is entered into 
on the basis of scepticism or idealized emotion it is inevitably a dissatisfaction with the 
substance of the given. And such dissatisfaction is hardly surprising, for we live in a time 
that is not at peace, that is without “the security of the man satisfied in well-being and 
freedom”: But it is also a time, as Levinas proceeds to argue, that is “a time of 
reckoning” . 85
84 Charles Taylor views authenticity in these terms as capable of contesting the ‘malaises of modernity’ we 
have mentioned earlier. Taylor, The Ethics o f Authenticity, passim.
85 Emmanuel Levinas, Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara 
Harshav (London: The Athlone Press, 1998), pp. 190, 191.
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Democratic Unfreedom and the Calculations o f  the Inventive Slave
Let us here briefly reconsider where our analysis has taken us. We have 
highlighted a number of subjective states through which we can situate a contemporary 
understanding of the ideological. This understanding itself we have pushed to the limit of 
critique by finding in the ideological both the terrain of consciousness and representation 
through which a certain marginalization of immediate lived experience takes place and 
also seeing it as the basis for the real collisions of individuals and their conditions of life. 
On the basis of this understanding we have considered the contemporary manifestation of 
desire and fear and have looked more specifically at current cultural archetypes 
assembled as cynicism and sentimentality as forms of the ideological.
We have first attempted to make use of our interpretation of the more critical 
aspects of the theories of ideology we encountered earlier in the thesis and incorporated 
these within a contemporary approach to ideology critique. Most certainly, as Lukäcs 
thought, the end result of a pervasive disenchantment is not only a clouded sense of 
subjectivity but also a serious loss of meaning of the object world. The ‘sensuous non- 
sensuousness’ we saw Marx attribute to the object is the very quality made difficult to 
discern in the presence of disenchantment. Karl Löwith argues that humanity is 
connected with a state of disenchantment to the extent that the knowledge that the world 
is without objective meaning is also the impetus to create meaning.*6 And perhaps this is 
why the cultural archetypes humanity develops, which, in conditions of unfreedom, are 
frequently expressed in ideological terms, are also the potential bases for an anticipatory 
consciousness. How extensive this dialectic is, is surely a matter of possibility rather 
than the necessity of some perverse logic in itself, which, as we know in the work of 
Adorno and Horkheimer, results in an overwhelmingly negative critique of 
disenchantment. But theorizing a disenchantment today requires us to look at its distance 
from, as much as its engagement with, the cultural archetypes through which the 
ideological is given form. For it could perhaps be, as Vattimo argues, that 
disenchantment no longer has any “argument whatsoever to counterpose to the reduction 
of social life to the pure and simple struggle of all against all” . 87 In this case, the 
recognition of a forsakenness in the midst of what is, which is an ontological not yet
86 Karl Löwith, “Gott, Mensch und Welt in der Metaphysik von Descartes bis zu Nietzsche”, in Sämtliche 
Schriften, vol. 9, quoted in Vattimo, The Transparent Society, p. 92.
87 Vattimo, The Transparent Society, p. 103.
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made explicit as any future consciousness, returns us constantly to the values in which we 
are presently engaged.
We have for this reason highlighted examples of cynicism and sentimentality in 
which reality is both more obviously exiled from the range of representations through 
which these forms are given meaning, and is either rendered dull and indistinct or made 
more real than real as a type of fantasy reality. Here in these archetypes we have found 
contemporary examples of the sort of complacency and denial through which the 
ideological becomes most effective. This allows us to conclude several elements in 
relation to contemporary ideology. Firstly that ideology struggles to make of reality a 
seamless copy of itself, papering over a gap between reality and irreality: It is instead 
forced to deal with reality in cynical or hyperreal form in order to shift immediate 
experience from the sphere of being. Secondly, it is unable to escape the basis in 
antagonism and unfreedom upon which its evincing of immediate experience exists. This 
dialectical relation that the ideological provokes we will pursue later in the thesis.
We have mentioned the significance of a subjectivity in tension with its exteriority, 
particularly where this exteriority is one in which unrealizable fulfilment is contained 
within many of its objects. For example, desire aroused through the commodification of 
any aspect of life is an endless game of expectation and ultimate disappointment in which 
much value accorded to what we know of our productive, creative life is reduced to the 
value of money. And yet a focus upon only the objective relations of these processes 
fails to reveal the contradictory nature of a commodified culture, a culture of both decay 
and renewal but also renewal in decay and attrition in newness. A state of deliberate 
unconsciousness takes us further in the direction of situating the subject as a constructing 
part of the ideological. What we must inevitably confront here is something about the 
orientation of the subject in an identification with an egocentric nothingness. It might 
well be an inattentiveness or lack of courage in the face of the enticements of a subjective 
egoism: Nietzsche, for example, theorizes both when Zarathustra encounters a shepherd, 
convulsed and choking, with a snake hanging from his mouth. Had the shepherd been 
asleep, Zarathustra ponders, as the snake crawled into the shepherd’s throat, securing 
itself there by biting fast? No amount of tugging at the snake could dislodge i t -  to free 
himself the shepherd needed to bite the snake’s head .88 What we see in the contemporary 
world is that the ideological problem manifests itself in a type of wilful self-deception or
88 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part 3, “Of the Vision and the Riddle”, p. 180.
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cynical, self-conscious knowing that nonetheless distorts one’s relation to the commodity. 
It is by way of this self-deception that “all that is heaviest, blackest will thus crawl” . 89 
The problem of the commodity is no longer only one of a straightforward, simple 
mystification. Similarly the problem of power is not only one of external enforcement. 
The theories presented by both Lukacs and Althusser ultimately largely fail to take into 
account the ‘real collisions’ of individuals with the conditions of their lives. Unravelling 
the ideological, as we have seen in this section, thus requires something more than 
dissecting the objective basis of mystified, reified reality. We have instead focussed upon 
a type of subjectivity that is based upon need and the need to fulfil need that can best be 
described as a ‘calculating enslavement’.
Whatever else governs our view of this situation, our own ability to make a lifeless 
abstraction of so vast a separation between our inner knowledge and our everyday 
involvement with the alienating consequences of unfreedom, is certainly cause for 
theorization. We have, as mentioned, in relation to this, indicated cynicism and 
sentimentality as cultural archetypes for which a type of subjectivity is required. The 
problem is one of how we come to know what it is we do in the process of doing and 
living. It is also about understanding the complex form of points of renewal. Distortions 
still play a considerable part in this - effort is rewarded by money and money is the 
signification of economic profit and thus value in much of our life. It is unlikely that 
within such a world one’s immediate sense of self will derive from much beyond one’s 
capacity to prevail solely within the blank delusion of a commodity world. The apparent 
sterility of this is masked by a seemingly endless array of possibilities and yet also the 
denial of the power of decisive change. It is also the case that many points of tension 
seem rapidly to be occupied and colonized by forces of unfreedom, making of a life lived 
within commodified citadel society a deeply disorienting experience. Some sort of 
subjective entanglement in this is inevitable and yet precisely how people will develop a 
sense of self cannot be neatly pre-determined. What we cannot avoid asking now is 
whether an ideology of consumerism, fear and want is a confinement that has lasted too 
long, harnessing humanity to a dreary, colourless and yet fiercely coercive economics 
despite whatever wishes might exist otherwise and in ways which are so little recognized 
that the resources to overwhelm a gushing, compulsive reified desire seem severely 
depleted, if not completely exhausted. What consumption and commodification present 
is the seemingly endless involvement of the individual in a parade of choice, a
89 Ibid.
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persistently difficult arena for the critique of ideology, particularly when understood in its 
relation to life inside the citadel. For here, that which appears in more straightforward 
terms as fears arising from institutional power and control is the fragility of the self when 
confronted by ultimately limited, restricted choice. We need now to examine more 
closely how we can theorize the mediation between subjective and objective and what it 
is that this means for a theorization of ideology. Section Two of this chapter will attempt 
this theorization.
Section Two: The Self-Encounter in a World Made Purposive: 
Mediations between the ‘Needy Subject’ and the Enigmatic
Necessity of the Object
Man, that inveterate dreamer, daily more discontent with his destiny, has trouble 
assessing the objects he has been led to use, objects that his nonchalance has brought his 
way, or that he has earned through his own efforts, almost always through his own 
efforts.
Andre Breton, Manifestoes o f Surrealism
Collisions o f Interior and Exterior
The Status o f  Objectivity
The question that initially presents itself for any theorization of subjectivity within 
a radical critique of ideology is the question we started out with in this chapter - that of 
why an objectivity came to reign supreme, or at least command enough to threaten both a 
way of understanding the world and the very viability of the idea of the subject herself. 
In the first section of the chapter we considered this issue from the perspective of a 
number of elements in which subjective states are grounded -  in particular at the 
significance of a cultural heritage in which the autonomy of the subject is sacrificed to the 
power of more external processes of control, and at some contemporary inflections of 
ideological struggle around inauthenticity in cynicism and sentimentality. In this section 
we will approach the issue of the status of objectivity from a slightly different angle-
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that of the relation of existence contained within subjectivity, or the mediation of the 
subjective and objective.
This approach is of much importance for even if we accept merely some 
semblance of subjectivity and at least the continuation of a presumptuousness of the 
object within a world of the spectacularized exchange of commodities and the 
internalized fear of something outside its dictates, then we would still want to argue that 
this cultural heritage, which insinuates so much, did not arise and take hold by itself. 
There needed to be a type of subjectivity prepared for, but most importantly willing to 
accept or live out, its logic. It is the object’s logic, or seeming necessity, that presents 
itself as somehow surpassing the now rather lost place of the modem subject - lost, as we 
have seen, within its own estrangement and ontological homelessness, but not lost to its 
own self-delusion and self-fictioning. As we have just seen, the subject is very much 
alive to forms of cynicism and sentimentality in which various malaises of unfreedom 
and the ideologies that subtend them are able to flourish. In both cases we are presented 
with a subjectivity that is frequently without a real engagement with a consciousness of 
self-knowledge. Is it that we need to locate the separation the self experiences, and, if 
this is the case, should we concern ourselves with the ‘objectivity’ within which the 
subject is located, or the subject herself, or perhaps both realms, or something altogether 
different? In order to situate this problem we will first put forward some preliminary 
comments as to the ambivalence in the value of desire and fear; for it is in a certain 
ambivalence of value that we have the clearest evidence of a subject/object 
interrelationship. Here, we will again have reason to state our relation to the theories we 
have earlier encountered in the thesis in order to take up once again the meaning of a 
critique of ideology.
Re-introducing so obstinately unfashionable a concept as that of the relation 
between subject and object is undoubtedly a task fraught with difficulties, but it is 
precisely this concept that is able to shift us beyond the impasse we have outlined within 
the critique of ideology. It is certainly the case that we live at a time in which there is no 
easy access to a sense of both the world and its meaning, knowledge and its object, 
interior and exterior -  but perhaps this is more properly the condition of any given 
relation of thought and deed; meaning is rarely perfectly easy to locate. The path of 
modernity through the ephemeral, the quotidian, the knowingly disenchanted certainly 
makes the difficulty of meaning more acute. If it is a lack of meaning and its distinctions 
that make up the world of our contemporary experience then this does not constitute a 
denial of meaning but is itself a type of meaning for which we need to account.
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In this thesis we have argued that where reality or its appearance seems to be 
beyond our grasp so too does a sense of possibility wither and withdraw. And yet, as 
Nancy argues, “if there is world, there is sense” . 90 Perhaps this is because whilst the 
world no longer has a sense, or at least no essential relation between meaning and the 
world, the world itself and thus our experience is sense, and yet all this can possibly mean 
is that some clarification or understanding of this experience is needed. The renewal of 
the critiques of both ideology and subjectivity is an attempt to capture something of the 
relation of existents to each other by way of the meaning we accord to thoughts and 
images constructed around this relation. It is a way of theoretically situating the 
possibility of human wakefulness and engagement with meaning. It is not to propose any 
given solution to a stated problem (which ideology, for example, might generate) but is to 
set out the terms in which a transformation of the self as another, or the capacity to 
choose authenticity or inauthenticity, can be described. This requires an examination of 
the relation between the subjective and exteriority. In the ideological we are presented 
with the curious situation of attempts to come to terms with the inadequacy of ourselves 
to our creations and needs. And yet just as strangely it is then upon this basis that 
experience is sacrificed to well-worn inauthenticities. What we want to consider here in 
this section is whether the collisions between subject and object provide any basis for 
aspects of subjectivity that have been made obscure or irrelevant by cold, unreflective 
expediency within an alienated existence to reveal themselves as something beyond 
mechanical need. We will later consider this more specifically in terms of the expression 
of the ethical self; here, in this section, we will focus upon the theoretical problem of the 
mediation between subject and object. In the first chapter of the thesis we mentioned the 
idea of Geschehen, of a sense of shock or accident in terms of the event or occurrence of 
the subject-object relation. In this section we want to pursue a sense of this in relation to 
the reciprocity that this concept implies. We will first approach this by considering this 
relationship in terms of our earlier reflections upon the cultural archetypes of desire and 
fear as contemporary manifestations of the ideological.
Ambivalence in the value o f  desire and fear
Bloch explains the complex relation we have to objects in terms of a range of 
spatial metaphors -  we are both too near to ourselves and slightly beneath the object that 
we behold. When, finally, we choose to command the object we place ourselves above it
90 Nancy, The Sense o f  the World, p. 7.
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-  we then make the object serve us. With many objects that we perceive intentionally 
and aesthetically we continue to carry an image of them with us “not just mimetically or 
simply empathetically, but so that I thus become for my part richer, more present, 
cultivated further toward myself by this artifact that participates in me”. At the same 
time, things that are made lovingly and out of necessity lead lives of their own and return 
“with us formed as we could not be in life, adorned with a certain, however weak sign, 
the seal of the self’. This mediation between subject and object enables the self­
encounter. At its best we can then feel ourselves here to be “looking down a long, sunlit 
corridor with a door at the far end”. More often, however, it is this very capacity that we 
have forgotten, so that everything looks back at us as hollowly as we perceive the world.91 
What we want to assess is how the ideological interferes with this mediation and in what 
ways its very outcome represents a challenge to the boundary between the trouble we 
have in assessing the objects we use and a not-yet conscious awakening to our world, 
where we can experience cynicism or sentimentality, or just as assuredly, the ‘values of 
amazement’ .92
What we are here first considering is the nature of the conditions under which the 
object appears at our disposal. This state seems to lend the subject a particular type of 
intention towards the object and also gives the object qualities which are inscribed with 
desire and potential fulfilment for the individual herself and not just as a result of the 
existence of the object as such. This state only makes sense to us within the context of a 
particular relationship to the world -  one of need that we encounter as forms of 
dissatisfaction. In an existence in which even our intention, our will or feelings can 
manifest as or are treated as ‘things’, this separation between satisfaction and need grows 
ever more intense. As we have argued throughout the thesis this character of the reality 
we experience gives much scope for the ideological. A sense of loss and the problem of 
displaced, unfulfilled desire, together with a generalized fear within one’s most 
immediate sense of self, is, as Bataille might argue, a morality of decline.93 The 
dialectical potential of this morality cannot, however, be readily assumed. Bataille draws 
a distinction between an ecstatic, mystical loss of self, which one fully embraces, and the 
self-acknowledged suffering of the disintoxicated who have received “hazy illusions like
91 Bloch, The Spirit o f Utopia, pp. 7 ,9,10.
92 Ibid., p. 193.
93 Bataille, On Nietzsche, passim. Bataille contrasts a morality of decline (a morality which resists 
temptation) with a morality of the summit (a morality which is exuberant in its non-productive 
expenditure).
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a narcotic necessary to bear life” but whose fantasies wear thin or who ultimately remain 
suffering beings. The suffering are lost in a night of babblers; they exist within “an 
unbreathable void” . 94 If this is the sort of condition we find the contemporary subject of 
ideology faces then we need to know whether we sense in this the problem of a passivity 
of self or one of the power of a structure of egoity with which the self is easily 
assimilated.
As we have seen, ideology’s more obviously narcotic illusions fail to relieve one’s 
suffering beyond the most momentary escape: And even here, suspended in so crudely 
embellished an invention, one might be too conscious of one’s disguised suffering for any 
quiescence to occur. But the possibility of a loss of self, in which one finds a sense of 
being for the other, exists. Its failure to be realized is frequently attributed to the indurate 
nature of the objective compulsion the subject faces, but is this the only way to 
understand the subjective mediation of the object of desire and control? The ambivalence 
of fear and desire exits but the sense in which it is currently maintained is centred not 
upon the existence of these conditions as values in themselves but upon the exploitation 
of fear and desire as emanations of useful value. This inversion of desire- what can be 
valued (predominantly monetarily) is that which provokes desire -  and this abuse of fear 
-  what it is that can achieve a state of being manipulated, cowered and controlled is that 
which arouses fear -  diminishes a creative ambivalence that these conditions are 
otherwise able to attain. Whether this then seriously questions the potential of these 
conditions within any transcendence of humanity must surely be considered. We are the 
inheritors of a culture in which the ‘murder of Christ’ has been assimilated- a trembling 
today is not for an awareness of this death; we are subject to the manufacture of 
formulaic prescriptions of desire and thus a contained reason dominates our impulses.
This control is not, however, of reality itself, or not of the phenomenon of its form 
for which we then create a content. The problem remains one of whether we see in this 
content an irrevocable destiny to which humanity succumbs (for which ideology plays a 
more or less significant part) or whether we are simply unable to draw any distinction 
between this form and content in the first place. Certainly if we accept that a profound 
fracturing between subject and object has occurred within the contemporary world and 
that this has taken place within the reified manifestation of a spectacularized 
commodification then the ontological problem we have just mentioned of the seeming
94 Bataille, Inner Experience, p. xxxii.
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self-sufficiency of the world suggests more to us than the objective perpetuation of forms 
of momentary desire within conditions of unrealizable fulfilment. In even the most 
extreme forms of passivity, or the haziest of illusions that desire can entail, the presence 
of the self necessarily introduces meaning into being. However attenuated self- 
knowledge might become it is not possible to remove from it entirely a capacity to find 
meaning and thus the potential to understand in this the relation of the self to humanity. 
Understanding the deep-seated psychology of a fear enacted by the presence of authority 
which enables some ideologies to work shifts us closer to a sense of being but not 
necessarily to a view of our relation to another being, to alterity as such. We can see that 
a capacity to attribute meaning to the symbolic significations of a world of authoritarian 
tendencies is vital to an understanding of human experience without knowing what this 
experience actually means.
Ideology obviously exists in both experiential and symbolic realms. Where we are 
able to consider more closely something of the subject herself- not as a ‘mammiferous 
larvae’ but as a reflective, feeling being -  we find that we can theorize not only a much 
more differentiated process by which the ideological takes hold, but a mediated view of 
humanity in relation to this process. The idea, which we have extended from Althusser’s 
work, of a state of ‘deliberate unconsciousness’ in which the subject is involved, allows 
us to further question this mediation. This concept forces us to question the role of the 
unconscious in relation to ideology and subjectivity. With this concept, an otherwise 
static view of an ideology of control, where the ability of the subject to exercise any 
determination over her situation is almost non-existent, is opened up to something 
creative in the subject’s relation to her own subjection. The subject can be an active part 
of her unconscious process of recollection and forgetting, rather than merely the 
thoroughly determined outcome of her subjection. A deliberate unconsciousness would 
seem to indicate the possibility of a deliberate consciousness, making of the individual 
not only an active participant within any given relations of domination, but a more 
fissured, multi-dimensional being. Both fear and desire tend towards something 
otherwise -  the ultimate emptiness of being, not because this emptiness is an inherent part 
of these processes but because the presence of these archetypes repeatedly entails a state 
of bad conscience on the part of the subject, a state in which one is constantly reminded 
and then commanded to forget one’s faithlessness to one’s own desires and fears. This is 
what we have indicated as the realm of the ideological, a realm of representations in 
which reality as immediate direct experience has withered or been deferred.
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What becomes of the already strained relation between consciousness and the 
object world, where a cynical disbelief in ideological values exists alongside a 
preparedness to live out ideological realities, is undoubtedly a part of the disenchantment 
of modem times. All experience, Adomo argues, has been emaciated, its marrow 
“sucked out of the concrete”. Where experience appears to be beyond the grasp of the 
subject, reality seems to be lifeless. Even where reality is permitted to enter we sense 
that something is wrong .95 In addition, he argues that the polarity between subject and 
object is definitive. 96 The problem today is perhaps more convoluted than this. Although 
Adorno’s suggestion that the determinants of everyday life are no longer filtered through 
one’s individual experience still has a certain validity - perhaps even greater significance 
given the extent to which people have become functionaries of abstract processes -  
currently we also face the added difficulty that the very processes of hope and 
disillusionment through which experience might be said to have withered are reinvented 
as we have previously mentioned in knowingly cynical fashion. The early theorists of the 
problem of commodification indirectly raised the question of how a dialectic of 
recognition and misrecognition might still be said to operate in a world in which the 
realness of experience had been so damaged: And yet, somewhat ironically, the very 
outcome of the inevitable end-point of the presumed death of experience has been a much 
more significant insinuation of the dialectic subtending self-recognition -  that between 
freedom and unfreedom. What such theorizations end up by treating far too sweepingly 
is the very issue they highlight as of central significance to the state of cultural demise-  
that of the unconscious absorption of values instituted by competition. In attempting to 
know why people might exhibit values of greed, hatred and self-delusion we surely need 
to enquire beyond the realm of the rationale of capitalism and its capacity to exert forms 
of control: we also need to know what conditions within the individual herself makes of 
this capacity a more or less certain outcome.
With such a sense of being we are better able to theorize the desiring subject and 
forms of submission to authority or repression, in relation to each other. For it is within 
and between these relations that we can see the operation of antagonism and contradiction 
as the fundamental characteristic of contemporary human life. Most particularly in this 
relation we can call into question the idea of a complete separation between a desiring, 
submissive subjectivity and an alluring, repressive objectivity. This distinction is what is
95 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 45.
96 Ibid., p. 163.
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supposed as the basis of ideology as false consciousness and very largely within 
immanent critique. We instead suggest that a more critical sense of the ideological 
reveals the papery fragility of this distinction. With the idea of a deliberate unconscious 
we are able to consider the dynamic place of the subject within relations of authority, 
desire and control. The inner reception of ideas and internal language the individual 
constructs in her relation to perceived, or sometimes unseen, fears, desires and terrors of 
modem existence is a vital part of the ability of the individual to actively participate 
within an ideological world. In these terms, how the connections between unconscious 
relations and conscious feeling and knowing enable one’s distance from, or absorption 
within, these fears and desires is an important part of the process of situating the 
ideological. This of course suggests to us the realm of the imagination, an active conduit 
between the conscious and the unconscious. The realm of the imagination is indeed vital 
for an understanding of the self. The ability for creativity is a basic part of the human 
spirit, and, for this reason, is as able to be given form to as it is vulnerable to dissolution 
under particular conditions. Creativity is not a “Grand Form” that fabricates the subject, 
as has sometimes been suggested of this and other types of subjectivity. 97 It is more a 
wisdom of everyday life through which a correlation between subject and object can be 
realized. The subject of the imagination and unconscious indicates an exchange rather 
than separation between subject and object. Let us now look at this philosophical 
problem in more detail.
Ideological recognition and the problems o f desire and fear
What we want to understand is where the ideological intersects with the mediation 
between subject and object that intention and satisfaction/dissatisfaction entail. Although 
the whole concept of desire, for example, has long been associated with the notion of a 
discrete subject possessing definite and consistent wants and needs, which are then acted 
upon in a world of assumed moral and ontological order, the sort of relation between 
object and subject suggested by desires and motives which we have encountered in this 
thesis has been somewhat different. For most radical theorists there is an apparently ‘non-
97 See, for example, Gerard Granel, “Who Comes after the Subject”, trans. Eduardo Cadava and Anne 
Tomiche, in Who Comes After the Subject?, eds. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy 
(London: Routledge, 1991), p. 149. Granel argues that the works o f both Marx and Heidegger suggest this 
Grand Form that fabricates the subject, “as rational and productive subject, as political and literary subject, 
as psychological and creative subject”. Ibid.
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human’ objectivity that seems to direct the individual. 98 This is particularly the case 
where the presence of the ideological is conceded. In the alienated objectivity of 
capitalism, for example, is often found the impetus of desire, and specifically an 
appropriation of desire to the services of money. This desire is enforced and controlled 
by fear, a fear that, as we have seen, is largely understood as an external compulsion. 
Desire emerges out of need but also engages humanity in the inauthentic. Intention here 
is construed as thoroughly bound by its object. Exteriority is taken to define reality. Is 
there any problem with this assumption and particularly with the way in which ideology 
is interpreted in relation to this sense of desire?
Within the enclosure of motivations bound by the object towards which they are 
directed, there would appear to be little room for very much else -  most tellingly for an 
awareness of one’s freedom. The freedom that is considered to exist is that of desire for 
the particular object as if desire inheres within the object itself and no other recognition 
matters. No real sincerity of desire is allowed for where desire is itself seen as incapable 
of being satisfied. The range of Marxist philosophy we have considered offers a number 
of different positions on this. It understands need within the context of real subjective 
and objective hunger. It views intention in relation to this need as capable of an authentic 
being in the world. At the same time, it takes these situated intentions to signify a certain 
distance between being and objects. This distance is frequently experienced as alienation 
and indeed as a type of self-alienation. But what does this suggest of the type of ‘radical 
choosing’ Sartre, for example, considered fundamental not only to an authentic freedom 
but to the very notion of value we ascribe to any of our desires and fears? 99 Does such a 
sense help or hinder us in understanding any ideological component of our motivations? 
For if desire is something more than the object it supposes as its limit then this suggests a 
greater openness in both conscious and unconscious feeling and intention than that which 
is quite definite and indeed finite, as in the form objects possess. Exteriority in this sense 
might not in fact define all reality; reality itself is perhaps not what is taken to be 
objective reality.
We have argued within the thesis that the unconscious plays a considerable role 
within the ideological construction of thought but that its theorization as some form of 
opposition to consciousness has prevented an appreciation of its ontological function.
98 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 87.
99 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism Is a Humanism”, in Existentialism versus Marxism, ed. George Novack 
(New York: Delta, 1966), pp. 77-79.
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Indeed, the potential of the unconscious as a vehicle through which different modalities 
of understanding the world might be realized has not been sufficiently theorized in 
relation to the ideological. Where the unconscious is viewed as hostile to consciousness 
or being and where the relation of consciousness to the unconscious is not understood in 
terms of the creation of phenomenality then the sort of questioning of reality that the 
force of the unconscious can unleash is unlikely to be considered. This is particularly the 
case where the concept of the subject remains only marginally examined. It is a lack 
made most obvious in theories of the unconscious that fail to present any sense of what a 
subjectivity might be beyond the vulnerable fragments of an ensnared corps morcele.'00 
The vision of subjectivity we have in Althusser and the post-Althusserians, of decentring, 
displacement, differance, and so on, does not really give us any sense of the transgression 
or possible transformation the subject is capable of, or even any feel for the reason as to 
why the lure of the reflected image, realized in a captured unconscious, keeps the self 
from finding herself. What it is that one makes of authority at an unconscious level is 
presented in too one-dimensional a manner for us to be able to theorize from this a 
thinking, experiencing, desiring bodily subject. The distance that keeps us from 
possession remains a distance that keeps us from ourselves and this alienation controls 
our freedom in relation to our intention. Ideology, in this sense, is just this sort of lack of 
freedom. If, in contrast, we theorize an openness in relation to the ideological where does 
this leave our theorization of the relation between subject and object, between interior 
and exterior?
The unfolding of being cannot be understood in relation to a given object; what 
we instead perceive from our understanding of alienation as self-alienation is that being 
emerges within the content of its subject/object condition. For example, the problem of 
reified authority is a problem of forms and attempts to control, including to self-control. 
But this sort of constraint is not the same thing as the ability to command - for it is 
repeatedly the case that “the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one 
covets someone who commands, who commands severely” . 101 The way in which the 
ideological has been understood is to deduce an interior that is always-already adjusted to
100 I am referring here not only to Lacan’s sense of fragmentation awakened in the individual in the mirror- 
phase, but also to those theorists, such as Althusser, who use Lacan’s ideas. Lacan himself was apparently 
inspired with this idea of the fragmented body by his viewing the paintings of Hieronymus Bosch. See 
Malcolm Bull, “Hate is the New Love”, London Review o f Books, 25 January, 2001, a review of Slavoj 
Zizek, The Fragile Absolute -  Or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? (London: Verso, 
2000).
101 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, par. 347.
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its exterior. In the case just mentioned, it is as if there is no lived tension of existence 
experienced within the acts of constraint and command that are felt, and thus no need to 
theorize a subjectivity beyond its purpose for authority alone. And perhaps more 
importantly still, there is no capacity theorized that allows for a distance to be held from 
the act, or for the intuitive contemplation of sensuous activity. The ideological is thus 
theorized as command. It is certainly the case that, as far as our perception of objects is 
concerned, in the very fact of existing objects exist for something and someone; an 
exterior veers towards an interior. The relation here of subject and object is thus given in 
the presence of the object. But what it is that constitutes this relation is open, it is not 
pre-determined by either the object or subject. The role of the unconscious enables us to 
see that the process of knowing is not one that exists straightforwardly in the direction of 
the object. Practice is in fact fundamentally subjective. Indeed, there is something about 
the forms of consciousness the subject possesses that enables a type of withdrawal from 
the object, a type of freedom from the object.
Somewhat ironically, we can see this best in the problem of ideology. Ideology 
assumes a relation between subject and object in which the condition for free action on 
the part of the subject is only that reducible to the power of the object. But the existence 
of ideology necessarily suggests otherwise: For a state of thought to emerge in which 
reality is constantly pushed to one side there must be a subject/object relation in which 
thought is effected by a subject capable of withdrawing from action. The outcome of this 
intention might be a compromise with the object with which the subject is presented, but 
equally it might be a suspension of this relation with the object. Desire is ultimately as 
much the sustained possibility of detaching oneself from the object, of existing in 
freedom, as it is an immersion in the object.
Command of the self is also, however, subject to displacements of meaning. 
Levinas writes of the problem of the adventure of knowing as being “not simply the 
spirituality and rationality of the manifest [...] but instead a drowsiness of spirit”. This 
‘drowsiness of spirit’ indicates the problem of a world already betrayed by knowledge, 
knowledge that is “absorbed in the object to the point of losing its soul and its name 
there, of becoming mute and anonymous” . 102 In desire and fear we suppose the place of a 
definite end to which knowledge is directed, and yet this may not necessarily allow us a 
sense of the wish-fulfilment and anticipatory consciousness that these archetypes can
102 Emmanuel Levinas, “Philosophy and Awakening”, trans. Mary Quaintance, in Who Comes After the 
Subject?, eds. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 210.
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entail. We have seen that an acknowledgement of the place of the radical imagination 
within the reification of authority can assist us in situating the mediations between 
subjective and objective elements of closure, constraint, forced consent and control. And 
through a greater sensitivity to a mediated view of the psyche we can assess the current 
cultural significance of the forms through which the ideological is realized, such as in a 
generalized conformism, cynicism or types of sentimentality. Does this then mean that 
we need to accept a type of unknowing that situates us beyond the need to tally interior 
experience with externalized conditions? Perhaps the relation between a command of the 
self and experience requires something more. In the workings of the imagination we are 
able to see that the internalization of fear is a part of a social imaginary and the radical 
imagination of the individual. That both these dimensions apply to the insinuation of fear 
and control does not mean that what we are dealing with is any less the images or 
representations ( Vorstellungen) of fear or desire. These images can, then, be ideological 
in the sense that we have developed in this thesis. Moreover these representations 
acquire a certain unity and logicality because they are situated, as all ideology is, within 
the context of conditioning realities. As we have already considered, the authoritarian 
speaker of “Hey you” projects not only a subjective utterance but an objective materiality 
in the recognition given his or her utterance. This context of authority matters greatly to 
the creative capacities of a radical imagination because in this context resides the 
possibility of awakening a subjectivity of “lost horizons”, as Levinas would say, 103 of the 
otherness of being that allows us to imagine our fundamental connectedness to all being.
Although it might well be, as Judith Butler argues, that there has tended to be a 
philosophical domestication of desire “in the name of reason”, the more particular 
problem with the theorization of the concept is that the central mode through which it is 
engaged is often marginalized. 104 Far from merely a ‘unified subject’ being assumed to 
serve as premise for desire’s immediacy and compulsion, it is instead a ‘unified 
objectivity’ through which much theory has explained the workings and, indeed, reason 
of desire. It is somewhat strange to consider the idea of an exclusively unified subject in 
relation to desire without reflecting upon the kind of subjectivity that has instead 
dominated much of the last two centuries of Western thought -  that of the disunified
103 Levinas, “Philosophy and Awakening”, p. 211.
104 Butler, Subjects o f Desire, p. 2.
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subject, or what Ricouer refers to as the “shattered cogito” .105 Of the more recent 
conceptualization of subjectivity we have seen a tendency to replace a sense of cogito or 
Ich denke with something more akin to intervention, thus with a sense of process or 
operation that gives us subjectivization or individuation rather than a subject or 
subjectivity as such, but is this the best way to proceed with the undoubtedly difficult 
conceptualization of the subject? 106
It would seem that an ever more deracinated, emptied out or perhaps refigured 
sense of what or who the subject is, leads us rather too rapidly and successively from a 
knowing ‘I’ or perhaps ‘I and thou’ through non-personal individuations or multiplicities 
to some unique place or point of passage. 107 What is not questioned with this assumption 
is that such an odyssey undertaken by the subject might return the subject through all of 
these stages simultaneously -  at the very least, potentially, the subject might experience 
herself or exist as an T ,  a subjectivation and a unique point of passage. ‘Who the subject 
is’ is surely a question of the conditions through which the subject is realized, and this, as 
we have already argued, centres our theorization upon the mediation between subject and 
object. Before the theorization takes place of what we take to be a fractured, inconsistent 
and contradictory subjectivity, and what this kind of subjectivity might bring to the idea 
of desire, we need to have considered, as we have set out in this chapter, what we might 
want to account for with an understanding of any degree of objectivity in relation to 
alienated desire. For if the idea of the subject has been marginalized precisely because 
intentionality associated with her existence is deemed to be no longer aimed at the 
constitution of an object, but at a more amorphous sense of existence or presence as such, 
then the status of constituted objects as objects of unfreedom is less of an issue. Let us 
consider something of this to assess whether this might be so.
10<s Ricouer, Oneself as Another, p. 11. Ricoeur sees th e ‘shattered cogito’ as a fundamentally important 
tradition in philosophy, one which, as he writes, is “less continuous perhaps than that of the cogito” but that 
nonetheless has provided a formidable alternative to the idea of the Cartesian cogito.
106 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe argues that the question of ‘who’ the subject is has been prevented from 
being posed because thinking on subjectivity has been dominated by a tekhne, by the idea of the ego cogito 
as the self-established guarantee of knowledge or by reversals of this idea. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “The 
Response of Ulysses”, trans. Avital Ronell, in Who Comes After the Subject?, eds. Eduardo Cadava, Peter 
Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 201.
107 This last sense of where subjectivity has arrived, as being at a point of passage, we find in the works of 
Maurice Blanchot or Jean-Luc Nancy.
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Certainly it is the case that desire itself becomes reified. In this there is the ‘order 
of things', as Bataille referred to it in the late 1940s.108 In this process of reification 
‘things’ seem to take on their own allure and desirousness. Understanding this 
superficially simple process as a vast and cavernous spectacle in which the individual is 
often drawn into a conformist, imitative, restless frenzy of want, is undoubtedly vital to 
any contemporary critique of ideology. This is what we have expressly indicated in 
earlier highlighting the importance of a metaphysics of the commodity. This order 
constitutes a conditioning moment. The commodification of every potential thing, 
including oneself, occurs as a form of self-limited intoxication with and through a 
particular reality, in which the production of the commodity, as an object of exchange, 
reigns supreme. It acts as a form of distraction by substituting a complex array of needs 
with rapidly replaceable and ultimately unsatisfiable wants, which increasingly come to 
revolve exclusively around value as determined by money. This seemingly simple 
process undoubtedly involves a complicated medley of feelings and emotions and indeed 
imaginative, perhaps unconscious, yearnings, and yet a construction of ideas whose basis 
is considerably more simple and shallow. What has seemed incontrovertibly elementary 
is the controlling power of a commodity rationale for life. Present existence for many 
would seem to come to a standstill if it were not for the continuation of a methodical 
repetition of acts of exchange, and increasingly controlled acts of exchange at that. The 
ideas and practices given to this process merely follow the logic of selling to buy and 
buying to sell. But why should this result in a whittled down form of desire, and does 
this then mean that such desire necessarily prevents us from understanding who we are in 
this process? Does freedom in relation to this reified process need to entail choice, and if 
so should we then distinguish between a sense of desirable alternatives and choice as 
such? Part of the difficulty here is that the ideological component of commodified desire 
is darkly controlling in numerous straightforward senses, and yet, at the same time, it has 
been necessary and perhaps possible to see in it a sort of waking out of such 
forgetfulness. Why this is the case returns us to Sartre’s problem of a radical choosing or 
what we have just mentioned of an ability to suspend one’s relation to the objects with 
which our being is linked. Whether we choose to do so or not the possibility exists to 
master our desires and fears. It might be that in depriving ourselves or placing our fears 
beyond reach we find that ‘revelation is the daughter of refusal’, as Breton commended,109
108 This concept is used, for example, in Bataille’s Theory of Religion, which was first published in 1948. 
Georges Bataille, Theory of Religion, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1989), p. 70.
109 Breton, Surrealism and Painting, p. 165.
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or that by intervening within the seeming anonymity of our existence that we uncover an 
anticipated sense of connectedness. An arbitrary resolve towards an attachment to 
objects should not be taken as a necessarily inauthentic way of being because this might 
in fact entail the ability of consciousness to enact the unconscious in ways that ultimately 
suspend a relation of otherwise seeming compromise with objects. In other words, it 
would be a distortion of the ability the subject has to assume that there is only one 
possible object towards which desire is directed and through which the ideological is 
effected.
The incarnation of reified desire revealed in the sort of use-values people have 
created for themselves is, of course, able to tell us much about the sort of humanity we 
have developed. The theorists we have considered have all indicated something about the 
reduction of the individual as a fully expressive being to her constitution in reified 
relations. More recently, theorists continue to extend this sense of the complete 
domination of the commodity form over all aspects of life by theorizing techniques of 
control designed into the lives of subjects, as Nikolas Rose conjectures, or by way of the 
technologization of the image, as Giorgio Agamben argues, or even by the sheer 
familiarity of formerly ambiguous cultural constructs, as Francis Mulhem suggests in 
relation to kitsch . 110 For us, acknowledging this far broader process, of which reification 
or commodity fetishism is but one part, enables us to see the fundamental connections 
between one’s participation within social life and ideology: But we wish to unravel 
something more about this “ravenous hunger in satiety” . 111 Indeed, we want to consider a 
self-hood necessitated not merely by the presence of a justified (and yet knowingly 
unjustifiable) greed, which commodification seems to demand of us, but by the creative 
conditions of the self and the importance of the role of the imagination in forming this 
desiring self. For it is here that symbolic forms in which meaning is derived, and 
relations of unfreedom through which a contestation of meaning takes place, are 
fundamental. An ipseity that suggests nothing more than the reification of external life to 
which the subject is exposed, if not condemned, is without its most vital sense of 
transcendence or even renewal. Various contemporary formulations of the Lukäscian or 
Debordian model might point out, however, that the complete alienation of language,
110 Nikolas Rose, Powers o f  Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999); Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993); Francis Mulhem, The Present Lasts a Long Time: Essays in Cultural Politics 
(Cork: Cork University Press, 1998).
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 129.in
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communicativity and the disappearance of any discernible margin between the realm of 
‘bare life’, as Benjamin referred to it and Agamben now uses it, and ‘politicly ’ , 112 are the 
most basic realms of the subject’s existence, and thus that any separation between 
external and internal has itself eroded. And yet strangely, as obvious as this is, it is not 
the way most people believe themselves to be living out their existence- are they simply 
wrong, deluded, misled in some way? Inevitably here we are returned to the problem of 
ideology and specifically to the sense of a possible accord of thought and being.
The reification of desire through the commodification of life is not the one­
dimensional process of much theory. We can see the role of the imagination within many 
attempts to find meaning within being and life. The reification of desire, upon which 
various ideological cultural archetypes have developed (of which we have considered the 
examples of cynicism and sentimentality) occurs on the basis of contradiction -  
contradiction between the satisfaction sought and the hunger felt, between promises held 
out and what is realized, between mass production and individual, exclusive 
consumption, between a reality-content and an ornamental form . 113 Desire has the 
desirable as its object, 114 and in this the subject becomes creatively entwined. The 
ideological component of this process cannot tell us whether the subject chooses this 
pattern of life, or whether she slots into a more pre-ordained way of being, nor is it the 
purpose of our critique of ideology to do so. What we want to question is what scope 
there is in this way of life for a dialectic of subject and object to unfold and make 
apparent the limitations of such a reciprocal alienation. What the initial path towards an 
understanding of commodification and the unconscious was able to make way for was a 
consideration of the presence of the dialectical image. Opening up this area of analysis, if 
only in the most basic terms, was itself a considerable achievement. From here we are 
able to theorize the many contradictions which exist in the process of desire as 
identification, affinity or opposition between the subject and the world of her 
commodified, citadel existence.
112 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
113 These are, of course, only some of the many contradictions one might view within the commodity form. 
There are further contradictions such as those attributed to modernity more generally -  those between 
atomization and an overly organized, controlling socialization of society, separation and totalization, 
security and fear, comfort and ferocity, voraciousness and boredom, and so on. For a fuller examination of 
such contradictions see Henri Lefebvre’s essay “What is Modernity?” in Introduction to Modernity, trans. 
John Moore (London: Verso, 1995), pp. 168-238.
114 Bataille, The Accursed Share, vols. II and III, p. 103.
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Whilst the spectacle of commodification provides a level of mediation through 
which we are able to trace the ideological engagement of subject and object, it is not 
because here we can find the source of the subject’s mistake -  the delusion of desire 
terminating in Elysian Fields - but because, in the servitude that the spectacle requires, 
there is necessary contestation, however shadowy and less than immediate its experience 
might be. The ideological component of this contestation amplifies whatever haunting 
moments of autonomy waft in; and it is here, as we have argued, that a quest for meaning 
can become a part of this experiential reality. “What is knowing in relation to being?”, 
Nietzsche asks -  a question that suggests much about the irresolution of knowledge 
caught within the vicious circle of a thinking ego who exists only to know with 
certainty. 115 But what we are perhaps dealing with here is a capacity in potential, 
sometimes in formation, only ever partial and unfinished in its movement. It is the search 
of an ens verum (certum) that is equalled to being perhaps, but not from the place of an 
assured being as much as it is from one who is not-yet. 116 And the dynamic within a 
contested world of commodified reality is one that both assists people in never fully 
facing themselves as they really are, and one that, in doing so, creates unfulfilled need 
and thus the potential for a striving for knowingly possessing the self. The difficulty is 
that the basis for untangling one side of this dynamic from the other is not readily given 
in the existence of the spectacle itself.
As we have put forward, the cultural heritage of commodification allows us to see 
some important aspects of the ideological in process. For example, despite being 
produced by an overwhelmingly narrow rationale in the service of the production of 
profit, the images emanating from commodification are themselves open to a wide range 
of interpretation and reappropriation. They might lend themselves to the reproduction of 
banal stereotypes in the form of nostalgic kitsch, depending for their existence upon
115 Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente, in Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 
Bänden, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1980), vol. 11, 
p. 640, quoted in Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche et la scene philosophique (Paris: Galilee, 1986), reprinted in 
Sarah Kofman, “Descartes Entrapped”, trans. Kathryn Aschheim, in Who Comes After the Subject?, eds. 
Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 178.
116 Lacoue-Labarthe refers to thinking around the subject as being oriented by a search whose foundation 
would permit the deployment, construction and articulation of “the (systematic) totality of knowledge as 
the jointure of being itself in totality”. In this sense he sees that this search will have necessarily proceeded 
from the ego cogito as the self-established guarantee of knowledge, as we have mentioned before. It is 
upon this assumption, he argues, that the Marxian and Nietzschean reversals of this sense of subjectivity 
developed. Lacoue-Labarthe, “The Response of Ulysses”, p. 201. Such an argument does not allow for a 
sense of the open possibility of subjectivity that we are suggesting in this theorization of the relation 
between subject and object.
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formulaic, vicarious sentiments and ideological manipulation in the form of fake 
emotions: But they might also give rise to the ‘dream image which waits to show the 
people their true faces’, as we have earlier seen Benjamin describe the range of things 
one might encounter within the city landscape of the mind. What needs to be constantly 
assessed is how these images become manifest. Their capacity to become rapidly 
commodified is not inscripted within their existence as images. Indeed, as images, they 
are constantly open to the realm of the imagination, to fantasy and reappropriation as 
unreality, chimera and wonderment. Jean-Luc Nancy raises the concept of privation used 
in relation to the motif of desire, where desire becomes our word “for an infinite loss of 
sense”. The object of desire, constituted as lack or the abyss, acts as what is true, or else 
desire is itself the true that it essentially hollows out. At the same time, by way of a 
subjectivity of lack, submission to desire can also become that in which sense consists. 117 
Desire is capable of placing sense within a ‘double truth’ of both reason and scepticism . 118 
Whether the image of desire means that truth can multiply into ‘constellations’ or other 
‘gatherings’ of sense, as Nancy would like, what we are certainly presented with in desire 
is a complex array of needs and practices. But is there any relation between freedom and 
unfreedom that we might detect in these shifting aspects other than that merely of an 
acknowledgement that sense is never situated only at one particular point? 119 Are the 
spectacle’s dreams, as much as its nightmares, part of the condition we merely find 
ourselves in, where the grasp of avarice and the shabby lies it needs for its truth tighten 
against us only to underscore the authenticity of escape?
Most radical theorists, as we have seen, have looked predominantly at the 
function of commodification, at the specifications of the vice, and have pondered the 
plight of the individual caught in its hold from the perspective of the necessity of the 
commodity function. We have seen for Marx and Lukäcs that there is at least some 
definite attempt to consider the subjective elements of the problem of commodification. 120 
There certainly are strengths in these attempts to situate the individual in relation to the
117 Nancy, The Sense o f  the World, p. 44.
118 Ibid., p. 45.
119 Bataille argues that we experience life as a current or like “a sort of streaming of electricity”. Thus, he 
writes, “there where you would like to grasp your timeless substance, you encounter only a slipping, only 
the poorly coordinated play of your penetrable elements”. Bataille, Inner Experience, p. 94.
120 Lukäcs sees quite clearly the results of commodification in “the fragmentation of its subject”, just as 
Marx understands the process as the uneasy alienation of one’s individuality but whether these sorts of 
analyses manage to capture the full extent of the dialectical process between the subject and her world and 
what exists in itself of both relationships, needs to be questioned. Lukäcs, History and Class 
Consciousness, pp. 89, 209, n. 16.
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stultifying aspects of a commodifying world but, as we have already seen, any tendency 
towards giving a priori conceptual primacy to the place of either objective or subjective 
relations destroys much of the imagistic and fluid relations between aspects of the 
struggle for meaning and the world. New and less predictable facets of this relation 
cannot emerge under the weight of assumptions as to a particular conceptual primacy. 
Little attention need be given to the experiential or sensual subject matter of relations 
which might be in conflict with abstract presumptions. Such problems leave the broader 
issue of subjectivity unanswered. Here, in this thesis, we have instead set out the basis 
for understanding impulses that are not directly given in the external functions of 
unfreedom. The subject is very much both a real and possible presence here in relations 
of unrealizable fulfilment. It is this issue to which we will now turn.
The Self in the Presence o f  the World
The SiaLus o f Subjectivity
The presence of the tension we have theorized, which is indicative of a self- 
deceiving egocentricity, is evidence of the continuation of a fractured, uneasy 
subject/object relation. The subject has not been fully absorbed within its exteriority just 
as it has not achieved any reconciliation with outwardness. The "intrigue of subjectivity’ 
we mentioned earlier is indicative of a nearness of the other, a nearness which the subject 
can ignore or address but never escape. Whether this means that the subject is 
fundamentally in torment with herself, as Kierkegaard would argue, or whether it means 
the existence of a “twofold will”, as Nietzsche puts forward - the abyss entails both the 
glance that plunges downward and the hand grasping upward -  the subject’s relation to 
existence remains a basic part of how we might theorize contingency and imagination 
within the realm of thought. 121 It is particularly so in relation to a theorization of ideology 
for it is within this realm that we are presented with the space between subject and object, 
reality and irreality, ‘thing’ and image. Ideology is in this sense, as Zizek writes, a 
“social bond” . 122 Ideology as the transposition of the real in the presence of these spaces
121 Soren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, trans. David Swenson and Walter Lowrie, vols. I & II (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1944); Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part 2, “Of Manly Prudence”, p. 
164.
Zizek, The Sublime Object o f Ideology, p. 124.122
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or gaps has, then, a very particular relationship to mediations between the subject and her 
exteriority.
The thesis we have presented on ideology has given us much reason to see that a 
part of the constitution of subjectivity within current conditions of antagonism is that to 
be found via the processes of self-fiction and self-delusion. The majority of us are 
entwined within the creative construction of myth and the abyss, and the desire and fear 
we experience are identified as objects of need and command. What sort of engagement 
in responsibility this entails or what type of inscription in being is made is very much 
caught up within our relation to the ideological. How much easier it would be to find in 
the subject’s knowing an objective necessity to which reality is ultimately reducible; that 
way the questions Nietzsche has his madman ask - “How could we drink up the sea?”, 
and “Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? ” 123 -  could seem to be 
directed solely at that empty space between self and being rather than including within 
this the subject herself.
These questions that are so much a part of a modernist concern for our place in a 
controlling world need to be reconsidered in relation to a sense of what the self, as an 
ethical self, can be. Whilst it might be that the objectiveness of the object world is 
perhaps more subjective than some radical theories ever allowed, there is yet something 
important in the significance indicated of a structured, institutional world registered in 
those very accounts of its pressing, almost overwhelming rationale. This is the problem 
that any theorization of a liberatory philosophy faces: how to account for an insidiously 
widespread institutionalization of society, and an instrumental reason as its logic, at the 
same time as examining critically the participation of people within this. As we have 
argued in the course of this thesis, it is also the central problem of a critique of ideology. 
Such a claim tends to run counter to the orthodoxy of theories of ideology which often 
assume that ideology forces by influence and control an otherwise unwilling subject to 
enact its compulsions. In the light of a consummate control attained by institutions of 
power, the usual direction of such views is to see an attendant disappearance of the 
subject. Whilst this is not usually taken to be a subjectivity in any sense liberated from 
myth, it is the constitution of being on the basis of the absence of a self capable of 
defining itself, and thus capable of self-delusion as a part of a Seelengestalt, the form of 
thought and spirit. As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, a more recent shift to
123 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, par. 125.
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various types of re-engagement with the idea of subjectivity has meant that, for some 
contemporary theorists at least, this absence might not be in any sense complete. Alain 
Badiou, for example, sees a difference between the classical ‘function’ of the subject and 
‘being’, and on this basis does not cast the subject into utter obsolescence. 124 
Nonetheless, by starting out on the basis of assuming the importance of the determination 
of reality by the self we are arguing for a very different theorization of ideology than that 
to be found in most recent theorizations of subjectivity. What we are arguing is that the 
subject is always present, in one form or other, within societal conditions in which we 
evaluate our relation as a self to another in terms of freedom or unfreedom.
Ultimately, where the basis of a subjectivity is dissembled in a fashion that 
destroys a sense of the unrealized needs and possibilities upon which human potential is 
centred, we find that a tendency to dissociate from ideology the subject’s own 
remembrance and awakening leads to a distorted and undialectical sense not only of the 
ideological but of subjectivity as well. It is in this sense that the structuralist attack upon 
humanism can in part be interpreted as a useful reminder of the limitations of the notion 
of subjectivity as an individual ‘I’, as a solitary or singular ego. In this section of the 
chapter we are instead making apparent the usefulness of the idea of subjectivity in 
relation to an understanding of emancipatory critique. In doing this we need to attempt to 
account for the subject’s place in an alienating object world. We are then suggesting that 
this can be best approached by considering the relation encountered by the subject to her 
world initially as a form of need. In need we can see the workings of a basic inner 
experience of the self; need encompasses the living, suffering, hungering aspects of the 
individual as a social being as well as indicating a presentiment of the realization of the 
self. This is more properly a transformation of need into a desire for transcendence, an 
examination of which we will more properly enter into in the final section of this chapter. 
In this section we are looking at need predominantly as a form for the expression of being 
that approaches the object by way of a situated subjectivity. We are not here assuming 
that need is the only way in which a subjectivity is realized; rather, we see in need one 
important aspect of the expression of the ideological through subjectivity.
We have thus far considered two major ways in which such need is played out. 
Firstly, by building upon what we have previously mentioned of the ambivalence of 
desire and fear as manifestations of a generalized sense of loss, we can see these
124 Badiou, “On a Finally Objectless Subject”, pp. 24-32.
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archetypes within the subject/object correlation not necessarily as the rupture from some 
former sense of completeness but, at times, instead a glimpsed understanding of the 
struggle required for self-knowledge and thus awareness of the other. With this we have 
set out an argument concerning subjective need in its relation to the realm of the 
imagined -  to the images and symbols the subject constantly conceives in creating 
meaning within life. Secondly, we have chosen to understand this ambivalence as a 
subjective mediation of the necessity of the object, a necessity that is more properly a 
condition, an often enigmatic condition, an almost unconditioned condition, that confers a 
tendency, a tension of discontinuity, its 'future anterior' between a categorizing subject 
and a categorized object. We will now consider this relation between subject and object 
from the perspective of what it is about being that confronts us as a part of subjective 
experience.
The Encounter between Subject and Object
Being, as we have considered, often seems to manifest as something alien to u s -  
as suffering, as need, as struggle for meaning. As concrete as the forms of subject’s 
relation to the object might be, a separation, an alienation, can still arise. Why is this? Is 
it a matter of the subject’s thinking in relation to existence or is it in the strange 
familiarity of the objects to which existence adheres? Let us first consider this from the 
point of view of the way in which the object is constituted against which being places its 
existence. From Marx’s critique of the determination of reality we derived a 
fundamentally important concept for the analysis of the ideological -  that of the sensuous 
non-sensuousness of the object, exteriority or reality. The importance of this concept is 
two-fold: Firstly, it indicates the continuum we have mentioned between reality and 
irreality (in which we have theorized the place of the ideological) by suggesting a multi­
dimensional state of being, and, secondly, it allows us to situate the realm of the 
possibility of experience within the being which itself possesses sensuousness -  in other 
words, the self. Let us look at this further.
Marx distinguishes between sensuous reality, in which he considers practice takes 
place, and a sensuous non-sensuousness that various objects within reality appear to 
possess. Where might we see the ideological as fitting within this? If ideology consists 
primarily of images and representations can its reality have an ontic meaning, in the sense 
that it designates being, or does it instead, or also, possess an ontological meaning 
because it opens to being the power of sensing, the possibility of experiencing? In many 
cases these two characteristics would suggest an incompatibility -  between the ontic and
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the ontological meaning of being125 and between the sensuous and the non-sensuous: But 
ideology occupies a peculiar place -  it is neither entirely reality nor entirely irreality but 
shifts between these states, ultimately unable to alter that from which its real being 
derives but equally unable to fully and openly occupy irreality. It at times designates 
being, such as the materiality of the gun, the prison, the State, the Logos, and so on, but it 
also indicates sensuous being as the power to sense, to experience. Marx’s criticism of 
Feuerbach, as we saw earlier, was in essence that Feuerbach fails to consistently maintain 
the difference between the ontic and the ontological meaning of sensuousness. It 
interacts with the most fundamental process of human existence -  that of the individual’s 
own becoming. We have seen that Marx’s theorization of the concepts of being help us 
to better understand the relationship of the self to the world as one in which an 
attachment to things can be separate from the care for existing as an extension into 
ontology - but we still need to account for the substantiveness of subjectivity in relation 
to what this existence might mean. Before we can theorize this we are confronted with 
the difficulty of understanding what subjectivity allows beings to be -  in other words, the 
relation of the subjectivity of the subject to the objectivity of the object.
What we are therefore considering is the state of mediation between subject and 
object in order to understand the relation to objects as one of feeling within the context of 
a highly personal relation to se lf-  for it is this sensuousness that determines subjectivity. 
The ambiguity that Marx highlights within this subjectivity is that within natural being- 
the relation between humanity and the rest of nature. And if we interpret this widely 
enough it can perhaps then include a sense of an ethics - a relation the individual has to 
the world as a part also of the relation she has to the other. “A being which has no object 
for a third being has no being for its object”, Marx states, preparing us to understand just 
what it is that being a suffering, sensuous, needing self in fact entails. In its most 
fundamental and indeed profound sense what this means is that “as soon as I am not 
alone, I am another”. This reality “other than the object outside me” entails a potentially 
rich and passionate sense of being, a need to confirm and realize the self within one’s 
being and one’s knowing. 126 The ideological is deeply embedded within this need. Let us 
consider this in relation to the example of self-alienation.
125 This is what Henry, for example, argues in relation to Marx’s critique of Feuerbach. Henry, Marx, 
p. 119.
126 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, pp. 390, 391.
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Knowing the object as its own self-alienation
Alienation, Marx tells us, has both negative and positive significance -  positive 
not only for itself and for humanity but for consciousness as well. 127 This has much to do 
with the fact that it signifies experience and that the experience which is peculiar to 
humanity is the experience of need within objects outside the individual self. The reasons 
why we seek meaning in objects, or the objects themselves, which are outside ourselves 
are, of course, complex but ultimately they reside in the fact that once we are living, 
social beings we necessarily exist in relation to others. Our existence entails “this third 
object”, as Marx refers to it. 128 As need, as hunger, objects outside ourselves seem to 
carry a certain necessity in relation to us: A being who breathes, as Feuerbach notes, is 
unthinkable without air. 129 But what does this mean for objects which are known to be 
our own self-alienation? We are thrown into painful collision with ourselves by feeling 
want, subjected to illusion, fears and desires because we perceive, in the desire for objects 
outside ourselves, our lives, or perhaps ourselves, as the lack of these objects and as the 
constant need for their possession. The objects of our want almost imperceptibly become 
social objects -  even the human eye is not merely an eye as organ but is an eye of human 
use and human seeing; 130 in Feuerbach’s terms, it “keeps theoretic festivals” .131 Thus 
objects become a confirmation of the self, an objectification of self and a fundamental 
part of one’s subjectivity. It is on this basis that an objectification of thought can obtain a 
certain ‘thingness’, an abstract otherness or exteriority, a self-consciousness through its 
alienation. The condition of knowing an object as one’s self-alienation suggests much 
more about intention towards the object than a straightforward absorption by the object. 
In order to detect the ideological playing out of a type of knowing by way of desire we 
need to be able to consider where this intention means something other than its 
satisfaction in the ‘thingness’ of the object. As we have already pointed out, the 
ideological here concerns the transposition of the real into images that entail an ebbing 
away of reality without any change to its fundamental being. It is here that subject and 
object coalesce in potentially creative although frequently ambiguous ways. Quite 
obviously the role of the unconscious, of subjectivity as fractured determination, of the 
other as some form of basic fear, are each important aspects of how the ideological takes
127 Ibid., p. 391.
128 Ibid., p. 390.
129 Feuerbach, The Essence o f Christianity, p. 40.
130 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 352.
131 Feuerbach, The Essence o f Christianity, p. 5.
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hold through intention towards the object. And perhaps the most important aspect of this 
is the existence of contradiction as a basic part of this reality. Let us consider this in 
greater detail.
Ideology and the Subject/Object Problem
Contradiction in the ideological transposition o f reality
Does ideology suggest, then, an inability to withdraw from the world, an inability to 
suspend an enactment of compromise with the object? Ideology certainly entails 
presenting an image of reality in place of reality that is perhaps more real or more 
persuasive than reality itself. In doing so the ideological is potentially able to achieve, by 
way of extracting reality from the images and representations of the reality it presents, a 
type of modification of the object. But does this not also suggest some sort of 
modification of the subject as well? We have earlier mentioned Marx’s perception of 
commodified desire as an ideological problem in terms of it being a type of need 
consisting of “exquisitely cunning, unnatural, and imaginary appetites” to which we each 
become an “inventive and ever-calculating slave” . 132 Here we can sense that Marx sees a 
realm of empathizing with commodities but that this realm is not one of straightforward 
identification.
Likewise, we should recall Marx’s understanding of the social relation of money for 
it is here too that he indicates why reification is not the simple process of an objectified 
subjectivity. Money is, for Marx, a philosophical problem precisely because the presence 
of money indicates the ability to intervene within desire -  often in the form of 
postponement or deferral. It suggests much more than the simple appropriation of things 
-  in acting ideologically, money reveals the promise of possession, or perhaps the 
possession of possession, which, as Levinas argues, “consecrates the lived equality of 
thought to its object in thought, the identification of the Same, satisfaction” . 133 The sort of 
quantification that money as measure of satisfaction must entail inevitably brings about 
new and at times quite exacting senses of justice. It perhaps even lets us catch sight of a 
justice of redemption, a ‘human totality’ 134 against which the quantification of people as
132 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 359.
133 Levinas, Entre Nous, p. 69.
134 Ibid, p. 38
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things, as exchangeable commodities, might be judged, both in our subjective experience 
and in some vaguely agreed upon cultural evaluation. Here we are creatures of 
fantasized, willed appetites but appetites for which judgement and the ethical possibility 
of the other always exists.
It is this understanding which we have extended. An intoxication with cunning and 
imaginary appetites does not preclude any awareness of the problems or pleasures of just 
such a reality. The process of disintoxication, when “we learn what we are” ,135 as Bataille 
writes, is also a part of our reality. Alienation is not its own indiscernible completedness. 
That which masks reality for us can also reveal much more than it attempts to conceal. 
The representations and images comprising the ideological might either fall short of or at 
times exceed reality but they cannot change anything substantial about its basic 
contradictions. We are capable of approaching our realities in many different ways, 
bringing to them something of the conditions of our inner and more externalized 
existence. 136 The exteriority of being reveals something of an interiorized relation of 
thought and being. Indeed, the sort of social and unconscious conditioning we know to 
place barriers upon human understanding is also involved in reaching beyond such 
barriers. When a part of this existence is the very disintoxication from the narcoticizing 
necessary in order to live out the limitedness and yet potential of our lives, against what 
we might dimly perceive in attempts to complete or give meanirg to being, then we 
realize that no straightforward clash of truth against falsity, reason against unreason, 
internal against external, is going to unravel this problem for us. We are not birds above 
the abyss but creatures who are as willing to imagine scaling its heights as we are able to 
pretend that its depths and dangers do not exist. This ambivalence of the possibilities of 
objective existence or things is also the ambivalence of subjectivity.
It is this constant contradictoriness within one’s very interaction with the 
commodifying tendency and the structures of control -  its promise of the momentary 
satisfaction of desire, of the transient release from fear - that we have indicated as an
135 Bataille, Inner Experience, p. xxxii.
136 It is simply not the case, as Lukacs maintains, that between “a ‘thinking’ slave and an ‘unconscious’ 
slave there is no real distinction”. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 169. This sort of 
objectivism denies not only the contradictory reality of subjectivity but flattens out the contradictions of the 
realities upon which the subject acts. Capitalism is an ‘object riddled with conjecture’ and the ‘theological 
capers’ of the commodity, of which Marx speaks, make its worship an ambivalent venture. Walter 
Benjamin refers to the object of materialism being “riddled with error, with 5o£,a [conjecture]”. See 
Walter Benjamin, “Addendum to ‘The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire’, in Charles Baudelaire: A 
Lyric Poet in the Era o f High Capitalism, trans. H. Zohn (London: Verso, 1983), p. 103.
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aspect of ideology. The spectacle is itself antagonistic. It is not a single dimension of the 
control of social memory and communication. This is in large part ignored in the 
contemporary critique of ideology. What we are given is the flatness of the necessity of 
an imagined reality of the system in itself, rather than the complex relation between the 
external world of need for the perpetuation of the commodifying tendency and the 
internal workings of the psyche entrapped in ideological thought, belief and ideas and 
desires, which deny an access to the freedom to transgress the world of enforced labour, 
commodification and a supposed reconciliation with what exists. The problem of the 
relation between subject and object is detached from these intentions. What is left is an 
absent relation between subject and object. Where a focus is upon the ‘eternal, iron’ 
regularity of the processes of commodity production, one fails to see any kind of 
interiority in relation to the subjective experience of commodification . 137 Likewise, 
contemporary theorizations of the complete triumph of the spectacle, or the extreme 
realization of regulatory mechanisms governing the body or desire, give scant attention to 
the possibility of contradiction or antagonism within these forms to which they otherwise 
give such observance. What is sometimes put forward is a theorization of the existence 
of a positive moment within conditions of destruction or overwhelming negativity: Thus 
Agamben argues that the complete expropriation of language by the spectacle “means 
that in the spectacle our own linguistic nature comes back to us inverted” . 138 But this 
sense that contradiction or inversion can only originate in the effective limitations of 
objective realities themselves, sounds strangely familiar: it is in essence what we have 
encountered in objectivist Marxist accounts of causality. Of the theorists we considered 
in this thesis this tendency is not always consistently the case: Lukäcs, for example, on 
occasion ponders the Nietzschean question of the formlessness of longing precisely to 
question what it is of this yieldingness that lends itself so usefully to a disabling sense of 
the never-ending negative ambiguity of one’s world -  a condition overwhelmingly useful 
to capitalism although not the necessary output of its function. Why he wants to know 
should the vital centre of life be revealed only to accidental insight? For in externalizing 
this sense of ambiguity and attributing it to an abstract sense of one’s world, the issue of 
how one’s very self engages in the world is often sidestepped. Liicäcs sees the 
fundamental difference between this, a blurred, long-suffering, almost nostalgic attitude
137 See Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 134.
138 Agamben, The Coming Community, p. 80. It might be argued that Negri and Hardt attempt a similar 
kind of theorization of what they see as the new ‘nomad horde’, essentially immigrant workers, who they 
believe will reappropriate global space as a result of their nomadic movement. Antonio Negri and Michael 
Hardt, Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000).
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to one’s culture, where one fails to see one’s inability to forge together soul and deed, and 
that of the clarity of “being both near and far” within an understanding of one’s self 
within the world . 139 It is this latter sense of perspective that is constantly threatened 
where ideology succeeds in distorting realities or presenting them in such a way that their 
own internal contradictions are momentarily erased. What his theory of reification fails 
to do is precisely this -  to prevent a constant externalization of the reification of 
extemalization, in other words, to distance this external ization from the activity of the 
subject by which it is mediated. Ultimately we are offered again a lim it- the end-point 
of reification itself that is somehow at the same time a moment of revelation. For the 
problem is that however impatiently humanity might wait for some inspiration and 
intensity of the senses, it nonetheless waits and has waited for some time, watching as 
each promise of deliverance from the forces by which humanity’s control over its 
experience is set in motion has evaporated.
The hope for positive moments within extremes of negativity would seem to 
indicate the very real problem with theorizing proportionality between subjective 
knowledge and, indeed, will and objective practice. Have we now shifted too decisively 
beyond a sense of some ultimate possibility of a reconciliation of contradictions? We 
have argued that this problem needs to be thought through metaphysically (perhaps for 
want of a better term) in a way which neither Marx nor the more contemporary Marxist 
theorists of ideology achieved . 140 All these theorists derive the psychological from the 
economic and extract the economic from the psychological, creating an identity out of the 
identical and non-identical, rather than attempting to understand life conditions by a 
variety, and even a certain randomness, of means involved in social existence - social, 
psychological, spiritual, ethical and aesthetic. The search for an imaginative 
transcendence or a surreality in these conditions is vital to a transformative philosophy. 
Without this we are presented only with the need to situate the ‘objectivity’ of 
commodification as above and beyond the interrelated aspects of subjective interaction, 
which makes of any such analysis of commodification an oddly lop-sided project. Posing 
questions as to the power and effectiveness of the ghostly objectivity commodification 
assumes is of course worthwhile, as is considering the seeming ineffectiveness of 
subjective control of these processes: But no such investigation should rule out the place
139 Lukäcs, Soul and Form, p. 91.
140 The idea of a metaphysics has been subject to much criticism but in it we find the fundamental basis of 
thought that is engaged with the world. From Kant to Nietzsche, most major Western philosophers have 
recognized this, and we find no good reason to do otherwise.
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of the subject within these processes a priori and thus the importance of a mediation of 
subject and object. And if a subjective mediation is a part of these processes then the 
imagination is an element within this as well.
For most radical theorists there is the assumption that we “acquire knowledge of 
ourselves by way of our acts”, as Althusser states. 141 Marx too had sensed the inescapable 
relation between deeds and self-understanding with his claim that: “As individuals 
express their life, so they are” . 142 We saw in Lukacs’s early work the belief that life and 
living are the basic realities of the soul; that even given the deep forgetfulness and “a 
clairvoyance of the memory” 143 to which we are prone, we are still ultimately the product 
of our lives in thought in communion with our lives in deed. It is precisely the 
inconcinnous relation between these - the rift between the self and world - that marks our 
unhappy age. 144 Lukacs refers to the ‘adequacy’ of deeds to the soul’s inner demands, 145 
and it is this precariousness of understanding and acting upon temptations to fall from or 
to discover the ‘pathless heights’ of our self that makes an emancipatory consciousness 
such an elusive and yet heroic struggle. For we exist not merely in “times without a 
god” 146 but in a period, as Reich theorizes it, in which we are haunted by our ‘murder of 
Christ’ - the annihilation of any certainty in an external salvation - and these times make 
the paradox of a fugitive existence all the more a battle with and within our selves. 147 
This is partly because we experience more and more aspects of the imposition of 
seemingly erratic and uncontrollable external conditions as the internalization of a 
panoramic fear. Our greater engagement with and knowledge of the world seems to 
result most often in a more acute sense of our homelessness. This condition is viewed as 
some sort of inherent human loss. It is also - and this is an important point we wish to 
make in this chapter - a condition, whether internal or external or both, of the control of 
the subject.
141 Althusser, “Letter to Jean Lacroix”, p. 225.
142 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 32.
143 Lukacs, Soul and Form, p. 157.
144 Lukacs, The Theory o f the Novel, p. 29.
145 Ibid, p. 30.
146 Ibid, p. 90.
147 Wilhelm Reich, The Murder O f Christ: The Emotional Plague o f Mankind (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 1967). This too is of course Nietzsche’s meaning contained within his claim that God is 
dead.
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There are “categories prescribed by the historico-philosophical position of the 
world-clock” , 148 as Lukacs describes it, which impinge upon any quest for freedom and 
thus need to be comprehended within the objective possibility of the transformation of the 
present. Do we have a clear enough sense of why people respond to the spectacle of 
commodification and fear in this way? Is a loss of self merely the necessary precursor to 
untrammelled commodification and institutions of control? Contra the later Lukacs, we 
are prepared to see that consciousness does not directly flow from being and yet we are 
then forced to confront Saint-Just’s problem that ‘when a people can be oppressed, it will 
be’. This suggests a profound difficulty in accounting for what it is the subject does in 
acting within the world. From precisely where wishes and desires emanate can seem as 
elusive as sources of oppression appear, at least superficially, perfectly obvious. What 
exactly it is that so disenables the individual that a refusal or even a recognition of 
oppressive thoughts and actions becomes unlikely, is enormously difficult to categorize 
with any certainty. Within the realm of ideology it is clear that particular meanings are 
able to serve purposes which hamper the realization of a generalized or individual 
freedom. If we can take this freedom to mean an ability to express the interrelatedness of 
one’s inner and outer value, which itself encapsulates a striving of life and thought 
towards a sublime relation with one’s self and one’s world -  with our self as another - we 
can see that the sorts of conditions which might interfere with this realization are many. 
It is for this reason that we have concentrated upon the problems of the spectacle and 
internalized fear in order to open up these areas of analysis to a more reflective sense of 
subjective mediation.
There is as well the problem Althusser presents us with - that of the material 
processes of subjection to power as it exists at any given time. At one level it is surely 
the case that the idea of the individual existing as a subject of autonomous decision and 
freedom can also occur as an ideology of the subjection of the subject to many forms of 
prevailing power. The loss of an autonomous power and self-direction on the part of the 
individual obviously matters greatly to the effectiveness of any such subjection. 
Moreover, structures that relate to each other via various signifiers and have effects as 
such, can be viewed as having some degree of causation. There is, as Althusser indicates, 
no ideology except by and for subjects: But such a statement remains tantalizingly 
ambiguous. Approaching such ambiguity cannot simply mean apportioning 
responsibility for ideology to either subjectivity or to particular conditions of control,
148 Lukacs, The Theory o f the Novel, p. 91.
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other than to acknowledge the necessary interplay of both the individual and her 
conditions of existence within any manifestation of the ideological. But is it inevitable 
that when we confront something such as ideology and all the limitations upon freedom 
that it necessarily implies that we must find in it such conditions of authority and 
influence that other realities seem to fade into the background? A general sense of the 
loss of the self can indicate the problem of a forsaken or interrupted individuality but is 
more likely to be used to indicate the external processes imposed upon the subject by 
which individuality becomes, if not extinguished, then severely restricted. The idea of 
the loss of the self is useful to an understanding of subjectivity to the extent that a 
recognition of the barren terrain left in the wake of a commodified, fearful life impinges 
upon the subject as the possibility of one’s own barrenness. If such a theory merely 
considers the endlessly difficult nature of the object of one’s alienation it will only ever 
provide an insight into one aspect of the problem. How might we shift this debate on 
subjectivity to include a more definite sense of the subject’s relation to the dialectical 
nature of a damaged existence?
We have theorized the importance of the dialectical movement of aspects of 
estrangement in which moments of discovery or unfolding can occur: But this leaves 
open the question of how we might assess this possibility. In rather starkly materialist 
terms, Kracauer argues that the “capitalist epoch is a stage in the process of 
demystification (Entzauberung)”. It founders in ‘false concreteness’ -  its own form of 
crystallized abstractness. 149 This is because reason and delusions do battle upon the broad 
expanses of a world increasingly divested of its magic, to, in Kracauer’s view, effect a 
radical dismantling of irrationality. Although this too captures something of the 
changing, contradictory processes of unfreedom it fails to view the immanent movements 
of a reality of uncontained oppositions. Kracauer assumes a steady pattern and necessity 
to the clash of moments of unfreedom -  for him, the disenchantment of the world that 
capitalism necessarily entails foretells the march of reason through and against the very 
unfreedom granting it free rein. What we want to understand is, rather, the more 
concealed difficulty that a commodified, fearful culture presents -  there is an ambiguity 
at its very centre that the problem of a democratic or voluntary unfreedom exemplifies.
149 Siegfried Kracauer, “The Mass Ornament”, trans. Barbara Correll and Jack Zipes, New German 
Critique, no. 5 (Spring 1975): p. 71. Kracauer o f course argues that a type o f reason, an obscured reason, 
operates in this context. The rationale o f the system is such that it can abandon the truth in which it has a 
stake precisely because this reason need not encompass human beings -  it in fact resists the reason deeply 
rooted in humanity.
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Disenchantment is itself fundamentally ambivalent, and most particularly so now in times 
when desire and fear seem heavily marked by an abandonment to our own finitude, as 
Paolo Vimo argues. 150 At one level the subject is faced with a seemingly endless stream 
of choices but no real alternative, other than that which fundamentally unravels the 
purpose of commodification itself. At another, the sort of abandonment by which this 
subjectivity is realized cannot take place without also being inhabited by a feeling of 
belonging, by a sense of potential community. It is for this reason that the spectacle of 
commodification becomes theorized as a form of alienation and reification -  a type of 
ideology that cannot escape its form and yet which always offers something more than its 
own limitations. We see these processes as part of a discontinuous experience of reality.
The discontinuity fundamental to a spectacularized commodification and control 
is an ideological process to the extent that a yearning, a reaching beyond the given, 
subtends the deception and self-deception of endlessly experienced ‘hunger in satiety’. 
This deception is nothing more or less than “the impotence of the truth” 151 -  perhaps 
momentarily unfathomable to us, but nonetheless present in the wrestle for meaning 
which ideology entails. At another level, we are confronted with the sheer continuity of 
the end result of estrangement - the holding up of a mirror image in which so many 
human desires and fears seem to be already captured, and through which our 
understanding is first filtered in even the most paradoxical of forms. The estrangement 
effect and the dialectical playing out of the problem of unfreedom is not then to be found 
purely in the collision of pre-determined moves between hunger and satiety.
This of course unavoidably returns us to the problem of the subject’s relation to the 
object, to the uncertainty we feel knowing if the asphodels we see “ever bloomed 
anywhere but on the insides of our eyelids”, as Castoriadis so richly expresses it, 152 and of 
whether the subjectivity we construct is ever adequate to the understanding required 
within so difficult an existence. In both cynicism and sentimentality the fracturing of the 
subject from her world appears to be centred upon desire, a desire that possesses the 
subject as a type of alterity. One does not need to accept Spinoza’s view that desire is the
150 Paolo Vimo, “The Ambivalence of Disenchantment”, trans. Michael Turits, in Radical Thought in Italy: 
A Potential Politics, eds. Paolo Vimo and Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1996), p. 31.
151 Bataille, On Nietzsche, p. 161.
152 Cornelius Castoriadis, Crossroads in the Labyrinth, trans. Kate Soper and Martin H. Ryle (Brighton: 
Harvester, 1984), p. ix.
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essence of humanity153 to acknowledge the importance of understanding the extent to 
which the subject ‘is driven’ by desire, by a compulsion for the unattainable made to 
appear attainable. Whilst the Spinozist account would have us define all desire as 
appetites of which we are conscious, and this would appear to make desire a very much 
less ambiguous process than we tend to believe it to be, there is a sense of this view of 
desire that accords with much experience -  that is, as the expectation, however passive 
this process is, of some sort of reciprocation, a need which ultimately underlines human 
unfreedom. It is also reasonable to suggest that in the midst of desire is the attempt by 
the subject to construct herself as a subject in relation to her sense of need and desire, as a 
type of sujet suppose savoir, as Lacan theorizes. 154 What it is that the subject is supposed 
to know is precisely that which, in the thrall of desire, is impossible to know. But is it so 
impossible? Is desire itself not contradictory? And is the basis of contrary desire not in 
both the capacity and failure to know oneself? What we have indicated is that a sense of 
the human psyche as the appearance in the world of a presence that both instructs and 
deceives with significations of everyday life is vital for viewing the spectacle of desire 
and fear in terms that could register aspects of human experience that are of importance 
beyond understanding their relation to objectivist mechanisms. Here we are dealing with 
displacements of meaning that also bear a relation to objectivizing consciousness.
What is of crucial importance to our theorization of ideology in relation to this 
problem of consciousness and being is the very necessary acknowledgement of wishes 
and desires, of the entire realm of the imagination, in the construction of our world. 
These are not extraneous to the otherwise normal conditions of our existence but are a 
fundamental part of everyday life. Quite how dreams, delusions, hopes and beliefs work 
within our lives is a necessarily undecided aspect of the theorization of consciousness and 
the unconscious. What we can say, however, is that despite the very repression of the 
times, yearnings for types of transcendence persist. We are not completely contained by 
our present but are instead constantly motivated by potentialities indicating a state of 
being more than the givenness of our current existence. Ideological contradictions are a 
part of our existence and, as we have seen, occur in conscious and unconscious forms. 
Whilst the general function of ideology might be to suppress these contradictions this
153 Spinoza, Ethics, trans. G. H. R. Parkinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 212. Spinoza 
writes, “Desire is the very essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to do something from 
some given affection of itself’.
154 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts o f Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), p. 232.
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does not mean that this is what it successfully achieves, nor that it even operates in any 
complete sense in this manner. Whatever appears in the form of a compromise of 
contradictions has been arrived at through a complex of processes of acceptance and 
refusal, doubt and belief, cynicism and gullibility. The mediation between people and 
their world means that much more takes place than a simple one-dimensional imposition 
of control in which the dreams and imaginings of individuals are pitilessly deracinated.
The Possession o f Self in Conditions o f Subjectivity
If we are arguing that the subject and some possible possession of self remains, we 
need to understand what it is that binds the self to being, and thus to being-in-the-world 
and social connectedness. It might have been assumed that the presence of ideology 
signifies a represented rather than an affectively experienced world, in which knowing 
requires of itself a representation of knowing being so as it might also stray from this path 
of self-knowledge, and likewise the possibility of freedom emerging inevitably from its 
absence. But, as we have seen, only ideology conceptualized as a structure of falseness 
would lead us in this direction. Understanding ideology as a part of an antagonistic 
struggle of existence not only allows us to distance ideology from the necessity of the 
philosophical privilege of representation but to see in the relation between subject and 
object or exteriority, which subtends the ideological, the presence of an anticipatory 
consciousness. We still need to ask, however, whether the subject of this relation is 
anything other than existence itself and whether the sense of being we have indicated is 
something other than the subject we here recognize as the subject of the subject/object 
relation.
Some contemporary theory contends that the subject that remains can be a “finite 
fragment”, “un-constituting, untied from all supports unrelated to the process of a 
truth” . 155 Where it is deemed unnecessary to suppress the category of the subject is where 
the subject ceases to be “the inaugural or conditioning point of legitimate statements”. 
According to Badiou, this subject, who is no longer that for whom there is truth, is 
necessarily the cancellation also of the object. It is an “objectless subject”, a de- 
objectified space of the subject. Badiou in fact traces the process of the apparent 
destitution of the subject to a confusion with what he argues is the “ineluctable process of
155 Badiou, “On a Finally Objectless Subject”, p. 25.
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the destitution of the object” . 156 But just as Badiou has indicated for us a difference 
between the classical conception (a conception involving a sense of function) of the 
subject and being, so too are there differences between concepts of the object. If we ask 
ourselves ‘can we think an objectless subject?’, we are bound to also ask after a 
subjectless object, and then find in this negation and irresolution of the contradiction 
between subject and object an empty and contrived juxtaposition of elements. For what 
is this objectlessness and its correlation in a destruction of the substantiality of the subject 
if not the outcome of a sense of complete and absolute alienation? And yet it is not clear 
whether this then should imply that the subject, now exiled to a realm from which there is 
no return and no recognition either, is in this sense overwhelmed by its own being, or by 
the apparent formlessness of the object. Substituting causality for a type of ‘always- 
already’ determination, as we see much contemporary philosophy does, fails to clarify 
this issue. If we want to define a sense of being as human possibility, rather than merely 
social experience, we perhaps will need to venture beyond a logic based upon the 
antagonistic struggle of existence. This is not because this logic is of itself in any sense 
currently misplaced (thus its abandonment within many contemporary theorizations of 
social experience is mistaken): It is because the theorization of the relation between 
subject and object that this logic yields requires, in addition, some sense of an ethical 
component of life beyond that necessitated by a playing out of a vacillating enchantment 
and disenchantment entailed in the ideological. It is this that we will endeavour to do in 
the following and final section of the chapter.
In the interrelationship of these different aspects of the problem posed by ideology 
we can see in the sort of escapist culture of endless commodity production and rule by 
forced consent, the creation of forms of desire and fear. As an ideology, a culture of 
escape seems something more imposed than willingly constructed and yet it is this very 
presumption which we need to scrutinize. What we have attempted to understand is the 
process by which people, who are subject to a certain appearance in ideology, are also a 
part of the construction of this appearance and its continued pretence. The habit of self- 
control, of internalized fear so necessary to the reproduction of a circumscribed system, is 
certainly important here. We have attempted to theorize what it is this objectivity 
encompasses by understanding it as a part of a reality of discontinuity. The view of 
ideology that emerges on this basis places the subject in a very much more important role 
than has been accorded by most radical theorists. As a part of viewing the significance of
156 Ibid., p. 24.
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the subject in ideology we will then be able to consider the context of the ideological 
surplus of which we have earlier spoken. Fear and desire enable us to see specific 
attributes of this ideological surplus. The diversion and distraction of a commodified 
world would seem most often to result in the individual failing to grasp her predicament, 
and yet, even here, precisely because the everyday realities of a citadel culture push 
towards the unstable and unpredictable, we are unable to draw this as our only 
conclusion. A culture of tedious discontent, of ‘the employees’, as Kracauer refers to it, 
might well be an escape from death, but because it cannot ever deliver such an escape it 
is constantly forced into reinvention and restlessness. 157 This process too is enmeshed in a 
subjective disquiet and vacillation. What escapes or is created afresh in this process, or 
indeed what is anticipated of the future in the present of the ideological, needs to be 
analyzed. This surplus may or may not engage humanity in a struggle for change but it 
always exists in potential as a part of the wrestle for truth, of which we have spoken 
throughout the thesis. This surplus is what remains of value for humanity beyond the 
inevitable processes of demystification or exposure of illusion which occur under 
particular circumstances in the existence of ideologies. We have attempted to theorize 
important aspects of this process by first considering the role of the subject within some 
of the significant ideas we have developed in relation to a spectacularized life and 
unrealizable fulfilment and have situated these in relation to a critique of ideology. Let 
us now turn to a fuller theorization of the place of presentiment within ideological reality.
157 Kracauer’s “The Employees” (sometimes translated as “The White-Collar Workers”) was first 
published in 1929 and appears in the third volume o f his Works. See Siegfried Kracauer, “Die 
Angestellten”, Schriften (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971), vol. Ill, quoted in Bloch, Heritage o f Our Times,
p. 26.
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Section Three: Occupying the Self as Another: Theorizing the 
Presentiment of the Ideological within the Ethos of the
Imagination
But we walk in the forest and we feel we are or could be what the forest dreams
Bloch, The Spirit o f Utopia
Ideology and the Struggle for Existence
Imagining oneself as another
In this final section of the chapter we will set out an understanding of the relation 
between subject and object within the realm of the ideological in terms of the presence of 
presentiment -  the idea of an anticipatory although not fully realized consciousness that is 
both part of the ideological and part of a world of intention towards freedom. We have 
contended that the relation between subject and object is one that can be generally 
described as dialectical - it involves temporal and spatial discontinuities and the 
experience of not-yet realized intentions and anticipations. Rather than situating the 
relation of subjective and objective within this difficult flux of participation and process, 
most theorizations of ideology have tended to make of this relation some type of 
mechanical necessity, leading ultimately to the concretization of a panlogical objectivity.
We are instead arguing that ideology can reveal partially conditional, and indeed, 
at times, unconditional aspects of the relation of subject and object. On the basis of a 
designation of a dialectical interrelationship between ideology and presentiment we will 
then consider what this suggests for a theorization of subjectivity. We have argued 
throughout that the presence of ideology indicates an absent or disengaged freedom, and 
that, although the antagonism that this entails means a struggle with unfreedom, any 
critique of ideology requires, in addition to this, an ethical commitment to life that is able 
to engage with the other as oneself. It is, we will argue, ultimately this very ability to 
respond to the other as to oneself that constitutes a premise of freedom. What we will 
consider with this is the necessity of guiding images through which humanity is able to 
sense, in terms of what of the self is made morally definable, the possibility cf freedom.
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This imaginative, experimental sense of freedom is then not merely a freedom from the 
constraints and limitations of present existence but is, more importantly, an engagement 
with ideas of what freedom might be for.
We refer to this as an ethos of the imagination because it is within the realm of the 
imagination that the ability to confront oneanother, not as things, but as a creative moral 
consciousness, exists. It is a realm that imposes both possibility and obligation. Of 
course such an assumption that an ethos is currently possible is not easy to make: 
However ambivalent its manifestations, the sense of the exhaustion of culture, which we 
have mentioned on various occasions, is a pervasive and significant aspect of 
contemporary life. The quest for an ethos is not only provoked by disenchantment but is 
a part of its reality. Understanding this means being able to cast a philosophical critique 
beyond the strictures of an opposition between a static, contained ideological world of 
unfreedom and that of some transcendence into ultimate freedom and the essence of 
being. We need to view freedom not as some disassociated, future realm but more 
perhaps as Vattimo does, as a current experience of a “continual oscillation between 
belonging and disorientation” . 158 The significance of the ethical here is in its suggestion 
of the possibility of autonomous experience, in encapsulating a recognition within oneself 
of the necessity of one’s responsibility to the other. The guiding images of such 
experience carry with them a sense of the task humanity faces. A selfhood that implies 
otherness or connectedness is a vital part of an ethos, a dwelling place, for the 
imaginative yearnings of humanity. Although based on a different logic to that of the 
struggle for existence inherent within the ideological, the ethical meaning of oneself as 
another also emerges out of antagonism. As we have mentioned, this inevitably means 
that in the current presence of antagonism an ethos is not a denial of this struggle but 
rather an alternative logic for an ethical commitment to life.
In this final section of the last chapter of the thesis we wish to set out a basis for a 
renewed theorization of ideology. As we have just indicated, this will eventually mean 
indicating where the limitations of such a critique necessitate an engagement with 
different problems and the elucidation of other concepts: but within the critique of 
ideology there is much of significance and relevance still to be said. We have already 
considered the many problems and reservations we have with some of the traditional and 
more critical projects of ideology critique. A number of the assumptions upon which
158 Vattimo, The Transparent Society, p. 10.
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such critiques were predicated are simply no longer relevant within the parameters of 
present cultural practice. A sense of ideology as straightforward falsity known to us 
through some abstraction of verifiable certainty; the idea of a static, completed 
conception of subjectivity; and, perhaps most importantly, an a priori conceptualization 
of agency, have all come to be thoroughly challenged. And yet, despite the problematic 
issues we have encountered with a logic of ideology critique that continues to 
incorporate, however marginally, aspects of these ideas, we are not at all persuaded that 
this obliges us to abandon the areas of investigation which first alerted radical theory to 
the significance of ideology and the importance of its as yet unsurpassed political 
critique. Indeed, within the areas highlighted in this thesis - that of the spectacle of 
commodified life as forms of desire, and that of the problem of fear and control within 
imagined inner experience - we have quite clearly argued for the continued relevance of a 
critique of ideology. In these areas we have seen the critical role of the conditions in 
which the subject exists, and have highlighted where a greater emphasis upon the 
mediation between the subject and her conditions of existence might reside. We have 
suggested a number of alternatives to reductionist approaches to subjectivity that take for 
granted a particular relation between the subject and her world. We have presented a 
theorization that allows for a complex relation between knowing and acting which 
expresses the various contradictions and paradoxes of the relation. It is in so doing that 
we have gained and yet also moved significantly away from the theorizations of ideology 
we have considered in depth in this thesis. The most important issue that marks out the 
approach of this thesis from other radical theories of the ideological is the significance it 
places upon an appreciation of a critique of subjectivity, and particularly upon a sense of 
selfhood, not as a mechanical dialectical necessity but as a living, experiencing 
participation within contradictory reality. We have already considered the problems 
associated with a reflexive mechanics of the self within the world theorized as an endless 
process of producing and being produced that fails to step beyond a limited notion of 
causality. In this section we will consider the importance of the realm of the imagination 
and its anticipatory consciousness that, as well as suggesting the partial conditionality of 
objective reality also considers something of the unconditional nature of the place of the 
self in the world that allows us to postulate a fundamental subjective participation 
marking the existence of the ideological.
Let us first set out a theorization of the relation between the ideological and 
presentiment. Here we will attempt to theorize our alternative emphasis upon the 
mediation of subject and object by considering two interrelated areas -  firstly, that of
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inventive need as the impetus of the mediation between hope and the surplus that 
transcends ideology, and, secondly, that of subjective hope and conditional and 
unconditional openness as a form of presentiment or ideological surplus. As mentioned 
at the outset of the chapter, we will return our analysis to the issue of unfreedom or a 
‘freedom still enmeshed in servitude’ and will do this in order to situate the question of 
the presence of both objective and subjective resources which enable a critique of 
ideology. As we stated earlier, in ideology we can detect the felt presence of a type of 
freedom which is missing -  this as the necessary corollary of a state of unfreedom. In 
understanding this we will then be able to set out why it is that we see within the 
ideological the workings of dialectical processes in which diverse and often contradictory 
images are brought into being. We have already examined a sense of this in our 
discussion of fear and desire as enmeshed in types of contradiction we see as fundamental 
to much ideology -  in this case, contradictions that involve shifts between wish-fulfilling 
images and those of dissatisfaction. Here, in this section, we wish to look more broadly 
at the philosophical underpinning of contradictory elements. Earlier in the thesis we 
considered theorizations of ideology that posit the subject as in one form or another 
mediated by forces which control the subject’s relation to the object. The theorization I 
have developed against this contends instead that the subject influences and shapes 
objective reality as it is itself influenced and shaped by this reality. There is exchange 
and confluence rather than any causal necessity. This means that disruptions of and 
within the relation between subject and object allow us to theorize the contradictions 
within ideology itself, and it is this we will see clearly in the presence of presentiment.
The Ideological as Dialectical Disruption in the Subject/Object Relation
Ideology, to paraphrase Marx’s comment on religion, is precisely the recognition 
of the subject by a detour through the intermediary of something else.159 It is the relation 
between the subject and this ‘something else’, constituting the ideological, that we 
continue to want to pursue, a relation that has troubled much philosophy which has 
attempted to theorize it, and that has, more recently, been widely abandoned by most 
contemporary critique. For Marx, the intermediary assumed in this ultimate recognition 
of the subject is that of power, or the State, which he sees as a fundamental entity 
intervening between people and their freedom. We too have assumed a type of mediation
159 Marx, On the Jewish Question, in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), p. 45.
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through various manifestations of unfreedom in order to argue that freedom resides 
beyond the ‘order of things’, and that the ‘economic transaction’ leads freedom to a 
betrayal that constitutes injustice. 160 What we have also theorized is the exchange 
between subject and object that suggests something more than a mediation of the subject 
by the conditions in which the subject exists.
One difficulty with this, as we have alluded to throughout the thesis, is that the 
realm of freedom is not some final counter to unfreedom but exists in a dialectical 
relation to it and is thus the constant possibility through which unfreedom is realized. 
Complicating this relation further, is the presence of freedom - a certain type of freedom - 
that we recognize within conditions of unfreedom: We are not only presented with 
freedom as possibility when we buy or exploit, but as the realization of contractual 
exchange. What this necessarily provokes is the realization that this mediation is not of a 
straightforward relation of one entity against another (subject against object or object 
against subject) but is of a more complex and interspersed kind. This then suggests to us 
that the needs of a self-fictioning subject may not coincide with any undisclosed necessity 
of the object. All of this means that something more is required of us in order to realize 
where injustice and unfreedom reside. This is a necessary step before any sense of an 
ethos, whose commitment is both to the ethical value of regarding oneself as another and 
to the imaginative possibilities of the self, can be realized.
This of course means understanding and developing a critique of the realm of the 
ideological as a social condition in which the individual becomes enmeshed. But what 
are the parameters here, or is the whole so unstable that we need to talk of other 
conditions through which the ideological is realized in unfreedom? According to 
Levinas, the voice of conscience needs someone to ask of it an accounting; justice, he 
argues, “does not result from the normal play of injustice” . 161 But the intention to gnöthi 
seauton we realize rests upon decisive conditions, at times the very conditions that 
interfere with or prevent self-knowledge itself. Just what boundaries or limitations the 
subject encounters in realizing this intention is then of considerable importance. In what 
different ways a dialectic is played out surely matters to how this conscience within 
unfreedom emerges. And whose voice it is that actually is this voice of conscience is also 
an important part of this judgement. For what we have argued in the previous section of 
the chapter is that, however it is mediated through the object, subjective reality is not
160 Levinas, Entre Nous, p. 30.
161 Ibid.
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reducible to any assumed universality of the object. Nor is there any necessary 
equivalence of subjectivities to which we might resort in the hope of expressing this 
relation of being. This would then surely seem to suggest that a critique of ideology need 
come to terms with the very ways in which the process of the ideological disrupts and 
fragments the relation between subject and object. For whatever truth might be elicited in 
self-knowledge, the subjective process of becoming, of value that constantly needs to be 
arrived at, means that something more than selfhood or ipseity is indicated. For truth, as 
Nancy argues, can be what it is “only by spacing itself out into a world”. This sense of 
the world is ‘being-in-common’, which is, we will go on to suggest, best arrived at 
through an imaginative, ethical commitment to life. For it is here that a sense of the 
radical immanence of life, of the determination of life by life itself, can challenge an 
externalized reduction of the subject to the object or to any equally spuriously imposed 
equivalence. It is then here that guiding images can act to reawaken what it is that a 
feeling of separation and alienation has made dormant - the fulfilment of longing through 
connectedness and obligation to one’s shared humanity and freedom. We are then 
necessarily returned to the question of the interiority of being for any radical immanence 
of life to be considered.
We have previously suggested that there exists the operation of a dialectical 
relation between the subjective and objective that gives to ideology the openness of 
contradiction and motion. Indeed, it is the concept of transformation that fundamentally 
characterizes the movement of existing contradiction as a process of differentiated unity 
within determinate diversity. Whether intended or not, this dialectics occurs; it is the 
basis of the expression of need in a world of unfreedom, or more precisely, the way in 
which we can explain the existence of this need as signifying process. Even in opposing 
many aspects of this concept, Nancy tells us that it is impossible to avoid the process of 
the dialectic: “With every step, discourse dialecticizes”, he argues. 162 And if we instead 
understand this process as conditional and unconditional events in which the subject 
participates we are perhaps only all the more confronted with the confirmation of 
dialectical reality. But what is it that occurs? And do we see in this concept a necessary 
construction of negations, to which the ideological and its critique might be suited, but 
which an ethics needs to shift beyond? Do we mean by the dialectic “the bacchanalian 
whirl in which no member is not intoxicated”, as Hegel theorized of this process, 163 or
162 Nancy, The Sense o f the World, p. 150.
163 Hegel, The Phenomenology o f Mind, p. 105 (translation slightly altered).
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merely that a world of struggle infers a world of constant change? Or is it more that the 
dialectic is, as Steiner attributes to Kierkegaard’s understanding, the division of the self 
into contradictory voices? 164 If so, are we then dealing with a relation of subjectivity with 
itself that is able to sidestep any possible mediation or equivalence? Again the difficulty 
is that freedom -  the moment of realization of a searching for the elucidation of our 
relation to others and to our own imaginative being - is the presupposition of unfreedom; 
so that even if we would prefer to see the dialectic as a part of a current reality in which a 
mediation of subject and object is imposed in the direction of externalizing the relation of 
self to being, we still need to theorize, in relation to this, a constant possibility of an 
affirmation of the radical immanence of life as a part of the structure of reality. We can 
call this dialectic by other names -  exodus, refusal, subtraction, withdrawal, as various 
autonomist theorists do165 -  but we are nonetheless returned to the issue of the relation 
between the social order in which we exist and that from which we withdraw our support. 
Perhaps it is more useful to see the ideological as a type of disruption to this dialectic, not 
quite an exodus or refusal because its engagement in antagonistic relations is a basic part 
of its own contradiction, but a way in which an alternative by way of defection or 
withdrawal is situated in potential.
We have already considered the main problem associated with a tendency to view 
ideology as a closed system of cause and effect - the mechanism of control becomes the 
sole determinant of patterns of acquiescence to, or struggle with, power. Here we are 
presented with a dialectics which, if dialectical at all, is so only in a one-dimensional and 
uni-linear fashion. The result of this is an understanding of being as a unitary, 
undifferentiated objective reality. What we instead want to consider in a theorization of 
ideology is a multi-level dialectics which takes into account both objective and subjective 
factors of contradiction as well as synchronous and non-synchronous antitheses. With 
this we are able to conceptualize being beyond its reduction to an objectivist exteriority. 
This is indeed one way in which the conceptualization of ideology with which we are 
dealing can be broadened to include a sense of presentiment. We need to shift the 
analysis of ideology from the somewhat static and abstract sense of polarities to an 
understanding of mutual interactions and contradictions - more to what Marx, as we have
164 George Steiner, “The Wound of Negativity: Two Kierkegaard Texts”, in Kierkegaard: A Critical 
Reader, eds., Jonathan Ree and Jane Chamberlain (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 103.
165 See, for example, Paolo Vimo, “Virtuosity and Revolution: The Political Theory of Exodus”, trans. Ed 
Emory, in Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics, eds. Paolo Vimo and Michael Hardt 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 189-210.
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seen, refers to as the “legitimation of chance” . 166 There is no necessary development 
between relations - this is merely the presumption of what is taken as a given, 
undifferentiated mode of their existence. The construction of relations such as freedom 
versus necessity, subject versus object, freedom versus control can only ever represent 
abstract conditions and static, mechanical, fixed dualities: We instead need to understand 
the tendencies and contradictions within the relations between freedom and control, 
subject and object that allow us to move beyond these negations.
Here we see a multiplication of powers that situates the relation between social 
conditions and ideology. What we mean by a multi-spatial and multi-temporal dialectics 
is best understood by considering what it is that comprises the relationship between 
subject and objects: Whether consciously or unconsciously, or both, subjectivity works its 
way out in relation to the processes of an objectification with which it interacts. This 
creates the constant possibility of a relation of being with itself, or a radical immanence 
of life. This relationship can bring to bear past and future, the backwards glance to what 
has not yet been fulfilled, and a future sense of transforming impulses; the counter­
movements of the subject against the objectivity confronting her as well as incomplete 
and unrealized identifications with a better past. There are contradictions between and 
within temporal and spatial dimensions. Ultimately, what provides the motor of these 
contradictions are subjects themselves, but subjects who possess a particular quality that 
unsatisfied need and unrealized potential has generated - a quest for the inner self to 
know herself through a propulsion outwards, an emergence into what one is and what one 
is within humanity. Bloch expresses this need as that in which all being is “built around 
the Not which induces hunger” . 167 It is this hunger which gives substance to the dialectic 
between subject and object. We need, of course, to give more substance to this bare 
propulsion into life, and for this are suggesting the motivation of a sense of experiencing 
oneself as another as the basis for an ethics. But let us first make some further remarks in 
relation to the dialectical disruption of subject and object.
Dialectical relations do not only involve what is merely given within social 
relations but also the possibilities beyond that which currently exists. We are surrounded 
by possibility, not merely by presence, as Bloch contends. “In the prison of mere 
presence we could not even move nor even breathe” . 168 A negative critique of the
166 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 109.
167 Bloch, “Dialectics and Hope”, p. 3.
168 Ernst Bloch, “Man as Possibility”, Cross Currents vol. xviii (1968): p. 281.
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ideological is trapped in this airless presence, and thus tends towards accounting for an 
endless contradiction and fixed antagonism of component parts. Such a way of viewing 
the relation between subject and object finds difficulties in introducing into its critique a 
type of alternative theorization of being outside the continuing logic of antagonism and 
negation. It is such an alternative that we are presenting with an ethos of the imagination 
and an ethical commitment to life. We can derive this from Bloch’s ontology of ‘not-yef 
which is directed towards the possibility of a “just and proper world” , 169 a world in which 
an “unrestricted polyphony” of the wealth of human nature can be expressed. 170 That 
such a world can be anticipated is entailed in what is given now; the future is not some 
far-off realm separated from the present - the presence of the future is in the expression of 
its possibility. There is “a future-laden definiteness in the real itself ’ . 171 Ideology can on 
occasion give us precisely such a sense. Humanity is a possibility which has not yet 
ripened the whole of its conditions. 172 To argue otherwise is to apply a mechanical 
concept of the relation people have to their world, it is to assume “a beginning frozen to 
death from birth” . 173 It is, we should add, also to artificially separate the self or being 
from the other and from the world. It is this relation between self and the rest of nature, 
one in which each is immanent within the other, which needs to be radically 
reconstituted. What this means for an understanding of ideology is that a sense of the 
relation the individual has to her world is not that of a fixed stasis within the control and 
oppression, which ideology, frozen at any given moment, might represent. Subjectivity 
within ideology can also be a part of a creative intoxication of the self with one’s world 
that enables images to arise as a part of a vision of something couched in, and yet also 
beyond, reality. Such images -  at times, guiding images - can express distance within 
momentary experience and the state of constant transformation of which they are a part. 
There is then something more arbitrary than necessary about the way in which a 
dialectical relation between subject and object might provide a basis for the emergence of 
any such images. But why should ideology play any such role of a ‘waking dream’?
169 Bloch, Philosophy o f the Future, p. 112.
170 Ernst Bloch, Natural Law and Human Dignity, trans. Dennis J. Schmidt (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1986), p. 167.
71 Bloch, The Principle o f Hope, vol. I, p. 235.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid., p. 237.
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The Ideological and Guiding Images
If the ideological is marked by a dialectical incompleteness, by a tendency to 
disrupt relations through which it is given expression, then the possibility of uncertain 
outcome always exists. This possibility means that the given content of an ideology may 
be transformed in ways that might not be instantly predictable. New connections 
between ideas might form, fundamentally altering the previous content or the intention in 
the use of the content of a particular ideology. In this sense ideologies might not be 
sufficient within themselves, or might be propelled by a momentum other than that with 
which they began life or were intended to be used. What all this indicates is the presence 
of a constant otherness within which experience is couched. At times this otherness can 
reveal a surplus within the images and ideas that arise -  a surplus which might extend 
such images beyond their connection with the conditions from which they appear to have 
emerged. As we have seen, often such ambiguity is itself grounded in particular 
contradictions that have their origin in fundamental antagonisms of an unfree life. A 
cynical reason can not easily be dispelled by critique of its ideological ramifications. 
And yet, despite such archetypes, guiding images can provide the questions required of 
the situatedness being in a morality and ethics. This does not mean that objective 
tendencies no longer operate within such a surplus or juxtaposition of images but that the 
capacity for a subjective depassement is more readily available. Ideology exists because 
a questioning of life as it is lived occurs. It thus contains within it the processes by which 
a questioning of ourselves and our experience is necessitated, posed and answered. This 
will often be expressed as a matter of difference as far as each subject is concerned; this 
does not, however, mean that it does not occur intentionally or without more general 
purpose.
We have mentioned several times the existence of a surplus within the 
ideological. Let us explain this in more detail. There can be the existence of a surplus 
within ideology that is capable of transforming the content of ideologies. Surplus images 
are entailed in the existence of ideology because contradictions between desires and 
habitual realities constantly emerge. Ideology involves its own peculiar forms of 
contradiction -  sometimes blunt, unavoidable and knowingly invented, sometimes more 
opaque and difficult to discern. As we have considered, ideology is capable of enormous 
changes, even where, as a routinized enactment of underlying contradiction, various 
predictable forms might be expressed. The ideology of fear of which Althusser speaks in 
relation to the works of Malraux, Camus, Koestler and Gabriel Marcel and their
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awareness of a threatened humanity, is obviously different from that of the fear at the 
basis of a ‘blood and soil’ fascism. And yet what is it that gives rise to either of these 
forms of fear other than a humanity ill at ease with itself and its world? It is within such 
objective conditions of the ideological that we can detect the basis for the creation of 
surplus images and qualities.
What is required is the subjective interaction with a surreality capable of 
suggesting transformation; for it is here that ideology ceases to be the static necessity that 
it might otherwise impose. Within ideology generally what emerges out of types of 
embellishment and abstraction (the ideology of freedom of exchange within the wage 
contract, or the ideology of freedom of choice within consumption, for example) might 
seem to be a certain inauthenticity within the sort of symbolic perfection these qualities 
anticipate, and yet, even given this embellished kind of exaggerated anticipation, the 
images which might emerge from this cannot be neatly accounted for in reductionist 
fashion. The clash of contradictory realities can at times produce a surplus of 
unpredictable images and ideals that can then structure a sense of our present relation to 
unfreedom. We are presented with a social form in which the capacity to determine 
constantly interacts with that which it determines. This is the complexity and difficulty 
of ideology; for ideology requires a ‘calculating slave’ in order to work, and yet, in 
working well, it will also make visible its surplus in unsatisfied and yet illuminated need, 
in the habit of forced acceptance, but so too in the possibility of liberation.
A critique of ideology needs to take into account these various facets of an 
understanding of the relation between subject and object and of a radically fractured 
sense of reality. It is, of course, precisely critique that is best able to do this by 
fundamentally questioning the basis of all assumed relationships. At the basis of critique 
is a sense of process, process which is itself potentially transformative, that engages in 
the interruptions, accidental and disparate connections and distances between types of 
subjective intervention within the world. Ideology suggests the operation of forms of 
constraint or limitation upon action, and yet, viewed dialectically, this can only mean the 
contradictory tension between restraint and spontaneity, restriction and expansion. The 
critique of ideology thus provides us with the most useful theoretical nexus of the 
collision between subject and object. We will now attempt to centre our discussion of 
this relationship with a more specific analysis of the issue ofpresentiment in relation to a 
contemporary understanding of ideology.
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A Contemporary Theory o f Ideology
‘the dream o f a thing’ — ‘presentiment’ and ideology
As we saw in an earlier chapter, Marx presents us with the following conundrum - 
that the world has long possessed ‘the dream of a thing’ of which it need only have a 
consciousness in order to really possess, and yet it remains the case that in possession of 
it the world is clearly not. Whilst a harmonizing of dream and consciousness sounds 
perfectly straightforward, the question remains one of how people might come to possess 
their own dreams in such a way that their consciousness mirrors their hopes. When 
consciousness is itself the very place of distortion, self-delusion and control how might 
anything other than a consciousness of this enable self-awareness? The role the 
imagination plays is no doubt important, and yet what is difficult to theorize here is what 
part of this imagining process remains, necessarily, a mystery. Indeed, is not a certain 
elusiveness an important aspect of the subject herself who dreams and imagines? Our 
initial theorization of presentiment might then be an acknowledgement of the enduringly 
mysterious, enigmatic and experimental aspects of human life. Ideology does not 
necessarily reveal any such tendency -  ideas that are prosaic and convenient and tend to 
provide an available solution to a contrived, inauthentic problem are unlikely to provoke 
any sublimity or presentiment. They would therefore be unlikely to pose the problem of 
subjectivity as an open problem, understanding humanity in relation to its potential, but 
instead affix to it a prescribed givenness that can never constitute a critique. And yet this 
provides us with a vital way into the critique of ideology and the question of subjectivity 
-  indeed of the problem of open potentiality which subjectivity presents - and, 
importantly, it allows us to view ideology critique as a form of discovery rather than as 
the presumed inevitable outcome of certain given conditions. For the ideological is, 
before anything else, an attempted reshaping of the self, a way in which self-delusions 
and self-fictioning tries to escape awareness. But because it so aims at the self, the 
ideological inevitably deals with the contradictions of the self, and, as Bloch reminds us, 
“the path to ourselves is never narrow” . 174 Much ideology critique, as we have seen, 
focuses exclusively upon the disclosure of pre-determined obstacles which have arisen as 
the necessary outcome of the play of objective forces: Instead, we need to shift from an 
understanding of what it is that enables the subject to accommodate herself to forms of
174 Bloch, The Principle o f Hope, vol. Ill, p. 934.
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ideological control to looking at what it is that provides the impetus to move beyond its 
strictures.
We have argued that in the ideological we are inevitably presented with a quest 
for meaning undertaken within conditions of unfreedom, inauthenticity or the fragility of 
self-knowledge. It is an abyss over which we hover and it is one for which we are little 
prepared. Why then should this suggest the presence of a presentiment, an anticipatory 
consciousness, able to illuminate the ‘darkness of the lived moment’? Surely the most 
telling aspect of the ideological is its ability to render impenetrable the superficial 
dimension of reality, its deceptive qualities, and the self-deceiving eye perceiving its 
character? The ideological, we are arguing, is an expression of the unresolved 
antagonisms arising from a state of existence in which presentiment can find meaning in 
a variety of conscious and unconscious representations and symbols. It can indeed 
become an active intervention, a conscious effort on the part of the subject to realize the 
world, its objects and a consciousness of these as acts of the self. We struggle to find 
meaning in a world of antagonism, constructing and securing a grounding that could 
provide substance for our existence out of the ideas and beliefs that might make 
possibility a reality. Ideology can make deceptive realities more present, or more 
imperceptible, but it also creates irrealities, and, in both, an as yet to be redeemed surplus, 
a greater fullness of being, hovers. If reality (ideological or otherwise) were sufficient it 
would not need to create embellishments or confusions of meaning. And yet the intention 
of symbols is not merely one of reassembling reality; the intention is also to provide 
meaning to existence itself. Whether this results in a rediscovery of the other is a 
pertinent question to pose for any type of intentionality in relation to consciousness. In 
attempting to situate ‘the sense of the world’, Nancy claims that myth and the abyss are 
postulations inscribed by philosophy as its own limits. 175 In both myth and nihilism the 
tension of the open space of sense presents itself as the double border of that opening 
philosophy itself wants to achieve. Does this suggest that the abyss and the mythic can 
be experienced more as the events they are, or that they remain points of closure that 
humanity is unable to displace itself onto? The traditional way of understanding ideology 
has presented us with archetypes through which the ideological is expressed that give us, 
in the sense of what is behind that which is apparent, the inevitability of constraint. But 
‘the dream of a thing’, the presence of presentiment, indicates a significantly different
175 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense o f the World, p. 50.
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process by which the archetypal forms of ideology could be said to operate. Let us 
consider this by way of an example.
Symbolic Limitation as Contradiction
In 1942, in an apocryphal dialogue with Charles de Brasses, Breton considered 
that the “absolute limit has been reached in the domination by the symbol of the thing 
signified”.176 Whatever this limit was perceived to be, it was not in the relation between a 
signification grounded in endless commodification and any obvious extant mythology 
that a “scabrous modernity”177 had revealed this extremity. This sort of modernity, or 
what we have indicated as the malaises of unfreedom, had by this time deadened most 
living mythology within far-ranging purview. The idea of a limit to the extent of the 
symbols of domination commodification could achieve was, however, reason to believe 
that a new mythology or more authentic way of living might emerge -  but on the basis of 
what? If the subject had been decisively crushed by the necessity of a disenchantment 
embedded not merely with a vague fear of the self but an external control able to implant 
itself in the unconscious, then how might the subject posit any sense of freedom in any 
part of her involvement in life? A complete domination by the symbol would surely 
suggest that all contradiction had been levelled, that unfreedom had been fully realized, 
and this, as we have previously mentioned, would suggest the unlikely scenario that 
ideology no longer has any place in contemporary life.
The idea of the advent of a limit, as something to be reached and experienced as an 
end-point, can of course instead suggest the very real involvement of the individual 
within the seeming ‘reign of autonomous things’ or “sovereignty of servitude”, as 
Bataille would say.178 Can such a state be said to exist today? Fear and desire, as we 
have seen, are complex evasions not only from or in relation to the object but in relation 
to the subject as well. They are forms of artifice that are also forms of escape that have 
not yet reached the limit of subjective expression, whether or not it might be that they 
have encountered their own outer limits in the form of commodified objects. This means 
that their existence in ideological form has not yet been exhausted or surpassed. But if
176 Breton, Surrealism and Painting, p. 156. Charles de Brosses, as we mentioned earlier in the thesis, 
wrote his Du culte des dieux fetiches in 1760.
177 Ibid., p. 122.
178 Bataille, Theory o f  Religion, p. 93. Various more recent theorists have taken up Bataille’s ideas of the 
individual becoming exposed to the complete ‘thing-like’ character of the human encounter so as to ‘touch’ 
the limit of such a tendency. See, for example, Agamben, The Coming Community.
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we argue on the one hand that ideological forms persist, and yet we also understand that 
the context of the creation of a new mythos has been seriously threatened by the very 
doubt cast upon the authentic by the knowing reproduction of the inauthentic, then we 
must surely face the difficulty of how to situate antagonism and contradiction within a 
deferral or manipulation of presentiment. For it is here that a significant impetus arises 
for a particular ordering of the symbol contents of an existence made fearful, grasping 
and mundane. And this ordering, this immediate sense of what it is that the self aims 
towards, might make any positing of the self as consciousness or presence appear as a 
limit of intention that has, as it were, already been fully reached.
It is certainly the case that we seek out kinds of necessity for actions in which we 
are involved, and it is because we are able to reflect upon our actions that we sense 
ourselves as actors within the realm of freedom or within the clutches of unfreedom. But, 
just as with authenticity, precisely where it is that the subject begins here and the object 
ends, or vice versa, is often difficult for us to detect. We might want to find a mastery the 
existent exercises on existence and the weight of existence on the existent, as Levinas 
theorizes of the relationship between existence and an existent, 179 but ideology intervenes 
within this relation at various different junctures. Likewise, the basis upon which the 
symbols we construct are shaped as particular representations of our existence is not fixed 
and unchanging, and not without its own unclear margins. This confluence of 
determinants, held in a dialectical tension between a type of necessity and a type of 
inventiveness, we see expressed in Marx’s comment that the “machine accommodates 
itself to man’s weakness, in order to turn weak man into a machine” . 180 Whether this 
means that the machine leads to the weakness of humanity or weak humanity creates the 
machinery by which it is enslaved, or whether we encounter a combination of both 
processes, is, of course, an unavoidable question. For if we are to seek out the guiding 
images by which a surplus might be realized and a moral existence and meaning given to 
our actions, then we need to be able to locate where the ideological emerges, wherever it 
congeals. For in the ideological is a certain demand made of the self in relation to others 
-  often to justify the usurpation of the needs of others by way of securing one’s own 
being in the world, but also, and perhaps surprisingly so, to extend a sense of a 
consciousness of self as a question of responsibility to another.
179 Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 77.
180 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 360.
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The critique of ideology we have outlined allows us to consider what might be 
beyond the self-limiting fears and desires and ‘fly-like happiness’ that keeps us 
imprisoned within conditions of unfreedom. We might flee from reality and its fears or 
desire to see it in weak, submissive terms, but there is nontheless still a reality of being 
left for us to honour through which various guiding images might be realized. It is, of 
course, perfectly possible that these guiding images might themselves be formulated 
insincerely, or indeed need properly to await another time to represent to humanity a 
better picture of itself. And these images too are not immune to a life lived in conditions 
of unfreedom. Nietzsche talks of ‘the little weeds’ “which grow up in and around 
everything and know how to cling everywhere” which ruin that which is great in us, 181 
and knowing how to clear this path to ourselves is not necessarily given in images of a 
more fulfilled moment.
Numerous social theorists have attempted to account for the types of compensation 
which weak or weakened humanity has developed. As we considered earlier, much of 
Reich’s theorization of ideology suggests the decisive role of the social type of the ‘little 
man’ - the sexually and socially repressed individual who seeks compensation in an 
identification with oppression. Georg Simmel too had drawn attention to a society that 
had moved in the direction of a “lifeless schematization”, becoming “proud of its 
woodenness” . 182 This identification might also emerge on the basis of what Nietzsche 
terms ‘ressentiment’ or what Bloch and Bataille call ‘intoxication’. Ideology might 
appeal particularly to the ‘worm-eaten’ types who, vengeful in their own weakness, 
“crave to be hangmen” . 183 But are these indications of contradictions of self or 
contradictions within a broader social context of antagonism and diversion? Does this 
distinction indeed matter if what we are dealing with is a cultural heritage in which ‘the 
darkness of the lived moment’ must inevitably do battle with its own surplus, its own 
latency? The representations and symbols of the ideological possess this very possibility 
of an exertion beyond what is given within or outside its own intentions. The content of 
the ideological can therefore only reach its own absolute limit by way of the realization of 
meaning itself, which this selfsame content is frequently functionally set against. 
Whether we identify with this at a personal or more social level, the question that remains
181 Nietzsche, Daybreak, par. 435.
182 Georg Simmel, “The Sociology of Sociability”, quoted in Peter Conrad, Modern Times, Modern Places: 
Life & Art in the 20th Century (London: Thames & Hudson, 1999).
183 Nietzsche, The Genealogy o f Morals, III, no. 14, p. 123.
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for a critique of ideology is still that of why a type of deceptive solution repeatedly arises 
within representations of the world and ourselves.
Ideology certainly often presents stolid, static forms that appear to neutralize any 
content that might contradict the assumption of inevitability and one-dimensionality that 
the ideological is more likely to occupy. Where an identification results in the terminus 
of possibility it would then seem to suggest that there is some degree of severance 
between what takes place as practices and systematized structures or structural 
configurations and what does or could otherwise occur. For example, what Marx sees as 
the development of a strange and antagonistic affinity people have with the world of 
capital - a being ‘at home’ within market relations, needs to be considered alongside the 
other part of this - the condition of being out of place within one’s self. A process of 
ideological naturalization suggests not only types of susceptibility in those who are 
subject to it but an actual need that arises in conditions in which complicity can then take 
place. For if we accept that we are often engaged in the creation “of something which 
does not yet exist” and that this occurs within circumstances encountered, given and 
transmitted from the past then, at one level at least, we do make history in circumstances 
not of our own choosing. 184 The interesting issues to consider are not only who or what it 
then is choosing our circumstances or limitations, but, much more inwardly and tellingly, 
why it is that we do not choose differently. For the sort of past that is transmitted, or 
even more directly encountered, is not a monolithic, undifferentiated, undisputed 
necessity -  even here we have choice. Our actions of the present and the future are only 
all the more open to a deliberate engagement. What Nietzsche terms ‘bad conscience’ - a 
“discontent in the face of involuntary contentment” 185 would then seem as important as 
Marx’s idea of the ‘calculating slave’ and in many ways each reveals the other side of 
what is the same essential problem.
If this takes us too close to the realm of open speculation it is certainly not 
without purpose that we have strayed into such territory. The sort of critique of ideology 
we are developing that engages with an ethos of the imagination consists perhaps of 
familiar signposts but is being visited in an entirely novel manner. This means that we 
are in many ways dealing with an as yet unknown selfhood and possibility that, in 
relation to the ideological, needs to begin to be considered. But let us again pose the 
central issue in relation to ideology and its critique: What sort of choice, consciousness or
184 Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, p. 146.
185 Nietzsche, The Genealogy o f  Morals, III, no. 23, p. 147.
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responsibility is involved in misconstruing the question of ourselves and our relation to 
the world? If it is ideology that might provoke this, how does presentiment survive the 
narrowing of options that a condition such as need surely entails? The problem we have 
seen developed within ideology critique has tended to focus upon the strength, extent and 
sophistication of the machine, as it were, rather than any sense of the weakness of 
humanity which the machinery of ideology is able to exploit. And so too then does it 
miss any sense of an affectivity of being in the world which might outline the 
inescapability of a connection to each other. Certainly ideas are ideological to the extent 
that they are incapable of fully explaining the realities by which they are generated. But 
this might not be enough to reconfigure the question of ourselves that the presence of the 
ideological makes so necessary for us to pose.
The basic derivation of ideology is the antagonism that arises when human 
existence is no longer open to freedom and the affirmation of life: But again this merely 
describes the general cause of ideology, it does not explain degrees of participation with 
or without a presentiment or surplus within ideology. Perhaps this is more illuminated by 
understanding the effect of ideology, which is often to render mystified its source in self- 
delusion, antagonism and contradiction. Ideology determines the content of the 
contradiction characterizing any given struggle over ideas in the same way that 
contradiction determines the content of ideology. It is contradiction rather than simply 
the struggle over ideas which is denied by the existence of ideology. By denying the very 
origins that give rise to its content, ideology can ensure a level of participation it might 
not otherwise attract. Do we then conclude that presentiment is in some way suspended 
by those very conditions which ensure its existence and accommodate participation 
within the ideological? Or can we theorize the presence of a surplus capable of breaking 
through the form of ideas in which the individual gains her meaning by decisively 
severing any connection with any other person? Let us consider this by examining in 
more detail what we mean by the presence of a cultural surplus in relation to ideology.
The Surplus that Transcends Ideology
In the previous chapters of the thesis we considered in detail ideas developed by 
some of the major theorists of ideology in which each shows elements of the basic 
contradiction of people to their estrangement, fearfulness or alienated life. In each case 
we critically evaluated the analyses presented by asking how a theorization of the 
problem of the contradictory character of such conditions in which estrangement exists is 
also a path beyond estrangement. Marx’s treatment of religion as an ideology, for
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example, brings out the various paradoxical strands of religious belief - the acceptance of 
some of the seeming illusions of the present at the same time as a yearning for another 
world and thus a protest against present conditions. We mentioned, earlier in this 
chapter, the necessity of a search for a transcendence or a surreality within the conditions 
of our existence as being vital to a transformative philosophy. What we are able to 
further theorize is that certain ideas which offer a clear alternative to the venal logic of a 
competitive system are not illusions about the world but the expression of a human 
potential, as yet unrealized, which makes of itself something hopeful (and thus, albeit 
erroneously, seemingly illusory) to the extent that its dreams of a better world are not yet 
a reality. For this we need to understand that there is nothing final in the relation people 
have to their world and that there exist many and varied emancipatory impulses which 
remain homeless in conditions of unfreedom. This openness is to be realized in 
circumstances which people are able to change as much as it is in the circumstances by 
which people are themselves changed. People are constantly engaged “in the creation of 
something which does not yet exist” . 186 There is much we can gain from such a 
theorization of the individual’s turbulent and often indeed troubled existence within 
social relations that seem to impose an alienating order beyond the subject’s control. 
Most importantly, we can see that as a result of such a theorization, there is no need to 
accept the assumption that hope and imagination are excised from a world whose 
rationale is commodified greed and fear.
Let us look at an example. Freedom and equality exist. The fact that they often 
exist in compromised or rather wizened forms in the world with which we are familiar 
does not alter the fact that they exist. We would need to imagine a very different world 
from this to claim conceptually and in terms of any lived experience that neither could be 
said to exist at all. Freedom and equality also exist ideologically: That is they exist 
within the form of suppressed antagonism and contradiction that in unfree society 
manifests itself in a wide variety of ways. Specifically in capitalist society, we see these 
manifestations in a range of different relations - from the wage relation, to the habit of 
servility, to the ability to usurp the place of the other within one’s world. It is nd that the 
ideological manifestation of freedom and equality is the denial of unfreedom and 
inequality, it is that it is the denial of the antagonistic basis of a lack of freedom and 
inequality in exploitation and alienation characterizing capitalist society. In this way we 
must also acknowledge where these concepts exist as guiding images. For the vast
186 Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire, p. 146.
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majority participating in the world of commodified exchange there is an engagement 
within relations of exploitation and alienation. This means that there is an experience of 
antagonistic relations and their ideological forms. Ideology critique that sees in the 
ideology of freedom merely the sham presence of imagined relations emerging in 
accordance with the needs of capital fails to appreciate the lived and living relation that is 
ideology. Capitalism operates on the basis of types of freedom - the freedom to sell one’s 
labour being the most obvious ‘freedom’ many people experience. It is a freedom that is 
also a relation of alienation and exploitation. It is the antithesis of spontaneity and 
emancipation. It is the realization of equality and freedom ‘which proves to be inequality 
and unfreedom ’ . 187 It is a freedom and equality respected in exchange values. It is this 
part of ideology, which does not fully coincide with a justificatory content, that an 
emancipatory critique must theorize, but not merely in terms of the way in which realities 
are justified; it must also consider what needs in people are satisfied by an acceptance or 
rejection of ideology.
What this means is that any account of subjectivity in relation to ideology needs to 
theorize the participation of people within the ideological in terms of a subjective 
participation itself -  not to claim this as some straightforward and simple choice on the 
part of individuals but to examine a range of reasons beyond those of only the 
externalized imposition of power and control in the manner of a static schematism. This 
also allows us to see that we create concepts as guiding images by which a better 
realization of the self in community might become manifest. What is needed, then, is a 
theorization capable of reflecting the dynamic contradictions of lived experience within 
social life. And what is required for this is some account of the processes of depassement 
-  the ability of the subject to in some sense surpass the strictures, obligations and 
expectations of systematized power; to express levels of discernment in relation to the 
forces of control experienced, and to make judgements of acceptance or refusal upon this 
basis. Neither reification nor processes of ideological interpellation make of the subject 
an empty shadow without any impulses or desires beyond those connected to the 
requirements of continued commodification. Reification and fear impose definite 
limitations but not without contradictions, disconnections and a lack of reconciliation. 
What is indicated, however, is that whatever we might see as subjective possibility occurs 
within a context of the conditions, both evident and less apparent, of which the self and
187 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 249.
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humanity is a part. And as we have made clear it is no doubt obvious that we cannot 
really theorize the former without reference to the latter.
If an anticipatory consciousness frequently places before us the outline of a sense of 
freedom as responsibility for the other and yet the conditions of an unfree world 
constantly marginalizes or skews this sense to accord with the needs of an existence that 
asserts the inability of the self to consciously confront fear, greed and self-delusion, then 
we are left with only a few conclusions: Either ideology is too powerful a force to 
challenge the command it exerts on humanity (and this, of course, is a condition we have 
criticized in a wide variety of ways throughout the thesis) or we can acknowledge the 
limitations of the critique of ideology to itself offer a complete alternative to the logic of, 
as in Pascal’s sense, the ‘hateful self. If it is the latter, and this we are contending, we 
need to present some outline of an ethics or presence of being that can itself account for 
the continual resurgence of a ‘memory of the future’. This is what we will now explain 
in terms of an ethos of the imagination.
An Ethos o f the Imagination
Suggesting, as this thesis does, that we are situated within the realm of our own 
possibilities does not in any way mean that the problems and difficulties of an internally 
riven cultural heritage are answered by understanding the presence of these possibilities. 
The difficulties of the times themselves impose limitations and potentialities to both an 
understanding and a realization of any possible transformation. The existence of 
ideology today is a constant reminder to us that self-delusion, if not also a broader 
cultural forgetting, mark even the most questioning of ages. What this suggests about the 
relation between the world of one’s existence and one’s own consciousness of power and 
freedom is certainly to be detected within the ideological. But if ideology is able to leave 
as many traces of self-constraint as that of a fledgling freedom are we not left with the 
problem of what the effect of the ideological is upon the transformation of the self? It 
would seem that this is precisely the problem that ideology presents today, and has indeed 
been the conundrum it has presented in a variety of forms throughout its history. This 
difficulty creates a lacunae in our theorization of ideology. What we wish to set out here 
is how only some sort of moral and aesthetic philosophy that is able to take the 
ideological into account, by way of understanding the presence in it of an anticipatory 
consciousness, is able to address this problem.
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We mentioned earlier in the chapter that what we felt was missing from the work of 
the ideology theorists we have considered is a type of metaphysics upon which they can 
draw in order to shift a negative critique of ideology into the realm of a dialectical 
engagement with the problem of freedom and enslavement and specifically into the realm 
of the ontological. We need, however, to consider this more closely. As Agnes Heller 
reminds us, the idea of a metaphysics is fraught with difficulties, not least of which is that 
modem philosophy cannot assume a position of straightforward authority without telling 
lies. 188 In addition, we have seen that the radical philosophy of, for example, Marx and 
Nietzsche in some important ways broke with a metaphysics on the basis of a perceived 
need for a philosophy of practice, which involved a moral re-evaluation of the present 
and a strong sense of the transformative possibilities of humanity. For this reason Heller 
refers to a contemporary philosophy, using Lukäcs’s term, as an “ethics of personality” . 189 
I prefer to use what I will term an ‘ethos of the imagination’ because although both terms 
are capable of encompassing a sense of both the transformation of social being and that 
concerning the conduct of one’s own personal life, the idea of an ‘ethos or ethics of the 
imagination’ is better able to fundamentally challenge any arbitrary separation between 
subject and object. Subjective and objective imagination are intertwined in much 
possibility and contingency within everyday life. More importantly, the term we have 
derived is able to shift moral philosophy away from the abstraction of a purely external 
morality, however positively utopian such an abstraction might be, to a sense of the 
significance of more directly lived experience. Moreover, an emphasis upon the 
imagination allows us to conceive the potential of the self in broad terms encapsulating 
the relation between the conscious and the unconscious, and fundamentally as a liberation 
of, and even perhaps from, the self. Here, as well as gaining a sense of a personal 
commitment to values, we are able to theorize a mind capable of grasping and realizing 
the liberatory aspects of dreams, the marvellous, of chance and the phantasmagoric, of 
the potential within humanity to participate within a creative intoxication with life. In 
addition, we are able to theorize how, by using such potentialities, the meaning of our 
suffering might be better confronted, and a realization of our fundamental connection to 
all humanity places the issue of a creative freedom at the centre of an ethics. This ethics 
can indeed be “a memory of the future: a community of those without community” . 190
188 Agnes Heller, An Ethics o f Personality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 2.
189 Heller refers to Lukäcs’s plan to write a book entitled Goethe’s Lebensfuehrung (Goethe’s Conduct o f  
Life ) as part o f his returning to an ‘ethics o f personality’. See Heller, An Ethics o f  Personality, p. 15.
190 Zanini, “Weak Thought between Being and Difference”, p. 57.
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Such consequences immediately place us at the heart of the problem of ideology: 
For such an ethos of the imagination, whose purpose is an emancipated humanity, 
requires the confrontation that is one’s own wrestle for truth, which is, at the same time, a 
knowledge of self-transcendence. As we have theorized, it is precisely within ideology 
that such a confrontation takes place. Ideology repeatedly presents to us levels of reality 
(which we may or may not then perceive) in which the unattached self is the unfinished 
reality upon which subjective and objective realities are painted, and the more partial and 
provisional realities are those of the individual who suffers and fails to fully understand 
the relationship of form and emptiness. Nietzsche expresses this somewhat obliquely 
with the concepts of ‘depth’ and ‘shallowness’ to explain that one’s own truth speaks as 
that of a sovereign individual when one finds within oneself the right to make promises. 
The deep self which one must find is here identified completely with a practical sense of 
one’s own destiny, untrammelled and undeterred by the needs and illusions of any other. 
This, as we have argued, is a difficult and ultimately undesirable outcome of the pursuit 
of meaning of the nature of suffering and only allows us to partly see the relationship 
between freedom and the ideological. We will suggest instead the necessity of a sense of 
a transcendental freedom, a self-transcendence that recognizes the basic interdependence 
of all phenomena and thus the lack of the inherent existence of each separate 
phenomenon (including that of the individual without relation to another) for an ethics of 
emancipation. The Nietzschean and Heideggerian tendency to understand being as 
deferral, as remembrance rather than presence, reveals its necessary limitations with this: 
The problem of object and subject is not outside us but is a part of our being in the world. 
Only outside any dialectic are we likely to situate our truth, including our tragic truth, as 
belonging to an T  alone.
As we mentioned in the first chapter of the thesis, the paradoxical and yet 
ultimately nihilistic barbarism of modem social reality does not allow us to posit any 
wholly autonomous regulative model against which the ideological might be judged. 
After Auschwitz and Hiroshima and much continued barbarism since, we are forced to 
question the very basis of all our potential strivings, our poetic and our moral ideals. It is 
not simply that these ideals have failed us but that they have been inadequate in the face 
of the horrors created because they could never reside completely outside the 
contradictory, antagonistic perversions of this very world. Their inadequacy is in their 
abstraction, an abstraction persisted with even in the face of the most extreme forms of 
inhumanity, and, at the same time, deceptively subtle forms of commanding and obeying. 
Freedom means very little if it does not mean the freedom to refuse to ‘dance in our
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chains’. A ‘contentment with the dark, with the closed horizon’ limits us as human 
beings. The darkness needs to be for us an existence of meaning in which an “inner 
brightening” is part of being in existence in itself. 191 What is required is not a despairing 
pessimism about the compromised semblance of subjectivity left in the wake of 
violations of humanity, but, rather, a much stronger sense of those properties of the self 
which radically surpass the givenness of the self -  particularly those which offer a 
fundamental opposition to the basic egoism of greed, hatred and self-delusion. We need 
today the ‘extravagant task’ of a confrontation with knowledge of ourselves and our 
world. A moral philosophy becomes merely soporific if it does not embrace the 
‘dangerous, insidious and the seductive’ . 192 And this we are claiming is best found in the 
unfinished possibilities of the seifs  insinuation into the content of the imagination.
It is in this context that we can see that the idea of an external counter-point to 
ideology, an abstract ethics or ideal by which the presence of domination and repression 
can be felt, makes little sense. The age of our immersion within the moral paradox of our 
own making is most certainly upon us. Our possibilities are involved within the shabby 
and yet anticipatory culture we live out. It is contemporary ideology, or what Zanini calls 
‘weak or soft thought’, that warns us against placing the subject or any metaphysics at the 
centre of a philosophy; it cautions us against accepting the idea of ‘the human We’ and its 
narrative of a quest for self knowledge, overcoming and connectedness. 193 In such 
thought we are assured that thinking being is remembrance rather than presence. This 
contemporary version of ontological difference denies much that a cultural heritage of 
need and mystery, loss and unity entitles us to: it does so, however, on the basis of a 
superficially surprising account of domination -  there is a definite ‘metaphysical clarity’ 
explaining the existence of domination because, quite straightforwardly, domination 
clearly exists. 194 It is, of course, the denial of domination, its disavowal, its desperate, 
palinodial refiguring and embellishment that the contemporary theory of difference 
ascribes to the ideological and therefore is a narrative from which it distances itself. The 
character of this domination is undoubtedly explicit, unavoidable and pervasive -  let us 
not underestimate this but let us not mistake its obviousness, an obviousness that requires 
very little of the theory that notes it, for any kind of account of contemporary social life.
191 Bloch, The Spirit o f  Utopia, p. 192.
192 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, pars. 226, 228, 230.
193 Zanini, “Weak Thought between Being and Difference”, p. 55.
194 Ibid.
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By emphasizing the diversity that greets this domination such theory achieves a sleight of 
hand that an old-fashioned false consciousness thesis could only wish for: The diversity 
that is claimed within this paradigm is nonetheless always of a particular type in relation 
to domination -  it is an absolute alienation, a submissive, weak, unthinking sameness in 
the guise of diversity. History here has reached an end.
We have noted where the real condition of a citadel culture achieves its greatest 
success is where it insists upon just such an end of both possibility and an ontology of 
power. A critique of this culture requires an ethics or moral philosophy that suggests our 
engagement within a humanum in nature, a sense of the inherent interrelatedness of 
people and all phenomena, to show the vital connection between spirit and nature, 
without prescribing any necessary limitation to such an ethics. This does not mean that 
we cannot have some sense of the qualities one needs to cultivate in order to make more 
likely a path to self-transcendence. We have already seen that, at a superficial level, 
ideology represents endless varieties of forms of distraction, the lack of clarity and self- 
delusion which make of self-transcendence a difficult and confusing path. At a deeper 
level we have theorized the presence of a dialectical relation between the attempt to 
impose and maintain types of ignorance and distraction (including by oneself) and, at the 
same time, yearnings for the inner self to know itself through a propulsion outward to its 
interconnectedness and impermanence.
In a world of unfreedom we are calculating slaves. The leap from necessity into 
freedom, which we can see as an awakening of meaning, means leaving behind those 
ideals, rules and ‘truths’ which remain external to the self. It is precisely such truths that, 
as Nietzsche argues, bore such beautiful names “that one could thenceforth venture to be 
inhuman with a good conscience (to bum Jews, heretics and good books and exterminate 
entire higher cultures such as those of Peru and Mexico) ” . 195 This too was Marx’s 
criticism of respect for the “name of freedom” where “only its actual implementation was 
prevented” . 196 It is, as we mentioned earlier, the much more personal questions of truth 
which need to be posed: As it is put by Nietzsche, and we will again quote, “What am I 
really doing? And why am /  doing it?”. An understanding of this requires a range of 
personal considerations which we might view under the rubric of an ethos of the 
imagination. None of this can come about through an imagination girded by the 
acquisition of profits and what Bloch terms “the mis-appropriation of values which only
195 Nietzsche, Daybreak, pars. 204, p. 123.
196 Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire,\>. 160.
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laugh on one side of their face” -  this ‘lonely world of illusion’ needs to be actively 
confronted. A world of greed is one of the separation between soul and deed, as Lukäcs 
told us, and one of the loss of a spiritual essence and the divestiture of one’s capacity, as 
Marx pointed out: But, more than this, it is a world of limitless, gargantuan, sometimes 
momentarily satiated but more usually embittered craving, an existence plagued by the 
hungry ghosts of unsatisfactoriness, of the constant longing for things to be somehow 
other than they are. The world of ideological tension and contradiction suggests the 
presence of the means for, if not always the realization of, an anticipatory consciousness. 
What then is it about ourselves and our relation to our place in society that we need to 
address?
We have at several intervals throughout the thesis viewed the complex problem of 
needs. We have theorized the presence of a state of inventiveness in relation to these 
needs that makes of many of our struggles for meaning a richly interwoven web of 
yearnings, doubts and self-deception. At the centre of this intricacy is what Benjamin 
calls, “that most terrible drug -  ourselves -  which we take in solitude” . 197 A society of 
fear and seemingly limitless commodification merely amplifies this solitude: But it also 
enables us to discover new resources with which to confront our fear. To what extent 
ideology achieves its purpose in attempting to convince of a particular meaning or to 
provide a particular justification is constantly placed under reassessment by this wrestle 
with a knowledge with oneself and one’s world which the existence of ideology helps to 
provoke. We might then acknowledge that ideology represents a wrestle for truth, as we 
stated at the outset of the thesis, but we need to know more of the conditbns under which 
this confrontation takes place if we are to see the significance of the imagination as a part 
of an ethical commitment to life.
Neither the self nor our social world is in any sense a neutral player in this struggle. 
We exist in a state of ‘a freedom still enmeshed in servitude’, a condition which has 
numerous consequences for our ability to perceive and attribute meaning to our thoughts 
and actions. Nietzsche refers to the need to liberate ‘that deepest self, the self which has 
been “buried and grown silent under a constant compulsion to listen to other selves” : 198 
But how are we to know this ‘deepest self? Certainly some discernment in relation to 
the compulsions creating the chatter of competing selves is required. We see in falseness 
the artificiality of various voices. But the problem of ideology is precisely the problem of
197 Benjamin, One-Way Street, p. 237.
198 Nietzsche, “Human All Too Human”, Ecce Homo, par.4. p. 93.
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a contention of selves, each competing for supremacy and the right to determine actions 
and reflection. The wrestle for truth is then a sensual, experiential play of understanding 
and interpretation, the quest for meaning as well as accidental insight. Because it 
involves the imagination its lack of fixedness is always available to us, even as a potential 
to be accessed in accordance with our efforts and intentions. Thus, whilst the reality of 
an ideological world is perfectly real, as Althusser has helped us to see, its illusoriness is 
an illusion which we can come to know. Acknowledging that different levels of reality 
exist and can exist simultaneously, and that we can come to understand this process, is 
basic to a critique of ideology. Shifting ideology away from a solely representational 
notion of truth to a sense of the presence of levels of reality allows us to see both the 
constantly changing and impermanent nature of our experience and to grant some ideal 
beyond ourselves (beyond the illusions that we as individuals are independent, separate 
beings of inherent existence) that makes sense of our suffering. By experiencing what we 
habitually take to be an external reality we continue to be vulnerable to the controlling, 
distracting and deluding aspects of the ideological. Recognizing the processes by which 
this takes place and seeing our own dependence within conditions that bring about 
illusion is an awareness of the dialectical and conditional nature of experience.
What this dimension of experience shows us is that a genuinely creative subjective 
activity -  which we are describing as ‘imagination’ -  is a conjunction of knowledge and 
experience and can include within it an ethical commitment to life. What we are 
suggesting is a theorisation that supposes a non-dominating knowledge and a 
consciousness that does not so much re-enact the internal dynamics of the object but 
creates something anew. This means that there is a degree of spontaneity in the 
experience but not necessarily any type of naivety in which might be substituted illusion 
with a genuine amazement. An authenticity of experience does not necessarily need to 
follow or imitate the authenticity of an object itself, as Adorno, for example, claims it 
must in his concept of ‘exact imagination’ (exakte Phantasie) . 199 A creative imagination 
is not only a decisive change in the experiencing subject herself but an alteration of the 
distance from the object the subject would otherwise experience. In ideology, as we have 
seen, the authenticity of the subject is compromised by the inauthenticity of the 
experience of the object, and it largely by the way of critique that any distancing of the 
subject from the object can be addressed. But even in this state of subjective 
inauthenticity that the ideological requires there can still be traces (Spuren), as Bloch
199 Theodor W. Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy”, Telos no. 31 (Spring, 1977): pp. 120-133.
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would say, creative experience in which the imaginative yearnings of humanity are 
congealed in thought. Objects do not interpret themselves, and even in their sensuous 
non-sensuousness, they cannot prescribe a conceptual configuration through which their 
meaning would be perfectly clear. This requires the awakening of what it is dreaming 
within the object, and such an awakening needs a creative consciousness and 
imagination. This is nowhere more obviously the case than in the need to imagine the 
other as oneself.
Such a fundamental questioning of the nature of ideology and the role of its critique 
leads us to, or should suggest, a basic re-evaluation of the philosophical concept of 
ideology itself. It has been made clear that the sort of renewed theorization of ideology 
we are putting forward requires a far broader sense of what ideology is than has more 
usually been considered. The constriction of the meaning and emancipatory value 
engendered by the term as we encountered in the first chapter of the thesis and in some 
ways saw also in the more sophisticated conceptualizations of the radical theory of 
Lukäcs and Althusser, need not be the case. We have argued that ideology needs to be 
understood as a dialectical process involving a complex interplay between subject and 
object. Whilst ideology represents the myriad forms of distraction and self-delusion a 
commodified, unfree society is able to conjure, it is also indicative of a wrestle with a 
knowledge with oneself and one’s conditions. What ideology means, then, is only clear 
to us when viewed in this dialectical sense.
We need concepts explaining these processes in relation to ideology that are able to 
theorize this dialectical relation between the imposition of types of distraction by both the 
self and by others and that are able, at the same time, to account for the capacities of the 
inner self to know herself through a sense of her relation to herself and her world. Marx 
has provided us with the wonderfully provocative idea that we as subjects in relation to 
ideology are calculating slaves. We need to find concepts conveying a similar sort of 
dialectical interrelation for other aspects of the existence of ideology. It might be that we 
can turn to aspects of the philosophical heritage that has dealt more directly with a vision 
of an emancipated humanity and then add to this in order to take into account the 
presence of the phenomena of ideology as it is currently experienced. Most basically 
what are required are concepts that deal with the general problem of the wrestle for truth 
within conditions of self-delusion and distraction.200 Such concepts would be able to
200 For example, this sort of concept we have indicated as necessary has much in common with ideas found 
in the texts of The Philokalia written in Greek between the fourth to the fifteenth centuries, in which
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explain not only the contradictory realities in which the ideological is engaged but situate 
within this a sense of a liberation from ideology. The term ‘ideology critique’ in Western 
philosophy suggests more a mere attack upon ideology than its transformation and this in 
a philosophical sense indicates one limitation with such critique for a contemporary 
radical approach.
We have mentioned the importance of guiding images to a sense of presentiment 
within the ideological that can provide a type of self-consciousness to the thoughts and 
actions in which humanity is engaged. This, we have suggested, can be gained through 
certain ideas we construct in finding an explanation for our being in the world, but also 
for a sense of what we would like to become. The contradictory manifestations of the 
ideological can indicate the presence of such reflection, particularly where it imposes 
some obligation upon us to respond to the non-egotistical, to the needs of others for 
whom we possess no controlling power. In this way the promise that the Zarathustrian 
self holds out is not enough to act as a guiding image. Being able to ‘bite the head of the 
snake that grips us’ is important, and is perhaps in this sense a first step in the direction of 
an empowered self. At the very least it offers an indication that the self is capable of 
recognizing the power that confronts her. But so too is it ultimately an erasure of 
otherness, a sense that the self is a sufficiency within this life we experience. This might 
have suited Nietzsche’s fm-de-siecle age where the disintegration of obligation and duty 
to others and more broadly the world was not yet complete. But today we need guiding 
images that are commensurable with the challenges that confront us. In the twenty first 
century we require the return of a sense of an obligation to the other and thus images 
which capture the simplicity of this within the complexity of the world we face.
In bringing together a broad, critical conceptualization of ideology with an ethos of 
the imagination we are able to consider one of the basic questions in relation to ideology
various concepts are used to account for the problem of being. Initially, for example, we might see the 
existence of ideology in terms of plani - the idea of illusion and beguilement that results in a ‘wandering 
away’ and an acceptance of a mirage which is mistaken for truth. We might also consider in relation to this 
the concept of prolipsis - the idea of prepossession or the involuntary presence of former failures and 
illusions in the memory, which, through force of habit, become difficult to resist. See, The Philokalia: The 
Complete Text, compiled by St. Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain and St. Makarios of Corinth, trans. G. E. 
H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard and Kallistos Ware, 4 vols. (London: Faber & Faber, 1981). It is indeed 
interesting to note that in the early Greek orthodox writings that, as well as terms existing that prefigure the 
concept of ideology, there are concepts which prefigure the liberation from ideology. In The Philokalia 
there are the concepts of diakrisis - the ability to discriminate between types of thought so as not to be held 
captive by illusory appearances, and nipsis - a type of watchfulness or attentiveness which enables one not 
to be beguiled.
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-  that of what humanity is and what the values are we are able to bring to the reality of 
human existence, particularly to any such existence as suffering. We have already 
considered the importance of the condition of ‘not-yet’, of the presence of an anticipatory 
consciousness that is fundamental to a sense of what humanity both is and can be. 
Bloch’s analysis of this consciousness enables us to ponder the critical issue of a 
humanity defined by hope, by a sense that despite our suffering we can hope “far 
afield” . 201 This type of hope is a path that can perhaps be chosen, it is not any type of 
necessity. But this hope tends repeatedly to engage us because we are incomplete within 
ourselves; if we were already in possession of a type of perfection then hope would not 
arise. Harvey Cox explains this thus: “To be human is to be on the way to something 
else” . 202 If we do not always act as if we know why it is we live, we are still capable of 
encompassing, by way of an acknowledgement of our interconnectedness, “even the 
beyond that is not yet”. This makes of our engagement with ideology a particularly 
creative and not simply reactive enterprise. In addition, Bloch draws our attention to 
what he terms a period of ‘Zeitwende’, a time in which the way we live can present itself, 
even if only momentarily, very clearly to us. We might today see such an opportunity, 
this turning point, as a period of potential tuming-in upon itself, where the darkness 
shrouding our deeds is what we are likely to encounter more than any type of self- 
realization: But this is precisely Bloch’s point -  that periods of extreme difficulty, 
darkness and seemingly endlessly newly made forms of distraction are periods of intense 
longing, even if this hunger goes unacknowledged as that which it actually is. It is an evil 
we are capable of radicalizing, as Nietzsche would argue. This is the positive basis for a 
renewed critique of ideology and subjectivity -  a foundation upon which we can then 
develop a critical ethics. It is hoped that this thesis has contributed to a shift in this 
direction for radical philosophy. Let us now conclude by re-engaging with the issues we 
have encountered in the thesis in relation to the critique we have developed in this 
chapter.
201 Ernst Bloch, Man on his Own: Essays in the Philosophy o f Religion, trans. E.B. Asliton (New York: 
Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 69.
Harvey Cox, Foreword, in Bloch, Man on his Own, p. 8.202
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Conclusion
This final chapter of the thesis has presented in outline a theorization of ideology 
that attempts to account for the contemporary problem of subjectivity and the dialectic of 
freedom and control. We have here put forward a case for an ethico-philosophical 
underpinning to a critique of ideology and have argued specifically for the need of an 
ontology that addresses these issues. This I have termed an ‘ ethos of the imagination’ 
because it enables us to situate the liberatory aspects of the imagination within an 
emancipatory ethics. A sense of a critical engagement with ideology and any liberation 
from the self requires not only some sort of a personal commitment to values but a view 
of the creative possibilities which provide us with the scope to examine the meaning of 
our suffering. We have been able to pose this issue of an ethos of the imagination 
because we have grounded our sense of a dialectic between ideology and presentiment in 
what we take to be some of the most important features of contemporary social life- our 
participation within a commodified existence and our struggle for meaning as posited 
within the conscious and the unconscious and the relation between them.
Such a grounding in an emancipatory ethics is not so much a means by which the 
problem of ideology might be definitively resolved -  as we mentioned at the outset of the 
thesis ideology remains one of the most contested of concepts for philosophy precisely 
because its meaning and uses are frequently reformulated and reinterpreted. This is the 
case because, at least to some degree, ideology as the construction of meaning is 
constantly open to new and varied interpretation. Understanding this state of contestation 
of meaning is important, but to actually shift an analysis of ideology beyond a sense only 
of its variability we need to view ideology and the contestation of meaning in which it 
takes place as indicative of the problem of cultural inheritance. Here we have isolated the 
particular problem of unfreedom and the struggle for meaning and self-transcendence 
which takes place in relation to unfreedom. It is in this context that an emancipatory 
ethics is of critical importance to both a fuller understanding of the contradictory nature 
of ideology itself and to the development of its critique.
' In this last section of this chapter we have given form to a number of central 
issues with which we have dealt here and elsewhere throughout the thesis. We have 
theorized most centrally the importance of an ethos of the imagination as the basis for any
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approach to the critique of ideology. Without any such philosophical basis we are not 
able to pose the most basic questions that ideology presents us with -  the meaning of 
humanity’s suffering and the place of a subjectivity within such a condition. Further to 
this we have posed the question of what kind of elementary, sensual experience ideology 
entails and have suggested the dialectical nature of our experience of an emancipatory 
knowledge, which instead of rendering fetishized, invented realities cannot do otherwise 
than reveal (whether or not it is perceived as such) more obviously its denial of a realm of 
consciously produced freedom. We have, in other words, suggested that a theory of 
ideology is a theory of experience rather than merely an abstraction of reflection. It does 
not suppose that we only need to uncover what has been suppressed. Meaning needs to 
be released from illusion as a potential to be transformed. Ideology may function in 
particular ways for particular periods but it is not a fixed, external power by which the 
self is controlled. It is as much an expression of the realm of necessity as it is the 
possibility of freedom; as much a part of a cultural heritage as it is reflective of what is 
incidental and unpredictable and thus worth constructing for the times in which we live.
In viewing this dialectical or liberatory aspect of the experience of ideology we 
have questioned the more static notions of truth and falsity, subject and object with which 
ideology and its critique have been associated. We have theorized the presence of levels 
of reality in order to view the fundamental importance of impermanence within everyday 
life. We have focused upon the idea of the self in relation to one’s communal being to 
show that our experience includes a sense of a future-oriented otherness and surreality 
beyond the limitations of our current suffering. Here we have raised the difficult issue of 
how we might theorize the contradictory and multi-dimensional aspects of the experience 
of ideology for a sense of the transformation of the self. Ideology leaves traces of both 
self-constraint and freedom, and, in doing so, conditions the self in a variety of 
contradictory and paradoxical ways. We addressed some of these problems by first 
situating the critique of ideology within a broader ethical philosophy and then by 
suggesting ways in which our basic sense of the ideological might itself be transformed 
by concepts which are able to take into account the dialectical process of experience and 
presentiment. We will now attempt to assess what we have achieved in the thesis as a 
whole and revisit the issue of where this leaves a contemporary critique of ideology.
CONCLUSION
In the Introduction to this thesis, we began by posing some issues we have 
taken to be vital to an understanding of ideology. These concerns we summarized 
with Goethe’s questioning as to why we choose to present to ourselves an objective 
confinement as something somehow other than it is. Why do we paint our prison- 
walls, substituting our reality and indeed perhaps any realization of our predicament, 
with a form relieved by shadows, by empty fantasies? This tendency of human 
existence we have understood in terms of the playing out of the strange paradox of an 
involuntary and yet also a voluntary servitude. We possess the capacity, and indeed 
deep yearning, for the realization of freedom, a freedom that consists in humanity 
being the subject of its own becoming, and yet, almost incomprehensibly, we are 
ineluctably drawn into a world of our own enslavement.
In this thesis we have addressed this difficulty and its plangent, unavoidable 
reverberations in three major ways. Firstly we have theorized ideology as a problem 
of a contradictory reconciliation of the subject with her existence within conditions of 
unfreedom. With this we have suggested that the power of the ideological rests in 
severing the imagining self from an awareness of the unfulfilled need that propels an 
enslaved life. At the same time, we have argued that these very conditions of a 
questing self, a disregarding enslavement and a constant swollen hunger are the basis 
for significant incursions into whatever hold the ideological might possess. It is with 
this that we have characterized the ideological, as it exists within conditions of 
unfreedom, as a fundamentally contradictory relation. Secondly, we have explored a 
theoretical basis of the disquietude that arises within an existence grounded in 
unfreedom. Here we have developed a theorization of existence that attempts to 
explain one aspect of the ontological problem -  that of how subjectivity is constituted 
within the world of existence. For this we have examined the complex relation of 
subject and object and their mediations. With this theorization we have been able to 
reclaim what is of importance within a dialectical approach to the place of the self 
within the world for an emancipatory critique. The self, we have argued, is a dynamic 
part of the conditions in which she exists and through which she is able to engage. 
Such an investigation of the theoretical parameters of the scission of being in thought 
and deed, inner and outer, self and other necessarily provokes the question of what 
existence itself might mean. This question is the point we have arrived at towards the 
close of the thesis. With the fundamental question of being as becoming in mind, we 
have then, thirdly, outlined a theorization of an ethos of the imagination. This concept
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has allowed us to ask the question of the place of being in existence from the 
perspective of a thorough critique of conditions of unfreedom, including those 
ideological conditions in which a compromised engagement with life is entailed. 
This, we have argued, is a substantial way in which not merely the issue of the ethical 
relation one has to life might be posed, but is a way in which we can situate the 
vitality and openness of the imaginative, creative impulse that so invigorates the vast 
possibility that is the human condition.
Let us then briefly reconsider the terrain we have traversed in the thesis and 
the issue of where this leaves a contemporary critique of ideology. In Part One of the 
thesis, we first approached the problem of a freedom enmeshed in servitude by 
suggesting that the traditional view of ideology has been to cast into suspicion certain 
ideas and practices which lend too much credence to an unwanted reality. These ideas 
are the deceptive chimera, the lies and conceits, we convince ourselves of rather than 
instead facing the substance of our imprisoned existence. This approach can be seen 
as thereby making of particular ideas, for which no present reality or a critical 
distance might readily be found, a false, distorted, unjustified or dubiously integrated 
presence in the world. We have instead suggested that ideology and its critique be 
viewed in terms of a struggle for meaning that takes place within conditions of 
unfreedom.
In this sense, there is no simple counterposition between ideological and other 
ideas, but instead contention over finding or attributing to existence a sense of the 
world for which both the self and the reality in which she exists are somehow at 
variance. We cannot proceed, as much radical theory once did, by claiming that today 
“ideology means society as appearance”1, nor can we carry out a reconversion of this, 
as some post-modernist theory has done, by seeing all reality as simulacra and thus as 
the attainment of the end of ideology. 2 The ideological emerges within conditions in 
which a failure to fully grasp the relation between oneself and one’s world, one’s 
thought and one’s deed, takes place. Thus, theoretically, ideology might be the fate of 
any idea, just as any idea might resolutely fall outside the purview of the ideological. 
It is certainly not the case that either the ideological is all or that nothing is ever the 
ideological. Neither one of these ways of viewing ideology helps us to understand 
contemporary antinomies of rule and freedom, abstract and concrete, self and other.
1 Theodor W. Adorno, Prisms, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 
1986), p. 31.
2 Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant (London: Sage, 1993), p. 
2 .
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By way of contrast, the way of viewing ideology I have outlined shifts the 
problem ideas and practices have to existence from some largely externalized 
abstraction of reality back to the creative capacities of the self and the particular 
conditions of unfreedom that she experiences. It is then able to consider points of 
resonance, where they occur, and the areas of the non-fashioned, the intentionless and 
the unpredictable in relation to the complexity of conditioned events in which subject 
and object interact. This is the first step in a fundamentally altered view of the 
usefulness of ideology critique. It is a shift from an epistemological or negative 
critique of the ideological to an ontological critique. This sort of critique allows us to 
pose the question of the sort of unfreedom humanity experiences and what kind of 
possibility and anticipation of a different future is expressed in relation to a seemingly 
captured present. It also prompts us to turn questions involving humanity’s 
unfreedom towards the relation the self has to this unfreedom. It is only on such a 
basis that we might have any sense of how humanity can enter into community as a 
“community of others” . 3 This whole complex area of subjectivity is what we have 
attempted to open within the first part of the thesis.
Much of Part Two of the thesis has taken us through some crucial aspects of 
why modernity has witnessed the arrival of a contemporary subjectivity as a whittling 
away of the independence of the subject, as the roily uncertainty of a sense of place in 
the world, and, most particularly, as the process of the subject becoming object, in 
which even the imagination itself has become imprisoned in an objective inevitability. 
These problems of modernity we have viewed from a variety of thematic perspectives 
- that of certain malaises of unfreedom that have, in the modem period, asserted 
themselves deeply and seemingly ubiquitously into the construction of everyday life. 
Here we have highlighted three distinct and yet interrelated problems -  the 
pervasiveness of a spectacularized commodification and a generalized disenchantment 
that has resulted in a jagged, uncertain fracturing within the relation the subject has 
with her world; the emergence of both conscious and unconscious forms of a 
psychology of control as both outer and inner experience; and the development of 
needs humanity has invented in order to contend with the reality it has created and to 
which it has become its calculating slave. In each case, we have pursued these themes 
in relation to a relevant critical literature in the hope of bringing fresh insight into 
what continue to be persistently engaging ideas concerning our theoretical 
understanding of the ideological.
3 Augusto Illuminati, “Unrepresentable Citizenship”, trans. Paul Colilli, in Radical Thought in Italy: A 
Potential Politics, eds. Paolo Vimo and Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 
1996), p. 173.
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As we have seen, most radical critiques of ideology have centred their cultural 
criticism away from the idea of thought as independent of life and towards an 
understanding of reality as composed of dominating ideas and practices. In this way 
such critiques have in many ways distanced themselves from a view of ideology as 
the ideas of a ruling class or power that necessarily distorts perception, inverts truth 
and creates false consciousness. At the same time it is not always apparent quite how 
the critique of ideology is situated within the cultural heritage it ostensibly addresses. 
Both Lukäcs and Althusser reject a view of ideology as false consciousness; Lukäcs 
by arguing that ideology is a socially necessary illusion, an objective fetishism of 
reality, and Althusser by claiming that ideology is the lived relation between people 
and their world, again as a type of necessary illusion. We have gained much from 
these incisive critiques of reified thought and unconscious control. But despite an 
implicit critique of the idea of false consciousness in both theories, a critique which 
places an emphasis upon that which is objectively necessary within ideological 
reality, there remains a distinct sense in which ideology is construed as a necessary 
and at the same time a false consciousness/unconsciousness. The consequence of this 
way of viewing ideology is that a rather one-dimensional, objectivist view of the 
ideological is presented. There is thus no real treatment of the limitations, failures or 
unintended consequences of ideology, nor any sense of the antagonism, contradiction 
and refusal which, as we have suggested, marks the form of ideology itself.
We have proceeded in the thesis by way of developing a thorough analysis of 
those aspects of the critique of ideology that fail to address the significance of a 
radical ontology, but have done so in such a way so as to preserve the very real 
importance of the thematic concerns of much radical ideology critique. Lukäcs makes 
us completely aware of the sheer enormity of the consequences of the 
commodification of life -  a definite and yet often unrecognized fracturing of subject 
and object that we so need to deeply appreciate. Althusser’s suggestions too, as to 
why a state of unfreedom is imposed upon us, are sometimes telling: But how and 
why we choose to participate in the affliction of ideology is otherwise left 
unanswered. Perhaps, in very Althusserian terms, it is because we are not yet able to 
pose the question of the subjective conditions of our own unfreedom: Or, more 
tellingly still, might it not be the conditions of our freedom - the very emancipation 
that we suppose as humanity’s right which we find so difficult to give form and 
meaning to -  is that which we find a challenge indeed to even imagine? In 
Althusser’s work, ideological interpellation controls even before the illusion of reality 
becomes manifest within the subject: There is, as well as a material determination, a 
pre-determination of those conditions which bind the subject to her subjection. The 
dialectic exists in a wizened form - the roots of the necessity of causality wind
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themselves so tightly around objective existence that the strangulation of the subject 
can always be assured. In fleeting moments we sense the difficulty which Althusser 
captures in his recognition of the price to be paid for the possibility of some sort of 
consciousness within the imposition of unwanted and yet then ideologically 
rationalized conditions. With his sense of a ‘deliberate unconscious’ Althusser sees 
the ‘delay’ in the dialectic, its dialectical ‘non-dialecticity’ at times in which the myth 
of consciousness barricades itself from its real conditions. Ideology thus helps reduce 
interrelationships to the “dialectic of the void”, its alibis and sublimations producing a 
‘foreign consciousness’ which need never contradict its own conditions.4 Althusser’s 
argument for a necessary rupture to recognize the nothingness of a consciousness 
sheltered from the world, is a definite engagement at least with, although not within, 
ideology.
Opening up the field of the unconscious to ideology offers enormous potential 
for a more nuanced account of how ideas form and congeal in the psyche, but 
removing a conscious subject from this -  even a merely sometime conscious one -  
subtracts much value from such a theorization. For Althusser, the unconscious is the 
cluttered cupboard of fear and submission whose contents spill out and dominate the 
consciousness, paralyzing any potential interaction. For a time - and yet oddly not the 
high point of Althusser’s time - this theorization of the eternal return of the 
ideological same resonated with a deeply felt defeat. The subject seemed genuinely to 
have lost her way in attempts to take on the fear with which an increasingly 
aggressively militarized, invasively paranoid, mindlessly consumerist and socially and 
ecologically destructive century engulfed humanity.
Ultimately both Lukäcs and Althusser display an ideological world only ever 
commensurate with its dreamless material basis. The subject is robbed of her ability 
to detect the disparate within her ideological reality. There is no tendency within 
ideology such that the existence of the ideological suggests equally the existence of a 
constricted or abandoned freedom. Ideology hovers in wait for even the most 
suspecting subject, but no contradiction within ideology is conceptualized in this 
process as a counter to this state of forced acceptance. We saw in both Lukäcs and 
Althusser the development of a theorization in incipient form of what it is that is 
ignored when the reifications of a petrified, static world are taken to be the totality of 
that world: But we noted too how this theorization ultimately turned upon an 
incomplete and externalized treatment of subjectivity.
4 Althusser, “The ‘Piccolo Teatro’: Bertolazzi and Brecht”, p. 140.
586 Ideology Critique and A Philosophy of Freedom
The emphasis in Marx’s work I have taken to be most crucial to his examination 
of the ideological is that of a dialectic of freedom and unfreedom. It is in this 
dialectic that we saw Marx’s reason for highlighting ideology in relation to a critique 
of social life. In this we uncovered how Marx theorizes contradictory realities. In 
particular, we interpreted Marx’s understanding of ideology as a form of, what I term, 
‘inventive need’. In the chapter dealing with Marx’s approach to the ideological we 
have seen that a theorization capable of understanding the variable conditions under 
which the processes of mystification and demystification take place is better able to 
capture the dialectic through which ideology is realized. This gives us, however, only 
a certain sense of how ideology functions. Marx situates ideological processes within 
a complex interrelationship between subjective desire and material constraint and, as 
Kofrnan has pointed out, uses the metaphor of sublimation to describe these elements.5 
This interrelationship frequently makes of people ‘ever-calculating slaves’ as they 
attempt to contend with their own imagined desires and the material needs of the 
system of which they are a part. Marx prompts us to see the compromise of ideals 
that base, material interest ultimately involves. Societies that rely upon command and 
the ultimate dissatisfaction of the capacity to consume result in a contradictory form 
of enslavement to insatiable desires. What develops is ‘an apparent satisfaction of 
need’ - an ideological state of prosaic reality and superficial mystification in which an 
ebbing of consciousness is readily accommodated. What is presented is an 
interesting, if too one-sided, depiction of ideology as a “paradoxical law of 
incorporation”, as Derrida refers to Marx’s theorization of spectres; 6 paradoxical most 
certainly in its understanding of process but nonetheless bound by categories whose 
existence as one of tension within the relation of subject and object is not always 
apparent.
This causes us to question the role of the individual and humanity generally in 
the impoverishment of life. Marx provides a detailed analysis of alienation and gives 
us in his remarkable examination of spirituality and an engaged humanity a definite 
sense of being as becoming, as being fundamentally concerned with freedom, but his 
examination of the workings of the human psyche remains in many ways 
underdeveloped. We are left assured of the problem of dehumanization and of a 
reified, ideological world but uncertain as to what the ‘spiritual and physical poverty’ 
that capitalism produces can result in, even once a consciousness of such poverty has 
developed. His dialectical approach to the question of being has, however, alerted us 
to the relation between subject and object in conditions of unfreedom, an unfreedom
5 Kofman, Camera Obscura o f Ideology, p. 11.
6 Derrida, Specters ofMairx., p. 127.
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which undoubtedly becomes manifest in as many uncertainties as conditioned 
experiences and determinations. The uncertainty here is of course in imagining what 
inner resources are retained by the self in the wake of the ravages of an alienated life. 
It is this we must begin to theorize if we are to develop a contemporary critique of 
subjectivity. Although to different degrees and thus with divergent outcomes, 
ultimately it is the case that all three radical theorists we have considered tend towards 
outlining something of the partial conditionality of objective possibility rather than 
subjective, mediated hope. It is then the latter we must seek to understand in relation 
to the estrangements of our present culture.
One of the most striking cultural features of the modem period, which has given 
rise to numerous studies, is what many theorists have understood as the process of the 
internalization of mystification, of forms of social control being achieved through 
self-control. Slaves, as Rousseau had told us, lose everything in their chains, “even 
the desire of escaping from them” . 7 This is the issue that engaged Lukäcs in his work 
on reification, as it had Marx before him, and that with which Althusser dealt with his 
concept of the interpellation of individuals as subjects. A real but mystified reality is 
central to understanding the function of ideology - for Lukäcs because it is a 
manifestation of a contradictory consciousness, and for Althusser because consent in 
the modem period always carries with it an edge of coercion. And coercion, as 
anyone who, like Althusser, had read and appreciated Machiavelli’s political insight 
would know, always invites rebellion. What we find is that this double-edged 
ideology of consent is taken to be merely the uninterrupted panlogical necessity of the 
contradictory reality of twentieth century capitalism. This was no doubt partly 
because the pattern of the potential for liberation giving way to illiberalism, reaction 
and fascism began to appear as the norm of modernity. The period that had dawned 
with the recognition that everyone bom in slavery is bom for slavery provided no real 
points of radical escape save that of an end to those very conditions giving rise to 
enslavement in the first place. It is this culture centred upon a radical concept of 
freedom that engaged the philosophers of ideology critique. Aspects of this culture 
are part of the reality with which we are today confronted and so we find elements of 
these modernist concerns of continuing relevance to a contemporary critique of 
ideology.
From each of the themes we have pursued we have derived an important sense 
of how the ideological operates as a particular renouncing of self within inner and 
outer, conscious and unconscious conditions of the contradictions of unfreedom.
7 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 5.
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Ideology is both a presence and absence of memory and future-oriented otherness 
existing often through the formation of fragments, of traces. This is the contradiction 
that the ideological represents. We paint our prison-walls for varying complex 
reasons but ultimately always because an anticipatory illumination of reality is 
available to us in the present. All realities possess horizons, and sometimes very real 
determinations press against any interaction and mediation we have with their 
immediacy, but the world itself and our actions within it are experimental processes. 
These processes generate and are given form to by many ideas that constitute being in 
the world. In this thesis we have considered the contradictory nature of the expression 
of fear and desire as responses to and creative engagements with the reality of a 
commodified, internalized existence. We have looked at some recent manifestations 
of the ideological in relation to these cultural archetypes in the examples of cynicism 
and sentimentality. Here we have seen a fragile harbouring of contradictory 
expressions of the subject in relation to the paradox of contemporary unfreedom. This 
particular voluntary servitude sacrifices a self-awareness for a frail connectedness, but 
in so doing, at the very least, reveals to us negative moments of a weak presentiment.
What this has prepared us for is a way in which we can begin to theorize a 
contemporary critique of ideology. It is this we have attempted in the final section of 
the thesis -  to indicate the terrain of such a critique and to suggest various ways in 
which this critique might be taken forward. What we have then presented with an 
outline of the ethos of the imagination is a way in which contradictions between 
thought and deed, subject and object, interior and exterior can be understood. To do 
this we have introduced a number of conceptual ideas. The existence of an 
anticipatory consciousness is theorized as a dialectical form in which we find 
existence not only as a constant struggle for meaning but also as a tendency or latency 
of symbols and practices that are both subjectively and objectively present in the 
world. This “nocturnal day where all real ciphers” are to be discovered is one of 
yearning, anticipation, concealment and delusion. 8 One way in which we can uncover 
aspects of these tendencies is by opening the ideological to such an analysis. Here we 
have considered the importance of understanding the surplus within much cultural 
experience through which it is possible to detect certain guiding images that situate 
the self in relation to creative possibility. It is this sense of the ideological that is lost 
or never really found in a view of ideology as deceptively or knowingly naturalized 
thought or false, distorted, externally imposed ideas.
8 Bloch, The Utopian Function o f Art, p. 140.
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The dynamic of ideology has much to do with the possibilities of the self 
within a world whose meaning is struggled for and contested. Bloch refers to the self­
encounter as the quest to know what we really are when this refuses to coincide with 
what we can actually experience. One stands near oneself, wanting to occupy oneself, 
but often experiences oneself trickling away. 9 It is then that we feel the need to 
escape the hardness of the world around us. It is then that one tries to ease things with 
embellishments. We live in a world that rests precariously upon a range of deliberate 
and unintentional unfreedoms. In this thesis we have characterized this world as the 
manifestation of a citadel culture. The citadel imposes and incorporates, but these 
processes are most often the emanations of our own unfulfilled need. We exist as 
calculating slaves within determinations and undecided possibilities of our own 
construction. Self-delusion and self-fictioning upon which the ideological rests arise 
in conditions of the unsettled content of the world -  a content that we currently 
experience in a range of unfreedoms and most particularly as an existence of a 
voluntary unfreedom. In this state, “the waking dream everywhere feeds on what has 
been missed” . 10 The freedom of the world and the freedom of the inner life are 
ultimately inseparable. To contend with an alienated existence, we need to create 
newly invigorated imaginative connections between the world and our inner life. As 
selves in the process of becoming we have to gain an awareness of the elucidated 
waking dream and express this process that is pending in concretely utopian terms. 
With this in mind, we have indicated throughout the final section of the thesis the 
need for a fundamental commitment to life in which one is able to express the dignity 
of humanity -  our freedom from exploitation, alienation, debasement and self- 
delusion -  in terms of an ability to see the other as oneself and thus in a way that 
expresses our most basic relation to life.
This is territory that we feel is opened up by the sort of critique of ideology 
that we have developed in this thesis. And what this makes possible is an assessment 
of both the strengths and limitations of such a critique to address these issues. As we 
made clear in the final chapter, ideology critique is best directed at bringing into view 
the problems of an unfree world - the antagonisms of alienation and reification of an 
unfree existence that we have considered as malaises of unfreedom. The ideological 
also indicates to us a world of unused dreams that can engage us at the level of an 
ethos of the imagination. A critique whose underlying assumption of a fundamental
9 Bloch, The Spirit of Utopia, p. 7.
10 Ernst Bloch, Verfremdungen (Frankfurt, 1964), p. 181, quoted in Stephen Eric Bronner, Of Critical 
Theory and its Theorists (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 66.
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antagonism is so well suited to an analysis of separation and inequality needs to more 
explicitly develop in the direction of a philosophy of an ethical commitment to life.
The decisive problem of our age is an inability to understand the consequences 
of unfreedom. It will not be possible to formulate an ethical and imaginative 
conception of the world without a thorough reassessment of the ideas and symbolic 
meanings that are generated in relation to the experience of unfreedom. For this we 
need a sense of the fragments, the thoughts and practices, through which the 
contradictory pull of freedom and unfreedom is expressed. But so too do we need a 
sense of our humanity in this: We are not external to these processes or an abstract, 
superficial part of their existence. We are basic to the consciousness of the life we 
develop. For this reason a critique of ideology must deal at a fundamental level with 
questions of being. It is humanity who further shrouds or who can instead illuminate 
the ‘darkness of the lived moment’. An awareness of the ruptures and disconnections 
between thought and deed, knowledge and reality, self and other, command and 
enslavement, in other words, an understanding of the aporias of realization and 
becoming that are basic to the ideological, is vital to an ethical engagement in the 
world.
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